CURRENT IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

Colonel G. A. JACOB

THE

VRAJAJIVAN INDOLOGICAL STUDIES

2

लौकिकन्यायाञ्जलिः

A HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS

CURRENT IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

By

Colonel G. A. Jocab

CHAUKHAMBA SANSKRIT PRATISHTHAN

DELHI

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Preface to First Edition.

It is with somewhat of a feeling of regret that I launch this third instalment of nyāyas; for I had hoped that they might be embodied in a revised re-issue of the first and second, so as to have the whole alphabetically arranged in one volume. There are not many, however, amongst India's two hundred and ninety millions, who take much interest in an effort of this kind, so we were compelled to follow a less ambitious course. To facilitate reference, I have prepared an index to the whole of the 430 nyāyas explained in the three volumes, and have written additional notes on several of those contained in the first and second. The latter will be found in the Superaddenda.

The present 'handful' differs materially from the two which preceded it in that it contains a goodly number of technical nyāyas; to wit, most of those representing important *adhikaraṇas* in the Mīmāṁsā system, as well as certain *paribhāṣās* from Patanjali and Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa. All of these appear to be quoted as nyāyas by writers on the various schools of philosophy; and I hope that such explanations of them as I have been able to give will prove of service to young students of these interesting works, and that the numerous references to the *Mahābhāṣya* will not be considered superfluous. That work, as presented in Benares editions, used to have a most forbidding aspect; for sūtra, vārtika, and bhāṣya, were crowded together, like sardines in a box, without numbers or any distinguishing marks to facilitate reference, and then this conglomerate was frequently (as in my own copy) sandwiched between two equally compressed portions of Kaiyaṭa! Dr. Kielhorn, however, has turned the impenetrable jungle into a well-laid-out park in which one can roam about with ease and comfort! Amongst other treasures, I was delighted to find there my two mango-tree nyāyas, namely, "आम्रसेकपितृतर्पण" and "आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे."

Now for a word regarding the title of these pamphlets. I am by no means satisfied with 'maxim' as the equivalent of nyāya, but adopted it because many great scholars had already done so. As to the naturalness of such a course on my part let two Indian poets speak:—"यद्यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदेवेतरो जनः। स यत्प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्तते." "एकस्य कर्म संवीक्ष्य करोत्यन्योऽपि गर्हितम्। गतानुगतिको लोको न लोकः पारमार्थिकः"॥ The nyāyas dealt with by me come under three distinct heads, and are either (1) Illustrations [dṛiṣṭānta], (2) Rules, or principles [as in the case of paribhāṣās &c.], or (3) Topics [adhikaraṇas, as in the case of the *kapinjalanyāya* and others from the same source]. It would, therefore, be better, in my opinion, to adopt the term nyāya itself, without translating it into English.

This would seem to be the most suitable place for a note on the *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, a work now in course of publication in *The Paṇḍit*, and from which I have occasionally quoted in the following pages. It has been stated by some Indian scholars of repute (beginning with Paṇḍit Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati, in 1871, in the preface to his edition of *Sānkhyatattvakaumudī*), and the statement is now stereotyped in the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the Government College, Calcutta, for the year 1900, that the Vācaspati who wrote the above work in refutation of S'ri Harsha's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, is identical with the celebrated philosopher Vācaspati Mis'ra. No reasons have been given for this assertion, and no evidence in its favour seems to be forthcoming from the work itself.

In a prefatory note by Mr. Arthur Venis, issued with the first part of the *Tārkikarakṣā* (in the Paṇḍit for Nov. 1899), he tells us that Vācaspati Mis'ra and Udayana were contemporaries, the *Nyāyasūcī* of the former having been written in 976 A.D., whilst the latter composed his *Lakṣaṇāvali* in 984–5. He adds that Udayana was "probably much the younger man as his *Paris'uddhi* is a commentary on Vacaspati's *Tātparya-*

ṭikā; and he may be supposed to have lived as late as 1050 A. D." Now, on page 13, the author of *Khaṇḍanoddhāra* quotes *Kusumānjali* i. 19, prefaced with the words "तदुक्तमाचार्यैः," and, on the next page, cites i. 10 of the same, with the words "आचार्या अप्याहुः." On page 45, he refers to *Ātmatattvaviveka* in the same way. Is it in the least likely that a renowned Ācārya like Vācaspati Mis'ra would quote a *very junior contemporary* in such language as that, even if he condescended to notice him at all? Again, on page 25, the author of the *Uddhāra* says "विस्तरस्तु तत्त्वालोके मयैवोक्त इतीहोपरम्यते," but the author of the *Bhāmatī* has never been credited with a treatise of that name, though we know of his *Tattvasamīkṣā*. Lastly, on page 35, there is a reference to विवरणमत, and, on page 40, to नरसिंहहरिशर्ममत, which could hardly carry us back to the tenth century.

It has been suggested by some that S'rī Harsha, too, was a contemporary of Vācaspati Mis'ra and Udayana,—but, since he quotes the former on page 354 of the *Khaṇḍana* (as I pointed out on page 29 of the Second Handful), and cites Udayana four times at least (see, especially, pages 633–637), this position can hardly be maintained. In 1871, Dr. Bühler, on the authority of a Jain writer named Rājas'ekhara, placed S'rī Harsha in the twelfth century; and, if that is correct, the question of the authorship of the *Uddhāra* is finally settled as far as Vācaspati Mis'ra is concerned. There was a prolonged discussion as to S'rī Harsha's date in the first three volumes (1872–4) of the *Indian Antiquary*, but nothing was conclusively established as against Dr. Bühler's view which is recorded on page 30 of the first volume.

On page 49 of *Khaṇḍanoddhāra* we read:—"अथ खण्डनकृत् षोडशपदार्थीं खण्डयिष्यंस्तत्र मूर्धन्यं प्रमाणं खण्डयितुं तदुपधायिकां प्रमामादौ खण्डयति स्म 'तत्त्वानुभूतिः प्रमेत्ययुक्तम्.'" The passage in question will be found on page 143 of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya*, and

the commentator S'ankara Mis'ra ascribes this definition of *pramā* to the *Lakṣaṇamālā*, a work which the editor, in a footnote, attributes to S'ivāditya, the author of the *Saptapadārthī*. The latter was published in the Vizianagram Sanskṛit Series in 1893, and in the Preface we have the same authorship of the *Lakṣaṇamālā* asserted on the authority of a *Citsukhīvyākhyā*, the date of which is not stated. In opposition to this, however, I would point out that Varadarāja quotes the *Lakṣaṇamālā* on pages 179 and 225 of his *Tārkikarakṣā*, and, in both cases, the famous commentator Mallinātha ascribes it to Udayana. The doubt expressed by Fitzedward Hall, on page 27 of his *Index* as to this being "the well-known commentator on the poems of Kālidāsa and others," is set aside by Mallinātha's quoting, on page 39, a portion of his commentary on *Raghuvams'a* ii. 34, and adding "इति स्फुटीकृतं चैतदस्माभिः पञ्चकाव्यादिटीकासु 'अलं महीपाल तव श्रमेणेत्यादौ.' "

G. A. J.

REDHILL, SURREY.
October 1904.

EXTRACT FROM PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

In Dr. Bühler's well-known Kashmir Report of 1877, we read the following:—"A curious and very useful though modern treatise is the *Laukikanyâyasangraha* of Raghunâth, a Rajput. This worthy has collected the *nyâyas* or 'inferences from familiar instances', which occur in the *S'âstras*, especially those from the *Vedântas'âstra e. g. Daṇḍâpûpikânyâya*, *Dehalîdîpanyâya* &c. The collection is not complete, but contains a good deal more than that Professor Bâlas'âstrî has given in his article in the *Paṇḍit.** P. Vâmanâchârya Jhalkîkar is at present engaged on a still more extensive work on this subject, which will comprise obout 900 such *nyâyas*" Page 76.

The information given in the concluding sentence raised our hopes to a high pitch, for the need of such a work was great, and Bâlas'âstrî had explained only nine of those nyâyas. But alas! 'there's many a slip between the cup and lip,' and though we have waited for this "more extensive work" for 22 long years, there are still no signs of its appearing.

I have therefore determined to lay before the public the 'handful' of popular maxims which I have collected during many years of reading, in the hope that they may become the nucleus of a very much larger collection. In Târânâth Tarkavâchaspati's *Vâcaspatyam* we have a list of 151 nyâyas, popular and technical; but references to works where they are to be found are few and far between, and this considerably lessons their value. Thirty of these were reproduced in V. S. Âpte's dictionary, in 1890, but with the same defect. Again, in 1875, Paṇḍit Satyavrata Sâmas'rami published a small pamphlet of 36 popular maxims together with a large number of purely technical ones, and professed to give a reference for each of them. But a man who refers you to the "Bhâgvata Purâṇa", to "A commentary on the Vedântabhâshya," or to "A commentary on the Kâvya-

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* October and December 1867.

prakâs'a," and vouchsafes no further information whatever, is a worthless guide! and such mere semblance of guidance deserves nothing but reprobation. One can tolerate ambiguity of this kind in the ancient writings; but in modern times, when printed books of reference abound, such vagueness is inexcusable.

My list comprises only 'popular' maxims, and therefore such purely technical ones as *Adhyâropanyâya*, *kaimutikanyâya*, *guṇopasaṁhâranyâya*, and others of a similar nature, which abound in the philosophical and grammatical works, will not be found here. Moreover, I have rigorously excluded even popular maxims which I have been unable to find *in actual use in the literature*, deeming an unverified maxim with a mere dictionary-existence as of very little value.

* * * * * *

I may add that about 22 illustrative sayings, which are practically *nyâyas*, might be gathered from the fourth Book of the *Sânkhyasûtras*; such as, for example, the well-known "अहिनिर्वयनीवत्" and others more or less useful. Some of them were published in the *Paṇḍit* for December 1876, under the title of "Stories illustrative of the Sânkhya doctrine"; but the whole will be found translated in the volume of "Sânkhya Aphorisms" published in Trübner's Oriental Series.

* * * * * *

In concluding this preface I must apologize to the reader for not givining him a bigger 'handful' of maxims, and one of better quality. But what there is has been put together in defiance of the warnings of the skilful oculist in whose hands I have been for the last five years, and therefore at some risk to failing sight. May some younger scholar be provoked to the good work of giving us something fuller and better.

Redhill, Surrey.
July 1900. G. A. J.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

Seven years have elapsed since the publication of this booklet, and, as my researches have been continued during the whole of the interval, I have naturally collected much additional material. Part of this was published as a "Second Handful" in 1902, and that was succeeded by a "Third" in 1904. During my reading I frequently came upon older references to many of the nyâyas first published, and these have now been utilized; whilst other changes, some of them of a radical nature, have been made, and a few new nyâyas added. The discovery of MSS. of Raghunâthavarman's works, as recorded in the preface to the "Second Handful", was of the utmost importance to me; but the student will find in my three small volumes some nyâyas which even he did not explain,—amongst which are the कृत्वाचिन्तान्याय and मणिमन्त्रन्याय here incorporated for the first time. I make no distinction now between what may be really called a 'popular' maxim, and one of a technical nature. Both need to be explained and illustrated, so both are freely admitted. I have thoroughly revised, and considerably enlarged, the "Second Handful" also, and hope soon to see it reprinted. It will contain, amongst much new matter, the story connected with the वधूमाषमापनन्याय which so long eluded me, and for which, as well as for several other valuable items of information, I am indebted to Mr. Govind Dâs, Honorary magistrate of Benares. Another lover of Sanskrit has come to my help in the person of Mr. M. R. Telang, Head Shirastedar of the Bombay High Court, who has kindly supplied what was to me, at any rate, a novel interpretation of the लोष्टप्रस्तारन्याय. I am anxious to revise as soon as possible *the whole* of the nyâyas which I have endeavoured to elucidate, before increasing infirmities compel the abandonment of the studies which have been my delight for forty-six years.

I wish I could impart to some of my fellow countrymen resident in India, something of the enthusiasm which its grand literature awakened within me in the early part of my career, and which has never waned during this long intervening period. Such a hobby not only provides delightful mental exercise, but, better still, it draws one into *sympathetic touch* with the people amongst whom one's lot is cast.

Redhill, Surrey,
October, 1907.

G. A. JACOB.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

The issue, in Benares seven years ago, of an edition of Raghunāthavarma's *Laukikanyāyasangraha*, has made it unnecessary to reprint the Preface to the former edition of the present Handful, seeing that a good part of it was devoted to a description of that then-unpublished treatise. For the same reason I have omitted the appended list of nyāyas contained in Raghunātha's work, and which, at no small expenditure of time and toil, I compiled from the two MSS. in the India Office Library.

The whole of the explanatory matter attached to the nyāyas has been thoroughly revised for this edition, and, in some cases, has been re-written. In addition to this the book will be found to contain thirty-two new nyāyas, some of them of considerable importance, and all of them more or less interesting. The six Systems seem to be the most attractive part of the field for the study of similes of the class which predominates in these pages; but grammatical commentaries also, appear likely to prove a not unfruitful field to the painstaking explorer.

For the reasons given in the preface to the Third Handful I would gladly have seized this opportunity of eliminating the word 'Maxims' from the titlepage; but it was not politic to change the name adopted ten years ago and repeated in each new issue.

It is not probable that this will pass into a third edition during my lifetime; but I trust that in its present form it may prove helpful to young students whose reading has not bene quite so wide as my own.

REDHILL, SURREY,
23 Sept. 1909.

G. A. JACOB.

Preface to Second Edition.

With the re-issue of this 'Handful' the revision of the three is complete but by no means perfect; for I have been sore let and hindered by the presence of that powerful 'limiting adjunct' (upādhi) *Avidyā*. Many a struggle have I had with it over some of the nyāyas; but it is for scholars to say with whom the victory rests. Had it been possible to borrow Indra's *Vimāna* for a week-end visit to Poona, a quiet talk with old friends there would have speedily dispelled many doubts and difficulties. Especially helpful would it have been to have got their opinion regarding the nyāya "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः," to which Kumārila and other writers on Mīmāṃsā appear to assign a meaning at variance with that of Patanjali as interpreted for me by Dr. Kielhorn,—an interpretation which seems to me to be the only reasonable one.

A comparison of this edition with the previous one will show that considerable changes have been made, especially in some of the technical nyāyas, and that twenty-two new ones have been added. I have abstained on the present occasion from appending supplementary notes, but will take advantage of this opportunity for making an interesting addition to the तैलपात्रधरन्याय in the Second Handful, by giving two important references to it. They are *Kathāsaritsāgara*, Book 6, chap i. verses 43–52; and *S'āntiparva* 11696 (chap. 317, verse 22 in Bombay edition). For the former I am indebted to Mr. C. H. Tawney, and, for the latter, to Professor Washburn Hopkins.

An alphabetical list of the nyāyas contained in the three pamphlets is appended as before.

I would once more, on the conclusion of the reprint of the nyāyas, congratulate my friend the Proprietor of the Press, on the high standard of excellence still maintained by him. My acquaintance with the Press began nearly 30 years ago (in the time of its worthy Founder); and, if I may be allowed to apply to it a Vedantic 'great sentence' in a non-Vedantic sense, it still stands out amongst the Presses of the dear old Land of Bharata, as एकमेवाद्वितीयम्.

G. A. J.

REDHILL, SURREY,
October 1910.

SOME OPINIONS OF THE PRESS ON THE FIRST HANDFUL.

"There are few books which give the results of so much reading in so small a compass as this little pamphlet of some fifty pages. As its name indicates, it is a collection of those popular maxims, or, as Dr. Bühler calls them, "inferences from familiar instances," which one hears so frequently in conversation with Pandits.........Similiar collections have been frequently put together...but we very rarely find in these any reference to the use of nyāyas in actual literature. The great value of Colonel Jacob's work is that at least one such reference is given for every maxim quoted. He has drawn principally from works on philosophy and on rhetoric, branches of Sanskrit literature which he has made peculiarly his own, and the modestly styled 'Handful' is only one more example of the labourious care and love of accuracy for which its author is distinguished.

The book is useful to other than Sanskrit scholars..............The student of Tulasī Dāsa, or of Malik Muhmmad, will find many an obscure passage illumined by this true *dehalī-dīpaka*, throwing light, as it does, both upon the past and on the present."

Journal of Royal Asiatic Society (July 1901).

"Under the title 'Laukikanyāyāñjali,' or 'A handful of Popular Maxims', Colonel G. A. Jacob has published and explained a number of those allusions to popular and, at the time, no doubt, well-known proverbs or stories which abound in Sanskrit literature. These nyāyas find their parallels from our own language in such common sayings as 'like the pot and the kettle', 'like the hare and the tortoise' etc. The proverbs or stories to which they allude are perfectly well-known and need no explanation. In the case of their Sanskrit

counterparts, the memory of their origin has not always been preserved or has become obscured. The list now published consists of those examples which Colonel Jacob has been able either to trace to their source or to partly explain. Let us hope that this useful little work, the result of many years of reading may, in his own words, 'become the nucleus of a very much larger collection'."

Luzac's *Oriental List* (March-April 1901).

"From what we have written above, we think our readers will see what a useful little book Colonel Jacob's is, especially for those who wish to address the people of this land in forms of speech and with thoughts that are familiar to them.

Prakās'ak (Kolhapur, March 1900).

A HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS.

अजाकृपाणीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the she-goat and the sword.* It is founded on some story of a goat's being suddenly killed by accidental contact with a sword, and is used to illustrate any surprising event happening altogether by chance. It, therefore, belongs to the same class as काकतालीय, खल्वाटबिल्वीय and others of a similar kind. An excellent illustration of its use is found on page 229 of S'rîharsha's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya:*—"पाणौ पञ्च वराटकान्पिधाय कश्चित्पृच्छति कति वराटका इति । पृष्टश्चाजाकृपाणीयन्यायेन ब्रवीति पञ्चेति" ॥ In a footnote the maxim is thus explained:—"कण्डूयनार्थं स्तंभादौ शिथिलबन्धखड्गे छागी ग्रीवां प्रसारयति यदृच्छया च ग्रीवा छिद्यते तथाभूतोऽजाकृपाणीयन्यायः काकतालीयन्यायसमः" ॥ Vardhamâna puts it differently in his comment on *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* iii. 196:—"यथाजया भूमिं खनन्त्यात्मवधाय कृपाणो दर्शितस्तत्तुल्यं वृत्तं केनाचिदात्मविनाशाय कृतमजाकृपाणीयम्" ॥ For another variety, see *Padamañjarî* on *Kâs'ikâ* 5. 3. 106.

The nyâya, with the same illustration, is found also in the *Khaṇḍanoddhâra*, page 52; and the illustration, *without* the nyâya, in *Siddhântales'a*, page 95. Then on page 96, it is again referred to in the expression "काकतालीयसंवादिवराटकसंख्याविशेषाहार्यज्ञानवत्."

It is interesting to note that the Marâṭhî-speaking folk of Western India have adopted the maxim, but with a changed meaning. Molesworth defines it as "The maxim of the sword upon the neck of the goat. Expressive of meekness and absolute helplessness."

अन्तर्दीपिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a lamp in a central position.* Applied to something which fulfils a double purpose. It occurs in S'ankara's bhâshya on the *Mundaka Upanishad* 3. 1. 5. ("सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष आत्मा सम्यग्ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यम्" ।) on which he says:—"नित्यं सर्वदा । नित्यं सत्येन नित्यं तपसा नित्यं सम्यग्ज्ञानेनेति सर्वत्र नित्यशब्दोऽन्तर्दीपिकान्यायेनानुषक्तव्यः" ॥ It is akin to देहलीदीपन्याय and मध्यदीपन्याय. Jîvânanda's edition of the *Mundakabhâshya* reads अन्त्यदीपकन्यायेन. The reading given above is from the Ânandâs'rama edition.

अन्धकवर्तकीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the blind man and the quail.* Like अजाकृपाणीय and many others, it is used to express a wholly fortuitous occurrence. Vardhamâna, on *Ganaratnamahodadhi* iii. 195, explains it thus:—"अन्धकश्च वर्तका च अन्धकवर्तकम् । अन्धकस्य वर्तकाया उपर्यतर्कितः पादन्यास उच्यते । तत्तुल्यमन्धकवर्तकीयम्" ॥ This authority brings the quail under the blind man's *foot;* but the commentator S'rîs'rutasâgara, who expounded the work *Yas'astilaka,** and who in the colophon is described as "तर्कव्याकरणछन्दोलंकारसिद्धान्तसाहित्यादिशास्त्रनिपुणमतिः प्राकृतव्याकरणाद्यनेकशास्त्रचनाचुञ्चुः," brings the bird into the man's *hands.* And, surely, such a prodigy of learning *must* be right! The verse in which the expression अन्धकवर्तकीय occurs is *Yas'astilaka* ii. 153. "संसारसागरमिमं भ्रमता नितान्तं जीवेन मानवभवः समवापि दैवात् । तत्रापि यद्भुवनमान्यकुले प्रसूतिः सत्सङ्गतिश्च तदिहान्धकवर्तकीयम्" ॥ "It is altogether by chance that a soul wandering about in this ocean of repeated births is born as a man; and that he should be born into a family of repute in the world, and enjoy the society of the good, is likewise as accidental as in the case of the blind man and the

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* This important work, described by Dr. Peterson at considerable length in his Second Report, was published in the *Kâvyamâlâ*, a valuable periodical issued by the Proprietor of the Nirnaya-sâgar Press.

quail." S'rîs'rutasâgara's explanation of the last term is as follows:—"अन्धकवर्तकीयो दृष्टान्तः। यथा कश्चिदन्धकः पुमान् करतलेन करं ताडयन्वर्तते तस्य करद्वयमध्ये वर्तकः पक्षिविशेषः समायाति स तु दुर्लभस्तथा मानवभवे सत्सङ्गतिर्दुर्लभा वर्तते" ॥

अन्धगजन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the blind men and the elephant.* A number of blind men desired to form an idea of the shape of an elephant. One touched his trunk and thought he must be like a snake; another took hold of a leg and supposed that he was like a post, and so on. Târânâtha tells us that it is used to illustrate the divergence of views held by the ignorant in regard to Îs'vara.

The story is found in the Buddhist work *Udânam* (vi. 4, pages 66-69) published by the Pâli Text Society in 1885.

It is referred to in Sures'vara's large *Vârtika* 4. 4. 566 (page 1813) as follows:—"एकमेवैकरूपं सद्वस्त्वज्ञातं निरञ्जनम्। जात्यन्धगजदृष्ट्येव कोटिशः कल्प्यते मृषा" ॥ Also in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* ii. 93:—"तदेतदद्वयं ब्रह्म निर्विकारं कुबुद्धिभिः। जात्यन्धगजदृष्ट्येव कोटिशः परिकल्प्यते" ॥ I have met with the nyâya again on pages 107 and 160 of *Syâdvâdamanjarî.* It occurs also in the Jainadars'ana of *Saḍdars'anasamuccaya* (page 46); but the passage in which it is found was taken *verbatim* from Malliṣeṇa's work, without any acknowledgment.

अन्धगोलाङ्गूलन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the blind man and the cow's tail.* The story is that an evil-disposed fellow found a blind man who, having lost his way, was wandering about helplessly. Expressing great sympathy for him, and promising to help him, the man led him to a young and frisky cow, and putting her tail into his hand told

him to hold on, and that she would certainly lead him to the village to which he wished to go. The result was, of course, most disastrous.

S'ankara, in his bhâshya on *Vedântasûtra* 1. 1. 7, applies the maxim to the case of a teacher who wrongly instructs his pupil in regard to emancipation and so leads him to destruction! These are his words:—"यदि चाज्ञस्य सतो मुमुक्षोरचेतनमात्मानमात्मेत्युपदिशेत्प्रमाणभूतं शास्त्रं स श्रद्दधानतयान्धगोलाङ्गूलन्यायेन तदात्मदृष्टिं न परित्यजेत्तद्व्यतिरिक्तं चात्मानं न प्रतिपद्येत तथा सति पुरुषार्थाद्विहन्येतानर्थं च ऋच्छेत्" ॥ The nyāya is found, too, in *Pancapâdikâvivarana*, page 170.

अन्धपरम्परान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a continuous series of blind men.* It would seem to be in this sense that S'ankarâchârya uses it in his *Brahmasûtrabhâshya* 2. 2. 30, 37. The passages stand thus:—"अनादित्वेऽप्यन्धपरम्परान्यायेनाप्रतिष्ठैवानवस्था व्यवहारलोपिनी स्यान्नाभिप्रायसिद्धिः"।"वर्तमानकालवदतीतेष्वपि कालेष्वितरेतराश्रयदोषाविशेषादन्धपरम्परान्यायापत्तेः" ॥ In his rendering of the former passage, Dr. Thibaut has overlooked the maxim, but the latter he translates as follows:—"For in past time as well as in the present, mutual interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series is like *an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men.*" I should add that, in the former case, S'ankara is arguing against the Buddhist theory of a beginningless series of mental impressions, and, in the latter, against the Sânkhya notion of a similar chain of human actions and divine interpositions. Dr. Thibaut's explanation of the maxim is quite in accord with that of Dr. Garbe in his rendering of the *Sânkhyasūtra* iii. 81 "इतरथान्धपरम्परा" "Else there would be a tradition [comparable to a row] of blind men [leading each other]."

A very apt quotation from one of Coleridge's *Lay Sermons* is given in that useful work *A Rational Refutation of Hindu Philosophical Systems* (now quite out of print), from which I

extract the following:—"The old man talked much and vehemently concerning an infinite series of causes and effects, which he explained to be a string of blind men, the last of whom caught hold of the skirt of the one before him, he of the next, and so on till they were all out of sight; and that they all walked infallibly straight, without making one false step, though all were alike blind. Methought I borrowed courage from surprise, and asked him, 'Who, then, is at the head to guide them?' He looked at me with ineffable contempt, not unmixed with an angry suspicion and then replied, "No one; the string of blind men goes on for ever without any beginning, for although one blind man cannot move without stumbling, yet infinite blindness supplies the want of sight."

In the opening part of the *Padamañjarî* (*Paṇḍit* x. 248) we find the expression अन्धपरम्पराप्रसङ्ग used with reference to testimony received through a series of blind men, and therefore of doubtful value. It is part of an interesting discussion regarding different forms of a word, why some are considered correct and others not. "तत्र ये साधवस्ते शास्त्रेणानुशिष्यन्तेऽसाधुभ्यो विविक्ताः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागेन ज्ञाप्यन्त इमे साधव इति। कथं पुनरिदमाचार्येण पाणिनिनावगतमेते साधव इति। आपिशलेन पूर्वव्याकरणेन। आपिशलिना तर्हि केनावगतम्। ततः पूर्वेण व्याकरणेन। यद्येवमन्धपरम्पराप्रसङ्गः। तद्यथा शुक्लं क्षीरमित्यन्धेनोक्ते केनेदमवगतमिति पृष्टो यदान्धान्तरं मूलं निर्दिशति सोऽप्यन्धान्तरं तदा नैतद्वचः शौक्ल्ये प्रमाणं भवति तादृगेतत्" ॥

That the nyâya is in very general use will be apparent from the following additional references. *Tantravârtika*, pages 11, 72, 75, 232, 799, 877. *Pancapâdikâ*, pages 98. *Bhâmatî*, pages 254, 464. *Nyâyamanjarî* pages 234, 249, 251, 425, 492.

अरुन्धतीप्रदर्शनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the pointing out of the star Arundhatî*. The idea here is that of gradual instruction, on the principle of the अध्यारोपापवादन्याय for which see the Second Handful. Its

usage is explained by S'ankara in *Brahmasûtrabhâshya* 1. 1. 8, as follows:—"यथारुन्धतीं दिदर्शयिषुस्तत्समीपस्थां स्थूलां ताराममुख्यां प्रथममरुन्धतीति ग्राहयित्वा तां प्रत्याख्याय पश्चादरुन्धतीमेव ग्राहयति तद्वन्नाय-मात्मेति ब्रूयात्" ॥ Similarly, too, in 1. 1. 12, we read:—"यथारुन्धती-निदर्शने बह्वीष्वपि तारास्वमुख्यास्वरुन्धतीषु दर्शितासु यान्त्या प्रदर्श्यते सा मुख्यैवारुन्धती भवत्येवमिहाप्यानन्दमयस्य सर्वान्तरत्वान्मुख्यमात्मत्वम्" ॥ The maxim is sometimes styled स्थूलारुन्धतीन्याय, and it appears under this name in Nṛisiṁhasarasvatî's commentary on section 20 of the *Vedântsâra*—that section which gives the views of Chârvâkas and others as to the *âtman*.

अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ॥

If one can find honey on the Arka-tree [close at hand] *then why go to the mountain for it?* That is, if an object can be accomplished by simple means, don't adopt a more complicated method. This is well illustrated by S'ankara in his *Vedânta-sûtrabhâshya* 3. 4. 3, as follows:—"केवलाच्चेज्ज्ञानात्पुरुषार्थसिद्धिः स्यात्किमर्थमनेकायाससमन्वितानि कर्माणि ते कुर्युः। अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेदिति न्यायात्" ॥

Its source, however, is S'abara on *Jaimini* 1. 2. 4. Here, the *Pûrvapakshin*, after taking exception to certain Vedic injunctions as useless says:—"तद्यथा पथि जातेऽर्के मधूत्सृज्य तेनैव पथा मध्वर्थिनः पर्वतं न गच्छेयुस्तादृशं हि तत्। अपि चाहुः। अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत्। इष्टस्यार्थस्य संसिद्धौ को विद्वान्यत्नमाचरेत्" ॥ The same couplet is quoted by Aniruddha in his comment on *Sâṇkhyasûtra* i. 1; also by Vâchaspati Mis'ra in his *Sânkhya-tattvakaumudî* 1., and again in his *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 220. Instead of अर्के, however, we have in the former instance अक्के and in the latter अक्के. Raghunâth reads अक्के and explains it by गृहकोणे. One more example of the application of this nyâya may be found in Kumârila's *Tantravârtika* 1. 2. 17:—

"यद्यल्पान्महतश्च कर्मणः समं फलं जायेत ततोऽर्के चेन्मधु विन्देतेत्यनेनैव न्यायेनाल्पेन सिद्धे महति न कश्चित्प्रवर्तेत" ॥

अर्धजरतीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the semi-senile woman.* It is very difficult to fix on the exact force of this saying. Authorities differ so much as to make it almost an instance of *quot homines tot sententiæ.* As expounded by Vardhamâna (iii. 195) it seems to imply *indefiniteness, half-and-half-ness, the being neither one thing nor the other.* He says:—"यथा स्त्री न तरुणी श्लथस्तनत्वात् कृष्णकेशत्वान्न जरती वक्तुं शक्यते तद्वत्सिद्धासिद्धं प्रयोजनम्" ॥ This seems to accord with the meaning assigned to it by Marâṭhas, as shown by Molesworth in his Marâthî dictionary where he defines it as "Action of indeterminate character; speech vague and indefinite; a proceeding void of decided learning or bearing."

The maxim is cited by S'ankara in *Brahmasûtrabhâshya* 1. 1. 19, and again in 1. 2. 8. In the former, after quoting *Taittirîya-upanishad* ii. 1-4 in regard to अन्नरसमय, प्राणमय &c. he says:—"इति विकारार्थे मयट्प्रवाहे सत्यानन्दमय एवाकस्मादर्धजरतीयन्यायेन कथमिव मयटः प्राचुर्यार्थत्वं ब्रह्मविषयत्वं वाश्रीयत इति" ॥ The commentators Ânandagiri and Râmânanda (erroneously styled Govindânanda*) ignore the maxim entirely, and so does Dr. Thibaut in his translation. In the second instance, S'ankara says:—"यथाशास्त्रं तर्हि शास्त्रीयोऽर्थः प्रतिपत्तव्यो न तत्रार्धजरतीयं लभ्यम्," which is rendered by Dr. Thibaut, "Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural matters is to be ascertained from scripture, and that *scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to and on other occasions to be disregarded.*" Ânandagiri's comment is:—"न हि कुक्कुटादेरेकदेशो भोगाय पच्यत एकदेशस्तु प्रसवाय कल्प्यते विरोधात्", "You cannot take one part of a fowl for cooking and leave the other part to lay eggs;" that is, you must take a

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* See Dr. Fitzedward Hall's *Index*, page 90.

thing in its entirety, or else leave it altogether. Râmânanda on the other hand, says:—"अर्धं मुखमात्रं जरत्या वृद्धायाः कामयते नाङ्गानीति सोऽयमर्धजरतीयन्यायः स चात्र न युक्तः," which seems to be based on Patanjali's words "न चेदानीमर्धजरतीयं लभ्यं… । तद्यथा । अर्धं जरत्याः कामयतेऽर्धं नेति", as found in *Mahâbhâshya* 4. 1. 78.* Again we find the maxim in the Bauddha section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 14 of Bib. Ind., and 17 of Jîvânanda's edn.), which reads thus:—"न चार्धजरतीयमुचितम् । न हि कुक्कुट्या एको भागः पाकायापरो भागः प्रसवाय कल्प्यतामिति कल्प्यते", and which is identical with Ânandagiri's exposition. Prof. Gough, who translated this chapter, rendered the maxim by "semi-effete"—"Nor is a semi-effete existence admissible."

Another excellent illustration of the usage of this nyâya is given in the following passage of the *Brahmasûtratâtparyavivaraṇa* 3. 4. 26. (The Paṇḍit vol. vi. page 220):—"ब्रह्मविद्या स्वफले कर्माणि नापेक्षते तथा स्वोत्पत्तावपि नापेक्षते । अन्यथा क्वचिदपेक्षा क्वचिन्नेत्यर्धजरतीयत्वापत्तिरिति प्राप्ते आह सर्वापेक्षेति । नार्धजरतीयन्यायो योग्यतावशादेवैकस्यैव कार्यविशेषेष्वपेक्षानपेक्षयोरुपपत्तेः । यथा लाङ्गलवहनेऽनपेक्षितोऽश्वो रथवहनेऽपेक्ष्यते तद्वत्स्वोत्पत्तौ तु विद्या कर्मापेक्षते" ॥

Other references are the following:—*Saptapadârthî*, page 26. *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 21. *Nyâyamanjarî*, pages 248, 249. *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, page 340.

अशक्तोऽहं गृहारम्भे शक्तोऽहं गृहभञ्जने ॥

I am too weak to construct a house, but I am well able to destroy one. This is found in Ḍhunḍhirâja's commentary on *Mudrârâkshasa* iii. 11. Chāṇakya says—"कथं स्पर्द्धते मया सह दुरात्मा राक्षसः" । and then follows the verse "कृतागाः कौटिल्यो भुजग

* Vol. ii. page 231 of the edition by Dr. F. Kielhorn, who himself most kindly gave me the reference.

इव निर्याय नगरात् &c.," on which Dhuṇḍhirâja remarks:—"ममेव नास्य बुद्धिबलं परंतु मत्सरमात्रेण अशक्तोऽहं गृहारम्भे शक्तोऽहं गृहभञ्जन इति न्यायेन मौर्यापकारमात्राय प्रयतमानः सन्केवलं पौरुषबलमवष्टभ्य मद्बुद्धेः प्रकर्षमतिशयितुं व्यवसित इत्यहो राक्षसस्य दुर्व्यवसितामिति" ॥ I am indebted for this passage to the late learned Librarian at the India Office, C. H. Tawney Esqr., who has also pointed out to me *Pancatantra* i. 363 as illustrating the nyâya.

The verse reads thus:—

"घातयितुमेव नीचः परकार्यं वेत्ति न प्रसाधयितुम् ।
पातयितुमेव शक्तिर्नाखोरुद्धर्तुमन्नपिटम्" ॥

अशोकवनिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the grove of As'oka trees.* Âpṭe says "Râvaṇa kept Sîtâ in the grove of As'oka trees, but it is not easy to account for his preference of that particular grove to any other one; so when a man finds several ways of doing a thing, any one of them may be considered as good as another, and the preference of any particular one cannot be accounted for." For the As'oka-grove see *Râmâyaṇa* 1. 1. 73. The only example of this nyâya that I have met with is in S'eṣânanta's ṭîkâ on S'as'adhara's *Nyâyasiddhântadîpa*, page 11. This work was commenced in the Paṇḍit for April 1903, but is still incomplete.

अश्मलोष्टन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the stone and clod of earth.* Âpṭe, following the *Vâcaspatyam*, explains it thus:—"A clod may be considered to be hard when compared with cotton, but is soft as compared with a stone. So a person may be considered to be very important as compared with his inferiors, but sinks into insignificance when compared with his betters." Târânâtha adds that when it is intended to indicate that there is *very little* differance between two things or persons compared, the kindred

maxim **पाषाणेष्टकान्याय** is used. With these Âpṭe compares the Marâṭhî proverb "**दगडापेक्षां वीट मऊ**" "Brick is softer than stone." The sense, however, is not quite the same; for, according to Molesworth, the Marâṭhî saying is used "in ironical softening of a difficulty or hardship but *barely* surmountable or sufferable, by comparing it with a matter *utterly* impracticable or intolerable."

Is it not much more likely however that the maxim is based on *Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upanishad* 1. 3. 7, "**यथाश्मानमृत्वा लोष्टो विध्वंसेत**" which S'ankara expounds thus:—"**यथा लोकेऽश्मानं पाषाणमृत्वा गत्वा प्राप्य लोष्टः पांसुपिण्डः पाषाणचूर्णनायाश्मनि निक्षिप्तः स्वयं विध्वंसेत विस्रंसेत विचूर्णीभवेत्**"? This is referred to in *Brahmasûtrabhâshya* 3. 3. 6. as the "**अश्मलोष्टनिदर्शन**" and it seems to remind one of the Scripture saying "Whosover shall fall upon that stone shall be broken; but on whomsover it shall fall, it will grind him to powder."

अस्त्रमस्त्रेण शाम्यति ॥

A weapon is silenced by a weapon. Perhaps analogous to the saying "Diamond cuts diamond," or, "Set a thief to catch a thief." It occurs in Jnânottama's commentary on Sures'vara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* i. 81, where he says:—"नन्वस्त्रमस्त्रेण शाम्यतीति न्यायेन काम्यैः काम्यानां निषिद्धैर्निषिद्धानां निवृत्तिरस्त्वित्यत आह न च काम्यैरिति" ॥

Compare with this *Nîtisâra* viii. 67:—

"विषं विषेण व्यथते वज्रं वज्रेण भिद्यते ।
गजेन्द्रो दृष्टसारेण गजेन्द्रेणैव बध्यते" ॥

अस्नेहदीपन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a Lamp without oil* [that is, from which the oil has burnt out]. Raghunâthavarama explains it thus:—"अस्मिश्चाध्यासेऽज्ञानं कारणम् । तत्त्वज्ञानेन वातदीपन्यायेन तन्निवृत्तावस्नेहदीपन्यायेन तदध्यासोऽपि निवर्तते । न च ज्ञानेनैवोभयनिवृत्तिः कुतो न

स्यात्। ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमिति न्यायविरोधात्। द्विविधा हि निवृत्ति-र्विरोधिना सामग्रीनिवृत्त्या च। यथा वातादिना दीपनाशो यथा च तैलवर्त्यादि-निवृत्त्या दीपनिवृत्तिः। तत्राद्या निवृत्तिरज्ञानस्य द्वितीया कार्यवर्गस्येति बोध्यम्" ॥

I have met with the following example of the nyâya in *Yogavâsiṣṭha* 2. 1. 44, a chapter entitled शुकनिर्याणम्:—

"तत्र वर्षसहस्राणि निर्विकल्पसमाधिना।
दश स्थित्वा शशामासावात्मन्यस्नेहदीपवत्" ॥

For the nyâya ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकम् see the *Third Handful of Popular Maxims*; and for निर्विकल्पसमाधि see *Vedântasâra*, pp. 55, 57, &c., and *Manual of Hindu Pantheism*, pages 109, 110.

अहिकुण्डलन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the snake and its coils*. The expression occurs in *Brahmasûtra* 3. 2. 27, and is explained in the *bhâshya*. They read thus:—"उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् ॥ ...अत उभयव्यपदे-शदर्शनादहिकुण्डलवदत्र तत्त्वं भवितुमर्हति। यथाहिरित्यभेदः कुण्डलाभोग-प्रांशुत्वादीनीति च भेद एवमिहापीति" ॥ Dr. Thibaut's translation is as follows:—"But on account of twofold designation, (the relation of the highest Self to the individual soul has to be viewed) like that of the snake to its coils......We therefore look on the relation of the highest Self and the soul as analogous to that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole the snake is one, non-different, while an element of difference appears if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, erect posture and so on." It is akin therefore to the expressions "a forest and its trees," "a lake and its waters," so often used by the Vedantists as illustrations of identity. The explanation given by Târânâtha in the *Vâchaspatyam* does not coincide with the above. He says:—"अहेः सर्पस्य यथा कुण्डलाकृतिवेष्टनं स्वाभाविकं तथा यस्य स्वाभाविकधर्मो व्यपदिश्यते तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥

आकाशमुष्टिहननन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *striking the sky with one's fist.* A vain attempt at an impossibility. It occurs in the Jaimini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 133 of *Bib. Ind.* edition, and p. 151 of Jîvânanda's) as follows:—"तस्मादुत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ च परतस्त्वे प्रमाणसंभवात्स्वतःसिद्धं प्रामाण्यमित्येतत्पूतिकूष्माण्डायत इति चेत्तदेतदाकाशमुष्टिहननायते" ॥ Prof. Cowell has rendered it thus:—"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced and recognized by means of something external, the Mîmâṁsâ tenet 'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd over-ripe and rotten. This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist."

Much older instances of the employment of the nyâya are the following:—*Tantravârtika*, page 170, "यस्तन्तूननुपादाय तुरीमाग्रपरिग्रहात् । पटं कर्तुं समीहेत स हन्याद्व्योम मुष्टिभिः" ॥ [With this compare the words of a great modern preacher–Dr. Maclaren–"Logic without Revelation is like a spinning-machine without cotton, busy drawing out nothing"]. *Pancapâdikâ* page 43, line 19, "तद्यदि नाम ज्ञानं लोके सिद्धं तथापि निरस्तप्रपञ्चात्मविषयमसिद्धमाकाशमुष्टिहननवन्न विधातुं शक्यम्." Then, in *Nyâyakandalî*, page 56, line 6, we find the cognate expression "यथा कश्चिन्निशितं कृपाणमच्छेद्यमाकाशं प्रति व्यापारयन्", and again in *Nyâyakaṇikâ*, page 219.

उपयन्नपयन्धर्मो विकरोति हि धर्मिणम् ॥

The appearance or disappearance of a quality (or characteristic) *produces a corresponding change in the subject of it.* This nyâya is the second line of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* ii. 35, the first being "आगमापायिनिष्ठत्वादनित्यत्वमियाद्दृशिः" ॥ Although it is included in Raghunâtha's list, it ought not, strictly speaking, to find a place amongst *popular maxims*; but I insert it in order to make a necessary correction in the printed text of the *Sarvadaras'anasangraha* where it is quoted. On page 161

of the Bibliotheca Indica edition, and on page 182 of that prepared by Jîvânanda Vidyâsâgara, we read "ततश्चोपपन्नस्त्वयन्धर्मो विकरोति हि धर्मिणमिति न्यायेन" and this bad reading of course affects the translation as it appears on page 244 of the volume prepared for Trübner's Oriental Series by Professors Cowell and Gough. The explication given in *Vâchaspatyam* is as follows:—"यथा पूर्वस्य रूपरसादिरूपधर्मपरावृत्तौ रूपरसाद्यन्तरोत्पत्तौ च घटादेर्धर्मिणो विकृतिरेवं यस्य धर्मिणः पूर्वधर्मस्यापगमेऽन्यधर्मस्योत्पत्तिस्तत्रायं न्यायोऽवतरति" ॥

उष्ट्रकण्टकभक्षणन्यायः—

The maxim of *a camel's eating thorns.* This is not in Raghunâtha's list, but in the *Vâcaspatyam* it is explained thus:—"उष्ट्रस्य शमीकण्टकवेधजातदुःखकालेऽपि शमीपत्रभक्षणसुखलेशो यथा तथाभीष्टविषयोपार्जनदुःखकाले तदुपार्जितद्रव्यजसुखलेशो यत्रोपदिश्यते तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ I regard this, however, as quite beside the mark. In *Brahmasûtrabhâshya* 2. 2. 1. Shankara, after combating at length the Sânkhya theory, that objects are *in themselves*, सुखदुःखमोहात्मक, says:—"शब्दाद्यविशेषेऽपि च भावनाविशेषात्सुखादिविशेषोपलब्धेः," which Dr. Thibaut renders—"And, further although the sense-object, such as sound and so on, is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on." On which Ânandagiri says:—"शब्दादीति। भावना तत्तज्जातियोग्या वासना तद्विशेषादुष्ट्रादीनां कण्टकादौ सुखादिदर्शनात् &c." Vâcaspatimis'ra, explains the same passage in the *Bhâmatî*, (pp. 380-1), pointing out that things are not *in themselves essentially* pleasent or unpleasent, and that what causes pleasure to one may be painful to another, and that even the same thing which at one time is agreeable may at another time be the reverse. Otherwise thorns would be as acceptable to men as they are to a camel. Here are his words:—"यदि पुनरेत एव सुखदुःखस्वभावा

भवेयुस्ततः स्वरूपत्वाद्धेमन्तेपि चन्दनः सुखः स्यात्। न हि चन्दनः कदाचिद-चन्दनः। तथा निदाघेष्वपि कुंकुमपंकः सुखो भवेत्। न ह्यसौ कदाचिदकुंकुमपंकः। एवं कण्टकः क्रमेलकस्य सुख इति मनुष्यादीनामपि प्राणभृतां सुखः स्यात्। न ह्यसौ कांश्चित्प्रत्येवाकण्टक* इति। तस्मादसुखादिस्वभावा अपि चन्दनकुंकुमादयो जातिकालावस्थाद्यपेक्षया सुखदुःखादिहेतवो न तु स्वयं सुखादिस्वभावा इति रमणीयम्". A camel, then, eats thorns because it likes them; a man does not eat them because he does not like them. May not the maxim, therefore, be the equivalent of our "*What's one man's food is another man's poison?*" Mr. M. R. Telang has kindly pointed out *Vikramânkadevacarita* i. 29. as illustrating a camel's love of thorns.

एकमनुसन्धित्सतोऽपरं प्रच्यवते ॥

Whilst seeking for one thing he loses another. The saying appears twice, in this form, in the *Sarvadars'anasangraha.* The first instance is in the Ârhata Section (p. 27 of Bib. Ind. and 33 of Jîvânanda's edn.), translated by Professor Cowell:—"एतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया ज्ञानं जडतां नानुकरोतीति ब्रूषे हन्त तर्हि तस्या ग्रहणं न स्यादित्येकमनुसन्धित्सतोऽपरं प्रच्यवत इति न्यायापातः"। "If in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that 'the perception does not follow the object in being insentient,' then there would be no perception that the object is insentient, and so it is a case of the proverb, '*While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another drops.*"

The second example, from the Akshapâda section (pp. 118 and 134), is as follows:—"नन्वेकमनुसन्धित्सतोऽपरं प्रच्यवत इति न्यायेन दुःखवत्सुखमित्युच्छिद्यत इत्यकाम्योऽयं पक्ष इति चेन्मैवं मंस्थाः"।

"Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the proverb of '*seeking one thing and dropping another in the search,*' since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted with some incidental pain &c."

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* The printed text wrongly reads कण्टक for अकण्टक.

In the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya* (page 447) and in Mallinâtha on *Târkikarakṣâ*, pp. 7 and 25, we meet with the nyâya in another form, namely "एकं सन्धित्सतोऽपरं प्रच्यवते" which means " Whilst trying to reunite one [piece of a broken vessel] another falls off."

एकवृन्तगतफलद्वयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *two fruits attached to one stalk.* Used by writers on Alankâra to illustrate a particular kind of *Paronomasia*, namely the coalescence of two meanings under one word. It was first pointed out to me by Mr. F. W. Thomas, Assistant Librarian to the India Office, he having met with it in the commentary on *Kâvyâdars'a* ii. 310. I have since found it in use in the *Alankârasarvasva*, *Kâvyapradîpa*, *Sâhityadarpaṇa*, *Rasagangâdhara*, *Alankârakaustubha*, and *Sâhityakaumudî*, in each case under the figure श्लेष. The maxim finds a place in Marâṭhî literature also, and is regarded by Molesworth as equivalent to our proverb "Killing two birds with one stone."

कदम्बकोरकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the buds of the Kadamba tree.* They are said to burst forth simultaneously. As, for example, in Hemacandra's *Paris'ishṭaparvan* i. 241 :—

"पित्रा स्वपाणिपद्मेन स्पृश्यमानोऽवनीपतिः ।
उत्कोरककदम्बाभो बभूव पुलकांकुरैः" ॥

In the *Nyâyamanjarî*, pages 214 and 228, and in the *Bhâshâparichchheda* (verse 166) this nyâya is given as an illustration of the way in which sound is produced. The last-mentioned reads thus:—

"वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन तदुत्पत्तिस्तु कीर्तिता ।
कदम्बकोरकन्यायादुत्पत्तिः कस्यचिन्मते" ॥

The commentary, *Siddhântamuktâvali*, however, explains कदम्बगोलकन्यायात् and this is the form given to the maxim in the *Vâchaspatyam* which explains it as follows:— "कदम्बगोलकस्य गोलाकारकदम्बस्य सर्वावयवेषु यथा युगपत्पुष्पोद्गम एवं सर्वप्रदेशेषु युगपद्यत्र प्रसारस्तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ In Vedantin Mahâdeva's comment on *Sânkhyasûtra* V. 103, we have a third form, namely कदम्बमुकुलन्याय.

कफोणिगुडन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *treacle on the elbow.* Used of something tantalizingly inaccessible. It is found in Udayana's *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 26:—अस्तु तर्हि भावस्वरूपातिरिक्ता निवृत्तिर्नास्तीत्यस्य सोपाख्येति शेषः । नन्वयमपि क्षणभंगस्योद्धार: स च कफोणिगुडायितो वर्तते भवतु वा निवृत्तिरसमर्था तथाप्यहेतुकत्वे तस्याः किमायातम्" ॥ Then in the Akshapâda chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 116 of Bib. Indica, and 132 of Jîvânanda's edition) we read:— "ननु दुःखात्यन्तोच्छेदोऽपवर्ग इत्येतदद्यापि कफोणिगुडायितं वर्तते तत्कथं सिद्धवत्कृत्य व्यवह्रियत इति चेन्नैवम्" ॥ which Prof. Cowell translates as follows:—"But is not your definition of the *summum bonum*, liberation, that is, the absolute abolition of pain, after all as much beyond our reach as *treacle on the elbow is to the tongue*; why then is this continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?" In a footnote he says, "Compare the English proverb 'As soon as the cat can lick her ear.'" In the *Vâchaspatyam*, however, the nyâya is explained an meaning the *absence* of a thing, not its inaccessibility. It says:— "कफोणौ गुडाभावेऽपि तदाशया यथा लेहनमेवं यत्र वस्त्वसद्भावेऽपि तत्प्रत्याशया व्यापारभेदस्तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ The St. Petersburg Lexicon (s. v. कफोणिगुडाय्) renders it "like a *ball* on the elbow."

काकतालीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the crow and the Palmyra fruit.* A crow alighted on a Palmyra tree, and at the same moment some of the fruit fell on its head and killed it. The maxim is therefore used to illustrate a startling and *purely accidental* occurrence. It is well explained in the *Kâs'ikâvṛitti* on *Pâṇini* 5. 3. 106 (as quoted by Dr. Eggeling in a footnote to *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* iii. 195):—"काकतालीयम् । अजाकृपाणीयम् । अन्धकवर्तकीयम् । अतर्कितोपनतं चित्रीकरणमुच्यते । तत्कथम् । काकस्यागमनं याद‍ृच्छिकं तालस्य पतनं च । तेन तालेन पतता काकस्य वधः कृतः । एवमेव देवदत्तस्य तत्रागमनं दस्यूनां चोपनिपातः । तैश्च तस्य वधः कृतः । तत्र यो देवदत्तस्य दस्यूनां च समागमः स काकतालसमागमसदृशः" ॥

We find the saying in *Pañchadas'î* ix. 12 as follows:—"अयथावस्तुविज्ञानात्फलं लभ्यत ईप्सितम् । काकतालीयतः सोऽयं संवादिभ्रम उच्यते" ॥ And again in Ânandavardhana's *Dhvanyâloka* ii. 16, and in *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 401. There is a capital example of it, too, in the following verses of the *Nyâyamanjarî* (page 106):—"अपि चानागतं ज्ञानमस्मदादेरपि क्वचित् ॥ प्रमाणं प्रातिभं श्वो मे भ्रातागन्तेति दृश्यते ॥ नानर्थजं न सन्दिग्धं न बाधविधुरीकृतम् । न दुष्टकारणं चेति प्रमाणमिदमिष्यताम् ॥ क्वचिद्बाधकयोगश्चेदस्तु तस्याप्रमाणता । यत्रापरेद्युरभ्येति भ्राता तत्र किमुच्यताम् ॥ काकतालीयमिति चेन्न प्रमाणप्रदर्शितम् । वस्तु तत्काकतालीयमिति भवितुमर्हति" ॥ In his commentary on *S'ântiparva* clxxvii. 11, Nîlakaṇtha Govind gives another, and less probable, definition of the maxim. He says:—"तालः करतलयोः शब्दजनकः संयोगस्तास्मिन् क्रियमाणे उत्पतन्काको दैवात्तत्र तालाभ्यामाक्रान्तोऽभूत्तदेतत्काकतालीयमित्युच्यते । काकस्पर्शसमकालं तालफलस्य तालवृक्षस्य वा पतनं तदित्यन्ये" ॥ Molesworth explains it thus:—"Said when any occurrence synchronizing with, or immediately following, some other seems, however in truth independent of it, to have been *occasioned* by it;—as the fruit of a Palmyra falling at the alighting upon it of a crow, may appear to fall *in consequence.*"

काकदन्तपरीक्षान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the examination of a crow's teeth*. Used of any useless and manifestly fruitless enquiry. It occurs in the Buddhist treatise *Nyâyabinduṭîkâ*, page 1, and again on page 3, line 8. Also in S'ankara's bhâshya on *Kaṭha-Upanishad* i. 25 ["नचिकेतो मरणं मानुप्राक्षीः"]:—"नचिकेतो मरणं मरणसंबद्धं प्रश्नं प्रेत्यास्ति नास्तीति काकदन्तपरीक्षारूपं मानुप्राक्षीमैवं प्रष्टुमर्हसि" ॥ We find it too in Abhinavagupta on *Dhvanyâloka* iii. 19 (page 163 of Paṇḍit Durgâprasâda's edition) as follows:—"व्यंग्योऽर्थो भवतु मा वाभूत् कस्तत्राभिनिवेशः। काकदन्तपरीक्षाप्रायमेव तत्स्यादिति भावः" ॥ It appears also in *Pancapâdikâ*, pages 53 and 68, and in many works besides. In *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 7, line 5, it takes the form of वायसदशनविमर्शन्याय.

काकाक्षिगोलकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the crow's eyeball*. Crows are pupularly supposed to have only one eye, which, as occasion requires, moves from the cavity on one side into that on the other. The maxim is used of a word which appears only once in a sentence but which applies to two portions of it; or of persons or things fulfilling a double purpose. I have met with it in the former sense in Svâtmârâma's *Haṭhayogapradîpikâ* iv. 10, "विविधैरासनैः कुम्भैर्विचित्रैः करणैरपि," on which the commentator, Brahmânanda, says "विचित्रैरिति काकाक्षिगोलकन्यायेनोभयत्र संबध्यते." Also in Abhinavagupta's comment on *Dhvanyâloka* iii. 1, "पदानां स्मारकत्वेऽपि पदमात्रावभासिनः", where he remarks "अपिशब्दः काकाक्षिन्यायेनोभयत्रापि संबध्यते" ॥ Of its use in the second sense, we have an interesting example in Kâmandaki's *Nîtisâra*, a work ascribed to the third century before Christ. Chapter xi. 24 reads thus:—"बलिनोर्द्विषतोर्मध्ये वाचात्मानं समर्पयन् । द्वैधीभावेन वर्तेत काकाक्षिवदलक्षितः."

काशकुशावलम्बनन्यायः ।

The maxim of *catching at straws.* The being driven from one argument or position to another equally untenable. Târânâtha says "नद्यादौ पतितस्य संतरणानभिज्ञस्य यथा कुशकाशावलम्बनं निरर्थकमेवं प्रबलयुक्तिषु निराकृतासु दुर्बलयुक्त्यवलम्बनं निरर्थकमित्येवमवलम्बनस्य निरर्थकत्वविवक्षायामस्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ The expression "काशकुशावलम्बनकल्पं" occurs in the Ârhata chapter (p. 25 of Bib. Ind. and p. 31 of Jîvânanda's edition) of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, and again in the Pâṇini chapter (pp. 142 and 161); and in both places Prof. Cowell has rendered it "like a drowning man's catching at a straw." We have the same, though not as a compound, in *Naishkarmyasiddhi* i. 76,—"एवं निराकृतोऽपि काशं कुशं वावलम्ब्याह." It appears also in *Nyâyamanjarî* page 183; and again, as follows, on page 551:—"तस्मात्प्रमाणतोऽशक्ये शक्ये वा वस्तुनिर्णये। एवं प्रायमयुक्तं यत्कुशकाशावलम्बनम्" ॥ In *Tantravârtika* 1. 3. 18 (page 213) we have the maxim in the following couplet:—"अर्थवत्त्वं न चेज्जातं मुख्यैर्यस्य प्रयोजनैः। तस्यानुषङ्गिकेष्वाशा कुशकाशावलम्बिनी" ॥

In expounding *Brahmasûtrabhâshya* 3. 3. 29, Ânandagiri quotes *Amarkos'a* 2. 4 166 (अस्त्री कुशं कुशो दर्भः पवित्रमथ कत्तृणम्) as follows:—"अत एवास्त्री कुशमित्यमरसिंहेनानुशिष्टम्." Does this throw any new light on the date of Amara? In his *History of Indian Literature* (page 230), Professor Weber tells us that the *Amarakos'a* cannot be widely separated from those dictionaries which we know to belong to the eleventh, twelfth, and following centuries; whilst Professor Macdonell, in his recently issued *History of Sanskrit Literature* (page 433) assigns that work to about 500 A. D.

कूपमण्डूकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a frog in a well.* It is applied to an inexperienced person brought up in the narrow circle of home, and

ignorant of public life and mankind. "Home-keeping youth have ever homely wits" (*Two Gentlemen of Verona* i. 1). The following passage from *Prasannarâghava-Nâṭaka* i. (page 13) illustrates the use of the term:—"कथं मामपि दशदिग्विलासिनीकर्णपूरीकृतकीर्तिपल्लवं त्रिभुवनवीरनामधेयं कूपमण्डूक इव सागरमविख्यातसपदिशसि" ॥ So, too, *Upamitibhavaprapancâ*, page 828:—

"यो न निर्गत्य निःशेषां विलोकयति मेदिनीम् ।
अनेकाद्भुतवृत्तान्तां स नरः कूपदर्दुरः" ॥

कूपयन्त्रघटिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the pots attached to the water-wheel of a well.* As the wheel revolves, some of the pots are going up and others are going down; some are full whilst others are empty; and so it is applied to illustrate the changes and chances of this mortal life. This is well put in *Mṛichchhakaṭika* x. 60:—

"कांश्चित्तुच्छयति प्रपूरयति वा कांश्चिन्नयत्युन्नतिं
कांश्चित्पातविधौ करोति च पुनः कांश्चिन्नयत्याकुलान् ।
अन्योन्यं प्रतिपक्षसंततिमिमां लोकस्थितिं बोधय-
न्नेष क्रीडति कूपयन्त्रघटिकान्यायप्रसक्तो विधिः" ॥

Târânâtha's explanation of this maxim is extremely tame, not to say nonsensical! According to him, it is intended to teach that as a pot is raised by the water-wheel from a deep well, so, by means of instruction, the essence of the S'âstras is drawn up, deep though they are by reason of their complexity! See the cognate घटीयन्त्रन्याय in *Second* and *Third Handful.*

कूर्माङ्गन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the limbs of the tortoise.* Its meaning and application will be apparent from the following passage taken from the Sânkhya section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 150 Bib. Ind. and 170 of Jîvânanda's edition):—"यथा हि कूर्म-

स्याङ्गानि कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति निःसरन्ति चाविर्भवन्त्येवं कारणस्य तन्त्वादेः पटादयो विशेषा निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त इत्युच्यन्ते निविशमानास्तिरोभवन्तो विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते। न पुनरसतामुत्पत्तिः सतां वा विनाशः'' ॥ Prof. Cowell renders it thus:—"As the limbs of a tortoise, when they retire within its shell, are concealed, and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects, as cloth &c., of a cause, as threads &c., when they come forth and are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing as the production of the non-existent, or the destruction of the existent." Very similar language is used by Vâchaspati Mis'ra, too, in his *Sânkhyatattvakaumudî* 9 and 15. See also, *Kshurikâ-Upanishad* 3, and *Gîtâ* ii. 58.

कृत्वाचिन्तान्यायः ॥

The nyâya stands thus in *Tantravârtika* 3. 4. 1:—"यस्तु भाष्यकारेणोपन्यासः कृतः स कृत्वाचिन्तान्यायेनेति द्रष्टव्यम्." On applying to my friend Mr. Arthur Venis for an elucidation of the nyâya he replied as follows:—"I have always understood it as the method of granting to your adversary what later you mean to refute, for which another common expression is अभ्युपगमवाद. The word कृत्वा is elliptical for इति कृत्वा, that is, having admitted your adversary's point, you proceed to the चिन्ता or discussion of it." This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that in *S'âstradîpikâ,* pages 615, 666, 707, 710, and 739, it takes the form of "इति कृत्वा चिन्त्यते," and that in S'abara on Jaimini 11. 3. 16, and 12, 2. 11, we read at the close of each "इत्येवं कृत्वा चिन्त्यते। कृत्वाचिन्तेयम्."

In his *Ṣaḍdars'anacintanikâ*, Mr. M. M. Kunte gives three different renderings of the expression. On page 650 (where it is attached to the title of the *adhikaraṇa*) its meaning is said to be "a point already discussed," and he claims for it the authority of Mâdhava; then, on page 1999, it

is rendered "an adjustment not founded on fact;" and, finally, on page 2040, "the examination of a subject after merely granting an opponent's statement." This third rendering coincides with that of Mr. Venis.

I may add that Prof. Gangânâtha Jhâ tells me that a paṇḍit would explain the term thus:—"कृत्वा (यद्यप्येतद्विषयकसंशयो नोदेति तथापि तद्विषयगतसकलविचारस्योपन्यासार्थं कल्पनां कृत्वा) चिन्ता (विचारः)." Or, as the Professor himself puts it, "the bhâsya has introduced certain points of discussion simply for *the sake of argument*, in order to exhaust all possible alternatives with regard to the subject matter of the adhikaraṇa." I have not met with the nyâya anywhere but in works on Mîmâṃsâ.

क्षीरं विहायारोचकग्रस्तस्य सौवीररुचिमनुभवति ॥

"*Leaving the milk suitable to the dyspeptic, he enjoys the sour gruel.*" The nyâya is found in this form in the Akshapâda section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (p. 118 of *Bib. Ind.* edition and p. 134 of Jîvânanda's ed.) as follows:—"ननु सुखाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिरिति पक्षं परित्यज्य दुःखनिवृत्तिरेव मुक्तिरिति स्वीकारः क्षीरं विहायारोचकग्रस्तस्य सौवीररुचिमनुभवतीति चेत्तदेतन्नाटकपक्षपतितं त्वद्वच इत्युपेक्ष्यते" ॥

Prof. Cowell translates it thus:—"But if you give up the view that liberation is the manifestation of happiness, and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour rice-gruel? Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]." There can be little doubt however that Mâdhava took the nyâya from Udayana's *Âtmatattvaviveka* where it appears (on page 56, line 5,) as "क्षीरं विहाय रुचिररोचकग्रस्तस्य सौवीरे." I know of no other instance of it, and it is not in Raghunātha's *Laukikanâyasangraha*.

खल्वाटबिल्वीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the bald* (or *bare-headed*) *man, and the woodapple.* Vardhamâna (iii. 195) explains it thus:—"यथा खल्वाटः पर्यटन्नतर्कितं श्रीफलतरोरधस्तादागतो दैववशाच्च बिल्वमुपरि पतितं तद्वदन्योऽप्युभयवस्तुसंयोग एवमुच्यते" ॥ Bhartṛihari, in his *Nîti-s'ataka* 90, brings the bald man under a *palm* tree:—

"खल्वाटो दिवसेश्वरस्य किरणैः संतापितो मस्तके
वाञ्छन्देशमनातपं विधिवशात्तालस्य मूलं गतः ।
तत्राप्यस्य महाफलेन पतता भग्नं सशब्दं शिरः
प्रायो गच्छति यत्र भाग्यरहितस्तत्रैव यान्त्यापदः" ॥

This maxim belongs to the same class as अजाकृपाणीय and काकतालीय, which see.

गगनरोमन्थन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *ruminating on ether.* Equivalent to beating the air. It is found twice in the *Sarvadaras'anasangraha.* First, in the Râmânuja section (page 57 of Jîvânanda's edition, and 47 of Bib. Ind.):—"तदेतद्गगनरोमन्थायितम्", which Prof. Gough renders "All this is about as profitable as it would be for a ruminant animal to ruminate on ether." Secondly in the Pâṇini section (pages 162 and 143 respectively):—"तदेतद्गगनरोमन्थकल्पम्", rendered by Prof. Cowell by "All this is only the ruminating of empty ether." In the *Nyâyamanjarî* page 453, it appears in a slightly different form, in the expression "व्योम्नि रोमन्थकेलिवत्;" and in *S'âlikâ* p. 154, and *Nyâyamakaranda*, page 129, we meet with गगनग्रासकल्प.

गड्डुरिकाप्रवाहन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a continuous rush of sheep.* It is used to indicate the blind following of others like a flock of sheep. So the *Vâchaspatyam*, which says:—"गड्डलिकानामवीनां संमादेका

चेन्नद्यादौ पतति तदा तत्संघान्तर्गताः सर्वेऽपि वार्यमाणा अपि तत्र पतन्तीति लोकप्रसिद्ध्या यत्र वार्यमाणानामपि अनिष्टमार्गे धावनं तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ The expression occurs in chap. viii. (page 214) of the *Kâvyaprakâs'a* where a very helpful note of Mahes'achandra's will be found; and also in chap. vi, page 188, of the *Sâhityadarpaṇa*, which however, Mr. Pramadâdâsa Mitra has rendered, "in pursuance of established custom."

It is found, also, on pages 86 and 125 of Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Dhvanyâloka*, and in the opening part of *Kâvyapradîpa* viii. (p. 327). There seems to be much difference of opinion as to the correct form of the first word of the maxim, since it appears in the four varieties of गड्डरिका, गड्डलिका, गड्डारिका and गड्डालिका.

गुडजिह्विकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the tongue* [smeared] *with treacle* [in order to disguise an unpalatable draught]. The *Vâchaspatyam* thus explains its use:—"यथा तिक्तताभिया निम्बपानमकुर्वाणस्य बालस्य जिह्वायां गुडलेपं दत्त्वा पित्रादिस्तं निम्बं पाययति एवमर्थवादवाक्यानि बह्वायाससाध्ये कर्मण्यप्रवर्त्तमानं पुरुषं स्वर्गाक्षय्यादिकं श्रावयित्वा प्रवर्त्तयन्ति । फलश्रुतिरपि रोचनार्था"॥

An excellent example of this is found in *Kâvyapradîpa*, p. 7:— "ये सुकुमारमतयोऽतिसुखिस्वभावा राजकुमारादयो नीरसे नीतिशास्त्रे प्रवर्तयितुमशक्यास्तान्काव्यं कान्तेव सरसतापादनेनाभिमुखीकृत्योपदेशं ग्राहयति गुडजिह्विकया शिशूनिवौषधम् । यथाहुः ।

स्वादुकाव्यरसोन्मिश्रं वाक्यार्थमुपभुञ्जते ।
प्रथमालीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटु भेषजम्" ॥

It is employed in a similar manner by Abhinavagupta in his comment on *Dhvanyâloka* iii. 30, and by the author of *Padamanjarî* in the early part of his work (the Paṇḍit x. 254); and, somewhat less clearly, in *Bhâmatî*, pages 342, 534, and *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ*, pages 438, 441.

गोबलीवर्दन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the cattle and the bull.* In the *Paṇḍit* for October 1867, Râjârâma S'âstrî expounded it thus:—"यत्र गाः कालय बलीवर्दं चेत्युच्यते तत्र गोपदेनैव बलीवर्दपदसिद्धौ बलीवर्दपदं दुर्दम्यत्वज्ञापनपरत्वेन सफलमिति कल्प्यते" ॥ That given in the *Vâchaspatyam* is somewhat fuller:—"बलीवर्दस्य गोविशेषत्वेऽपि बलीवर्दस्य झटिति गोत्वेन बोधनार्थं यथा प्रयोगस्तथान्ययोः सामान्यविशेषरूपयोर्झटिति बोधनार्थं यत्र प्रयोगस्तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ In his exposition of *Manu* viii. 28, where six classes of women are enumerated as having a claim to the king's protection, Kullûka says:—"अत्र चानेकशब्दोपादाने गोबलीवर्दन्यायेन पुनरुक्तिपरिहारः" ॥ The commentators Râghavânanda and Govindarâja also quote the maxim in the same connection, and we have it in *Kâvyapradîpa* vii. 11 (page 300). Vâcaspatimis'ra, too, makes frequent use of it. It occurs in *Bhâmatî*, pages 518, 536; and in *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ*, pages 11, 118, 119 and 404. It belongs to the same class as ब्राह्मणवसिष्ठन्याय and ब्राह्मणपरिव्राजकन्याय.

गोमयपायसीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *cowdung as a milky preparation.* Some stupid person is supposed to argue that cowdung is made of milk, because it comes from the cow; hence it is used to denote an utterly absurd argument or statement. It occurs in Vyâsa's bhâshya on *Yogasûtra* i. 32. He says:—"कथंचित्समाधीयमानमप्येतद्गोमयपायसीयन्यायमाक्षिपति" ॥ On which the *Yogavârtika* remarks:—"गोमयं पायसं गव्यत्वादित्यादिन्यायमतदूषणं समाधीयमानमप्याक्षिपति तिरस्करोति" ॥ See, too, *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ*, p. 435.

It is found also in the Bauddha section of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 18 of Bib. Ind. and 22 of Jîvânanda's edition) in the following sentence:—"एवं चायमभेदसाधको हेतुर्गोमयपायसीयन्यायवदाभासतां भजेत्", which Professor Gough renders "Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is

difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity, *like milky food made of cowdung.*"

The compound गोमयपायसीय is included in *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* iii. 196, but Vardhamâna did not explain it.

घट्टकुटीप्रभातन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *day-break in the vicinity of the toll-collector's hut.* A man, anxious to avoid paying toll, takes another road, but losing his way in the dark, finds himself, at day-break in the vicinity of that very toll-gate! The saying is employed to illustrate उद्देश्यासिद्धि, as Prof. Cowell puts it; that is, failure to accomplish a desired object. It occurs in the Pâṇini section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* as follows:—"ननु स्फोटवाचकतापक्षेऽपि प्रागुक्तविकल्पप्रसरेण घट्टकुटीप्रभातायितमिति चेत्तदेतन्मनोराज्यविजृम्भणं वैषम्यसंभवात्", which is thus rendered by Prof. Cowell:—"But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called *sphoṭa* which expresses the meaning, the same untenable alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that '*the dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house close by*'. This, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference between the two cases."

S'rîharsha, too, used the simile in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya* (page 35):—"तर्हि कारणस्य सत्तामभ्युपगतवानसीति घट्टकुट्यां प्रभातमिति चेन्न" ॥ See also *Siddhântales'a*, pages 40 and 116; *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 62; *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, pages 63, 146, 219, 371; *Citsukhî*, i. 12; ii. 24 (Paṇḍit iv. 518; v. 510), and *Kusumânjali* iii. 16 (page 496).

घुणाक्षरन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the letter made by the wood-worm ghuṇa.* This worm bores holes in wood and in books which sometimes assume the shape of a letter of the alphabet; hence its use to

intimate the occurrence of something quite accidental. Here is Vardhamâna's (iii. 195) description of it:—"घुणोत्किरणात्कथंचिन्निष्पन्नमक्षरं घुणाक्षरम्। तदिव यदकुशलेन दैवान्निष्पद्यते तद्घुणाक्षरीयम्" ॥

The simile is found in the opening part of the *Prasannarâghava* (page 9) as follows:—"अहो घुणाक्षरन्यायो यदिदं भ्रमरद्वयं प्रति मयोक्तं बन्दिद्वयं प्रति फलितं वचः" ॥ Also in *Râjataraṅgiṇî* iv. 167:—"त्रीन्वारान्समरे जित्वा जितं मेने स मुम्मुनिम्। सकृज्जयमरेर्वीरा मन्यन्ते हि घुणाक्षरम्" ॥ *Mâgha* iii. 58 may also be referred to.

चन्द्रचन्द्रिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the moon and its light.* Used of two inseparable things. It is found in Ânandagiri's *S'ankaravijaya*, page 124:—"अतः सर्वदेवकारणस्य रुद्रस्य या शक्तिश्चन्द्रचन्द्रिकान्यायेन तदुद्बोधरूपिणीस्वाधीनवल्लभेति प्रसिद्धा सैव भवानी" ॥

चौरापराधान्माण्डव्यनिग्रहन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the punishment of Mâṇḍavya for the crime committed by robbers.* The story of the Rishi Aṇî-Mâṇḍavya is told at length in *Âdiparva* cvii, cviii. Whilst he was practising severe austerities, in conjunction with the *mauna-vrata*, some robbers concealed themselves and their plunder in his Âs'rama. The king's guard found them there, and, believing the sage to be implicated in the affair, carried him off together with them and impaled them all together! Mâṇḍavya was eventually removed from the stake, but its point (अणी) remained in him; hence the name, given him by the people, of Aṇî-Mâṇḍavya. The maxim is found in the Pûrṇaprajna chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 73 of Jîvânanda's edition, and 62 of Bib. Ind.):—"तस्मान्न भेदप्रत्यक्षं सुप्रसरमिति चेत्किं वस्तुस्वरूपभेदवादिनं प्रति इमानि दूषणान्युद्घुष्यन्ते किंवा धर्मिभेदवादिनं प्रति । प्रथमे चौरापराधान्माण्डव्यनिग्रहन्यायापातः" ॥ But its earliest occurrence is in *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 70, line 15, where we read "एवं हि चौरापराधेन

व्यक्तमयं माण्डव्यनिग्रहः स्यात्'' ॥ and it was from this source that the Khaṇḍanakâra, too, derived the nyâya together with several pages of context! Compare pages 633-636 of S'rîharṣa's work with pages 70 and 71 of Udayana's.

छत्रिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the men with umbrellas.* The thought here is of a crowd of men, *many* of them with umbrellas up, and so *all* seeming to have them. Its application will be apparent from the examples which follow. We have one in S'ankara's bhâshya on *Katha-Upanishad* iii. 1 (''ऋतं पिबन्तौ'' &c.):—''एकस्तत्र कर्मफलं पिबति भुङ्क्ते नेतरस्तथापि पातृसंबन्धात्पिबन्तावित्युच्यते छत्रिन्यायेन'' ॥ Again, in his bhâshya on *Vedântasûtra* 3. 3. 34, where the same text is expounded:—''ऋतं पिबन्तावित्यत्र तु जीवे पिबत्यशनायाद्यतीतः परमात्मापि साहचर्याच्छत्रिन्यायेन पिबतीत्युपचर्यते'' ॥ On the former of these two passages, the commentator Gopâla Yatîndra says:—''छत्रिन्यायेनेति । यथा लोके छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीति प्रयोगे सपरिवारे राज्ञि गच्छति छत्र्यछत्रिसमुदाये छत्रिशब्दो वर्तत एकसमूहवाहित्वेनैवं पिबदपिबत्समुदाये पिबतिर्वर्त्तत इत्यर्थः ॥

I have met with the maxim in the *Kuvalayânanda* also under the figure उल्लास, and in Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtra-bhâshya* 1. 2. 11; 1. 4. 12.

But the nyâya is found long before S'ankara's time, and perhaps originated with S'abara, in whose bhâshya on Jaimini 1. 4. 28 we read ''यथा छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीत्येकेन छत्रिणा सर्वे लक्ष्यन्ते''; and in *Tantravârtika* 1. 4. 13 ''तस्मादेकदेशस्थैरपि विश्वेदेवैरुपलक्षितानां छत्रिन्यायेन तत्प्रख्यतयैव सर्वेषां नामधेयत्वम्'' ॥

तमोदीपन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *darkness and the lamp.* This is found in the *Vedântasiddhântamuktâvali* (page 125) where we read:—

"तदयं तमोदीपन्यायः । तथाहि । अज्ञानं ज्ञातुमिच्छेद्यो मानेनात्यन्तमूढधीः । स तु नूनं तमः पश्येद्दीपेनोत्तमतेजसा" ॥ "Hence the well-known illustration of darkness and the lamp:—Thus that dullest of dull-heads who would cognize Nescience by means of a pramâṇa, would forsooth go looking for darkness with a brilliant lamp."

This verse is most probably based on that of Sures'vara in *Taittirîyavârtika* 2. 1. 177:—

"प्रमाणोत्पन्नया दृष्ट्या योऽविद्यां द्रष्टुमिच्छति ।
दीपेनासौ ध्रुवं पश्येद्गुहाकुक्षिगतं तमः" ॥

दग्धपटन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the burnt cloth.* When a piece of cloth, or a leaf, is thrown into the fire and consumed, its outline is still visible in the charred remains; and this the Vedântists use to illustrate the unreality and unsubstantiality of all phenomena. It occurs twice in Nṛisiṁhasarasvatî's commentary on the *Vedântasâra*, namely on pages 55 and 66, as follows:—"यद्वा सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मैतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वमित्यादिश्रुतिबलात्सर्वमहमिति गिरिनदीसमुद्रात्मकं सर्वं जगत्स्वाभिन्नसच्चिदानन्दब्रह्मत्वेनानुभूय तस्य दग्धपटन्यायेन प्रपञ्चभानेऽप्यद्वैतं सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणं वस्तु भासत एवेत्यर्थः" ॥ (Page 55).

"नन्वेतादृशस्य जीवन्मुक्तस्य देहेन्द्रियादिभानमस्ति न वेत्याशङ्क्य दग्धपटन्यायेनेन्द्रजालनिर्मितसौधसमुद्रादिवच्च बाधितानुवृत्त्या मिथ्यात्वेन भानेऽपि परमार्थतया भानं नेत्याह अयमित्यादिना न पश्यतीत्यन्तेन" ॥ (Page 66).

दण्डापूपिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the stick and the cakes.* If a number of cakes (chapâṭis) are attached to a stick, and the stick is carried off or eaten by mice, the inference is that the cakes have shared the same fate. The application of the maxim is obvious. In the *Sâhityakaumudî* (xi. 8), and in the *Kuvalayânanda* (page 244), it is used to illustrate the figure अर्थापत्ति and काव्यार्थापत्ति respectively.

"दण्डापूपिकयान्यार्थागमोऽर्थापत्तिरिष्यते ॥ ८ ॥ मूषिकेण दण्डो भक्षितश्चेद्दिहस्थः पूपोऽपि तेन भक्षित इति न्यायो दण्डापूपिका । तयान्यार्थागमोऽर्थान्तरप्रत्ययोऽर्थापत्तिरित्यर्थः" ॥ (*Sâh.*)

"कैमुत्येनार्थसंसिद्धिः काव्यार्थापत्तिरिष्यते*। स जितस्त्वन्मुखेनेन्दुः का वार्ता सरसीरुहाम् ॥ अत्र स इत्यनेन पद्मानि येन जितानीति विवक्षितं तथा च सोऽपि येन जितस्तेन पद्मानि जितानीति किमु वक्तव्यमिति दण्डापूपिकान्यायेन पद्मजयरूपस्यार्थस्य संसिद्धिः काव्यार्थापत्तिः । तान्त्रिकाभिमतार्थापत्तिव्यावर्तनाय काव्येति विशेषणम्" ॥ (*Kuv*).

See also *Bṛihadâraṇyakopanishad-bhâshyavârtika*, page 909, verse 135.

देहलीदीपन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a lamp on the threshold*. A lamp so placed gives light both inside and outside the house, and is therefore used as an illustration of anything which fulfills a double purpose. S'abara refers to such a lamp in his bhâshya on *Jaimini* 12. 1. 3:—"यथा प्रासादे कृतः प्रदीपः सन्निधानाद्राजमार्गेऽप्युपकरोति". There is a similar expression, too, in *Kuvalayânanda*, page 97. Another good example of the nyâya is found in the commentary on *Saptapadârthî*, page 52. The text stands thus:—"द्रव्यानारंभकं कार्यद्रव्यमन्त्यावयवि ॥ प्रागभाववत्कार्यम् ॥ भोगायतनमन्त्यावयवि शरीरम्" ॥ on which Mâdhava Sarasvatî remarks:—"शरीरलक्षणेऽन्त्यावयविपदज्ञानाय तल्लक्षणमाह द्रव्येति। यद्यप्युद्देशानन्तरं लक्षणस्य वक्तव्यत्वाच्छरीरलक्षणानन्तरं भोगादिवदन्त्यावयवी लक्षयितुमुचितस्तथाप्यत्र द्रव्यपदव्यवच्छेद्यत्वेन प्राप्तत्वाद्देहलीप्रदीपन्यायेनोभयत्रोपकार्यतयात्रैव लक्षित इत्यदोषः" ॥

My friend Professor Cowell pointed out another instance of the use of the nyâya in Ânandagiri's *S'ankaravijaya* xi, page 82. The maxim is akin to काकाक्षिगोलकन्याय and जामात्रर्थं श्रपितस्य सूपादेरातिथ्युपकारकत्वम् ॥

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* The author of *Rasagangâdhara* finds fault with this definition. See page 487 of Durgâprasâda's edition, Bombay 1888.

नष्टाश्वदग्धरथन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the lost horses and burnt chariot.* This is based on the story of two men travelling in their respective chariots, and one of them losing his horses and the other having his chariot burnt, through the outbreak of a fire in the village in which they were putting up for the night. The horses that were left were harnessed to the remaining chariot, and the two men pursued their journey together. Its teaching is—union for mutual advantage. That the story is very old is clear from the fact that the saying is quoted in the 16th *vârtika* ("संप्रयोगो वा नष्टाश्वदग्धरथवत्") to *Pâṇini* 1. 1. 50, and again in S'abara's *bhâshya* 2. 1. 1. It appears also in Sures'vara's *Bṛihadâraṇya-bhâshyavârtika* 2. 1. 38, which reads thus:—"नष्टाश्वदग्धरथवन्न्यायं चाश्रित्य भूमिपम्। प्राह मानुषवित्ताढ्यं दैववित्तसमन्वितः" ॥ On which Ânandagiri says:—"अधिकारिणे विद्यां वक्तुं गार्ग्यश्चेदुपचक्रमे तर्हि योग्यं ब्राह्मणं हित्वा किमिति राजानमुपेत्य ब्रवीति। तत्राह नष्टेति। यथाहुर्युक्तः संयोगोऽधिकारार्थेन हेतुना नष्टाश्वदग्धरथवदिति" ॥

Râmatîrtha, too, quotes the maxim in his comment on the *Vedântasâra* (page 93, line 3):—"नष्टाश्वदग्धरथन्यायेन 'कर्मणा पितृलोक' इति श्रुतिरुपपद्यते", of which the following translation is found in *The Paṇḍit* for May 1872:—"The Vedic text 'The world of progenitors is attained by works,' can be explained according to the analogy of two men, of whom the horses of the one are lost and the chariot of the other burnt [for the horses of the latter may be yoked to the car of the former, and they may travel together; and in like manner, constant and occasional works, though no special result has been recorded of them, may supply a cause for the attainment of the world of the progenitors, which requires some special works as a condition]." See also *Tantravârtika*, pp. 15, 709, 832, and *Bhâmatî*, page 81.

नहि कठोरकण्ठीरवस्य कुरङ्गशावः प्रतिभटो भवति ॥

A young fawn cannot stand up against a full-grown lion.

This is found in the Akshapâda chapter of *Sarvadars'ana-sangraha* (page 136 of Jîvânanda's, and 119 of Bib. Ind.):—"नैतत्परीक्षाक्षममीक्ष्यते नहि कठोरकण्ठीरवस्य कुरङ्गशावः प्रतिभटो भवति", which Prof. Cowell renders, "This pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn can stand the attack of the full-grown lion." Compare "नाल्पीयसा महतोऽभिभवः संभवति" ॥ of *S'âlikâ*, Page 94, and see the nyâya "नहि भवति तरक्षुः &c." in *Second Handful.*

नहि खदिरगोचरे परशौ पलाशे द्वैधीभावो भवति ॥

The Palās'a tree is not cleft when the axe is applied to the Khadira tree. The saying is used to indicate that two objects are essentially distinct. I have met with it in three of Vâcaspatimis'ra's works.

It occurs in *Bhâmatî* 2. 2. 28 (page 438) in the following connection. "स्वरूपं विज्ञानस्यासत्याकारयुक्तं प्रमेयम् । प्रमेयप्रकाशनं प्रमाणफलं, तत्प्रकाशनशक्तिः प्रमाणम् । बाह्यवादिनोरपि वैभाषिकसौत्रान्तिकयोः काल्पनिक एव प्रमाणफलव्यवहारोऽभिमत इत्याह 'सत्यपि बाह्येऽर्थे' इति । भिन्नाधिकरणत्वे हि प्रमाणफलयोस्तद्भावो न स्यात् । नहि खदिरगोचरे परशौ पलाशे द्वैधीभावो भवति । तस्मादनयोरैकाधिकरण्यं वक्तव्यम्" ॥

Then in *Yogabhâṣyaṭîkâ* i. 7 we read:—"ननु पुरुषवर्ती बोधः कथं चित्तगताया वृत्तेः फलम् । नहि खदिरगोचरव्यापारेण परशुना पलाशे छिदा क्रियत इति" ॥

And very similarly in *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 67:—"अथ प्रमाणफलयोर्भिन्नविषयत्वेन विप्रतिपत्त्या प्रमाणफलभावायोगात् । नहि पनसविषयेण परशुना खदिरे द्वैधीभावो भवति" ॥ But he is not the only writer who makes use of it, for in *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, page 93, we read:—"तयोर्भिन्नाधिकरणवृत्तित्वे खदिरगोचरे परशौ पालाशे द्वैधीभावो भवेत्" ॥ For earlier references to this nyâya, see the Superaddenda to the *Third Handful*.

न हि वरविघाताय कन्योद्वाहः ॥

The bride is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. This is found in *Brahmasûtrabhâshya* 4. 1. 2, and in the Pûrṇaprajna chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 63 of Bib. Ind., and 75 of Jîvânanda's edn.). It occurs also in *Jîvanmuktiviveka*, page 101 (line 4 from bottom). In the *Vâchaspatyam* and in the *Laukikanyâyasangraha*, the maxim is given in the *positive* form, *viz.* "वरघाताय कन्यावरणम्" with the other as a possible variant. Târânâtha explains it thus:—"विषकन्यायां वृतायां यत्र वरस्य घातः संभाव्यते तत्र तां नोद्वहेदेवं विवक्षायामस्य प्रवृत्तिः । तथा चानिष्टान्तरपातादिसंभावनायामभीष्टहेतुरपि वस्तु न वरणीयमित्येवं तन्न्यायतात्पर्यम् । अयमेव न्यायः क्वचिन्न हि वरघाताय कन्यामुद्वाहयतीति न्यायतया पठ्यते" ॥ We have a reference to "poison-damsels" in *Kathâsaritsâgara* xix. 82, which reads thus:—"विदधे विषकन्याश्च सैन्ये पण्यविलासिनीः । प्राहिणोत्पुरुषांश्चैव निशासु छद्मघातिनः" ॥ In a foot-note to his translation of the passage, Mr. Tawney says, "One of these poison-damsels is represented as having been employed against Chandragupta in the Mudrâ-Râkshasa. Compare the xi th tale in the Gesta Romanorum, where an Indian queen sends one to Alexander the Great. Aristotle frustrates the stratagem."

पङ्कप्रक्षालनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the washing off of mud.* It is evidently deduced from *Pañchatantra* ii. 157, a verse intended to strengthen an argument against the possession of riches under any circumstances, and which reads thus:—"धर्मार्थं यस्य वित्तेहा तस्यापि न शुभावहा । प्रक्षालनाद्धि पङ्कस्य दूरादस्पर्शनं वरम्" ॥ "If a man desires wealth for charitable purposes, even to him it will bring no good; for, better than the washing off of mud is the keeping away from it altogether." The nyâya is therefore the equivalent of our "Prevention is better than cure." In his bhâshya on *Brahmasûtra* 3. 2. 22. S'ankara twice quotes the second line of the above couplet; and, in commenting thereon, Ânandagiri uses the maxim three times. It is again applied twice by him

on *Brahmasûtrabhâshya* 4. 1. 16. as follows:—"अग्निहोत्रादीनामपि पुण्यान्तरवद्विनाश्यत्वात्पङ्कक्षालनन्यायापातादारुरुक्षुणापि तानि नानुष्ठेयानि"; "धीनाश्यानामपि कर्मणामनुष्ठानस्य विद्योत्पत्त्यर्थतया पङ्कप्रक्षालनन्यायानवकाशात्पूर्वं ज्ञानादनुष्ठेयान्यग्निहोत्रादीनीति सिद्धान्तप्रतिज्ञां विवृणोति." See also *Bhâmatî* and *Bhâshyaratnaprabhâ* on the same, and *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 97, line 14.

पङ्ग्वन्धन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the lame man and the blind man.* The conception is that of a lame man mounted on the shoulders of one who is blind, so that the former is furnished with the power of locomotion and the latter with sight. It is intended to illustrate mutual dependence for mutual advantage, as exemplified in *Sânkhyakârikâ* 21, the text of which, with Colebrooke's translation, is as follows:—"पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य। पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः" ॥ "For the soul's contemplation of Nature, and for its abstraction, the union of both takes place, as of the halt and blind. By that union a creation is framed." Vâchaspati Mis'ra ignores the illustration, but Paṇḍit Târânâtha has a helpful note on it. He says:—"उक्तार्थे दृष्टान्तः पङ्ग्वन्धवदिति। यथा गतिशक्तिरहितस्य पङ्गोर्गतिसाधनाय गतिमतोऽन्धस्यापेक्षा, दृष्टिशक्तिरहितस्य चान्धस्य गतिशक्तिसत्त्वेऽपि स्वाभीष्टदेशगमनं दर्शकमन्तरेण न संभवति तथा च यथा स्वस्वकार्याय तयोरन्योन्यापेक्षा तथा क्रियारहितस्य पुरुषस्य सक्रियप्रधानस्यापेक्षा दृष्टिशक्तिरहितस्य च प्रधानस्य दृष्टिशक्तियुक्तपुरुषस्यापेक्षेत्यत उभाभ्यामन्योन्यमपेक्ष्य स्वस्वकार्यं निष्पाद्यत इत्यर्थः" ॥ The above *kârikâ* is quoted on the last page of the Sânkhya section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, and is preceded by a very clear explanation of the maxim.

पञ्जरचालनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the moving of the bird-cage.* An illustration of the power of united effort. In a discussion on *prâṇa*, under *Vedântasûtra* 2. 4. 9, S'ankara introduces this maxim and

explains it thus:—"ननु पञ्जरचालनन्यायेनैतद्भविष्यति । यथैकपञ्जरवर्तिन एकादशपक्षिणः प्रत्येकं प्रतिनियतव्यापाराः सन्तः संभूयैकं पञ्जरं चालयन्ति । एवमेकशरीरवर्तिन एकादशप्राणाः प्रत्येकं प्रतिनियतवृत्तयः सन्तः संभूयैकां प्राणाख्यां वृत्तिं प्रतिलप्स्यन्त इति" ॥ Dr. Thibaut translates the passage as follows:—"But, an objection may be raised, the thing may take place in the manner of the moving [of the ?] bird-cage. Just as eleven birds shut up in one cage, may, although each makes a separate effort, move the cage by the combination of their efforts, so the eleven prâṇas which abide in one body may, although each has its own special function, by the combination of these functions, produce one common function called prâṇa."

पाटच्चरलुण्ठिते वेश्मनि यामिकजागरणम् ॥

The vigilance of the watchman after the house has been plundered by thieves. Equivalent to our proverb "Shutting the stable door after the horse is gone." It occurs in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya*, page 45:—"प्रयोजनानुपयुक्ते काले तस्य स्वरूपतोऽवस्थानं पाटच्चरलुण्ठिते वेश्मनि यामिकजागरणवृत्तान्तमनुहरति" ॥

पिण्याकयाचनार्थं गतस्य खारिकातैलदातृत्वाभ्युपगमः ॥

He went to crave the leavings of the oil-seed, and had instead to agree to give 16 *measures of oil.* Used of one completely worsted in argument. I render पिण्याक in accordance with its meaning in *Pañchatantra* iii. 99("श्रेयस्तैलं च पिण्याकात्"). The maxim is found in the Pûrṇaprajna section of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 63 of Bib. Ind., and 75 of Jîvânanda):—"सोऽयं पिण्याकयाचनार्थं गतस्य खारिकातैलदातृत्वाभ्युपगम इव", which Prof. Gough render:—"And thus it must be allowed that, in raising the objection, you have begged for a little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil."

पिष्टपेषणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the grinding of that which is already ground.* Fruitless reiteration, unproductive repetition. The oldest in-

stance, known to me, of the employment of the nyâya, is by S'abara on Jaimini 9. 2. 3:—"न हि स्निग्धस्य स्नेहनं शक्यं कर्तुं पिष्टस्य वा पेषणम्". It occurs again in 12. 2. 16, and in *Tantravârtika*, pp.54 and 477. We find it likewise in S'ankara's bhâshya on *Kena-Upanishad* 32:—"यदि तावच्छ्रुतस्यार्थस्य प्रश्नः कृतस्ततः पिष्टपेषणवत्पुनरुक्तोऽनर्थकः प्रश्नः स्यात्" ॥, and in Sudars'anârya's comment on *Âpastamba-Gṛihyasûtra* xiv. 9 ("पुंसवनं व्यक्ते गर्भे तिष्येण"), where he says "इदमपि सीमन्तवत्प्रथम एव न तु प्रतिगर्भं पिष्टपेषणन्यायात्" ॥ Compare तुषकण्डनन्याय in *Second Handful*.

प्रदीपे प्रदीपं प्रज्वाल्य तमोनाशाय यतमानः ॥

Trying to remove the dimness of a lamp by lighting another. Used of foolishly superfluous and misdirected effort. It occurs in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya*, page 294:—"लघोरुपायात्साध्यसिद्धौ भवन्त्यां...गुरावुपाये प्रवर्तमानस्य तवैवेदं दोषोद्भावनं प्रदीपे प्रदीपं प्रज्वाल्य तमोनाशाय यतमानस्येव पुंसः" ॥ In a footnote, the editor says:—"प्रदीपं प्रज्वाल्य प्रदीपे तमोनाशाय यतमानस्य पुंस इवेत्यन्वयः."

In *Upades'asâhasrî* xvii. 41 (page 215), we read:—"न हि दीपान्तरापेक्षा यद्वद्दीपप्रकाशने । बोधस्यात्मस्वरूपत्वान्न बोधोन्यस्तथेष्यते"; and, in Sures'vara's *Bṛihadâraṇyakavârtika* 4. 3. 501:—"ननु दीपः स्वमात्मानं स्वात्मनैवावभासयन् । दृष्टो दीपप्रकाशार्थं न हि दीपान्तराद्धतिः" ॥ See also *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 625, on *Nyâyasûtra* 5. 1. 10.

प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the destruction of the chief antagonist.* The principle that when the most formidable enemy has been defeated, the less formidable are already virtully overcome. In the bhâshya on *Vedântasûtra* 1. 4. 28 ("एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः") we read:—"अतः प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्यायेनातिदिशति । एतेन प्रधानकारणवादप्रतिषेधन्यायकलापेन सर्वेऽण्वादिकारणवादा अपि प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता वेदितव्याः" ॥ Here, there is undoubtedly a play on the word प्रधान, the Sânkhya theory of the Pradhâna being the chief antagonist met and overcome in the foregoing Sûtras

and bhâshya. The same expression appears again in the bhâshya on *Sûtra* 2. 1. 12, and the maxim is found, too, in the Râmânuja chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 54 of Jîvânanda's edition, and p. 45 of Bib. Ind. edition).

बीजाङ्कुरन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *an eternal series of seed and shoot.* As the seed produces the shoot, so the latter in turn reproduces the former. Each therefore is a cause and an effect. The maxim is met with very frequently in the literature. We find it in *Brahmasûtrabhâshya* 2. 1. 36 (on the eternity of the world) as follows:—"न च कर्मान्तरेण शरीरं संभवति । न च शरीरमन्तरेण कर्म संभवतीतीतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गः । अनादित्वे तु बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेनोपपत्तेर्न कश्चिद्दोषो भवति", which is rendered thus by Dr. Thibaut:—"Without merit and demerit nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be formed; so that—on the doctrine of the world having a beginning—we are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains." It occurs again at the end of the *bhâshya* on 3. 2. 9. Also in the Ârhata section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 31 of Bib. Ind., and 37 of Jîvânanda), in Râmatîṛtha's commentary on *Vedânta-sâra* (page 110), and in *Panchapâdikâ*, page 12, line 12.

ब्राह्मणपरिव्राजकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the Brâhmans and the mendicants.* In such a sentence as ब्राह्मणा भोजयितव्याः परिव्राजकाश्च the separate mention of the latter, who are really included in the former term, merely emphasizes their position as a special part of the general body. It is thus the exact paralled of the गोबलीवर्दन्याय and of the ब्राह्मणवसिष्ठन्याय. It is used by S'ankara three times in his exposition of the *Vedântasûtras*, namely under 1. 4. 16, 2. 3. 15, and 3. 1. 11; but I forbear to quote his words, for without a

lengthy portion of context they would be unintelligible. It appears also in *Tantravârtika*, pages 423, 590.

ब्राह्मणवसिष्ठन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the Brâhmans and Vasishṭha*. This is of the same type as ब्राह्मणपरिव्राजकन्याय, which see. Satyavrata gives as a reference "हलन्त्यं-सूत्रभाष्यं," *i. e.* Patanjali on *Pâṇini* 1. 3. 3. But the reference is a pure delusion; and I think I may safely say that the maxim is not to be found in any part of the *Mahâbhâshya*. It would not be unreasonable, however, to infer that the author of the *Padamanjarî* had this nyâya in view when he penned the following:—वैदिकानां लौकिकत्वेऽपि प्राधान्यख्यापनार्थं पृथग्ग्रहणं यथा ब्राह्मणा आगता वसिष्ठोऽप्यागत इति" ॥ (*The Paṇdit*, vol. x, page 282). Compare तक्रकौण्डिन्यन्याय in *Second handful*.

ब्राह्मणश्रमणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the Brâhmana-ascetic*. The श्रमण is a Buddhist ascetic, and therefore not a Brâhman,—but the expression ब्राह्मणश्रमण implies that though now a Buddhist he was formerly a Brâhman. The maxim is used by the authors of the *Kâvyaprakâs'a* (page 68) and the *Sâhityadarpaṇa* (article 257) in exactly the same connexion. After giving an example of 'suggested meaning' in the form of 'semblance of contradiction' (विरोधाभास), the author of the latter work says:—"अत्रामित इत्यादावपिशब्दाभावाद्विरोधाभासो व्यङ्ग्यः । व्यङ्ग्यस्यालंकार्यत्वेऽपि ब्राह्मणश्रमणन्यायादलंकारत्वमुपचर्यते", which Mr. Pramadâdâsa Mitra renders thus:—"Here, from the absence of the particle अपि after the words अमित &c., the semblence of the ornament named 'contradiction' is suggested. The suggested meaning, though strictly what is ornamented, is figuratively spoken of here as the ornament, with reference to its being an ornament in another condition [*i. e.* when it is *expressed*, not suggested], just as we use the word Brâhman-mendicant, which, though it

etymologically means an absurdity, *viz.* a mendicant, or one not a Brâhman, who is a Brâhman, tropically signifies one who *was* a Brâhman."

भक्षितेऽपि लशुने न शान्तो व्याधिः ॥

Although the garlic has been eaten the disease is not cured. This proverb is applied as follows by Nṛisimhasarasvatî in his comment on the opening verse of the *Vedântasâra*:—"ननु भक्षितेऽपि लशुने न शान्तो व्याधिरिति न्यायेन प्रपञ्चस्याधिष्ठानव्यतिरिक्ततया प्रतीयमानत्वात्कथमद्वैतसिद्धिरित्याशङ्कां तृणीकुर्वन्नाह अखण्डमिति" ॥ It is found also in *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 37.

भिक्षुपादप्रसारणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a beggar's obtaining a firm footing* [in a patron's house]. Perhaps approaching our "give him an inch and he will take an ell." Târânâtha explains it thus:—"यथा कश्चिद्भिक्षुर्यथेष्टभोजनाच्छादनवासगृहादिलाभार्थं कस्यचिद्धनिनो गृहे प्रविश्य युगपत्सर्वाभीष्टालाभं मन्यमानः प्रथमं धनिगृहे मे पादप्रसारणमस्तु पश्चादनेन परिचयमुत्पाद्य सर्वमभीष्टं संपादयिष्यामीति धिया स्वल्पामपि भिक्षां बहुमन्यमानः पश्चात्क्रमेण स्वाभीष्टं संपादयत्येवं यत्र विवक्षा तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥

It occurs in the Bauddha chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 14 of Bib. Ind. edn.) as follows:—"माध्यमिकास्तावदुत्तमप्रज्ञा इत्थमचीकथन्भिक्षुपादप्रसारणन्यायेन क्षणभङ्गाद्यभिधानमुखेन स्थायित्वानुकूलवेदनीयत्वानुगतसर्वसत्यत्वभ्रमव्यावर्तनेन सर्वशून्यतायामेव पर्यवसानम्" ॥ Here is Prof. Gough's rendering:—"The Mâdhyamikas, excellently wise, explain as follows, namely that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression *like the intrusive steps of a mendicant*, through the position of a momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of reality."

I have met with one other example only, namely in Venkaṭanâtha's *Tattvamuktâkalâpa*, page 254:—"अस्त्वेवमिति चेन्न भिक्षु-

पादप्रसारणन्यायेन निरीश्वरवादावतारादतः क्रोधावश्यम्भावादीश्वरस्यापि दुःखावश्यम्भावः" ॥ The subject under discussion here is आगमिकेश्वरसिद्धि. For the cognate expression पादप्रसारिका see the *Second Handful.*

मणिमन्त्रादिन्यायः ॥

The nyâya of *a gem or charm* &c. [as an obstructer or exciter of fire &c., by its presence or absence]. This obscure nyâya is not in Raghunâthavarma's collection, but is defined as follows in the *Vâcaspatyam*, page 4166:—"मणिमन्त्रादीनां वह्नेर्दाहं प्रति यथा स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रतिबन्धकत्वं लोकसिद्धं न च तत्र युक्त्यपेक्षा एवं कामिनीजिज्ञासाया अपि ज्ञानमात्रं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकत्वमित्येवं यत्र पृथक् प्रतिबन्धकत्वं तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥

I am much indebted to Mr. Arthur Venis for the following note elucidating the nyâya:—"In their analysis of the notion of cause and effect many Indian writers distinguish between those cases in which the processes that intervene (*avântara-vyâpâra*) between the cause and its final product (*kârya*) are known by ordinary experience (*lokasiddha*), and those other cases in which the intermediate stages are not thus known. Of the latter cases, while we know as a fact (say these writers) that, for example, a *maṇi* or a *mantra* will produce a certain effect or prevent it from coming into existence, we are quite unable to explain the rationale of the process in terms of ordinary experience. All that can be said in such cases is that the *maṇi* or the *mantra* has the power (*s'akti*) to produce this or hinder that result. This postulate of a power transcending ordinary experience is the मणिमन्त्रादिन्याय, and its proper application (*pravṛitti*) is to the class of causes thus roughly described. If I remember rightly, another, and to us westerns a more interesting, example of this nyâya is the double fact of *attention to* something and *attention away from* something else. The lover, intent on discovering his mistress (*Kâminî-jijnâsâ*), is psychologically dead to all that does not

concern her. But *how* should his attention *to* her cause attention *away from* all the world beside? Here, says the Indian psychologist, analysis of the *how* can proceed no further. The postulate of the मणिमन्त्र must be applied here; or, in other words, we can only say that *attention to* a thing has the power to cause (*s'akti*) *attention away from* something else." This question is discussed in *Kusumânjali* i. 10, and Prof. Cowell's translation of the *kârikâ* and Haridâsa's comment will be found helpful. I have met with the nyâya in the *Sankṣ'epas'ârîraka* iii. 87, 88, 91; in *Tattvamuktâkalâpa* iv. 103, and better still, in v. 99; and in *Vidvanmaṇḍana*, page 59.

मण्डूकप्लुतिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a frog's leap*. Used by grammarians and others to express the passing from one rule to another over intervening ones. I noted it in the following portions of the *Mahâbhâshya*:—1. 1. 3 (vârt.2); 5. 2. 4 (2); 6. 1. 17 and 3. 49; and 7. 2. 117. I have met with it also in Jayaratha's commentary on *Alankârasarvasva* 20 ("विषयस्यापह्नवेऽपह्नुतिः"), where he says:—
"केचन मण्डूकप्लुतिन्यायेनानुवर्तनस्यानुचितत्वाद्भ्रान्तिमदनन्तरमपह्नुतिर्ग्रन्थकृता लक्षिता उल्लेखश्चातिशयोक्त्यनन्तरमिति ग्रन्थं विपर्यासितवन्तः। न चैतत्" ॥
See, too, *Bhâmatî* 1. 3. 39, and Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyâya*, ii. 80.

मध्यदीपिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the central lamp*. The idea is of a lamp in a central position shedding its light on all sides. It occurs in the *Muṇḍaka-bhâshya* 1. 1. 3 (शौनको ह वै महाशालोऽङ्गिरसं विधिवदुपसन्नः पप्रच्छ):—"शौनकाङ्गिरसोः संबन्धादर्वाग्विधिवद्विशेषणादुपसदनविधेः पूर्वेषामनियम इति गम्यते। मर्यादाकरणार्थं मध्यदीपिकान्यायार्थं वा विशेषणम्" ॥
Also in Râmatîrtha on *Vedântasâra* (page 129):—मध्यप्रदीपन्यायेनोत्तरत्रापि जाग्रद्वासनेत्यत्र कोशत्रयपदं संबध्यते", which is thus ren-

dered by Prof. Gough (in the *Paṇḍit* for Feb. 1873, p. 212):— "The term triad of sheaths has a double connection [with both the preceding and following clauses], after the manner of a lamp placed in the middle of a door [and throwing light both inwards and outwards]." The following from *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 212, further illustrates the nyâya:—"गृहे दधिघटीं द्रष्टुमानीतो गृहमेधिना । अपूपानपि तद्देशान्प्रकाशयति दीपकः" ॥ Akin to this is मध्यमणिन्याय, which is explained in the *Paṇḍit* for Dec. 1867 as referring to the central ruby of a nose-ring which casts a lustre on the pearl on each side of it.

मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिः ॥

To know the thing to be measured you must know the measure. This is quoted in the opening part of the Akshapâda section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिरिति न्यायेन प्रमाणस्य प्रथममुद्देशे तदनुसारेण लक्षणस्य कथनीयतया प्रथमोद्दिष्टस्य प्रमाणस्य प्रथमं लक्षणं कथ्यते" ॥ Prof. Cowell's translation is as follows:—"In accordance with the principle that 'to know the thing to be measured you must first know the measure,' proof (pramâṇa) is first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have first a definition of proof." We find it too, in *Tattvapradîpikâ* (or *Citsukhî*) ii. 18, as follows: "मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिर्मानसिद्धिश्च लक्षणात् । तच्चाध्यक्षादिमानेषु गीर्वाणैरपि दुर्भणम्" ॥ Compare also the following from **Sankshepas'ârîraka* (i. 487):—"मानेन मेयावगतिश्च युक्ता धर्मस्य जाड्याद्विधिनिष्ठकाण्डे । मेयेन मानावगतिस्तु युक्ता वेदान्तवाक्येष्वजडं हि मेयम्" ॥ See, too, *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 86, and *Sânkhyakârikâ* 4 ("प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि").

मुञ्जादिषीकोद्धरणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the extraction of the interior spike of the*

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* Its author, Sarvajnâtmamuni, was a pupil of Sures'varâcârya See Mr. K. B. Pâṭhak's valuable paper *Bhartṛihari and Kumârila* (1892), page 24.

Munja grass. The following verse from the *Pañcadas'î* (i. 42), with an extract from Râmakṛishṇa's comment thereon will fully explain the meaning and application of the saying:—"यथा मुञ्जादिषीकैवमात्मा युक्त्या समुद्धृतः । शरीरत्रितयाद्धीरैः परं ब्रह्मैव जायते" ॥ "यथा येन प्रकारेण मुञ्जादेतन्नामकात्तृणविशेषादिषीका गर्भस्थं कोमलं तृणं युक्त्या बहिरावरकत्वेन स्थितानां स्थूलपत्राणां विभजनलक्षणेनोपायेन समुद्ध्रियत एवमात्मापि...शरीरत्रितयात्...धीरैः...समुद्धृतः पृथक् कृतश्चेत्स परं ब्रह्मैव जायते" ॥ The illustration is a very ancient one, since it is employed in *S'atapatha Brâhmaṇa* 4. 3. 3. 16, and in *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* vi. 17. The latter instance is as follows:—"तं स्वाच्छरीरात्प्रवृहेन्मुञ्जादिवेषीकां धैर्येण." For the former, see this nyâya in the Superaddenda to *Third Handful.* It is found also in *Bṛihadâraṇyakavârtika* 4. 4. 1277.

याचितकमण्डनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *borrowed ornaments.* Appearing in borrowed plumes. It is well illustrated by *Naiṣadhacarita* vii. 56:—"अस्या मुखश्रीप्रतिबिम्बमेवं जलाच्च तातान्मुकुराच्च मित्रात् । अभ्यर्थ्य धत्तः खलु पद्मचन्द्रौ विभूषणं याचितकं कदाचित्" ॥ On which Mallinâtha comments thus:—"याचितकं याच्ञानिर्वृत्तम्"। याच्ञयाप्तं याचितकमित्यमरः। अपमित्ययाचिताभ्यां कक्कनाविति कन्प्रत्ययः (Pâṇ. 4. 4. 21)। विभूषणं कदाचिदभ्यर्थ्य धत्तो दधाते खलु। एतदीयमेव सुहृल्लब्धमनयोर्याचितं मण्डनं न स्वाभाविकमित्युत्प्रेक्षा". In the above form the nyâya is found in *Târkikarakṣâ*, page 46:—"तेनायथार्थस्यापि यथार्थानुभवजनितत्वेन यथार्थत्वव्यपदेश इति याचितकमण्डनकमनीयमेव स्मृतेर्याथार्थ्यम्." As याचितमण्डन I have met with it in *Khaṇḍanoddhâra*, page 62, and in *Kâvyapradîpaṭikâ* of Vaidyanâtha Tatsat, page 173.

लोष्टप्रस्तारन्यायः ॥

This occurs in Abhinavagupta's comment on *Dhvanyâloka* iii. 16 (page 159) in the following sentence:—"तेन लोष्टप्रस्तारन्यायेनानन्तवैचित्र्यमुक्तम्," and in the first edition I said that it

could only mean the maxim of *an expanse of clods of earth* [as in a roughly ploughed field]. Regarding however प्रस्तार as a mislection for प्रस्तर it would mean the maxim of *a stone and a clod of earth,* and would be synonymous with अश्मलोष्टन्याय of the dictionaries. Mr. M. R. Telang (of the Bombay High Court) has however kindly suggested the following, with which I was quite unfamiliar. He says:—"लोष्ट means a pebble and प्रस्तार a table showing the varieties of metres &c. formed by different arrangements of the short and long syllables in prosody, music &c. The Indians make use of this process to find out the number of varieties of any number of given things. So the meaning of the nyâya can be better explained by the expression the maxim of *the process of permutations and combinations.*

It may be asked what लोष्ट (a pebble) has to do with permutations and combinations. In finding out the number of varieties of any number of given things, a pebble is used for marking certain figures according to the Indian process with the help of प्रस्तार, खण्डमेरु, नष्टोद्दिष्ट &c. These processes are well known to any one conversant with books on Indian music or prosody. The following references to books on the subject will support my statement. *Vide* संगीतरत्नाकर Chap. i verses 61 to 69 (pages 57–60); संगीतदर्पण Chap. i ver. 144 to–154."

वरं सांशयिकान्निष्कादसांशयिकः कार्षापणः ॥

Better is a certain kârshâpaṇa than an uncertain nishka. This and the proverb immediately following are found in the second chapter of Vâtsyâyana's *Kâmasûtra* (page 19), and are the equivalents of our saying "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush."

वरमद्य कपोतः श्वो मयूरात् ॥

Better is a pigeon to-day than a peacock tomorrow. See above.

विपुलकदलीफललिप्सया जिह्वाच्छेदनम् ॥

Cutting off the tongue while trying to get a fine plantain. This is found in the Pûrṇaprajna section of *Sarvadars'ana-sangraha* (page 64 of Bib. Ind., and 75 of Jîvânanda's edn.) as follows:—"एवं च परमेश्वराभेदतृष्णया विष्णोर्गुणोत्कर्षस्य मृगतृष्णिकासमत्वाभिधानं विपुलकदलीफललिप्सया जिह्वाच्छेदनमनुहरत्येतादृशविष्णुविद्वेषणादन्धतमसप्रवेशप्रसङ्गात्" ॥ Prof. Gough renders it thus:—"Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vâdins) in their thirst to be one with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishṇu is like a mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vishṇu they must enter into the hell of blind darkness."

विषकृमिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *worms bred in poison* (or, *in manure*). Âpṭe's Dictionary alone gives us this nyâya which he describes as follows:—"It is used to denote a state of things which though fatal to others, is not so to those who, being bred in it, are inured or naturalized to it." In this case it might represent our "What is one man's food is another man's poison." Âpṭe gives no reference to a passage where the maxim is used, and I am indebted for one to that veritable *Ratnâkara*, Dr. Böhtlingk's *Indische Sprüche* (6164). It consists of a quotation from *Vṛiddha-Câṇakhya*, a work which appears to exist in MS. only. It runs thus:—

विप्रास्मिन्नगरे महान्कथय कस्तालद्रुमाणां गणः
को दाता रजको ददाति वसनं प्रातर्गृहीत्वा निशि ।
को दक्षः परदारवित्तहरणे सर्वोऽपि दक्षो जनः
कस्माज्जीवसि हे सखे विषकृमिन्यायेन जीवाम्यहम् ॥

The Doctor renders the last line by "Wozu lebst du, o

Freund? Ich lebe nach Art des Mistkäfers (d. i. Ich suche das Beste heraus)." If this is correct, the nyâya must be expressive of "living in clover," or, amidst "marrow and fatness!"

विषवृक्षन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the poisonous tree.* This appears to be based on the second half of *Kumârasambhava* ii. 55 (or *Pañcatantra* i. 245), which runs thus:—"विषवृक्षोऽपि संवर्ध्य स्वयं छेत्तुमसाम्प्रतम्." "It would be improper to cut down even a poisonous tree after cultivating it oneself." This is used as a maxim by the author of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya* (page 727) in the following sentence:—"एते सर्वे तर्काः...अस्माभिरेव तर्कपदव्यामभिषिक्तास्ततो न प्रबन्धेन निरस्यन्ते 'विषवृक्षोऽपि संवर्ध्य स्वयं छेत्तुमसाम्प्रतमिति' " ॥ There is another capital instance of it in *Upamitibhāvaprapancâ Kathâ*, page 715:—"हा हा मयेदं नो चारु कृतं यत्सुतभर्त्सनम्। विषवृक्षोऽपि संवर्ध्य स्वयं छेत्तुमसाम्प्रतम्" ॥

वीचीतरङ्गन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *wave-undulation.* This is used by the author of the *Bhâshâpariccheda* (verses 165, 166) to account for the production of sound. He says—"सर्वः शब्दो नभोवृत्तिः श्रोत्रोत्पन्नस्तु गृह्यते। वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन तदुत्पत्तिस्तु कीर्तिता। कदम्बकोरकन्यायादुत्पत्तिः कस्यचिन्मते" ॥ Almost the same words are used by Vedântin Mahâdeva (latter part of 17th century) in his comment on *Sânkhyasûtra* V. 103:–किंतु शब्द एव वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा श्रोत्रदेशं गतः श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते". "But sound comes to the seat of hearing in the same manner as the undulating waves [of water], or as the anthers of a [globulous] Kadamba flower and is thus apprehended by the ear." The translation, is Dr. R. Garbe's.

वृद्धकुमारीवाक्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the request of the aged spinster*. This is recorded in *Mahâbhâṣhya* 8. 2. 3 as follows:—"अथवा वृद्धकुमारीवाक्यवदिदं द्रष्टव्यम्। तद्यथा। वृद्धकुमारीन्द्रेणोक्ता वरं वृणीष्वेति सा वरमवृणीत पुत्रा मे बहुक्षीरघृतमोदनं कांस्यपात्र्यां भुञ्जीरन्निति। न च तावदस्याः पतिर्भवति कुतः पुत्राः कुतो गावः कुतो धान्यम्। तत्रानयैकेन वाक्येन पतिः पुत्रा गावो धान्यमिति सर्वं संगृहीतं भवति" ॥ This would be applied to a sentence having a variety of meanings. In *Tantravârtika* 2. 2. 2 (page 452) we meet with it as वृद्धकुमारीवरप्रार्थन; and in the *Paṇḍit* for December 1867 (page 156) we find exactly the same kind of thing under the heading वृद्धब्राह्मणवरन्यायः. This worthy was not only old but blind, and his request was "स्वपौत्रं राजसिंहासनस्थितमीक्षितुमिच्छामीति."

वृद्धिमिष्टवतो मूलमपि ते नष्टम् ॥

Wishing to grow, you have destroyed your root. This is Prof. Cowell's rendering of the saying as it appears in the *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 27 Bib. Ind., p. 33 Jîvânanda):—"तथा च वृद्धिमिष्टवतो मूलमपि ते नष्टं स्यादिति महत्कष्टमापन्नम्" । In the *Vâcaspatyam*, however, we have the literal and more usual meaning of the nyâya, namely "Whilst seeking to obtain interest, the creditor loses [that and] the capital too." "वृद्धिमिष्टवतो मूलमपि विनष्टमिति न्यायः । वृद्धिर्धनप्रयोगेऽधमर्णात्प्राप्यांशभेदलाभः। तामिष्टवत उत्तमर्णस्याधमर्णदौस्थ्याद्यथा मूलं नश्यत्येवं यत्राभीष्टान्तरसंपादनाय प्रयतमानस्य मूलं नश्यति तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ See also *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya*, p. 31; *Pancadas'î*, vii. 81; *Vedântakalpataru*, page 321; and *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, page 19. An amusing illustration of this saying is found in *Kuvalayânanda*, under the figure विषम· "इष्टार्थमुद्दिश्य किंचित्कर्मारब्धवतो न केवलमिष्टस्यानवाप्तिः किन्तु ततोऽनिष्टस्यापि प्रतिलंभश्चेत्तदपि विषमम्। यथा भक्ष्यप्रेप्सया सर्पपेटिकां दृष्ट्वा प्रविष्टस्य मूषकस्य न केवलं भक्ष्यालाभः किन्तु स्वरूप-

हानिरपीति" ॥ Raghunâtha has two other maxims of the same kind, namely, "पुत्रलिप्सया देवं भजन्त्या भर्तापि नष्टः", and "चर्मतन्तौ महिषीं हन्ति."

शरपुरुषीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the man and the arrow.* Vardhamâna explains this, as follows, in his comment on *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* iii. 196:—"शरश्च क्षिप्तः प्राकाराच्च पुरुष उत्थितः स तेन हतः। तत्तुल्यं शरपुरुषीयम्" ॥ An arrow is discharged from a bow, and at the same moment a man rises up from behind a wall and is killed by it. It illustrates, therefore, a purely accidental and unforeseen occurrence, and must be classed with the अजाकृपाणीय, खल्वाटबिल्वीय, and others of a like nature.

शर्करोन्मज्जनीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the pebble and the* [man's] *emerging* [from the water]. This, like that immediately preceding, is found in Vardhamâna's work, and on the same page. He explains it thus:—"शर्करा च क्षिप्ता पुरुषस्य चोन्मज्जनं तत्तुल्यं शर्करोन्मज्जनीयम्" ॥ At the moment that the pebble is thrown, a man who has been diving or swimming emerges from the water and is struck by it. This, too, therefore, belongs to the अजाकृपाणीय and काकतालीय category.

शिरश्छेदेऽपि शतं न ददाति विंशतिपञ्चकं तु प्रयच्छतीति शाकटिकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the carter who would be beheaded rather than pay a hundred, but will at once give five score!* It

occurs in the Pûrṇaprajna section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 71 of Bib. Ind. and page 83 of Jîvânanda's) as follows:— "ननु प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वमभ्युपेयते नासत्त्वमिति चेत्तदेतत्सोऽयं शिरश्छेदेऽपि शतं न ददाति विंशतिपञ्चकं तु प्रयच्छतीति शाकटिकवृत्तान्तमनुहरेन्मिथ्यात्वासत्त्वयोः पर्यायत्वादित्यलमतिप्रपञ्चेन" ॥ "If you say that you accept the falsity of the universe, but not its unreality, you are simply acting like the carter who would lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of money, but at once gives five score ! For falsity and unreality are synonymous. But enough of prolixity."

It is found also in *Âtmatattvaviveka* (page 31), from which Mâdhava probably took it. In *Tattvamuktâkalâpa* ii. 71 (page 244) it takes the form of "शतमदित्सतः शतार्धद्वयदानम्", and there is still another variety of it in *Khaṇḍanoddhdra*, page 74, namely "शिरच्छेदेऽपि काकणीं न ददाति पञ्चगण्डकांस्तु ददाति." Compare with this the following from *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 432:—"अथोच्यते न प्रत्यक्ष आत्मा किंत्वपरोक्ष इति नेदमर्थान्तरवचनं शिशव एवं प्रतार्यन्ते न प्रामाणिकाः" ॥

शीर्षे सर्पो देशान्तरे वैद्यः ॥

A snake in the head, and the doctor in another country! This occurs, in Prâkṛit, in *Karpûramanjarî* iv. (page 100). It is found in somewhat similar form in *Mudrârâkshasa* i. 21, also in Prâkṛit. The *chhâyâ* is as follows. "उपरि घनं घनरटितं दूरे दयिता किमेतदापतितम् । हिमवति दिव्यौषधयः शीर्षे सर्पः समाविष्टः" ॥

शुकनलिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the parrot and the Nalikâ-tree.* Illustrative of causeless fear. In *Udyoga-Parva* xcvi. 42 we read "काकुदीकं शुकं नाकमक्षिसंतर्जनं तथा" । on which the commentator Nîlakaṇṭha says:— "काकुदीकमित्यादयोऽष्टावस्त्रजातयः ।...येन शुकनलिकान्यायेन अभयेऽपि भयदर्शिनो हयरथादिपादेषु गाढं श्लिष्यन्ति तच्छुक

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मोहनं नाम" ॥ I have met with it also in a MS. (No. 233 of 1882-83 in Deccan College, Poona) of Nârâyaṇa's commentary on *Gopâlottaratâpanîya-Upanishad* 8 (corresponding with 21 and 22 of *Bib. Ind.* edition), where, expounding the words "यो हि वै कामेन कामान्कामयते &c.," he says:— "वास्तवं कर्तृभोक्तृत्वं बन्धमोक्षादिकमात्मनो नास्ति किंतु स्वकामपरिकल्पितं शुकनलिकान्यायेन" ॥

शृङ्गग्राहिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *seizing oxen by their horns.* That is, by way of *specification*, and not in the sense of our proverb 'Taking the bull by the horns!' This is very clearly put in Râmakṛishṇa's commentary on S'ankarânanda's *Âtmapurâṇa* iv. 561-2. The text runs thus:—"शास्त्रं चात्र प्रवृत्तं सत्प्रवृत्तिं कुरुते द्विधा । विधानेन निषेधेन लोकदृष्टिसमाश्रयात् ॥ ५६१ ॥ शृङ्गग्राहिकया यद्धि बोधयेत्तद्विधायकम् । यथा लोके करे तेऽस्ति फलमित्यादिभाषणम् ॥ ५६२ ॥" On the latter verse, Râmakṛishṇa says:—"तत्र विधायकशास्त्रस्य लक्षणं लौकिकमुदाहरणं चाह शृङ्गेति । शृङ्गस्य ग्रहणं यस्यां क्रियायां सा शृङ्गग्राहिका । संज्ञायामिति ण्वुल् । (Pâṇ. 3. 3. 108–9) । यथा गोव्रजे का मदीया गौरिति गोपः पृष्टः शृङ्गं गृहीत्वा गां प्रदर्शयेत्तथाबोधकं शास्त्रं विधायकमुच्यते" ॥ So too, in Sures'vara's vârtika on *Bṛihadâraṇyakopanishadbhâshya* 1. 4. 866:—"शृङ्गग्राहिकया श्रुत्या ब्रह्मतापोदिता स्फुटम्", on which Ânandagiri says:—"यथा गोमण्डलस्थां गां शृङ्गं गृहीत्वा विशेषतो दर्शयत्येषा बहुक्षीरेति &c." The same sense is attached to the maxim in Nîlakaṇṭha on *Udyoga-Parva* XLV. 9 ("मदोऽष्टादशदोषः स स्यात्पुरा योऽप्रकीर्तितः") where we read:—"अप्रकीर्तित इति दमविरोधिन एव प्रातिकूल्यादयो मददोषत्वेन सूचिता अपि शृङ्गग्राहिकया प्रकर्षेण विधिमुखेन न प्रोक्ता इत्यर्थः" ॥ A fourth instance of the employment of this maxim in the same sense is found in the metrical comment on *S'âṇḍilya-sûtra* 87:—"न तावत्समवायेन भेदसंबन्धगौरवात् । शब्दानां समयोऽप्येवं शृङ्गग्राहिकया लघुः" ॥ The passage is translated by Prof. Cowell as follows:—"It will not do to hold that the connexion between the cause and its effect may be that

called 'Intimate relation,' and not that called 'Identity,'—because it is a much more cumbrous assumption than ours and involves the connexion of 'difference,' and by our own we easily get at the true meaning of the various S'ruti passages,—seizing them one by one, as oxen by their horns." In a footnote he adds:—"That is, such passages as 'Uktha is Brahman,' 'Prâṇa is Brahman' &c. *S'ṛingagrâhikânyâya* is a proverb sometimes explained as 'catching an unruly bull first by securing one horn and then the second,' and sometimes, 'driving many oxen into a stall, by seizing them one by one by their horns'." In *Bhâmatî* 3. 2. 22 (page 566) we have the phrase again:—"यथा गवादयो विषयाः साक्षाच्छृङ्गग्राहिकया प्रतिपाद्यन्ते प्रतीयन्ते च नैवं ब्रह्म" ॥ Mr. F. W. Thomas has pointed out to me the शीर्षग्रहणन्याय which is quoted in the commentary on Daṇḍin's *Kâvyâdars'a* ii. 368. I think its usage must be similar to that of the above.

श्येनकपोतीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the hawk and the pigeon.* Vardhamâna, in *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* iii. 195, explains it in the following way:—"श्येनकपोतयोरिव श्येनकपोतीयो दुर्योगः । यथा कपोतोऽतर्कितमागतेन श्येनेन गृहीतस्तथाकस्मिको यो दुर्योगः स एवमुच्यते" ॥ This must be classed therefore with शरपुरुषीय and others of a similar kind. We have a श्येनकपोतीयमुपाख्यानं given in the table of contents which forms the opening part of the *Mahâbhârata*, and the story will be found in *Vanaparva* cxcvi. There is another in chapter cxxxi.

श्वश्रूनिर्गच्छोक्तिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the mother-in-law who said, 'Be off.'* This quaint illustration appears in Sures'vara's *Naishkarmyasiddhi*

i. 28, as follows:—"अभ्युपगताभ्युपगमाच्च श्वश्रूनिर्गच्छोक्तिवद्भवतो निष्प्रयोजनः प्रलापः" ॥ "And since you now express agreement with that which we also acknowledge, your protracted discussion was as unreasonable as was the mother-in-law's saying [to the mendicant] 'Be off." The commentator, Jnânottama, explains this in the following manner:—"भिक्षामटते माणवकाय भिक्षां प्रत्याचक्षाणामात्मनः स्नुषां भर्त्सयित्वा श्वश्रूः पुनस्तमाहूय समागते तस्मिन्नास्ति भिक्षा निर्गच्छेति तथैव प्रत्याचष्टे" ॥ "After abusing her daughter-in-law for refusing to give alms to a wandering mendicant, the mother-in-law called him back, and, when he had come, said to him, There are no alms, be off,' thus refusing also herself!

सिंहावलोकनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a lion's glance.* This is based on a lion's habit of looking in front and behind, after killing its prey, to see if there is any rival to dispute possession! It is applied, says Târânâtha, where a word in a sentence is connected with what precedes and with that which follows it. It is not, however, restricted to this. The expression occurs four times in the *Taittirîya-Prâtis'âkhya,* namely in ii. 51, iv. 4, xiii. 3 and 15. Prof. Whitney remarks as follows on the first instance of its occurrence:—"The 'and' of this rule [वर्गवच्चैषु], the commentator says, brings forward, on the principle of 'the lion's look' (a distant glance backward), the already defined organs of production of the various mute series." It is found also in Nîlakaṇṭha's comment on *Vanaparva* ccxxi. 1 (गुरुभिर्नियमैर्जातो भरतो नाम पावकः) :—"सिंहावलोकनन्यायेन शंयोः पौत्रमूर्जपुत्रं भरतं स्तौति सार्धेन गुरुभिरिति" ॥ It was a favourite maxim of Vâcaspatimis'ra's, and I have met with it eight times in three of his writings. It occurs in *Bhâmatî* 2. 3. 6 (page 473); in *Sânkhyatattvakaumudî*, 7 (page 36); and in *Nyâyavârtika-tâtparyaṭîkâ*, pages 97, 199, 230, 322, 403, 405. An example of a different kind is found in Hemachandra's *Paris'ishṭaparvan*, i. 63:—"सिंहावलोकनन्यायेनालीढः क्षत्रतेजसा । प्रत्यक्षानिव सोऽद्राक्षीत्तानमात्यान्सुतद्विषः" ॥

सूचीकटाहन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the needle and the boiler*. It is explained as follows in Molesworth's Marâṭhî dictionary :—"A phrase used as an illustration upon the occasion of two matters of which the one is superlatively simple and easy, or altogether insignificant, and the other indefinitely greater, more difficult, or more important, arising at once to be done ; and of which it is intended to intimate that the trifling one should be despatched first." It occurs in the opening part of chapter iv of *Kâvyapradîpa*, and again on page 70. Also in the commentary on *Sâhityakaumudî* iv. 1, where the same *kârikâ* is expounded. The following is from the *Saptapadârthî*, page 21. The text runs thus:—"अनुभवोऽपि द्विविधः। प्रमाऽप्रमा च। अप्रमापि संशयो विपर्ययश्च। प्रमा प्रत्यक्षमनुमितिश्च" ॥ On which the commentator remarks:—"प्रमानिरूप्यत्वात्परस्ताद्विभक्तामप्यप्रमां सूचीकटाहन्यायेन प्राग्विभजतेऽप्रमापीति" ॥ There is another good example of the maxim, with a lucid translation by Dr. Ballantyne, in the introduction to Book ii of his *Aphorisms of the Nyâya*.

स्थालीपुलाकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the rice in the cooking-pot*. "In a cooking-pot all the grains being equally moistened by the heated water, when one grain is found to be well cooked the same may be inferred with regard to the other grains. So the maxim is used when the condition of the the whole class is inferred from that of a part." (Apṭe's Sanskrit Dictionary). It is therefore equivalent to "*Ex uno disce omnes.*" Patanjali seems to have laid the foundation of the nyâya in the followinng words, in *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 4. 23 (vart. 15):—"पर्याप्तो ह्येकः पुलाकः स्थाल्या निदर्शनाय." ॥ Then we find it in Jaimini 7. 4. 12, the sûtra with a portion of S'abara's bhâṣya being as follows:—"लिङ्गस्य पूर्ववत्त्वाच्चोदनाशब्दसामान्यादेकेनापि निरूप्येत यथा स्थालीपुलाकेन ॥ ......एतन्न्यायपूर्वकं लिङ्गमेकत्रापि दृश्यमानं तुल्यन्यायानां सर्वेषां धर्मवत्तां ज्ञापयति। यथा स्थाल्यां तुल्यपाकानां पुलाकानामेकमुपमृद्यान्येषामपि सिद्धतां जानाति." ॥

Other instances of its occurrence are *Tantravârtika* 3. 5. 19; *Vedântakalpataru*, page 446; *Kalpataruparimala*, pages 115, 468, 667, 685; and *Tattvamuktâkalâpa*, 293. Of similar import is the following line from Hemachandra's *Parisiṣṭaparva* vii. 94:—"सिक्थेनापि द्रोणपाकं जानन्ति हि मनीषिणः" ॥

स्थूणानिखननन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the driving in of a post.* As a post is driven into the ground by repeated efforts, so a position is strengthened by the bringing forward of a succession of facts or arguments. It occurs three times in S'ankara's bhâshya on the *Vedântasûtras*, as follows:—"पुनश्च जगज्जन्मादिहेतुत्वमीश्वरस्याक्षिप्यते स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन प्रतिज्ञातस्यार्थस्य दृढीकरणाय" 2. 1. 34. "आक्षेपपूर्विका हि परिहारोक्तिर्विवक्षितेऽर्थे स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन दृढां बुद्धिमुत्पादयति" 3. 3. 53. "सत्यं प्रसाधितं तस्यैव तु स्थूणानिखननवत्फलद्वारेणाक्षेपसमाधाने क्रियेते दार्ढ्याय" 3. 4. 2. But S'abara seems to have originated it in his bhâshya on Jaimini 7. 2. 1.

स्वाङ्गं स्वव्यवधायकं न भवति ॥

One's own body does not hinder one. It is found at the end of the Akshapâda section of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, as follows:—"न च स्वातन्त्र्यभङ्गः शङ्कनीयः स्वाङ्गं स्वव्यवधायकं न भवतीति न्यायेन प्रत्युत तन्निर्वाहात्" "Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions], since there is the well-known saying, 'One's own body does not hinder one;' nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims." This is Professor Cowell's translation.

Other instances of its employment are *Bhâmatî* 3. 4. 20 (page 682); *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, pp. 72. 90; *Târkikarakṣâṭîkâ*, page 50; *Nyâyamakarandaṭîkâ*, pp. 201, 215; and *Khaṇḍanoddhâra*, pages 58, 62.

लौकिकन्यायाञ्जलिः

द्वितीय भागः

A SECOND HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS.

अजातपुत्रनामोत्कीर्तनन्यायः ॥

Proclaiming the name of a son before he is born. That is, counting your chickens before they are hatched. The nyāya, in a negative form, is found in the *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 345:—"यश्चासौ व्यापारः क्रियते चाभिधीयते च स किं पूर्वमभिधीयते ततः क्रियते पूर्वं वा क्रियते पश्चादभिधीयते युगपदेव वास्य करणाभिधाने इति । न ताव-त्पूर्वमभिधीयतेऽनुत्पन्नस्याभिधानानुपपत्तेः । न ह्यजाते पुत्रे नामधेयकरणम्" ॥

अणुरपि विशेषोऽध्यवसायकरः ॥

Even a slight difference [between two or more things or expressions] *establishes the fact* [that they do differ, and enables us to discriminate between them]. After explaining the पुष्टलगुडन्याय and nine others of similar purport, Raghunātha says:—"पुष्टलगुडन्यायादारभ्यैतत्पर्यन्तानां न्यायानां साम्येऽपि यत्किंचिद्विशेषमादायाणुरपि विशेषोऽध्यवसायकर इति न्यायेन भेदसिद्धि-भिन्नोदाहरणत्वसिद्धिश्च केषांचिदिति बोध्यम्." The nyāya occurs in Mathurānātha's commentary on the opening paragraph of *Ātmatattvaviveka* (page 19), where, after stating that, according to the Buddhists, mokṣa is brought about by the knowledge of the non-existence of soul, he says:—"तदुक्तम् । नैरात्म्यदृष्टिं मोक्षस्य हेतुं केचन मन्वते । आत्मतत्त्वधियं त्वन्ये न्यायतत्त्वानुसारिणः ॥ इति । न च तत्र नैरात्म्यदृष्टिपदं शरीरात्मभिन्नतत्वज्ञानपरमिति वाच्यम् । निरः संसर्गा-भावबोधकतया तादृशज्ञानस्य तदर्थत्वासंभवात् । न्यायमते च मोक्षाश्रयमुख्य-विशेष्यकतया अणुरपि विशेषोऽध्यवसायकर इति न्यायेनात्मविशेष्यकशरीरादि-भिन्नत्वज्ञानस्यैव मोक्षहेतुत्वादिति ध्येयम्."

अत्यन्तपराजयाद्वरं संशयोऽपि ॥

Better even a doubtful condition of things than a crushing defeat. This occurs in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* 5. 1. 43. (page 491):—"यदि त्वस्य कदाचित्सम्यक्साधनवादिनोऽपि प्रतिभाक्षयात्समाधानं न स्फुरति ततोऽत्यन्तपराजयाद्वरं संशयोऽपीति न्यायेन समाधानाभासेनापि प्रत्यवस्थेयमेवेत्याशयवानाह तेषां साध्वसाधुतायामिति" ॥ On page 473 of the same, and in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 620, it appears as एकान्तपराजयाद्वरं सन्देहः ॥ It is not in any of the lists of nyāyas to which I have had access, but Raghunāthavarman has two of the same purport, namely "मारणाय गृहीतोऽङ्गच्छेदं स्वीकरोति" (which see below), and "मरणाद्वरं व्याधिः"; and, in *Nyāyamālāvistara* 6. 2. 7. Mādhava gives us "प्रधानलोपाद्वरमङ्गलोपः" ॥ All of these seem akin to our "Half a loaf is better than no bread."

अध्यारोपापवादन्यायः ॥

The method of *illusory attribution followed by its withdrawal.* This nyāya belongs entirely to the Vedāntists, but I follow Raghunātha in admitting it here. The two terms are explained as follows in the *Vedāntasāra*:—"Illusory attribution is the attributing to the real of that which is unreal; as a snake is imagined in a rope which is not a snake." "The withdrawal is the assertion that the whole of the unreal, beginning with Ignorance, which is an illusory effect of the Real, is nothing but the Real; just as a snake, which is the illusory effect of a rope is nothing whatsoever but the rope." This rendering is from my *Manual of Hindu Pantheism*, pages 44 and 83. On page 42, there is the following note which includes a quotation from page 209 of that valuable book *A Rational Refutation of Hindu Philosophical Systems*:—

"12. *Illusory attribution* &c. (*adhyāropāpavāda*).

In order to describe the pure abstraction Brahma, the teacher

attributes to him, or superimposes on him, certain qualities which in reality do not belong to him, and then afterwards withdrawing them, teaches that the residuum is the undifferenced Absolute. When the Vedāntins speak of the origin of the world, they do not believe its origin to be true. This mode of expression they call false imputation (*adhyāropa*). It consists in holding for true that which is false, in accommodation to the intelligence of the uninitiated. At a further stage of instruction, when the time has arrived for propounding the esoteric view, the false imputation is gainsaid, and this gainsaying is termed rescission (*apavāda*)."

See also a long note on page 172 of the text of the *Vedāntasāra.* The verse in the *Vivekacūḍāmani,* there referred to, should be 140 instead of 170.

अन्धदर्पणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a looking-glass for a blind man.* It is found in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 836, as follows:—"केवलं ज्ञातशास्त्रोऽपि स्वावस्थां यो न बुध्यते। तस्याकिञ्चित्करं ज्ञानमन्धस्येव सुदर्पणः" ॥ See also S'eṣānantācārya on *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*, page 22, line 2. The *Laukikanyāyaratnākara* gives the following example:—"तदुक्तं वासिष्टे। यस्य नास्ति स्वयं प्रज्ञा शास्त्रं तस्य करोति किम्। लोचनाभ्यां विहीनस्य दर्पणः किं करिष्यति" ॥ I have no doubt that the reference is to the *Yogavāsishṭha*, but the verse is also found in the *Hitopades'a* (iii., 115). See, too, under अरण्यरोदनन्याय.

अन्धस्येवान्धलग्नस्य विनिपातः पदे पदे ॥

One who leans on a blind man will fall with him at every step. This is akin to the saying "If the blind lead the blind, both will fall into the ditch." It occurs in *Bhāmatī* (page 20)

as follows:—" योऽयमर्थप्रकाशः फलं यस्मिन्नर्थश्चात्मा च प्रथेते स किं जडः स्वयंप्रकाशो वा । जडश्चेद्विषयात्मानावपि जडाविति कस्मिन् किं प्रकाशेताविशेषादिति प्राप्तमान्ध्यमशेषस्य जगतः । तथा चाभाणकः । अन्धस्येवान्धलग्नस्य विनिपातः पदे पदे" ॥ Compare the following expression in Venkaṭanātha's vṛitti on his *Tattvamuktākalāpa* iii. 50:—" इति चान्धस्य जात्यन्धयष्टिदानोपमं विदुः " ॥ Though not exactly parallel with the nyāya, the following verse of Jayanta's (page 120) will not be out of place here:— " हस्तस्पर्शादिनान्धेन विषमे पथि धावता। अनुमानप्रधानेन विनिपातो न दुर्लभः " ॥

अपराद्धेषोरिव धानुष्कस्य कण्ठाडम्बरः ॥

Noisy boasting like that of an [unskilful] *archer whose arrows always miss the mark.* This simile occurs in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* (page 49), but was no doubt borrowed from Māgha ii. 27:—

" अनिर्लोडितकार्यस्य वाग्जालं वाग्मिनो वृथा ।
निमित्तादपराद्धेषोर्धानुष्कस्येव वल्गितम् " ॥

" The chatter of a talkative man who has no knowledge of affairs, is as useless as the swaggering of an archer whose arrows always miss the mark."

अरण्यरोदनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *crying in the wilderness.* Used to imply wasted effort. Molesworth defines it as "A term for unregarded or unavailing complaint or supplication." The following verse from Namisādhu's comment on Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālankāra* viii. 37 includes not only this nyāya but also Raghunātha's शवोद्वर्तनन्याय, ऊपरवृष्टिन्याय, श्वपुच्छोन्नामनन्याय, बधिरकर्णजपन्याय, and

probably his अन्धदर्पणन्याय; for Dr. Böhtlingk, who quotes the verse as from *Pancatantra*, gives धृतोऽन्धमुखदर्पणः as a variant for कृतान्धमुखमण्डना.

> अरण्यरुदितं कृतं शवशरीरमुद्वर्तितं
> स्थले कमलरोपणं सुचिरमूषरे वर्षितम् ।
> श्वपुच्छमवनामितं बधिरकर्णजापः कृतः
> कृतान्धमुखमण्डना यदबुधो जनः सेवितः ॥

See also *Pancatantra* i. 393; *Kiraṇāvali* page 5; and *Kusumānjali*, vol. ii, page 176.

अर्थी समर्थो विद्वानधिक्रियते ॥

He has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit. This nyāya is found in the Jaimini section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* as follows:—"अर्थी समर्थो विद्वानधिक्रियत इति न्यायेन दर्शपूर्णमासादिविषयावबोधमेवक्षमाणास्तत्त्वबोधे स्वाध्यायं विनियुञ्जते" ॥ Professor Cowell translated it thus:—"According to the old rule 'He has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit,' those who are aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full-moon sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them."

The saying is found in a more complete form in *Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā* 1. 3. 9, namely, "अर्थी समर्थो विद्वाञ्शास्त्रेणापर्युदस्तोऽधिक्रियते," which is itself a reproduction of the following passage in *S'ānkarabhāṣya* 1. 3. 25:—"शास्त्रं ह्यविशेषप्रवृत्तमपि मनुष्यानेवाधिकरोति शक्तत्वादर्थित्वादपर्युदस्तत्वादुपनयनादिशास्त्राच्चेति वर्णितमेतदधिकारलक्षणे." Dr. Thibaut renders it thus:—"The S'āstra, although propounded without distinction (*i. e.* although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its precepts), does in reality entitle men only (to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the S'āstra);

are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the S'āstra); are, thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the *Upanayana* ceremony and so on. This point has been explained in the section treating of the definition of *adhikāra* (Pūrva Mīmāmsā vi. 1)." For the last-mentioned, see under अधिकारन्याय in the third Handful. This question of अर्थित्व &c. will be found also in *S'ānkarabhāṣya* 1. 1. 4 (page 54); 1. 3. 26, 33, 34; and 2. 2. 10.

अर्धवैशसन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the slaying of one half* [of a body, whilst the other half is kept alive!]. Raghunāthavarman defines it as follows:—"असंभवविवक्षायामर्धवैशसन्यायः । यथा कुक्कुटीमांसभोजनकामस्तत्सन्ततिकामश्च कश्चिद्यवनस्तद्ग्रीवादिकं छित्त्वा भुंक्त उदरं च सन्तानार्थं स्थापयतीति तस्यार्थः" ॥ The nyāya is therefore expressive of absurdity, contradiction, or incongruity; and so, in some respects, resembles the अर्धजरतीयन्याय. The earliest example, known to me, of the use of the term is in *Kumārasambhava* iv. 31, where Rati complains that, by destroying Kāma, Fate had slain half of herself. The verse stands thus:—" विधिना कृतमर्धवैशसं ननु मां कामवधे विमुञ्चता । अनपायिनि संश्रयद्रुमे गजभग्ने पतनाय वल्लरी " ॥ Mallinātha points out that as the slaying of a part involves that of the whole, Rati here announces her own destruction also, as is clearly implied in the second half of the verse. Its employment here by Kālidāsa, however, is in a literal sense, whilst the philosophical writers apply it figuratively.

In the latter part of S'ankara's bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 18 we find the expression " न ह्यर्धवैशसं संभवति ", and I have noted it in *Tantravārtika*, pages 84, 89, 97 and 202. The first of the four passages is the following:—"अविरोधे श्रुतिमूलं न मूलान्तरसंभवः । विरोधे त्वन्यमूलत्वमिति स्यादर्धवैशसम् " ॥ In this passage, as well as in the other three, contradiction or inconsistency

is clearly implied. So, too, in a passage in *Nyāyakanduli*, page 6, line 3; and in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, page 685. One more example will suffice, namely *Bṛihadāraṇyavārtika* 1. 4. 1276:—"न चार्धवैशसं युक्तं तत्त्वज्ञाने विवक्षिते। संशयो हि तथा श्रोतुः स्यादनिश्चितवाक्यतः"॥ Ānandagiri explains this in the manner stated above by Raghunātha, viz. "कुक्कुटादेरेको देशः प्रसवाय कल्पते पच्यते देशान्तरमित्यर्धवैशसं तदिहायुक्तं नहि वस्तु ब्रह्म चाब्रह्म च तत्त्वज्ञानस्य विवक्षितत्वाद्विरुद्धस्यातथात्वादित्यर्थः"॥

अलाभे मत्तकाशिन्या दृष्टा तिर्यक्षु कामिता॥

Failing to obtain a lovely woman, affection is seen [to have been lavished] *on animals.* This very stupid nyāya is expounded by Raghunātha as follows:—"यत्राधिकार्थालाभेऽल्पार्थे प्रवृत्तिर्न दोषायेति विवक्षायां तत्रालाभे मत्तकाशिन्या दृष्टा तिर्यक्षु कामितेति न्यायः। मत्तकाशिनी स्त्रीविशेषः"॥ I have met with it only in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* (page 130) and in Ānandabodhācārya's *Pramāṇamālā*, page 2.

अश्वतरीगर्भन्यायः॥

The simile of *a she-mule's being in foal.* Raghunātha explains it thus:—"नन्वज्ञानकार्यान्तःकरणवृत्त्यात्मकं ज्ञानं कथं स्वकारणीभूताज्ञाननाशाय स्यादुपजीव्यविरोधादिति चेदश्वतरीगर्भन्यायादित्यवेहि। बडवायां गर्दभादुत्पन्नाश्वतरी तस्या गर्भो यथा तन्नाशाय भवति तथा भवतु ज्ञानमपि स्वहेत्वज्ञाननाशायेत्यनवद्यम्"॥ The following verse, bearing on this subject, is found in *Hitopades'a*, ii. 135, *Pancatantra*, ii. 32 and iv. 14:—"सकृद्दुष्टं तु यन्मित्रं पुनः सन्धातुमिच्छति। स मृत्युमेव गृह्णाति गर्भमश्वतरी यथा"॥ As Dr. Peterson points out in his Note on the verse from *Hitopades'a*, the second line is found in *Ādiparva* (Bombay edn.) CXL. 83 (not 75, as wrongly printed), and in *S'āntiparva* CXL. 30 (not 347 as stated). In a footnote to *Indische Sprüche* 58, Dr. Böhtlingk quotes Nīlakaṇṭha's comment on the verse from *S'āntiparva*—

"अश्वतरी गर्दभजाश्वा उदरभेदेनैव प्रसूत इति प्रसिद्धम्." Of like import are two other nyāyas quoted by Raghunātha, namely कदलीफलन्याय and वृश्चिकीगर्भन्याय. As to the former of these, compare the following, *Vanaparva* CCLXVIII. 9 (Bombay edn.):— "यथा च वेणुः कदली नलो वा फलत्यभावाय न भूतयेत्मनः। तथैव मां तैः परिरक्ष्यमाणामादास्यसे कर्कटकीव गर्भम्"॥ This verse is quoted by Johnson in his Notes on *Hitopades'a* II. 147, and he adds, "In the Gulistān, the Persian poet Sāadi declares that the young of the scorpion eats its way out through the mother's entrails"; and in *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 354, line 2, we are told "वृश्चिकादिर्मातुरुदरं निर्भिद्य मृताज्जायते." Udayana (in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 67, line 9) seems to assert the same thing of the crab:— "कुलीरस्येव सम्प्रसूतयुक्त्यापत्येनैव प्रतिहतत्वात्."

अहिभुक्कैवर्तन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the opium-eater and the fisherman*. I have not met with this in actual use in the literature, but include it on the authority of Raghunāthavarman, whose interpretation of it, however, seems most improbable. The word अहि is said by him to mean "an intoxicating plant, known in the language of the West as *Post*" ("उन्मादकर औषधिविशेषः पोस्तेति पाश्चात्यभाषायाम्"). This meaning of अहि is unknown to the lexicographers; but, in Bate's Hindi dictionary, पोस्त is said to mean "the poppy-plant; an infusion of the poppy formerly much used as a slow poison;" whilst Fallon defines it as "Poppy-head or capsule; an intoxicating drug." We must take अहि therefore in the sense of अहिफेन which is the original of the modern अफीम, opium. The story on which the maxim is said to be based is as follows:—"अहिभुक्कैवर्तन्यायस्तु तादात्म्याध्यास एव ज्ञेयः। श्रूयते हि लोके कश्चिदहिभुन्नावमारुरोह स च तत्र बहुजनसमुदायं दृष्ट्वा केनचिन्मे विनिमयो न स्यादिति धिया स्वपादे रज्जुं बद्ध्वा तन्द्रां प्राप। कैवर्तश्चोपहासार्थं तत्पादात्तां मोचयित्वा स्वपादे बबन्ध। नावि पारं गतायामवरोहणसमयेऽहिभुक्स्वपादे रज्जुमदृष्ट्वा कैवर्तपादे च तां दृष्ट्वाहमयमयमहमिति स्वहृदि निश्चित्यारे कैवर्त त्वमहमहं च त्वमिति तेन विवादं कृतवान्"॥ This nonsense is meant to teach the identity of the individual with the one Self!

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ॥

That which at the beginning and the end has no [real] *existence, has none either during the intervening period.* The Vedantists of S'ankara's school hold that existence is of three kinds, namely, *pāramārthika* (true), of which Brahma is the sole representative,—*vyāvahārika* (practical), to which all phenomena belong,—and *prātibhāsika* (apparent), which includes such things as a snake surmised in a rope, or nacre mistaken for silver. The second and third kind, therefore, have no real existence from the beginning to the end of their supposed existence.

Raghunātha says regarding it:—" नन्वादावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथेति न्यायाद्ये तुच्छमेव द्वैतं मन्यन्ते तेषां ब्रह्मबोधेन सविकल्पविद्याबाधो न स्यात्तस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपनित्यबोधमहिम्ना सदैव बाधितत्वात् " ॥ He may have taken the nyāya, like so many others in his book, from the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* where it is found as the first line of 4. 45. 45; but its real source is Gauḍapāda's kārikās on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.* It occurs twice there, namely in ii. 6 and IV. 31.

आम्रसेकपितृतर्पणन्यायः ॥

Watering a mango-tree, and, at the same time, satisfying the Manes with a libation. Bringing about two results by one operation. Its earliest occurrence is in the *Mahābhāṣya*, where it appears twice. In 1. 1. 1 (page 14) it stands thus:— " कथं पुनरेकेन यत्नेनोभयं लभ्यम् । लभ्यमित्याह । कथम् । द्विगता अपि हेतवो भवन्ति । तद्यथा । आम्राश्च सिक्ताः पितरश्च प्रीणिता इति " ॥ The second instance is in 8. 2. 3.

The nyāya in its consolidated form is found in the following passage of the *Nyāyamanjarī* (5. 1. 39), page 634. "तदेवमनेन चतुर्विंशतिजात्युदाहरणप्रतिसमाधानोपदेशवर्त्मना शब्दानित्यत्वसाधने परकीयमुपालम्भजातमेवंप्रायमखिलमपाकृतमाम्रसेकपितृतर्पणन्यायेन भवति भगवता सूत्रकारेण " ॥ It is not in any of the dictionaries or lists of nyāyas.

आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे ॥

Questioned as to mango trees, he speaks of Kovidāra trees. This is nyaya 223 of the second part of Raghunāthavarman's large work, the *Laukikanyāyaratnākara*, and is applied by him as follows (page 419*a* of India office MS. 582):—"तथा हि लोके प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र इत्यत्र प्रकृष्टपदेनाप्रकृष्टखद्योतादेः प्रकाशपदेनाप्रकाशात्मकान्धकारादेश्च व्यवच्छेदेन जिज्ञासितश्चन्द्रप्रातिपदिकमात्रार्थः प्रतिपाद्यते। इतरथा आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्ट इति न्यायेन वक्तुरजिज्ञासितमर्थं प्रतिपादयतोऽश्रद्धेयवचनत्वप्रसङ्गात्"॥ It is found in *Bhāmatī* 1. 1. 22 (page 145):—"यद्यप्याकाशपदं प्रधानार्थं तथापि यत्पृष्टं तदेव प्रतिवक्तव्यम्। न खल्वनुन्मत्त आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे"॥ In *Vedāntakalpataru* 1. 4. 1 (page 201):—"जीवे पृष्टे तं दुर्दर्शमिति तद्व्यतिरिक्तपरमात्मप्रतिवचनमाम्रप्रश्ने कोविदारप्रतिवचनवदसङ्गतम्"॥ There is also an excellent example in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, page 187, line 16, and another on page 545 of the comment on *Tattvamuktākalāpa*. Its source, however, is *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 2. 45 (vart. 8):—"अन्यद्भवान्पृष्टोऽन्यदाचष्टे। आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे."

आयुर्घृतम् ॥

Butter is life. This scarcely deserves a place amongst maxims, but I follow Raghunātha in admitting it. It is one of the stock illustrations of writers on Alankāra, and is found in Namisādhu's comment on Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālankāra* vii. 83, as follows:—

आयुर्घृतं नदी पुण्यं भयं चौरः सुखं प्रिया।
वैरं द्यूतं गुरुर्ज्ञानं श्रेयो ब्राह्मणपूजनम्॥

I have traced it, however, as far back as *Tait.-Sa^{m}hitā* 2. 3. 2. 2, and have met with it again in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 59 (vārt. 6), and 6. 1. 32 (vārt. 6). For the last passage see "दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः" in the *Third Handful*. Sures'vara too furnishes an excellent example of it in his large *vārtika* 1. 5. 1848:—"परीक्ष्य चक्षुषा यस्माल्लभते गोधनादिकम्। चक्षुः स्यान्मानुषं वित्तं यथायुर्घृतमुच्यते"॥

आशामोदकतृप्तन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *one who is satisfied with sweetmeats in prospect.* It is found in a verse quoted in *Nyāyakandalī*, page 130:—

"आशामोदकतृप्ता ये ये चोपार्जितमोदकाः ।
रसवीर्यविपाकादि तुल्यं तेषां प्रसज्यते" ॥

The same verse is quoted on page 37 of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khādya*, and is translated by Prof. Gangānātha Jhā (in the new periodical, *Indian Thought*) as follows:—"But, says an objector, from your theory it would follow that *those who enjoy merely imaginary sweets*, and those who eat real sweets, would have exactly the same experiences of flavour, strength, nutritive effects, and so on. He, we reply, who flatters himself with the hope of this objection invalidating our view, truly himself *feeds upon imaginary sweets* (इत्यस्यापि बाधकत्वमाशामोदकायते)." In *Nyāyadīpāvali*, p. 7, we read "आशामोदकोपार्जितमोदकयोरस्त्येव स्वप्नेऽपि कियद्वैलक्षण्यम्."

इषुकारन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the arrow-maker*. Used of one wholly engrossed in his work, and unconscious of his surroundings. It is based on the following verse of *S'āntiparva*, chapter 178:—"इषुकारो नरः कश्चिदिषावासक्तमानसः । समीपेनापि गच्छन्तं राजानं नावबुद्धवान्" ॥ S'ankara makes use of it in his exposition of *Vedānta-sūtra* 3. 2. 10 ["मुग्धेऽर्धसंपत्तिः परिशेषात्." In the case of one in a swoon (there is not entrance into either of the states of sleep &c.), so, by the only remaining alternative, there is a semi-entrance (into sound sleep and another state)]. He says:—इषुकारन्यायेन मुग्धो भविष्यति । यथेषुकारो जाग्रदपीष्वासक्तमनस्तया नान्यान्विषयानीक्षत एवं मुग्धो मुसलसंघातादिजनितदुःखानुभवव्यग्रमनस्तया जाग्रदपि नान्यान्विषयानीक्षत इति । न । अचेतयमानत्वात्" ॥ Ānandagiri

refers to the same nyāya in his comment on Sures'vara's large *Vārtika* 1. 5. 106 (page 816). See, too, *Nyāyamakaranda-ṭīkā*, page 78. Compare with this the picture drawn by John Bunyan of "a man who could look no way but downwards, with a muck-rake in his hand. There stooda lso one over his head with a celestial crown in his hand, and proffered him that crown for his muck-rake; but the man did neither look up nor regard, but raked to himself the straws, the small sticks, and the dust of the floor".

इषुवेगक्षयन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the gradual diminution of the speed of an arrow.* It is found in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 3. 32:— "प्रवृत्तफलस्य कर्माशयस्य मुक्तेषोरिव वेगक्षयान्निवृत्तिः" ॥ Then, in *Bṛihadāraṇyavārtika* 1. 4. 1529 (page 736) we read as follows:— "आरब्धफलशेषैकहेतुत्वाद्देहसंस्थितेः । रागादिप्रत्ययोद्भूतिरिपुचक्रादिवेगवत्" ॥ "The experience of passion and other mental conditions, owing to the continuance of the body caused by the remnant of fructescent works, is like the [diminishing] speed of a [potter's] wheel or of an arrow." Upon which Ānandagiri remarks:— "इषुचक्रेति ॥ यथा प्रवृत्तवेगस्येष्वादेर्वेगक्षयादेव क्षयस्तथारब्धक्षयो भोगादेव । 'भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा संपद्यत' इति न्यायान्न ज्ञानादित्यर्थः" ॥ The quotation is *Vedāntasūtra* 4. 1. 19. In S'ankara's most interesting exposition of sūtra 4. 1. 15, we meet with the expression कुलालचक्रवत् in the same connection.

उत्कृष्टदृष्टिर्निकृष्टेऽध्यसितव्या ॥

The idea of something higher is to be superimposed upon something lower. This is Dr. Thibaut's rendering of the nyāya as it occurs in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 4. 1. 5 (the sūtra being ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात्):—" एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः । ब्रह्मदृष्टिरेवादित्यादिषु स्यादिति ।

कस्मात् । उत्कर्षात् । एवमुत्कर्षेणादित्यादयो दृष्टा भवन्ति । उत्कृष्टदृष्टेस्तेष्वध्यासात् । तथा च लौकिको न्यायोऽनुमतो भवति । उत्कृष्टदृष्टिर्हि निकृष्टेऽध्यसितव्येति लौकिको न्यायः । यथा राजदृष्टिः क्षत्तरि" ॥ "To this we make the following reply. The contemplation on Brahman is exclusively to be superimposed on Āditya and so on. Why? 'On account of exaltation.' For thus Āditya and so on are viewed in an exalted way, the contemplation of something higher than they being superimposed on them. Thereby we also comply with a secular rule, namely the one enjoining that the idea of something higher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as when we view—and speak of—the king's charioteer as a king." Vācaspatimis'ra, in his comment on the above in the *Bhāmatī*, changes the form of the expression to "निकृष्टदृष्टिर्नोत्कृष्ट इति लौकिको न्यायः," and perhaps Rāmānuja had this in mind when, in his very short comment on the sūtra, he wrote "उत्कृष्टे हि राजनि भृत्यदृष्टिः प्रत्यवायकरी, भृत्ये तु राजदृष्टिरभ्युदयाय."

उत्खातदंष्ट्रोरगन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the snake whose fangs have been extracted.* The illustration is used by Sures'vara in his vārtika on *Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishadbhāshya* 1. 4. 1746 (page 776):—"उत्खातदंष्ट्रोरगवदविद्या किं करिष्यति । विद्यमानापि विध्वस्ततीव्रानर्थपरम्परा"॥

उपजीव्यविरोधस्यायुक्तत्वम् ॥

It is wrong to quarrel with that on which one's livelihood depends. It is found in *Paribhāshendus'ekhara* 85, as follows:-"संनिपातो द्वयोः संबन्धस्तन्निमित्तो विधिस्तं संनिपातं यो विहन्ति तस्यानिमित्तम् ॥ उपजीव्यविरोधस्यायुक्तत्वमिति न्यायमूलैषा" ॥ Professor Kielhorn has rendered it thus:—"सन्निपात 'a combination' is the junction of two (things; that which is taught in) a rule (the application of) which is caused by such (a combination), does not

cause (the application of) another (rule) which would destroy that combination. This (Paribhāshā) is founded on the maxim that *one must not be hostile to that to which one owes one's existence.*"

There are references to the nyāya in the following works:— *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, page 128; *Vedāntakalpataru*, pages 231, and 556 (especially the latter); *Parimala*, pages 10, 11, 12, 451; *Nyāyamakarandaṭīkā*, page 149.

उष्ट्रलगुडन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the camel and the stick*. The equivalent, apparently, of "Hoist with his own petard" (*Hamlet*, Act iii, Scene iv). The following is Raghunātha's exposition of it:— "स्वमते परेणोद्भाव्यमानानां दूषणानां तन्मते पातने उष्ट्रलगुडन्यायावतारः । यथोष्ट्रेणोह्यमानेनैव लगुडेन तत्प्रहारः क्रियते तथा तार्किकोत्थापितदूषणैस्तन्मतमेव वेदान्तिभिर्निराक्रियते । तथाहि । अद्वैतवादे यद्भोगसांकर्यादिरूपं दूषणं तैरुच्यते तदौपनिषदैर्विभ्वनेकात्मवादिनां तेषामेव मते पात्यते" ॥ It occurs in the following passage of the *Ātmatattvaviveka* (page 54, line 16):—"तज्जातीयस्य तु बाह्यवद्विज्ञानस्यापि विवेचनमेवेति स्वसंवेदनबाधितोऽयं विरुद्धधर्माध्यासो न भेदसाधक इत्युष्ट्रलगुडकं संवेदनेनैवास्य साधितत्वात्" ॥ There is another instance of it in *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 118 (where it appears as the उष्ट्रलकुटन्याय), and again in *Nyāyadīpāvali* page 6, line 11.

ऊषरवृष्टिन्यायः ॥

The simile of *rain on a saline barren waste.* Its application is similar to that of अरण्यरोदन, which see above. Hemacandra has a good example of it in his *Parisiṣṭaparvan* viii. 417:—

"कषायपक्षिवृक्षेषु कृतघ्नेषु दुरात्मसु ।
एतेषु निष्फलं दानमूषरेष्वम्बुवृष्टिवत्" ॥

In *Anus'āsanaparva* xc. line 4314, we read:—" यथोषरे बीजमुप्तं न रोहेन्न वा वप्ता प्राप्नुयाद्बीजभागम्। एवं श्राद्धं भुक्तमनर्हमाणैर्न चेह नामुत्र फलं ददाति " ॥

ऋजुमार्गेण सिध्यतोऽर्थस्य वक्रेण साधनायोगः ॥

No one tries to accomplish in a round-about way a thing which can be effected by direct means. This nyāya is the counterpart of अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत &c., and is used twice by Vācaspatimis'ra in his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā.* On page 195, we read:—" न च कार्येणैव कारणमनुमीयतां जीवच्छरीरे किं व्यतिरेकिणा ऋजुमार्गेण सिध्यन्तं को नु वक्रेण साधयेदिति वाच्यम्। कारणमात्रस्य ततः सिद्धेरित्युक्तम् " ॥ Again, on page 203:—" अन्वयव्यतिरेकिणि हेतौ सत्यपि वैधर्म्ये साधर्म्योदाहरणमेवोचितं तत्र तत्पूर्वकत्वाद्वैधर्म्यप्रतीतेः ऋजुमार्गेण सिध्यतोऽर्थस्य वक्रेण साधनायोगात् " ॥

A still older example is found in *S'ālika,* page 86:—

" ऋजुमार्गेणार्थसिद्धौ न वक्रमार्गमाश्रयेत."

See, also, *Tarkabhāṣā,* page 48, line 5.

एकाकिनी प्रतिज्ञा हि प्रतिज्ञातं न साधयेत् ॥

Bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. This is Professor Gough's rendering of the saying as found in the Bauddha chapter of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 10 of Jīvānanda's edn.):—" यदि कश्चित्प्रामाण्यमनुमानस्य नाङ्गीकुर्यात्तं प्रति ब्रूयादनुमानं प्रमाणं न भवतीत्येतावन्मात्रमुच्यते तत्र न किञ्चन साधनमुपन्यस्यत उपन्यस्यते वा। न प्रथमः। एकाकिनी प्रतिज्ञा हि प्रतिज्ञातं न साधयेदिति न्यायात् " ॥ The following is from the *Laukikanyāyasangraha:*—" नन्वेकाकिनी प्रतिज्ञा हि प्रतिज्ञातं न साधयेदिति न्यायेन प्रतिज्ञयार्थसिद्ध्यभावान्नाद्वैतं साधयितुं पार्यते। भेदवादिनो हि जीवेशाभेदमपि न क्षमन्तेऽन्यस्य का कथा । तद्भेदेऽपि किं मानमिति चेन्नाहमीश्वर इति प्रत्यक्षमित्यवेहि " ॥ The nyāya " नहि प्रतिज्ञामात्रेणार्थसिद्धिः " is given in Raghunātha's list as one of similar import. Compare *Nyāyavārtika,* page 345, line 11:—" न च प्रतिज्ञा प्रतिज्ञां साधयति."

एकामसिद्धिं परिहरतो द्वितीयापद्यते ॥

Whilst avoiding one kind of fallacy, another kind appears! This is explained by Raghunātha as follows:—" इयं बौद्धाधिकारे उदयनाचार्योक्तिः । यथांकुराद्यकर्तृकं शरीर्यजन्यत्वादित्यत्र शरीरीतिविशेषणेन स्वरूपासिद्धिं परिहरतो बौद्धस्य व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरापद्यते " ॥ The work here entitled *Bauddhādhikāra* is styled *Bauddhadhikkāra* in Hall's *Index* (pp. 81, 82). It is more generally known as *Ātmatattvaviveka;* and the passage in question is found on page 108, as follows:—" अस्तु तर्हि सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं शरीराजन्यत्वादिति चेन्न असमर्थविशेषणत्वेनासिद्धभेदस्यातुल्यबलत्वात् । असिद्धिपरिहारेण विशेषणं समर्थमिति चेन्न एकामसिद्धिं परिहरतो द्वितीयापत्तेः " ॥ The same passage is clearly referred to in *Citsukhī* I. 24 (Paṇḍit, vol. v. page 110):—" क्षित्यादिकमकर्तृकं शरीर्यजन्यत्वादाकाशवदित्यादाविव व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरिति चेन्मैवम् । तत्राकर्तृत्वे साध्ये तदेकदेशस्याजन्यत्वस्यैवोपाधितया विशिष्टस्य व्याप्यत्वासिद्धेः । उक्तं हि । एकामसिद्धिं परिहरतो द्वितीयासिद्धिरापद्यत इति " ॥ So, too, Venkaṭanātha in the comment on his *Tattvamuktākalāpa* iii. 22 (p. 289), and again in his *Nyāyasiddhānjana*, page 100. For a clear and concise definition of the three terms आश्रयासिद्ध, स्वरूपासिद्ध and व्याप्यतासिद्ध, see Āpṭe's *Practical Sanskrit Dictionary*, s. v. असिद्ध.

कटकगवोदाहरणम् ॥

The illustration of *a cow* [tied] *in an enclosure.* This occurs in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, page 632:—" यत्तु सत्तेवेत्युक्तं तत्कटकगवोदाहरणमनुहरति यतः सत्ताप्यमुना दूषणेनास्माभिः खण्डनीया. " The commentator explains as follows:—" यथा कटके बद्धा गौर्बन्धनरज्जुमादाय विद्रवति विद्रवद्भिरश्वैः सह तथामुना खण्डनेन विद्रवता भेदेन सत्तापि विद्रविष्यतीत्यर्थः ।' यद्वा यथा कटके गौरपसार्यमाणापि पुनस्तथैवायाति तथा बहुशः खण्डितापि सत्ता पुनरुदाहरणत्वेनायातीत्यर्थः" ॥ I may add that the long passage beginning with the words "किं भेदज्ञानं नास्ति," on page 632, down to the words "इत्येषा दिक्" on page 637, is taken *verbatim* from Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pages 70 to 72. It includes another, and probably the earliest, example of the use of the nyāya "चौरापराधेन माण्डव्यनिग्रहः", for which, see the first Handful of maxims.

कण्ठचामीकरन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the golden ornament on the neck.* A person is supposed to have a golden ornament round the neck and yet to be unaware of it until some one points it out; a kind of illustration greatly in vogue amongst Vedantists, who tell us that although we are already Brahma, and free, we are not aware of the fact until instructed by a competent teacher! For the translation of a passage of the *Vedāntaparibhāshā* bearing on this, see pages 130 and 131 of my *Manual of Hindu Pantheism.* The above nyāya is found at the top of page 130 of *Ātmatattvaviveka.*

कदलीफलन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the fruit of the plantain tree.* For explanation of this see अश्वतरीगर्भन्याय. Another instance of it is found in *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* iv. 14:—"बुद्धिमेवापस्मृद्गाति कदलीं तत्फलं यथा." See, also, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* i. 12.

करविन्यस्तबिल्वन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the woodapple on the* [open palm of the] *hand.* Said of something unmistakably clear—"as plain as a pike-staff"! It occurs in Sures'vara's large *Vārtika* 2. 1. 95:—"अतोऽनुपेतमेव त्वां करविन्यस्तबिल्ववत् । ब्रह्म विज्ञापयिष्यामि यज्ज्ञाने सर्वविद्भवेत्" ॥ Again in 2. 5. 136 of the same:—"निःशेषोपनिषत्सारस्तदेतदिति साम्प्रतम् । उक्त्याविष्क्रियते साक्षात्करविन्यस्तबिल्ववत्" ॥ A third instance is found in 4. 3. 1334, and there is another in the vārtika on the *Taittirīyopanishadbhāshya*, page 200. Of exactly the same import is the करस्थामलकन्याय, for which see the former *Vārtika* 3. 1. 14.

कर्मभूयस्त्वात्फलभूयस्त्वम् ॥

Abundance of labor produces abundance of fruit; from great pains come great gains. It occurs in the following passage of Vidyāraṇya's *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 247:—"ब्रह्मोपासनानां सर्वेषामपि यद्येकरूपं फलं तदा गुणोपचयापचयाभ्यामुपासनोपचयापचयौ व्यर्थौ स्याताम् । तथा च कर्मभूयस्त्वात्फलभूयस्त्वमिति न्यायविरोधः" ॥ Compare S'abara's "अङ्गभूयस्त्वे फलभूयस्त्वम्" in 10. 6. 62. and 11. 1. 15. It is quoted in *Parimala*, page 600.

कांस्यभोजिन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the man who eats from a brazen vessel.* Raghunātha explains it thus:—" मया नित्यं गुरुशिष्टं भोक्तव्यं कांस्यपात्रे च भोक्तव्यमिति नियमवतो विनेयस्य नियमाभङ्गाय गुरुर्नित्यं कांस्यपात्रे भुंक्त इति । यद्यप्ययं शास्त्रीयस्तथाप्येतद्व्यवहारस्य लौकिकत्वात्सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायवल्लौकिकेषु परिगणितः " ॥

The nyāya is taken from Jaimini's sūtra 12. 2. 34, where S'abara interprets it as follows:—"कांस्यभोजिवत् । तद्यथा । शिष्यस्य कांस्यपात्रभोजित्वनियम उपाध्यायस्यानियमः । यदि तयोरेकस्मिन्पात्रे भोजनमापद्यतेऽमुख्यस्यापि शिष्यस्य धर्मो नियम्येत । मा भूद्धर्मलोप इति " ॥ The principle here laid down is that of some one's doing something which he is *not* bound to do, in order that he may not hinder another who *is* required to do it. The converse, that is, of a man's *abstaining* from doing something, possibly harmless in his case, lest another should do the same and suffer harm. " If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend."

Examples of the nyāya are found in *Tantravārtika*, pages 393, 577, and 907; in *Vidhirasāyana*, page 50; in *Bhāmatī*, page 478; in *Vedāntakalpataru*, pages 314, 425, 502, 517; and in *Parimala*, pages 462, 572, 666.

काकोलूकनिशावत् ॥

The simile of *the crow's and owl's night-time.* What is day to the former is night to the latter, and *vice versā.* This characteristic of the owl is often referred to by the poets, as, for instance, in Bhartṛihari's *Nītis'ataka* 93:—

"पत्रं नैव यदा करीरविटपे दोषो वसन्तस्य किं
नोलूकोऽप्यवलोकते यदि दिवा सूर्यस्य किं दूषणम्"।

The nyāya is found is Sures'vara's large vārtika 1. 4. 313:—

"काकोलूकनिशेवायं संसारोऽज्ञात्मवेदिनोः।
या निशा सर्वभूतानामित्यवोचत्स्वयं हरिः" ॥

Ānandagiri comments on this as follows:—"काकेति। या काकादीनां प्रसिद्धा निशा तस्यामुलूको जागर्तीति तद्दृष्ट्या सापलप्यते। यदा च काकादयो जाग्रति तदा नक्तंदृशो निशेति काकादिदृष्ट्या सापह्नूयते यथेत्यर्थः। एवमज्ञस्यायं मात्रादिः संसारो यदा विवर्तते तदा तद्दृष्ट्या तत्त्वस्यासत्कल्पना। यदा विदुषस्तत्त्वानुभवस्तदा तद्दृष्ट्या मात्रादेरसत्त्वमिति" ॥ The quotation in the second line of Sures'vara's verse is from *Gītā* ii-69 which reads thus:—"या निशा सर्वभूतानां तस्यां जागर्ति संयमी। यस्यां जाग्रति भूतानि सा निशा पश्यतो मुनेः" ॥ In *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* iii. 111 the nyāya is quoted as उलूकनिशावत्. The passage stands thus:—"अनुदितानस्तमितकूटस्थबोधमात्रस्वाभाव्यादात्मनो दुःसम्भाव्योऽविद्यासद्भाव इति चेन्न। अविद्याप्रसिद्ध्यैव तत्सद्भावसिद्धेरुलूकनिशावदित्यत इदमुच्यते।

अहो धाष्टर्यमविद्याया न कश्चिदतिवर्तते।
प्रमाणं वस्त्वनादृत्य परमात्मेव तिष्ठति" ॥

कारणगुणप्रक्रमन्यायः ॥

The principle *of the reproduction, in the effect, of certain qualities, in the proportion in which they exist in the produc-*

ing cause. In the *Vedāntasāra*, section 12, we read:—"तदानीं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि कारणगुणप्रक्रमेण तेष्वाकाशादिषूत्पद्यन्ते" ॥ On which, the commentator Nṛisimhasarasvati remarks:—"तदानीमुत्पत्तिवेलायां सत्वादयस्त्रयोऽपि गुणास्तारतम्येन कारणगुणप्रक्रमन्यायेन तेष्वाकाशादिषु पञ्चभूतेषूत्तरोत्तराधिक्येन जायन्त इत्यर्थः" ॥ For full notes on कारणगुण, see page 176 of the *Vedāntasāra* referred to above.

कार्पासरक्तताद्दृष्टान्तः ॥

The illustration of *the redness of cotton* [produced by smearing the cotton-seeds with red lac]. One of the stock illustrations of the Buddhist when seeking to establish the doctrine that *all existence is momentary* (क्षणभङ्गवाद). For the examination and refutation of the tenet, see S'ankara on *Brahmasūtras* 2. 1. 18, 2. 2. 20 &c.; and the opening part of the Ārhata chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha.* The nyāya is contained in the following verse:—

"यस्मिन्नेव हि सन्तान आहिता कर्मवासना ।
फलं तत्रैव बध्नाति कार्पासे रक्तता यथा" ॥

This is quoted in *Syādvādamanjarī*, pages 155 and 193; in Maṇibhadra's comment on kārikā 5 of *Ṣaḍdars'anasamuccaya;* in a slightly altered form, on page 1501 of *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtika;* in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 443; in the vṛitti on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* i. 29; and in the Ārhata section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, where Professor Cowell renders it:—"In whatever series of successive states the original impression of the action was produced, there verily accrues the result, just like the redness produced in cotton". We find the कार्पासरागसंक्रान्तिदृष्टान्त in *Nyāyamanjarī* page 465, in the concluding portion of the author's क्षणभङ्गनिरास, and the following extract from the *Ātmatattvaviveka* (page 102) exPlains the process:—"यथा क्षीरावसेकादम्लत्वं परिहृत्य माधुर्यमुपादायानुवर्तमानामलकी

कालान्तरेऽपि माधुर्यमुन्मीलयति, लाक्षारसावसेकाद्वा धवलिमानमपहाय रक्तता-मुपादायानुवर्तमानं कार्पासबीजं कुसुमेषु रक्तताम्." In the closing verses of the निरालम्बनवाद (*S'lokavārtika*, page 267) Kumārila deals with this Buddhist illustration in connection with a citron (बीजपूर) instead of the cotton plant; and we meet with it again in *Bhāmatī* 1. 1. 4 (page 95).

किमार्द्रकवणिजो वहित्रचिन्तया ॥

What has a seller of ginger to do with ships? Possibly the equivalent of "No cobbler beyond his last." It occurs in the following passage of *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 62, line 10:—अविद्यैव हि तथा तथा विवर्तते यथा यथानुभाव्यतया व्यवह्रियते तत्तन्मायोपनीतोपाधिभेदाच्चानुभूतिरपि भिन्नैव व्यवहारपथमवतरति गगनमिव स्वप्नदृष्टघटकटाहकोटरकुटीकोटिभिः । तदास्तां तावत् । किमार्द्रकवणिजो वहित्रचिन्तयेति ॥

कुठारच्छेद्यतां कुर्यान्नखच्छेद्यं न पण्डितः ॥

A wise man should not imagine that he can remove with a finger-nail that which can only be cut down with an axe. A caution against under-rating the strength of an enemy. It occurs in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 1044:—

"नोपेक्षणीयं देवेन तस्मादेतत्प्रयोजनम् ।
कुठारच्छेद्यतां कुर्यान्नखच्छेद्यं न पण्डितः" ॥

Compare Udayana's saying in *Kiraṇāvali*, page 74:—"न खलु नखरञ्जनिका परशुच्छेद्यं छिनत्ति."

कुड्यं विना चित्रकर्मेव ॥

Like a decoration without a wall [to be decorated; or, like a

painting without a canvas]. An unreality, like a hare's horn &c. It is found in the *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 103, in a disquisition on योगिप्रत्यक्षसाधनम्.

"प्रसङ्गसाधनं नाम नास्त्येव परमार्थतः ।
तद्धि कुड्यं विना तत्र चित्रकर्मेव लक्ष्यते ॥
नहि नभःकुसुमस्य सौरभासौरभविचारो युक्तः" ॥

A much older example is contained in *Sānkhyakārikā* 41:— "चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा छाया । तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम्" ॥

There is a similar thought in Aniruddha's comment on *Sānkhyasūtra* iii. 12. He says:—"यद्यात्मना विना देहेऽहमिति प्रत्ययस्तदा मृतदेहेऽहमिति प्रत्ययः स्यात् । न चैवम् । यथावरकेण विना न छाया भित्तिं विना न चित्रं तथात्रापि" ॥ See also Mallinātha on *Tārkikarakṣā*, page 111 and 176.

क्षीरनीरन्यायः ॥

The simile of *milk and water*. Used to illustrate the most intimate union of two or more things. The oldest example of it known to me is in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 2. 32:—क्षीरोदके सम्पृक्त आमिश्रीभूतत्वान्न ज्ञायते कियत्क्षीरं कियदुदकं कस्मिन्नवकाशे क्षीरं कस्मिन्नवकाश उदकमिति." Writers on Alankāra employ it to exemplify the figure called *Sankara* (Commixture), in which there is a combination of other figures. It differs from *Saṁsṛishṭi* (Collocation) which is compared to the union between rice and sesamum, which is less intimate and easily distinguishable. The author of the *Alankārasarvasva* (page 192) says:— "अधुनैषां सर्वेषामलंकाराणां संश्लेपसमुत्थापितमलंकारद्वयमुच्यते । तत्र संश्लेषः संयोगन्यायेन समवायन्यायेन च द्विविधः । संयोगन्यायो यत्र भेदस्योत्कटतया स्थितिः । समवायन्यायो यत्र तस्यैवानुत्कटत्वेनावस्थानम् । तत्रोत्कटत्वेन स्थितौ तिलतण्डुलन्याय इतरत्र तु क्षीरनीरसादृश्यम् । क्रमेणैतदुच्यते । एषां तिलतण्डुलन्यायेन मिश्रत्वं संसृष्टिः ।......क्षीरनीरन्यायेन तु संकरः" ॥

Similarly too in *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* (page 262):—

"संसृष्टिरिति विज्ञेया सर्वालंकारसंकरः ।
सा तु व्यक्ता तथाव्यक्ता व्यक्ताव्यक्तेति च त्रिधा ॥
तिलतण्डुववव्यक्ता छायादर्शवदेव च ।
अव्यक्ता क्षीरजलवत्पांशुपानीयवच्च सा ॥
व्यक्ताव्यक्ता च संसृष्टिर्नरसिंहवदिष्यते ।
चित्रवर्णवदन्यास्मिन्नानालंकारसंकरे" ॥

It will be noticed that here there is mention of a third kind of combination which is likened to that of man and lion. The three kinds are noticed in *Kuvalayānanda*, also (page 337), as follows:—"अथैतेषामलङ्काराणां यथासंभवं क्वचिन्मेलने लौकिकालंकाराणां मेलन इव चारुत्वातिशयोपलंभान्नरसिंहन्यायेन पृथगलंकारावस्थितौ तन्निर्णयः क्रियते । तत्र तिलतण्डुलन्यायेन स्फुटावगम्यभेदालंकारमेलने संसृष्टिः । नीरक्षीरन्यायेनास्फुटभेदालंकारमेलने संकरः" ॥

खले कपोतन्यायः ॥

The simile of *pigeons alighting on a threshing-floor.* Used by writers on Alankara to illustrate the production of a certain effect by the simultaneous action of numerous causes. In *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (739) we read:—"समुच्चयोऽयमेकस्मिन्सति कार्यस्य साधके । खले कपोतिकान्यायात्तत्करः स्यात्परोऽपि चेत्" ॥ "The conjunction is when notwithstanding the existence of one cause sufficient to bring about an effect, there are represented others producing the same, according to the maxim of the Threshing-floor and the pigeons." See this, also, very concisely put, in *Alankārasarvasva*, page 161, and in *Kuvalayānanda*, p. 240. There is further reference to this nyāya in Mallinātha on Magha x. 16, and in *Nyāyamālāvistara* 11. 1. 3.

गन्धाश्मरजसा स्पृष्टो नष्टो दीपः पुनर्ज्वलेत् ॥

A lamp which has gone out will burn up again if touched with sulphur-powder. The use of this illustration will be seen from the following passage of the vṛitti on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* ii. 65:—"ननु संसृत्यवस्थासिद्धं निरयाणां प्रातिकूल्यं स्वानुभूतं च दुःखं मुक्तः पश्यति वा न वा। आद्ये गन्धाश्मरजसा स्पृष्टो नष्टो दीपः पुनर्ज्वलेदिति न्यायेन पुनरपि दुःखसन्ततिरुदियात्" ॥

गर्तवर्तिगोधामांसविभजनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the partition of the flesh of an Iguana whilst it is still in its hole!* Used to illustrate an impossibility. Raghunātha says of it:—"अनवबुद्धार्थे प्रवृत्तिर्बिलवर्तिगोधाविभजनन्याये-नाशक्येति ध्वनितम्." It occurs, in the form given above, in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* page 640:—"यदपि तथापि क इत्यादि तिर्यक् चेत्यन्तं तदपि गर्तवर्तिगोधामांसविभजनन्यायमनुहरति पक्षत्रयस्याप्यु-क्तयुक्त्या आच्छादितस्य दर्शयितुमशक्यत्वेन तद्विभागव्यवस्थितेरनवसरनिर-स्तत्वात्" ॥

गले पादुकान्यायः ॥

The simile of *the shoes on the neck*. This quaint nyāya appears to be used when an opponent is compelled to accept certain conclusions or else adopt an utterly absurd alternative. It occurs three times in *Citsukhī*. The first instance is in i. 11 (Paṇḍit, vol. IV, page 484), as follows:—सर्वेषामपि भावानामाश्रय-त्वेन संमते। प्रतियोगित्वमत्यन्ताभावं प्रति मृषात्मता ॥ ११ ॥ तथाहि पट-घटादीनां भावानां स्वाश्रयत्वेनाभिमतास्तन्त्वादयो ये तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियो-गितैव तेषां मिथ्यात्वम्। नहि तेषामन्यत्रसत्ता संभाविनी। तत्रापि चेत्सा न स्यात्तदा गले पादुकान्यायेन मृषात्वमेव पर्यवस्येत्" ॥ This verse is quoted in the second chapter of the *Vedāntaparibhāshā*, and a

translation of it, and of the comment on it, by Professor Venis will be found in the *Paṇḍit* for 1883, page 660. I subjoin that portion which contains the simile. "For the existence of these things cannot be surmised anywhere but in their substrates......, and if the existence of these things, in their substrates, cannot be surmised..., then the unreality of things is the only conclusion (forced upon us), much in the same way that a man must hang his shoes round his neck if he will not wear them on his feet." The other two examples are in i. 26, and ii. 16 (Paṇḍit, vol v, pages 112 and 435). It is found also in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 45, in *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, pages 7 and 124, and in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 284, in the erroneous form "गले पादिका."

The explanation given by *Raghunātharvarman* differs entirely from the above, and is extremely far-fetched and unsatisfactory. He says:—"सदसतोरुत्पत्तिनिवृत्त्यसंभवेन परस्परविरोधे न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिरिति न्यायसिद्धस्य सत्त्वस्यासत्त्वस्य वानुपपत्तेर्गले पादुकान्यायेनाज्ञानकार्यस्य बाधानुपपत्त्या चाज्ञानस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वं बलात्स्वीकार्यम् । यथा कस्यचिद्गृहस्थस्य गृहेऽन्नाद्यर्थित्वछलेनागतो निषण्णश्च कश्चिद्विटस्तेन तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा गच्छ गच्छेति पुनःपुनरुच्यमानोऽपि यदा धौर्त्येन स्वेच्छया गमनं न स्वीकरोति तदा पादुकासहितं पदं गले निधाय नोदयित्वा च बलान्निस्सार्यते तथा प्रकृतेऽपि बोध्यम्" ॥

गृहीत्वार्थं गताश्चौराः कस्तानाच्छेत्तुमर्हति ॥

The robbers have got away with the booty; who is able to intercept them? This saying is quoted by Vācaspatimis'ra in his comment (on page 59) on *Nyāyavārtika* 1, 1. 2. "अपायोऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानान्मिथ्याज्ञानस्य स्वरूपतो वा विषयतो वा फलतो वा स्यात् । न तावत्स्वरूपतः । ...नापि विषयतः । नहि शुक्तिकाज्ञानं रजतज्ञानस्य रजतविषयतामपहर्तुमुत्सहते जातं हि तद्रजतं विषयीकृत्य । यथाहुः । गृहीत्वार्थं गताश्चौराः कस्तानाच्छेत्तुमर्हतीति" ॥ It is found also in *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, page 119.

घटप्रदीपन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a lighted lamp inside a vessel.* Raghunātha points out that a lamp so placed illuminates only the interior of the vessel, and he applies it to one whose knowledge of Brahman is of a low order. The maxim is used very differently, however, by Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka* iii. 33 (page 190), ts the following extract will show:—"न त्वेष वाच्यव्यंग्ययोर्न्यायः । नहि व्यंग्ये प्रतीयमाने वाच्यबुद्धिर्दूरीभवति । वाच्यावभासाविनाभावेन तस्य प्रकाशनात् । तस्माद्घटप्रदीपन्यायस्तयोः । यथैव हि प्रदीपद्वारेण घटप्रतीतावुत्पन्नायां न प्रदीपप्रकाशो निवर्तते तद्वद्व्यंग्यप्रतीतौ वाच्यावभासः" ॥ Abhinavagupta, when explaining *Dhvanyāloka* i. 12, refers to this passage in the following words:—"अत एव तृतीयोद्द्योते घटप्रदीपदृष्टान्तबलाद्व्यंग्यप्रतीतिकालेऽपि वाच्यप्रतीतिर्न विघटत इति यद्वक्ष्यति तेन सहास्य ग्रन्थस्य न विरोधः" ॥ According to these great authorities on Alankāra, therefore, the nyāya teaches that as the lamp continues to burn after it has lighted up the interior of the vessel, and is indeed essential to the continuance of that illumination, so the expressed meaning of a sentence is absolutely essential as a basis for the figurative meaning which it also conveys.

घटीयन्त्रन्यायः ॥

This has the same meaning and application as the कूपयन्त्रघटिकान्याय, for which see the first series of maxims. It occurs in Sures'vara's large *Vārtika* 4. 4. 248, and 6. 2. 155, as follows:—"अनिर्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वः सन्कामबन्धनबन्धनः । घटीयन्त्रवदश्रान्तो बंभ्रमीत्यनिशं नरः" ॥ "घटीयन्त्रवदश्रान्ता एवमेव पुनः पुनः । परिवर्तन्ति संसारे कर्मवायुसमीरिताः" ॥ Similarly, in his vārtika on the *Taittirīyabhāshya* 2. 1. 221 (page 86):—"मृतिबीजं भवेज्जन्म जन्मबीजं तथा मृतिः । घटीयन्त्रवदश्रान्तो बंभ्रमीत्यनिशं नरः" ॥ It is found too in a third work of his, namely *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* i. 42. Also in the Jain treatise *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 62, as follows:—

"आपद्गतं हससि किं द्रविणान्धमूढ
लक्ष्मीः स्थिरा न भवतीति किमत्र चित्रम् ।
किं त्वं न पश्यसि घटीर्जलयन्त्रचक्रे
रिक्ता भवन्ति भरिता भरिताश्च रिक्ताः" ॥

In *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, pages 52, and 418, it appears as अरघट्टघटीयन्त्रन्याय. In *Kīrtikaumudī* vi. 43, we have the compound भ्रमद्घटीसंघटितारघट्टखाङ्कारशब्दैः. The word अरघट्ट has become राहाट in Marāthī, as in राहाटगाडगें.

चक्रभ्रमणन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the* [continued] *revolving of the potter's wheel.* Followers of both Sānkhya and Vedānta have asked why, on attaining to right knowledge, a man is not immediately liberated. Kapila's answer is contained in Sūtra iii. 82. "चक्रभ्रमणवद्धृतशरीरः" ॥ On which Aniruddha says:—"यथा दण्डापगमे संस्कारवशाच्चक्रं भ्रमति तथा विवेकिनामपि देहधारणकर्मणोऽक्षीणत्वान्न तत्क्षणान्मुक्तिः किन्तूपभोगादिना कर्मक्षयादिति ॥ तथा च श्रुतिः । दीक्षयैव नरो मुच्येत्तिष्ठेन्मुक्तोऽपि विग्रहे । कुलालचक्रमध्यस्थो विच्छिन्नोऽपि भ्रमेद्घटः" ॥ *Brahmasūtrabhāshya* 4. 1. 15 teaches the same thing from the Vedāntist's standpoint, and propounds the very important doctrine that whilst accumulated and current works are destroyed by true knowledge, fructescent works, which brought about the present existence, are not. Therefore the Jīvanmukta has to continue here until death—just as the potter's wheel continues to revolve until the impetus given to it exhausts itself.

चिन्तामणिं परित्यज्य काचमणिग्रहणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *giving up the fabulous gem Cintāmaṇi, and taking instead a mere piece of quartz!* Its application is

obvious. Raghunātha applies it to the man who abandons the search for the knowledge of Brahma in order to enjoy the pleasures of this life. *S'āntis'ataka* 12, in Haeberlin's Anthology, bears on this:—"जन्मेदं वन्ध्यतां नीतं भवभोगोपलिप्सया । काचमूल्येन विक्रीतो हन्त चिन्तामणिर्मया" ॥ So, too, *Hitopades'a* ii. 60:—"मणिर्लुठति पादेषु काचः शिरसि धार्यते । यथैवास्तु तथैवास्तु काचः काचो मणिर्मणिः" ॥

There is an additional example in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 420:—"निर्वाणसुखसंसारसुखयोश्च परस्परम् । चिन्तारत्नस्य काचेन यावत्तावद्गुणान्तरम्." Then, lower down on the same page, this and eight other figures are employed to illustrate the folly of one who, though acquainted with the Jaina creed, still clings to evil. The whole passage is reproduced for the benefit of those who have not the book to refer to. "यो जैनमपि सम्प्राप्य शासनं कर्मनाशनम् । हिंसाक्रोधादिपापेषु रज्यते मूढमानसः ॥ संहारयति काचेन चिन्तामणिमनुत्तमम् । करोत्यङ्गारवाणिज्यं दग्ध्वा गोशीर्षचन्दनम् ॥ भिनत्ति नावं मूढात्मा लोहार्थं स महोदधौ । सूत्रार्थं दारयत्युच्चैर्वैडूर्यं रत्नमुत्तमम् ॥ प्रदीपयति कीलार्थं देवद्रोणीं महत्तमाम् । रत्नस्थाल्यां पचत्याम्लखलकं मोहदोषतः ॥ सौवर्णलाङ्गलाग्रेण लिखित्वा वसुधां तथा । अर्कबीजं वपत्येष तूलार्थं मूढमानसः ॥ छित्त्वा कर्पूरखण्डानि कोद्रवाणां समन्ततः । वृतिं विधत्ते मूढोऽयमहं सश्रुतिकः किल" ॥ On page 170 there is yet another word of Siddharṣi's in regard to the *Cintāmaṇi*, namely "निर्लक्षणनरो नैव चिन्तामाणिमवाप्नुते."

चेतनस्य यत्नहीनस्योर्ध्वगतिश्चेतनान्तराधीना ॥

Movement upward on the part of a quiescent intelligent being is dependent on [the action of] *some other being of intelligence.* I should call this an axiom rather than a maxim; but as Ānandagiri terms it a *laukika-nyāya* I include it here. It occurs in his comment on *Brahmasūtrabhāshya* 4. 3. 5, as follows:—"चेतनस्य यत्नहीनस्योर्ध्वगतिश्चेतनान्तराधीनेति लौकिकन्यायेन यत्नहीनानां गन्तॄणां गमयितारोऽर्चिरादयश्चेतनाः स्युरिति सूत्रयोजनया ब्रूते" ॥

जलकतकरेणुन्यायः ॥

The simile of *particles of the Kataka nut* [placed] *in water* [in order to clear it]. Manu refers to it in vi. 67 thus:— "फलं कतकवृक्षस्य यद्यप्यम्बुप्रसादकम् । न नामग्रहणादेव तस्य वारि प्रसीदति" ॥ In the *Laukikanyāyasangraha* the nyāya is explained as follows:—"यथा हि सपङ्कजले निक्षिप्ताः कतकस्यौषधिविशेषस्य रेणवो रजांसि तस्माज्जलात्पङ्कं विलाप्य स्वयमेव विलीयन्ते तथा तत्त्वज्ञानं सविलासाज्ञानं निवर्त्य स्वयमेव निवर्तते" ॥ The larger work, the *Laukikanyāyaratnākara*, adds the following quotation in support of the definition:—"तदुक्तं भगवत्पादैः । अज्ञानकलुषं जीवं ज्ञानाभ्यासाद्विनिर्मलम् । कृत्वा ज्ञानं स्वयं नश्येज्जलं कतकरेणुवत् ॥" The "worshipful feet" are those of S'ankarāchārya, and the verse is *Ātmabodha* 5.

Sures'vara has given a capital illustration of the application of this in his large *Vārtika* 4. 3. 975-6 (page 1553):—

"अपां कतकसंपर्काद्यथात्यन्तप्रसन्नता ।
अपास्ताशेषसंसारभावनस्यैवमात्मनः ॥
स्वास्थ्यं प्रसन्नतैतस्मिन्सुषुप्ते भवतीत्यतः ।
सम्प्रसादमिमं प्राहुः सुषुप्तं तद्विदो जनाः" ॥

There is an interesting example, too, in Hemachandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* ii. 4:—

"गुरुवाक्कतकक्षोदसंसक्तमभवत्सदा ।
प्रशान्तदुर्ध्यानमलं तन्मनोवारि निर्मलम्" ॥

Venkaṭanātha, however, does not altogether hold with this simile; for in the vṛitti to his *Tattvamuktākalāpa* ii. 50 (page 215), he says:—

"न तु क्वचिदपि द्रव्यनाशः । अवस्थान्तरापत्त्या चादर्शनम् । कतकरजोनिदर्शनं च बालप्रलोभनम् । न हि पयसि पंकः कतकरजसा शाम्यते विश्लेषमात्रदृष्टेः । न च स्वयं तत्र नश्यत्यसंश्लेषमात्रसिद्धेः" ॥

———

जामात्रर्थं श्रपितस्य सूपादेरतिथ्युपकारकत्वम् ॥

Broth cooked for the son-in-law is also useful for the unexpected guest. This, like the देहलीदीपन्याय and many others, resembles our proverb "killing two birds with one stone." I have met with it only in *Kuvalayānanda* (page 98) under the figure दीपक. The passage is as follows:—"नहि दीपस्य रथ्याप्रासादयोर्युगपदुपकारकत्वेन जामात्रर्थं श्रपितस्य सूपस्यातिथिभ्यः प्रथमपरिवेषणेन च प्रासङ्गिकत्वं हीयते &c." This passage also illustrates another of Ragunātha's nyāyas, namely गृहार्थमारोपितस्य दीपस्य रथ्योपकारकत्वम्.

ज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्नालंकारोपदेशवत् ॥

Like instructions for obtaining Takshaka's crest jewel as a febrifuge! An illustration of utter impossibility. It occurs in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, page 3, line 9, in a passage regarding the *anubandhas*. It runs thus:—"अतस्तेषु संशयो युक्तः । अनुक्तेषु तु प्रतिपत्तृभिर्निष्प्रयोजनमभिधेयं संभाव्येतास्य प्रकरणस्य काकदन्तपरीक्षाया इव । अशक्यानुष्ठानं वा । ज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्नालंकारोपदेशवत् । अनभिमतं वा । मातृविवाहक्रमोपदेशवत् ॥" I am indebted to Professor C. Bendall for pointing out this passage to me. It is applied by Vācaspatimis'ra, in the same sense, in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 3 and in the *Nyāyakaṇikā*, pages 338 and 417.

टिट्टिभन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the bird named Ṭiṭṭibha* [Parra Jacana]. It is based on the story of this bird as given in the *Hitopades'a*, and is used as an illustration of ridiculous conceit. The verse which paves the way for the story is ii. 137:—

"अङ्गाङ्गिभावमज्ञात्वा कथं सामर्थ्यनिर्णयः ।
पश्य टिट्टिभमात्रेण समुद्रो व्याकुलीकृतः" ॥

तक्रकौण्डिन्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *buttermilk for Kauṇḍinya.* This is one of Raghunātha's grammatical nyāyas, taken from Mahābhāṣya, and is intended to indicate a special exception to a general rule as in the sentence ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय, where an exception is made in the case of Kauṇḍinya though included amongst the Brahmans. It occurs in *Bṛihadāraṇyavārtika* 1. 6. 71 (page 881):—

"तक्रकौण्डिन्यवद्न्यायो न चेहाप्यवसीयते ।
उत्सर्गानवकाशत्वाच्छून्यतैवात आपतेत् " ॥

On which Ānandagiri comments as follows:—"अभिन्नशब्दस्य भेदनिषेधित्वेऽपि न भेदस्य शून्यता सर्वत्र प्राप्तस्य कारणे निषेधादार्येभ्यो दधि दीयतामित्यार्योपाधौ प्राप्तस्य दध्नस्तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेति कौण्डिन्ये निषेधेऽप्यशून्यतावदित्याशंक्याह तक्रेति" ॥

I have noted down seven instances of the occurrence of this illustration in the *Mahābhāṣya*, namely, 1. 1. 47; 6. 1. 2 (4); 6. 2. 1; 6. 4. 163 (2); 7. 1. 72 (3); 7. 2. 117 (2); and 7. 4. 61 (4). It will suffice to quote the first, as the other six are practically the same:—"लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । लोके हि सत्यपि संभवे बाधनं भवति । तद्यथा । दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेति सत्यपि सम्भवे दधिदानस्य तक्रदानं निवर्तकं भवति." See, also, Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa's *paribhāṣā* LVII, and Professor Kielhorn's translation of the same. Other instances of it will be found in *Vākyapadīya*, ii. 352; *S'lokavārtika*, page 617 (verse 15); *Tantravārtika*, page 262 (last 2 verses); and *Bhāmati*, 3. 3. 26 (page 628).

तपनीयमपनीय वाससि ग्रन्थिकर्तारमुपहससि स्वयं च कनकमुपादाय गगनाञ्चले ग्रन्थिं करोषि ॥

Thou ridiculest the man who taking his gold ties it up in

a corner of his garment, and then thyself taking the gold tiest it up in the skirt of the sky! It is found in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, (page 58, line 3 from bottom), as follows:—"तस्मान्नीलादीनां प्रकाशमानत्वं परिपालयता ग्राह्यलक्षणे यत्नः कर्तव्यः परिहर्तव्यं वा प्रकाशमानत्वम् । अन्यथा तपनीयमपनीय वाससि ग्रन्थिकर्तारमुपहससि स्वयञ्च कनकमुपादाय गगनाञ्चले ग्रन्थिं करोषीति । सेयं सर्वप्रकारमसिद्धिः सर्वप्रकारं चानैकान्तिकमिति" ॥

तस्करकन्दुन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a thief* [who engaged himself] *as a cook*. His inability to perform the duties, however, led to his discovery and arrest. This is intended to teach the folly of undertaking to do something quite beyond our powers! Sures'vara is the only author in whose works I have met with it. The following verse, which contains it, appears in his large *Vārtika* (page 610), and also in that on the *Taittirīyopanishadbhāshya* (page 169), the preceding context, too, being identical in both cases:—"अशक्ये विनियुक्तोऽपि कृष्णलान् श्रपयेदिति । सर्वात्मनाप्यसौ कुर्वन्कुर्यात्तस्करकन्दुवत्." The following is an extract from Ānandagiri's comment on the former passage:—"तत्र यद्यपि सन्तापमात्रं कृष्णलेष्वपि शक्यं कर्तुं तथापि विक्लित्तिप्रधानः पचतेरर्थ इति न्यायेन सन्तापजन्यां तामेव तेषु कुर्वन्नायासमात्रभागी स्याद्यथा लोके तस्करः सन्कन्दुरपूपादिपक्तृषु स्वयमपि प्रविश्य तत्कर्म कुर्वन्नशक्यकारित्वादायासमात्रभाग्भवत्येवमशक्यत्वाज्ज्ञानेऽपि न वैधी प्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः" ॥ The same commentator's explanation of the nyāya as it appears in the latter work is somewhat different. He says:—"कश्चिच्चौर्यं कृत्वा स्वकीयचौर्यसंवरणार्थं सन्निहितं कन्दुगृहं प्रविष्टः गृहस्वामिना कन्दुना कन्दुकर्माणि नियुक्तस्तत्कर्मण्यशक्ये विनियुक्तत्वात्तत्कुर्वन् राजपुरुषैस्तस्करमन्वेषमाणैस्तत्र झटिति समागतैरुक्ते कर्मण्यकुशलतां समालोच्य तस्करोऽयमिति ज्ञात्वा गृहीतो व्यर्थक्लेशभागी यथा तस्करकन्दुः संवृत्तस्तथा ब्रह्मज्ञाने नियुक्तोऽपि तस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्तत्कुर्वन्व्यर्थक्लेशभागी भवेदित्यर्थः" ॥ The nyāya occurs again on page 181 of the *Taittirīyavārtika*:—"अदृश्यं पश्य इत्येवं नियुक्तोऽपि न शक्नुयात् । शक्नुयात्सन्नियोगाच्चेत्कुर्यात्तस्करकन्दुवत्" ॥

तस्करस्य पुरस्तात्कक्षे सुवर्णमुपेत्य सर्वाङ्गोद्घाटनम् ॥

A thief's offer of his limbs for examination when the gold has been found under his armpit! This occurs in the Jaimini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 134 of Bib. Ind. edition, and page 152 of Jīvānanda's) of which the following is an extract:—"यदत्र कुसुमाञ्जलावुदयनेन झटिति प्रचुरप्रवृत्तेः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयाधीनत्वाभावमापादयता प्रण्यगादि......तदपि तस्करस्य पुरस्तात् कक्षे सुवर्णमुपेत्य सर्वाङ्गोद्घाटनमिव प्रतिभाति" ॥ Professor Cowell's rendering of the passage is as follows:—"As for the argument urged by Udayana in the Kusumānjali, when he tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech which sets him acting......all this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had actually found the gold under his armpit."

तिलतण्डुलन्यायः ॥

The simile of *rice and sesamum seeds.* Used to illustrate an easily distinguishable union of two or more things, in contradistinction to the more intimate and indistinguishable union exemplified by the commingling of milk and water. For examples, see क्षीरनीरन्याय. Also Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālankāra* x. 25.

तुलोन्नमनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the raising* [with the hand, one scale] *of a balance.* That, of course, causes the other scale to go down; and so the simile is used to illustrate the bringing about of two or more results by one operation. It occurs in the following passage of *Pancapādikā* (page 38):—"नेदं रजतमिति यत्र विपर्यासमात्रं निरस्यते न वस्तुतत्त्वमवबोध्यते तत्र तथा भवतु । इह पुनर्वि-

ज्ञानमेव तादृशमुत्पन्नं यद्विरोधिनिराकरणमन्तरेण न स्वार्थं साधयितुमलं तुलोन्नमनव्यापार इवानमननान्तरीयकः । तथाह्युन्नमनव्यापारः स्वविषयस्य तुलाद्रव्यस्योर्ध्वदेशसंबन्धं न साधयितुमलं तत्कालमेव तस्याधोदेशसंबन्धमनापाद्य । न चोन्नमनकारकस्य हस्तप्रयत्नादेरानमनेऽपि कारकत्वम्" ॥ In commenting on this, Prakās'ātman says:—"अन्यविषयव्यापारादन्यविषयस्य नान्तरीयकसिद्धिं साधयति तथाह्युन्नमनव्यापार इति" ॥

Other good examples of it will be found in *Nyāyavārtika* 3. 2. 12 (top of page 412), the substance of which is reproduced in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 456; in *S'lokavārtikaṭīkā*, page 311 (where it is seen in conjunction with the पद्मपत्रशतव्यतिभेदन्याय); and in *Vivaraṇaprameya*, page 99, line 4.

तुषकण्डनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the grinding of chaff*. Used, like पिष्टपेषणन्याय, of any unnecessary and useless effort. It occurs in Padmapāda's *Pancapādikā*, page 68, as follows:—"तेन पुरुषार्थरूपताऽनन्यसिद्धता तत्प्रतिपाद्यता चेति भिद्यन्ते विषयसंबन्धप्रयोजनानि तानि च त्रीण्यपि प्रवृत्त्यङ्गम् । नापुरुषार्थे काकदन्तपरीक्षायां तुषकण्डने वा प्रवर्तते प्रेक्षावान्" ॥ Also in the *Hitopades'a* iv. 13:—"अविचारयतो युक्तिकथनं तुषकण्डनम् । नीचेषूपकृतं राजन्वालुकास्विव मूत्रितम्" ॥

Sures'vara too makes very frequent use of it. We find it on pages 676, 1036, 1334, 1505, and 1572 of his large *Vārtika*; and on page 176 of his *Taittirīyavārtika*.

The nyāya is not in Raghunātha's book, but he has others of the same meaning which I have not met with in the literature; namely जलमन्थनन्याय, and गर्दभरोमगणनन्याय. The same idea is expressed in the following sentence of the *Nyāyamanjarī* (page 645):—"किमयं दग्धो दह्यते मृतो वा मार्यते अनैकान्तिकहेतूपन्यासेनैव खल्वयं तपस्वी निगृहीतोऽसाधनाङ्गवचनादिति किं हेत्वन्तराख्यनिग्रहस्थानान्तरोद्दीरणेनेति" ॥

तुष्यतु दुर्जनन्यायः ॥

This saying is explained by Tārānātha as follows:—"तुष्यतु दुर्जन इति न्यायो यत्र प्रतिवाद्युक्तपक्षं दुष्टमपि वादिना प्रौढिवादेनाङ्गीकृत्यापि दूषणान्तरस्य दानं तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ It would therefore seem to mean "Let this evil fellow, my opponent, chuckle over his apparent success in this argument, but what about so-and so?" I have met with it in *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, page 14, in the following sentence:—"यथास्वरूपं किमधिकरणमुताधेयम् । यद्वा प्रतीतिकालः किं वा प्रतीतिरेव । उतावच्छेदकदेशो वेत्यत्र विनिगमनाविरहात्तुष्यतु दुर्जनन्यायेन स्वीकारेऽपि न निर्वाहः" ॥ It occurs again on page 16. In the *Bhāmatī*, page 243, we have it in the form "तुष्यतु परः" as follows:—"यद्येष परस्याग्रहो धर्मिण्यगृह्यमाणे तद्धर्मा न शक्या ग्रहीतुमिति । एवं नामास्तु तथा तुष्यतु परस्तथाप्यदोष इत्यर्थः ॥" This is decidedly the clearest example. In his translation of Haridāsa's comment on *Kusumānjali* i. 3, Prof. Cowell's rendering of the nyāya is "the principle of satisfying an opponent."

तृणजलायुकान्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the caterpillar*. This illustration is used and explained in *Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad* 4. 4. 3 as follows:—"तद्यथा तृणजलायुका तृणस्यान्तं गत्वान्यमाक्रममाक्रम्यात्मानमुपसंहरत्येवमेवायमात्मेदं शरीरं निहत्याविद्यां गमयित्वान्यमाक्रममाक्रम्यात्मानमुपसंहरति" ॥ I include it because it is found in Raghunātha's list; but it is of no practical value.

तृणारणिमणिन्यायः ॥

The simile of *straw, araṇi wood, and the burning gem* [as means of producing fire]. The kind of fire produced by each varies (just as that of a lighted lamp differs from that of burning wood or cowdung); and the method of production, too, is

different; that being in one case blowing, in another attrition, and in the third the rays of the sun. The application of the nyāya will be seen from the following passage of *Nyāyamanjarīsāra*, page 3, line 5:—"अत्र नव्याः तृणारणिमणिन्यायेन विघ्नध्वंसविशेष एव मङ्गलस्य फलं विघ्नध्वंसविशेषान्तरं च विनायकस्तवपाठादेः फलम् । समाप्तिस्तु विघ्नसंसर्गाभावादिकारणकलापजन्या". For an interesting discussion as to the 'capacity' (शक्ति) residing in straw &c., see *Kusumānjali* pages 58-72, and Prof. Cowell's translation, pages 6 and 7. The nyāya is not included in Raghunatha's collection, but is explained in the *Vācaspatyam* (*s. v.* न्याय) as follows:—तार्णवह्निं प्रति तृणस्य, आरणेयवह्निं प्रत्यरणेः, मणिजन्यवह्निं प्रति मणेश्च कारणत्वं, न तु वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति तृणादेः कारणत्वं परस्परव्यभिचारात् । एवं यत्र कार्यकारणभावबाहुल्यं कार्यतावच्छेदकं कारणतावच्छेदकं च नाना तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥

तैलपात्रधरन्यायः ॥

The simile of a *man carrying a vessel full of oil* [and who is to be put to death if he spills a drop of it!]. This curious illustration is given in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* vii-70, and applied to one who has adopted the ascetic life:—"तैलपात्रधरो यद्वदसिहस्तैरधिष्ठितः । स्खलिते मरणत्रासात्तत्परः स्यात्तथा व्रती."

त्यजेदेकं कुलस्यार्थे ॥

One should abandon an individual for the sake of a whole family. This is the first pāda of *Hitopades'a* i. 115 which reads thus:—"त्यजेदेकं कुलस्यार्थे ग्रामस्यार्थे कुलं त्यजेत् । ग्रामं जनपदस्यार्थे आत्मार्थे पृथिवीं त्यजेत्" ॥ It is quoted by Ānandagiri, in his comment on *Brahmasūtrabhāshya* 1. 1. 22, as follows:—"त्यजेदेकं कुलस्यार्थ इति न्यायाद्भूयसीनां ब्रह्मलिङ्गश्रुतीनामनुग्रहायाकाशश्रुतेरेकस्या बाध इत्याह" ॥ Raghunātha expounds it thus in the *Laukikanyāyasangraha*:—"यत्रोभयकोटिकसंशये एकत्र बह्वर्थहानिर्द्वितीयस्वीकारे त्वेकार्थहानिस्तत्र द्वितीयपक्षः स्वीकर्तव्य इति विवक्षायां त्यजेदेकं कुलस्यार्थ इति

न्यायः प्रसरति" ॥ Further on he says, "यस्तु त्यजेदेकमिति न्यायं नानुसरति सोऽल्पस्य हेतोर्बहु हातुमिच्छन्विचारमूढः प्रतिभासि मे त्वमिति न्यायविषयतां नातिवर्तते" ॥ A nyāya of similar import to the one under consideration is "सर्वनाशे समुत्पन्ने अर्धं त्यजति पण्डितः," which see below.

दग्धेन्धनवह्निन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the fire which has consumed the fuel* [and therefore goes out]. This immediately follows the जलकतकरेणुन्याय in Raghunātha's list, and is meant to teach much the same thing. He says:—"दग्धानीन्धनानि येन सोऽग्निर्यथा स्वयमेव शाम्यति तथेति पूर्ववत्" ॥ We have an instance of the employment of the figure in *S'vetās'vatara* Upaniṣad vi. 19; and again in S'ankara's bhāshya on *Brahmasūtra* i. i. 4 (page 76), and Sures'vara's large *Vārtika* pages 1593 and 1840. The following is *Paramārthasāra* 77:— "त्यक्त्वा कर्मविकल्पानात्मस्थं मनः केवलं कृत्वा। दग्धेन्धन इव वह्निः सर्वत्रात्मा भवेच्छान्तः" ॥

दण्डिन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a man with a stick* [or, men with sticks]. The first instance, which I know of, of the employment of this nyāya is in a curious passage of Patanjali's on Pāṇini 8. 2. 83, for reference to which I am indebted to Professor Kielhorn. It occurs also in the *Nyāyavārtika* on sūtra i. 37. In this, and in the preceding sūtra, there is a definition of *udāharaṇa*, in the course of which the term तद्धर्मभावी occurs. In regard to this the Vārtikakāra remarks:—"अन्ये तु तद्धर्मभावीत्येतत्पदमन्यथा निराकुर्वन्ति तद्धर्मभावी भवन्नुष्णभोजिन्यायेन वा भवेद्दण्डिन्यायेन वा भवेत्। तद्यदि तावदुष्णभोजिन्यायेन उष्णं भोक्तुं शीलमस्येत्युष्णभोजी तद्धर्मं वा भावयितुं शीलमस्येति तद्धर्मभावी। अत्रापि भावयितुं गमयितुं यावदुक्तं स्यादिति। नायं सूत्रार्थ इति न किञ्चिदेतत्। दण्डिन्यायस्तु दण्डो यस्यास्तीति स दण्डी तद्धर्मभावो यस्यास्ति स भवति तद्धर्मभावी" ॥

The following from Vāchaspatimis'ra's *Tattvabindu* closely resembles the explanation given of the छत्रिन्यायः—"दण्डिनो गच्छन्तीत्यत्र तु दण्डवदण्डिषु समूहिषु लक्ष्यमाणेषु तदन्तर्गतस्याविशेषाद्दण्डिशब्दार्थस्य परिग्रहः" ॥

दामव्यालकटन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the Asuras, *Dāma, Vyāla, and Kaṭa.* This is expounded by Raghunātha in the following manner:— "दामव्यालकटन्यायो न तव स्यात्कदाचन । भीमभासदृढन्यायः सर्वदा तेऽस्तु राघव" ॥ इत्यादिना वासिष्ठ इदं न्यायद्वयं सप्रपञ्चमुपन्यस्तम् । तत्राद्यस्योच्चतरां दशामापन्नस्याप्यज्ञस्यातिनीचदशाप्राप्तिरवश्यं कालेन भवतीति तत्त्वबोधोऽवश्यं संपाद्य इति विवक्षायां प्रवृत्तिः । दामव्यालकटाख्यास्त्रयोऽसुराः शंबरेण स्वमायया निर्मितास्ते च तलप्रहारादिना मेर्वादिचूर्णीकरणे शक्ता अप्यज्ञानप्रभावात्कालेन मशकादियोनिं प्रापुरिति प्रसिद्धं तत्र ॥ तत्त्वविन्न कदापि स्वपदात्पततीति विवक्षायां द्वितीयस्यावतारः । तेऽप्यसुरास्तेनैव तथा निर्मिताश्चिरं जीवन्मुक्तिसुखमनुभूय निर्वाणपदं प्राप्ता इति संक्षेपः । प्रपञ्चस्तु तत्रैव द्रष्टव्यः" ॥ "Vāsishṭha," means the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, in Book 4 (chapters xxv—xxxiv) of which, we have a detailed account of these six Asuras. The verse quoted by Raghunātha is not found in the printed edition exactly in that form, but 4. 34. 36 reads thus:—

"दामव्यालकटन्यायस्तस्मान्मा तेऽस्तु राघव ।
भीमभासदृढन्यायो नित्यमस्तु तवानघ" ॥

There is one of similar import in the opening part of their history, and Mr. M. R. Telang has pointed out a third in the closing part of chapter xxiv.

धनंजयन्यायः ॥

The simile of *Arjuna.* Used to show that something, though once done, may be done again, as in the case of Arjuna who defeated the Kuru race after Krishṇa had already defeated

them. Raghunātha says:—"नित्यबोधमहिम्ना बाधितेऽपि द्वैते वाक्यजबोधस्य धनंजयन्यायेन बाधकत्वोपपत्तेः । यथाहुः । 'नित्यबोधपरिपीडितं जगद्विभ्रमं नुदति वाक्यजा मतिः । वासुदेवनिहतं धनञ्जयो हन्ति कौरवकुलं यथा पुनः' ॥" "Knowledge effected through Vedic sentences destroys that error termed the world, which had already been destroyed by eternal knowledge (Self, Brahman): just as Arjuna slays again the Kuru race already slain by Vāsudeva." The verse is *Sankshepas'ārīraka* ii. 38, and the translation is that of Mr. Arthur Venis in the *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvali* (page 174) where the verse is quoted.

धान्यपलालन्यायः ॥

The simile of *grain and its husk*. The earliest example of this figure is in the *Brahmabindu Upanishad*, verse 18:—"ग्रन्थमभ्यस्य मेधावी ज्ञानविज्ञानतत्त्वतः । पलालमिव धान्यार्थी त्यजेद्ग्रन्थमशेषतः" ॥ This verse, with others of similar import, is quoted in *Pancadas'ī* IV. The following, from *Bhāmatī*, page 54, appears also, without any acknowledgement, in the first chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"अवर्जनीयतया दुःखमागतमपि परिहृत्य सुखमात्रं भोक्ष्यते । तद्यथा । मत्स्यार्थी सशल्कान् सकण्टकान्मत्स्यानुपादत्ते स यावदादेयं तावदादाय विनिवर्तते । यथा वा धान्यार्थी सपलालानि धान्यान्याहरति स यावदादेयं तावदुपादाय निवर्तते" ॥

Vācaspatimis'ra, however, was not the originator of the illustration. It occurs four times in the *Mahābhāṣya*, namely, 1, 2. 39; 3. 3. 18; 3. 4. 21 (vārt. 2); and 4. 1. 92. The following is the passage, the substance of which is reproduced in the *Bhāmatī* and *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"कश्चिदन्नार्थी शालिकलापं सपलालं सतुषमाहरति नान्तरीयकत्वात् । स यावदादेयं तावदादाय तुषपलालान्युत्सृजति । तथा कश्चिन्मांसार्थी मत्स्यान्सकण्टकान्सशकलानाहरति नान्तरीयकत्वात् । स यावदादेयं तावदादाय शकलकण्टकानुत्सृजति." See, also, Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa's *paribhāṣā* 73. The nyāya seems to have a different application in Marāṭhī literature. Molesworth's defini-

tion is as follows:—"The law of the corn and its straw. Conquer the king and you conquer his subjects; accomplish or acquire a matter and you attain all it sustains or involves."

न खलु शालग्रामे किरातशतसङ्कीर्णे प्रतिवसन्नपि ब्राह्मणः किरातो भवति ॥

A Brāhman does not become a Kirāta by living on the S'ālagrāma mountain filled with hundreds of those barbarians! This is equivalent to our saying, "A horse does not become an ass by being born in the stable of the latter." Compare, too, S'ankara's "न ह्यश्वस्थाने गां पश्यन्नश्वोऽयमित्यमूढोऽध्यवस्यति" in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 4. 1. The saying as given above is found in Vācaspatimis'ra's comment on *Yogabhāshya* i. 5; and he makes use of it again in his *Bhāmati* i. 1. 5 (page 126) in the sentence "अन्यथा किरातशतसंकीर्णदेशनिवासिनो ब्राह्मणायनस्यापि किरातत्वापत्तेः" ॥

न यद्गिरिश्टङ्गमारुह्य गृह्यते तदप्रत्यक्षम् ॥

A thing does not become imperceptible because perceived by one who has ascended a mountain peak.—This saying, quoted from *Tantravārtika* 1. 2. 2. (page 6), appears in *the Nyāyamanjarī* (page 422) in the course of a discussion on the *sādhutva* and *asādhutva* of words. The passage is as follows:—"ननु यदि श्रोत्रकरणकेनैव प्रत्ययेन साधुत्वासाधुत्वे प्रतिपत्तारः प्रतिपद्यन्ते व्याकरणाध्ययनवन्ध्यबुद्धयोऽपि प्रतिपद्येरन् । न च प्रतिपद्यन्ते तस्मान्न ते इन्द्रियविषये इति । नैष दोषः । वैयाकरणोपदेशसाहायकोपकृतश्रोत्रेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । यथा ब्राह्मणत्वादिजातिरुपदेशसव्यपेक्षचक्षुरिन्द्रियग्राह्यापि न प्रत्यक्षगम्यतामपोज्झति । यथाह 'न यद्गिरिश्टङ्गमारुह्य गृह्यते तदप्रत्यक्षमिति' ॥" Jayanta quotes it on pages 96 and 222, also.

नरसिंहन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the union of man and lion.* Used to illustrate a particular kind of Alankāra consisting of a combination of figures. See the quotations from *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* and *Kuvalayānanda*, under क्षीरनीरन्याय.

न हि निन्दा निन्द्यं निन्दितुं प्रयुज्यते किं तर्हि निन्दितादितरत् प्रशंसितुम् ॥

Blame is not employed in order to blame something that is blameworthy, but rather to praise something other than that. This is the form taken by the nyāya in S'abara on Jaimini 2. 4. 20. In *Tantravārtika*, page 16, it appears as "न हि निन्दा निन्द्यं निन्दितुं प्रवर्तते अपि तु विधेयं स्तोतुम्," and Ānandagiri quotes this reading of it in his comment on *Brihadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya* 2. 5. 16.

The following passage from *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, page 51, admirably illustrates the meaning of the nyāya:—"ननु चेदं वेदमूलत्वं पञ्चरात्रतन्त्राणामनुपपन्नं वेदनिन्दादर्शनात् । उक्तं हि चतुर्षु वेदेषु पुरुषार्थमलभमानः शाण्डिल्य इदं शास्त्रमधीतवानिति । अनवगतवचनव्यक्तेरयं पर्यनुयोगः । न हि निन्दा निन्द्यं निन्दितुं प्रवर्तते अपि तु निन्दितादितरत्प्रशंसितुम् । यथैतरेयकब्राह्मणे 'प्रातः प्रातरनृतं ते वदन्ति' इत्यनुदितहोमनिन्दा उदितहोमप्रशंसार्थेति गम्यते । यथा मानवे (iv. 124) ।

'ऋग्वेदो देवदैवत्यो यजुर्वेदस्तु मानुषः ।
सामवेदस्तु पित्र्यः स्यात्तस्मात्तस्याशुचिर्ध्वनिः' ॥

इति सामवेदनिन्दा इतरवेदप्रशंसार्था । यथा वा भारते ।

'चत्वार एकतो वेदा भारतं चैकमेकतः ।
समागतैस्तु ऋषिभिस्तुलयारोपितं पुरा ॥
महत्त्वे च गुरुत्वे च ध्रियमाणं यतोऽधिकम् ।
महत्त्वाच्च गुरुत्वाच्च महाभारतमुच्यते' ॥

इति महाभारतप्रशंसार्थेति गृह्यते न वेदनिन्देति । एवं पञ्चरात्रप्रशंसेति गम्यते" ॥

Another reference to the nyāya will be found in *Nyāyaman. jarī* page 273.

नहि भवति तरक्षुः प्रतिपक्षो हरिणशावकस्य ॥

A hyena does not find a suitable opponent in a young fawn. This may be contrasted with the saying "न हि कठोरकण्ठीरवस्य कुरङ्गशावः प्रतिभटो भवति." It is found in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, page 33:—"तुल्यबलौ हि मिथः प्रतिपक्षौ भवतो न तु दुर्बलोत्तमबलौ । न हि भवति तरक्षुः प्रतिपक्षो हरिणशावकस्य किन्तु समरकण्डूनिम्नविषाणकोटिसमुल्लिखितगण्डशैलस्य विपिनमहिषस्य" ॥

न हि भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीयन्ते न च मृगाः सन्तीति यवा नोप्यन्ते ॥

Men do not refrain from setting the cooking-pots on the fire because there are beggars [who may come to ask for some of the contents], *nor do they abstain from sowing barley because there are wild animals* [which may devour it]. This oft-quoted saying appears three times in the *Mahābhāṣya*, namely in 1. 1. 39 (vārt. 16), 4. 1. 1 (vārt. 15), and 6. 1. 13 (vārt. 13), and this is probably the original source of it. I have met with it in two of Vācaspatimis'ra's works, as follows. In the *Nyāyavārtika tātparyaṭīkā*, page 62:—"नो खल्वयं प्रेक्षावतां समाचारो यद्दुःखभिया सुखपरित्याग इति अपि तु सुखं दुःखाद्विभिद्योपाददते दुःखं च वर्जयन्ति । न हि मृगाः सन्तीति शालयो नोप्यन्ते भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीयन्त इति" ॥ Similarly, on page 441 of the same. In *Bhāmatī*, page 54, we read:—"तस्माद्दुःखभयान्नानुकूलवेदनीयमैहिकं वामुष्मिकं वा सुखं परित्यक्तुमुचितम् । न हि मृगाः सन्तीति शालयो नोप्यन्ते भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीयन्ते" ॥ The same passage, with a good deal of the preceding context, reappears, without acknowledgment, in the Chārvāka chapter of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha.* We find the saying in a modified form in the *Panca-*

pādikā, page 63:—"अतोऽजीर्णभयान्नाहारपरित्यागो भिक्षुकभयान्न स्थाल्या अनधिश्रयणं दोषेषु प्रतिविधातव्यमिति न्यायः ॥" It appears in this form in *Jivanmuktiviveka*, (page 8) also, and is there ascribed to Ānandabodhācārya. See his प्रमाणमाला page 21. Then we have the well-known verse, *Hitopades'a* ii. 50:—

"दोषभीतेरनारम्भः कापुरुषस्य लक्षणम् ।
कैरजीर्णभयाद्भ्रातर्भोजनं परिहीयते ॥"

न हि श्यामाकबीजं परिकर्मसहस्रेणापि कलमाङ्कुराय कल्पते ॥

Not even by the employment of a thousand different processes can S'yāmāka grain be made to germinate as rice. Vācaspatimis'ra was fond of this kind of saying. That above is from his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, page 55, and another of the same class occurs twice in the *Bhāmatī*. On page 180 (1. 2. 18) "नहि जातु वटाङ्कुरः कुटजबीजाजायते," and on page 704 (4. 1. 1.) "न खलु कुटजबीजाद्वटाङ्कुरो जायते" ॥ Compare, too, Manu ix. 40:—"अन्यदुप्तं जातमन्यदित्येतन्नोपपद्यते । उप्यते यद्धि यद्बीजं तत्तदेव प्ररोहति" ॥ They all remind us of those sayings from another part of the Orient:—"Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" and again, "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap."

न हि सहस्रेणाप्यन्धैः पाटच्चरेभ्यो गृहं रक्ष्यते ॥

Not even a thousand blind men can protect a house from robbers. This is another of the sayings of Vācaspatimis'ra, and is found in his ṭikā on *Nyāyavārtika* 1. 2. 2 (the definition of जल्प). To see the aptness of the saying it would be necessary to transcribe a lengthy passage of the *bhāshya* and *vārtika*; but the scholar can easily refer to them himself.

न हि सुतीक्ष्णाप्यसिधारा स्वं छेत्तुमाहितव्यापारा ॥

The edge of a sword, even though very keen, is not employed to cut itself. The nyāya is found in this form in *Syādvādamanjarī*, page 89, in combination with that which immediately follows; and Mr. Thomas, the Librarian at the India Office, tells me that he has met with the two together in Nāgārjuna's ईश्वरकर्तृत्वनिराकरण, but there the sword-nyāya takes the form of "न हि खरतरकरवालधारा स्वमात्मानं छेत्तुं समर्था भवति." In *Madhyamakavritti*, page 62, it again occurs in conjunction with another simile:—"यथापि नाम तयैवासिधारया सैवासिधारा न शक्यते छेत्तुं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण तदेवाङ्गुल्यग्रं शक्यते स्प्रष्टुं &c." For the latter, see Third Handful. Further instances will be found in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 255; *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 131; and others of a like nature in Venkatanātha's *Sarvārthasiddhi*, page 391.

न हि सुशिक्षितोऽपि नटवटुः स्वस्कन्धमधिरोढुं पटुः ॥

No young actor, however well-trained, is clever enough to get on his own shoulder. This is Mallisena's version of the nyāya, as cited in conjunction with the cognate one above. In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 3. 54, S'ankara quotes it as "न हि नटः शिक्षितः सन्स्वस्कन्धमधिरोक्ष्यति." In the vārtika on *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, page 108, Sures'vara puts it thus:—"नालं स्वस्कन्धमारोढुं निपुणोऽपीह साधकः" ॥ Other varieties are the following. "न हि सुशिक्षितोऽपि विज्ञानी स्वेन स्कन्धेनात्मानं वोढुमुत्सहते, *Bhāmatī* 1. 3. 41 (page 277); "न हि सुशिक्षितोऽपि नटबटुः स्वस्कन्धमारुह्य नृत्यति," *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, page 592; and, finally, "न हि पटुतरोऽपि नटबटुः स्वस्कन्धमारुह्य नरीनर्ति", *Vidyāsāgarī* on *Khaṇḍana*, page 57. It will thus be seen that no two authors agree as to the form of the maxim!

न ह्यप्राप्य प्रदीपः प्रकाश्यं प्रकाशयति ॥

A lamp does not illuminate until it [*i. e.* its light] *reaches the object to be illuminated.* It therefore comes under the head of प्राप्यकारी, for which, and its opposite, see *Nyāyakandalī*, page 23. It occurs in the *Nyāyamanjarī* on 5. 1. 7 (page 624): "सोऽयं हेतुः प्राप्य वा साध्यं साधयेदप्राप्य वा । प्राप्य चेद् द्वयोर्लब्धस्वरूपयोरप्राप्तिर्भवतीति किं कस्य साध्यं साधनं वेत्यविशेषः । अप्राप्य तु साधकत्वमनुपपन्नमतिप्रसङ्गात् । न ह्यप्राप्य प्रदीपः प्रकाश्यं प्रकाशयतीति" ॥ Also in *Tārkikarakṣā* page 271:—"न हि दाह्यमप्राप्तो दहनो दहति प्रकाश्यमप्राप्य प्रदीपः प्रकाशयति." Then in *Sarvārthasiddhi* (on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* i. 32) we read:—"अप्राप्तोत्पादने सर्वस्मात्सर्वमुत्पद्येत प्रकाश्यमप्राप्य वा दीपः प्रकाशयेद्दाह्यमप्राप्य वा दहनो दहेत्." Compare Nāgārjuna's kārika vii. 11:—"अप्राप्यैव प्रदीपेन यदि वा निहतं तमः । इहस्थः सर्वलोकस्थं स तमो निहनिष्यति" ॥

नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्यः ॥

One person does not remember what another has seen. This is the first pāda of *Kusumānjali* i. 15, the whole verse being as follows:—

"नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्यो नैकं भूतमपक्रमात् ।
वासनासंक्रमो नास्ति न च गत्यन्तरं स्थिरे" ॥

Professor Cowell translates thus:—"One does not remember what another has seen; the body remains not one and the same from decay; there cannot be transference of impressions, and if you accept a non-momentary existence there is no other means." The kārikā, however, is hardly intelligible apart from the preceding context of which it is a sort of summing up. The nyāya did not, however, orginate with Udayana, since it is quoted in Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya* iii. 14, and in *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1. 1. 10. It is found, too, in *Syādvādamanjarī*, pages 61 and 154; also in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 437, line 10.

नो खल्वन्धाः सहस्रमपि पान्थाः पन्थानं विदन्ति ॥

Not even a thousand blind travellers can discover the road [to be taken]. This is contained in *Bhāmatī* 1. 1. 5 (page 124), in the following passage:—"न हि प्राधानिकान्यन्तर्बहिष्करणानि त्रयोदश सत्त्वप्रधानान्यपि स्वयमेवाचेतनानि तद्वृत्तयश्च स्वं वा परं वा वेदितुमुत्सहन्ते। नो खल्वन्धाः सहस्रमपि पान्थाः पन्थानं विदन्ति। चक्षुष्मता चैकेन चेद्वेद्यते स एव तर्हि मार्गदर्शी स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता नेता तेषाम्" ॥

पण्डकमुद्घाट्य मुग्धायाः पुत्रप्रार्थनम् ॥

It is better to leave this untranslated. The पण्डकोपाख्यान is found in Vyāsa's *Yogabhāshya* ii. 24, as follows:—"अत्र कश्चित्पण्डकोपाख्यानेनोद्घाटयति। मुग्धया भार्ययाभिधीयते। पण्डक आर्यपुत्र अपत्यवती मे भगिनी किमर्थं नाम नाहमिति। स तामाह मृतस्तेऽहमपत्यमुत्पादयिष्यामीति" ॥ On this Vācaspatimis'ra remarks:—"अत्र कश्चिन्नास्तिकः कैवल्यं पण्डकोपाख्यानेनोपहसति" ॥ The nyāya, as given above, is found in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, page 29:—"यदि हि पक्षं विहाय बहिरेव सपक्षासपक्षयोरविनाभावो गम्येत तदा बहिर्व्याप्तिमात्रबलेन पक्षधर्मोऽपि हेतुर्न पक्षे साध्यं साधयेत्। असिद्धा हि तत्र स्वसाध्येन व्याप्तिः। तदेतत्पण्डकमुद्घाट्य मुग्धायाः पुत्रप्रार्थनमिव" ॥ See, too, *Citsukhī* ii. 26 (Paṇḍit, vol. v. page 514) where reference is made to Vācaspati's use of the nyāya; and the same objection is taken to it by S'rīharsha in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, page 354.

पादप्रसारिका ॥

Professor Venis tells me that the Benares paṇḍits regard this as a shortened form of the भिक्षुपादप्रसारणन्याय (for which, see the First Handful of maxims), and that it means "unduly extending one's claim or one's position generally." Its equivalent in Marāthī is पाय पसरणें, which, Molesworth tells us, means "to establish one's self freely and fully: to extend one's power far and wide." He gives, as an example of its use, the Marāthī

proverb "भट्टास दिली ओसरी भट्ट पाय पसरी," which is the equivalent of our "Give him an inch and he'll take an ell." In the passages, however, in which I have met with the expression, it seems to imply *a dogged adherence to a position* in spite of previous failure, and when. there is little prospect of future success. Two passages in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā* pages 798 and 907, seem to confirm this:—"एतत्सर्वमनालोच्य कृत्वा पादप्रसारिकाम्। विवेकचक्षुः सम्मील्य स्वपन्ति ननु जन्तवः" ॥ "ततो विषादमापन्नः सर्वकर्मपराङ्मुखः। स्थितोऽहं मौनमालम्ब्य कृत्वा पादप्रसारिकाम्" ॥ There are two other instances of it on pages 656, 657 of the same, and it occurs three times in the *Nyāyamanjarī*, as follows. On page 113:—"एवं हि द्विविधं प्रतिबन्धमनुमेयाव्यभिचारनिबन्धनमनुक्त्वा केवलसाहचर्यनियममात्रवर्णनं यत्प्रसारिका सैवेति। उच्यते। पादप्रसारिकैव साधीयसी स्थूलदृष्टिभिरवलंबिता वरं न सूक्ष्मदृष्टिभिरुत्प्रेक्षितास्तादात्म्यादिप्रतिबन्धाः" ॥ On page 121:—"यं कंचिदर्थमालोक्य यः कश्चिन्नावगम्यते। कंचिदेवाक्षिपत्यर्थमर्थः कश्चिदिति स्थितिः ॥ तत्र वस्तुस्वभावोऽयमिति पादप्रसारिका। दृश्यते ह्यविनाभूतादर्थादर्थान्तरे मतिः" ॥ On page 504:—"न च न कदाचिदनीदृशं जगदिति पादप्रसारिकामात्रं कर्तुमुचितं सर्गप्रबन्धप्रलयप्रबन्धस्य समर्थितत्वादिति ॥ अतश्च पक्षान्तरदुर्बलत्वाद्यथोदितः सिध्यति भूतवर्गः। तं यस्तु पश्यन्नपि निह्नुवीत तस्मै नमः पण्डितशेखराय" ॥ There is one instance of it in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* (page 31) also:—"न च सत्ताभेदानन्त्यमस्त्येवेत्यपि पादप्रसारिका निस्ताराय," which is rendered by Prof. Gangānātha Jhā:—"Nor will you escape from this predicament by *taking the long step* of assuming an infinity of different kinds of real existence." *Indian Thought*, page 17.

पिण्डमुत्सृज्य करं लेढि ॥

Leaving the sweet morsel he licks his hand! It is found in *Pañcapādikā*, page 49, as follows:—"अथ वेदाधिकरणे वेदांश्चैके सन्निकर्षमिति विशेषाभिधानाद्द्वैदिकत्वासिद्धिरिति। सोऽयमाभाणको लोके पिण्डमुत्सृज्य करं लेढीति सूत्रकारस्याप्यकौशलं प्रदर्शितं स्यात्" ॥ In Raghunātha's list it appears as पिण्डं हित्वा करं लेढि. We may compare it with the saying "क्षीरं विहायारोचकग्रस्तः सौवीररुचिमनुभवति".

पित्रनुसृतस्तनंधयन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a father's conforming to* [the ways of] *his little child.* This is set forth as a model for the knower of Brahma, that, by a lowly and humble demeanour, he may attract the ignorant. It is thus explained in the *Laukikanyāya-sangraha*:—"कृतकृत्यस्य तत्त्वविदोऽतत्त्वविदुद्धारातिरिक्तकर्तव्याभावाद्यथा तदुद्धारः स्यात्तथैव कर्तव्यम् । सुरेन्द्रादिपूज्येनापि विदुषा पित्रनुसृतस्तनंधयन्यायेनाज्ञोऽनुसर्तव्यः । तैर्निन्द्यमानोऽपि देहस्य निन्द्यत्वमात्मनोऽवाङ्मनसगम्यत्वं च जानन्नोद्विजेत् । किन्तु प्रत्युत तच्चेष्टानुसारेण स्वयमप्याचरेत्" ॥ In the larger work the following passage is quoted by way of illustration:—"तदुक्तं वृद्धैः । ...... अविद्वदनुसारेण वृत्तिर्बुद्धस्य युज्यते । स्तनंधयानुसारेण वर्त्तते तत्पिता यतः ॥ अधिक्षिप्तस्ताडितो वा बालेन स्वपिता तदा । न क्लिश्नाति न कुप्येच्च बालं प्रत्युत लालयेत् ॥ निन्दितः स्तूयमानो वा विद्वानज्ञैर्न निन्दति । न स्तौति किन्तु तेषां स्याद्यथा बोधस्तथाचरेत्" ॥ The "elder" is Vidyāraṇya, and the verses are *Pancadas'ī* VII. 286-288.

पिशाचानां पिशाचभाषयैवोत्तरं देयम् ॥

Pis'ācas should be answered in the Pis'āca language. This nyāya is found on pages 214 and 410 of *Sarvārthasiddhi* (on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* ii. 49 and iv. 13), in the first instance in conjunction with "यक्षानुरूपो बलिः", with which it is clearly synonymous. See "यादृशो यक्षस्तादृशो बलिः".

पुष्टलगुडन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a stout cudgel.* Such a stick, hurled at a yelping cur, may at the same time strike and silence other dogs near it; and so the nyāya seems to be used somewhat in the sense of "Killing two birds with one stone." It is thus defined by Raghunātha:—"एकतान्त्रिकमतनिरासाय प्रयुक्तया युक्त्या तत्सदृशमतान्तरनिराकरणं यदा विवक्ष्यते तदा पुष्टलगुडन्यायप्रवृत्तिः । यथा बहूनां शुनां मध्य एकस्य शुनः प्रहारार्थं प्रक्षिप्तः पुष्टलगुडस्तं प्रहृत्यान्यानपि प्रहरति तथा ब्रह्मकारणवादिभिः सांख्याभिमतप्रधानकारणवादनिरासाय प्रयुक्ता 'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दं' 'रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानं' इत्यादिसमन्वयाविरोधाध्यायगतसूत्रस्था

युक्तयस्तं निरस्य योगाभिमतप्रधानकारणवादमपि साम्यान्निराकुर्वन्तीति दिक्" ॥ The simile is employed in this sense in *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, page 100:—"न चेदं दोषत्रयं वैशेषिकेपूक्तं तदेव विज्ञानवादिषु किमर्थमापद्यत इति वाच्यम् । पुष्टलगुडन्यायेन वैशेषिकमत इव 'अन्तः सत्' इतिवादिनो 'बहिः सत्' इतिवादिनश्च बौद्धस्य मतेऽपि प्रसरतीत्यभिप्रायात्" ॥ It is akin to प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्याय, which see in First Handful.

प्रदीपवत् ॥

The simile of *a lamp.* We have here another of the many lamp-illustrations. In *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 49 (vārt. 4) an *adhikāra* is said to be of three kinds, and in the first it is likened to a lamp in the following words:—"कश्चिदेकदेशस्थः सर्वं शास्त्रमभिज्वलयति यथा प्रदीपः सुप्रज्वलित एकदेशस्थः सर्वं वेश्माभिज्वलयति." In the opening part of 2. 1. 1, where the question is asked "कः पुनरधिकारपरिभाषयोर्विशेषः," the *paribhāṣā*, and not the adhikāra, is likened to a lamp, in the same words as above.

Nāges'a (in vol. iii. page 8 of the *Uddyota*) quotes the following verse:—

> "एकदेशस्थिता शास्त्रभवने याति दीपताम् ।
> परितो व्यापृतां भाषां परिभाषां प्रचक्षते " ॥

We find the same figure in Jaimini's sūtra 11. 1. 60, which S'abara explains thus:—"प्रदीप एकस्मिन्प्रदेशे सुञ्जानानां ब्राह्मणानामेकस्य सन्निधौ प्रज्वलितः सर्वेषामुपकारं करोति." In dealing with this adhikaraṇa Mādhava substitutes the figure of a single *dancer* amusing a number of spectators. See the नर्तकन्याय in Third Handful.

प्रसक्तं हि प्रतिषिध्यत इति न्यायः ॥

This nyāya, which is quoted by Amaradāsa in his ṭīkā on *Vedāntas'ikhāmaṇi*, page 262, is apparently another form of the more concise प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध which, as it occurs in the Yoga section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, is rendered by Prof. Cowell

"Express negation." In a footnote (on page 250) he explains it thus:—"Where the negation is prominent it is called *prasajya-pratishedha*; but where it is not prominent we have the *paryudāsa* negation. In the former, the negative is connected with the verb: in the latter, it is generally compounded with some other word; as, for example, (a) 'Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note'. (b) 'Unwatched the garden bough shall sway'. The former corresponds to the logicians' *atyantābhāva*, the latter to *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda*".

In the Vācaspatyam the nyāya is quoted under प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध as follows:—"प्रसज्य प्रसक्तिं सम्पाद्यारोप्येति यावत्प्रतिषेधः । अत्यन्ताभावे । 'प्रसक्तं हि प्रतिषिध्यत' इति न्यायेन आरोपितप्रसंगस्यैव निषेधः । तेन वायौ रूपं नास्तीत्यादावपि वायौ रूपारोपं कृत्वैव निषेधो नञा बोध्यत इति विवेकः ॥" According to this, then, the meaning of the nyāya is "that which has been applied or asserted is subsequently withdrawn or denied."

Both the forms of negation are contained in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 4. 50 &c., in *Vākyapadīya* ii. 86, and in Sures'vara's large vārtika 3. 9. 73. Verses defining the two are quoted on page 214 (Chap. vii.) of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, and renderings will be found on page 254 of Mr. Pramadādāsa's translation. Compare Molesworth's definitions of the terms.

फलवत्सन्निधावफलं तदङ्गम् ॥

The principle that *whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connection with something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the latter.* This is Dr. Thibaut's rendering of the nyāya as it occurs in *Brahmasūtrabhāshya* 2. 1. 14 (page 443), and he explains it thus in a footnote:—"A Mīmāmsā principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely auxiliary to another act." The source of the nyāya is

S'abara 4. 4. 19, and Mādhava applies it in *Nyāyamālāvistara* 4. 3. 16 (sūtra 37). I have met with it also in *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, page 178, line 2; and in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 117, line 11; and page 147, line 9 from bottom.

बकबन्धनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the capture of a crane*. Raghunāth explains it thus:—A man wishing to secure a crane puts butter on its head, which, when melted by the sun, goes into its eyes and blinds it, so that he can then take hold of it! He clearly took this explanation from the *Tattvadīpana*, a commentary on the *Pancapādikāvivaraṇa* (itself a commentary), and I subjoin a portion of each. *Vivaraṇa*, page 283, line 4:—

" ननु स्वर्गकामिनो यागकर्तव्यता स्वर्गसाधनमन्तरेणानुपपन्ना । तच्च साधनत्वं क्षणभंगिनः कर्मणो मध्यवर्तिकार्यमन्तरेणानुपपन्नमिति श्रुतार्थापत्त्याऽपूर्वं गम्यते तत्र शब्दस्य सामर्थ्यं गृह्यत इति सोऽयं बकबन्धः"॥ On this the *Dīpana*, page 779, bottom line :—" बकबन्ध इति । बकबन्धसमानन्याय इत्यर्थः । बकग्रहणे क उपाय इति केनचित्पृष्टे खरतरदिनकरसंपर्कात्तन्मस्तकनिहितनवनीतबिन्दुभिर्नयनयोः पूर्णतायां तद्ग्रहणं सुकरमिति कश्चित्तुच्छमतिः प्रतिवक्ति । न च तदुपपद्यते । बकग्रहणमन्तरेण तन्मस्तके नवनीतप्रक्षेपानुपपत्तेः । तस्मिंश्च परिगृहीते तत्प्रक्षेपोऽपि मुधा." Then follows his application of the nyāya. Both writers evidently regard it as an illustration of something ridiculous; and to me it recalls the nursery tradition that the way to catch a sparrow is to put salt on its tail! Raghunātha, however, classes it with nyāyas deprecating a roundabout way of doing a thing. Amongst these he gives the दण्डसर्पमारणन्याय, where a man whilst looking for a stick with which to kill a snake, comes upon an axe; but, instead of using that against the enemy, he goes out to cut a stick with it.

In *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 262, line 9, we again find the बकबन्धप्रयास.

बधिरकर्णजपन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *whispering in the ear of a deaf man.* A good example is found in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 1062:—

"बधिरे कर्णजापोऽयमन्धे नृत्तप्रदर्शनम् ।
ऊपरे बीजनिक्षेपस्तस्य या धर्मदेशना" ॥

Compare the following from *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 405:—
"तदेतद्बधिरस्य रामायणं वर्णितमस्माभिर्य एवमपि श्रुत्वा वेदार्थपरिगमाभ्युपायं मृगयते." Also the expression "बधिरेष्विव गायनम्" in *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* iv. 21. For similes of a like kind, see अरण्यरोदनन्याय.

बहुछिद्रघटप्रदीपन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a lamp in a vessel with many holes.* Raghunātha explains it as follows:—"चक्षुरादिद्वारा बहिर्निर्गत्यैव जीवोपाधिभूता धीर्बाह्यविषयान्व्याप्नोति तद्योगाच्च चिदाभासोऽपि निःसृत इव प्रतीयत इति विवक्षायां बहुच्छिद्रघटप्रदीपन्यायोऽवतरति। अयं भगवत्पादैः संक्षेपेण भाष्यतात्पर्यप्रकाशके श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तिस्तोत्रे सोदाहरणमुक्तः । 'नानाछिद्रघटोदरस्थितमहादीपप्रभाभास्वरं ज्ञानं यस्य तु चक्षुरादिकरणद्वारा बहिः स्पन्दते। जानामीति तमेव भान्तमनुभात्येतत्समस्तं जगत्तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये' इति" ॥ The above is verse 4 of S'ankara's poem, to the exposition of which Sures'vara devotes 37 verses in his *Mānasollāsa.*

भारैकदेशावतरणन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the lowering of one part of a load* [and so easing one's burden]. This is found under *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 22 (page 222):—"दृढविपर्ययज्ञानानन्तरं सहसैव च सम्यग्ज्ञानोत्पादातिभाराद्भारैकदेशावतरणार्थं संशयोत्थापनामात्रमेव तावद्युक्तम्." Prof. Gangānātha Jhā renders the passage thus:—"When a certain conclusion to the contrary has been laid out in an exceptionally

strong manner, if one proceeds to immediately point out the true theory, it involves a very hard work; and hence with a view to lighten this burden, the present sūtra proceeds only to weaken the contrary view by throwing it open to doubt."

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa reproduced this on page 419 of the *Nyāyamanjari* as follows:—"पूर्वपक्षिकोक्तयुक्तिसमुत्थापितस्थिरतरविपर्ययज्ञानसमनन्तरं सहसैव सम्यग्ज्ञानोत्पादनातिभाराद्वारैकदेशावतरणन्यायेन संशयस्तावदुपपद्यते."

भीमभासदृढन्यायः ॥

The illustration of the three Asuras, *Bhīma, Bhāsa, and Dṛiḍha*. See this explained under दासन्यालकटन्याय.

भूलिङ्गन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the bird Bhūlinga*. It is supposed to say "*mā sāhasam*," "don't do anything desperate", and then does desperate deeds itself! The purport of the nyāya would therefore seem to be, "Practise what you preach." There are two references to this bird in *Sabhāparva*. The first is in XLI. 18 (Bombay edition):—"न गाथागाथिनं शास्ति बहु चेदपि गायति । प्रकृतिं यान्ति भूतानि भूलिङ्गशकुनिर्यथा" ॥ This is explained by the second passage (XLV. 27-32.):—"अथ चैषां न ते बुद्धिः प्रकृतिं याति भारत। मयैव कथितं पूर्वं भूलिङ्गशकुनिर्यथा ॥ २७ ॥ भूलिङ्गशकुनिर्नाम पार्श्वे हिमवतः परे। भीष्म तस्याः सदा वाचः श्रूयन्तेऽर्थविगर्हिताः ॥ २८ ॥ मा साहसमितीदं सा सततं वाशते किल। साहसं चात्मनातीव चरन्ती नावबुध्यते ॥ २९ ॥ सा हि मांसार्गलं भीष्म मुखात्सिंहस्य खादतः। दन्तान्तरविलग्नं यत्तदादत्तेऽल्पचेतना ॥ ३० ॥ इच्छतः सा हि सिंहस्य भीष्म जीवत्यसंशयम् । तद्वत्त्वमप्यधार्मिष्ठ सदा वाचः प्रभाषसे ॥ ३१ ॥ इच्छतां भूमिपालानां भीष्म जीवस्यसंशयम् । लोकविद्विष्टकर्मा हि नान्योऽस्ति भवता समः" ॥ ३२ ॥ In the Calcutta edition of 1834, the chapters are XL and XLIII respectively. Raghunātha's remark on the simile is as follows:—

"यो भूलिङ्गन्यायेन परोपदेशमात्रकुशलः स्वयं च यथेष्टाचरणशीलः सोऽपि दांभिकत्वात्त्यक्तव्यः । भूलिङ्गाख्यः पक्षी मा साहसं कुर्विति पुनः पुनरुच्चैर्वदन्सिंहदंष्ट्रान्तर्लग्नं मांसलवं जिघृक्षतीति प्रसिद्धम् ॥" For the following interesting example of the application of this nyāya (though the bird is not mentioned by name) I am indebted to my friend Mr. C. H. Tawney, C. I. E. It is found on pages 138-9 of the *Paris'iṣṭaparvan*:—"ततः कमलवत्यूचे हे नाथ कमलानन। मासाहसशकुनिवन्मा त्वं साहसिको भव ॥ १४१ ॥ तथा ह्येकः पुमान्देशान्तरे दुर्भिक्षपीडितः । चचाल स्वजनं हित्वा सार्थेन महता सह ॥ १४२ ॥ एकस्यां च महाटव्यां सार्थ आवासिते सति । आहर्तुं तृणकाष्ठादि स एकोऽपि विनिर्ययौ ॥ १४३ ॥ तदा च सुप्तव्याघ्रास्यात्पक्ष्येको वनगव्हरे । दन्तलग्नामिषखण्डान्याद्दायारोहद्दंह्रिपम् ॥१४४॥ मा साहसमिति मुहुः स भणन्मांसखादकः । शकुनिस्तेन जगदे पुरुषेण सविस्मयम् ॥ १४५ ॥ रौषि मा साहसमिति व्याघ्रास्यान्मांसमत्सि च । मुग्धस्त्वं दृश्यसे वाचोऽनुरूपं कुरुषे न च ॥ १४६ ॥ हित्वा साक्षाद्भवसुखं तददृष्टसुखेच्छया । तपश्चिकीर्षुस्त्वमसि मासाहसखगोपमः" ॥ १४७ ॥ An interesting conversation on the inconsistency of not practising what one preaches (though not in connection with this nyāya) is found also in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* x. 33. 27-40.

भौतविचारन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the reflections of a madman*. The story connected with this is told in the following passage of *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 64:—"तच्चेद्विचारासहं किं तेन भौतविचारकल्पेन । तथाहि केनचिद्भौतेन राजद्वारि द्विरदमालोक्य विकल्पितं किमयमन्धकारो मूलकमत्स्याहोस्विज्जलवाहो बलाकान्वर्षति गर्जति च । यद्वा बान्धवोऽयं 'राजद्वारे श्मशाने च यस्तिष्ठति स बान्धवः' इति परमाचार्यवचनात्* । अथवा योऽयं भूमौ दृश्यते तस्य छायेति दूषितं च । तत्र नाद्यस्तस्य सूर्पयुगलप्रस्फोटनाभावात् । न द्वितीयस्तस्य स्तंभचतुष्टयाभावात् । न तृतीयस्तस्य लगुडभ्रामणाभावात् । न चतुर्थस्तस्य नरशिरःशतोद्गिरणाभावात् । ततो न किञ्चिदिदमिति । किमेतावता द्विरदरूपं निवर्तताम्" ॥

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* *Pancatantra* V. 41 (*Indische Sprüche* 1221).

मणिप्रभामणिमतिन्यायः ॥

The supposition that the light of a gem is itself the gem. This follows Mr. A. E. Gough's explanation of a slightly varied form of the nyāya which is found in the Bauddha section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha.* He adds that, in this case "we may yet handle the gem, because it underlies the light, while, if we were to take nacre for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver." The correctness of this view is established by an important passage at the beginning of *Pancadas'ī* IX, which treats of ध्यान as a means of arriving at a right knowledge of Brahman. Such meditation, being directed towards Brahman with qualities, is of course erroneous, inasmuch as that Impersonality has no qualities; but it nevertheless leads to the underlying *nirguṇa* Brahman, just as the mistaken notion regarding the sparkle of the gem leads to the discovery of the gem itself. This is styled संवादिभ्रम, an error which has a corresponding reality underlying it. To mistake the distant shining of a lamp through the keyhole of a door for a gem, is an illustration of विसंवादिभ्रम, an error entirely devoid of an underlying reality. The passage is as follows:—"मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः । मिथ्याज्ञानाविशेषेऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ॥ २ ॥ दीपोऽपवरकस्यान्तर्वर्त्तते तत्प्रभा बहिः । दृश्यते द्वार्य्यथान्यत्र तद्वद्दृष्टा मणेः प्रभा ॥ ३ ॥ दूरे प्रभाद्वयं दृष्ट्वा मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः । प्रभायां मणिबुद्धिस्तु मिथ्याज्ञानं द्वयोरपि ॥ ४ ॥ न लभ्यते मणिर्दीपप्रभां प्रत्यभिधावता । प्रभायां धावतावश्यं लभ्येतैव मणिर्मणेः ॥ ५ ॥ दीपप्रभामणिभ्रान्तिर्विसंवादिभ्रमः स्मृतः । मणिप्रभामणिभ्रान्तिः संवादिभ्रम उच्यते ॥ ६ ॥ The commentator, Rāmakṛishṇa, ascribes verses 2-5 to a *vārtika;* whilst Citsukha Muni, in his comment on verse 2 which is quoted in the *Nyāyamakaranda* (page 148), names Dharmakīrti as its author. This is not improbable; for Dharmakīrti is known to have composed *vārtikas* on the works of Dignāga, a famous Buddhist writer of the sixth century (See Mr. K. B. Pāṭhak's paper "On the authorship of the Nyāyabindu"). In *Nyāyamanjarī*, pages 24 (line 1), 33 (line 4 from bottom), and 158

(line 10), the nyāya is found as मणिप्रभामणिबुद्धिवत्. Then on page 308 (line 9 from bottom) there is the following passage which corresponds with the extract from *Pancadas'ī*, namely:— अर्थं हि मूलवर्तिनमुपलभ्य प्रवर्तमानस्तमाप्नोति अपवरकनिहितमणिप्रसृतायां कुञ्चिकाविवरनिर्गतायामिव प्रभायां मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तमानः । यत्र तु मूलेऽप्यर्थो नास्ति तत्र व्यामोहात्प्रवर्तमानो विप्रलभ्यते दीपप्रभायामिव तथैव मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तमानः ॥ The nyāya occurs again on page 317.

Other references to it are *S'ālikā*, page 22, line 4; *Nyāya-kandalī*, page 190; *Atmatattvaviveka*, page 45; and *Tārkika-rakṣā*, page 16.

मणिविक्रयदृष्टान्तः ॥

The illustration afforded by *the sale of gems*. It is intended to teach that, in disposing of precious stones, one who understands their value will derive greater advantage than one who is without that knowledge. This would undoubtedly be the case if the seller were a S'abara and the buyer a dealer in gems! The illustration is S'ankara's, and is used by him in his exposition of *Chhāndogya* 1. 1. 10, which sets forth the value of an *intelligent* use of the syllable *Om*. The passage is as follows:—" तेनोभौ कुरुतो यश्चैतदेवं वेद यश्च न वेद । नाना तु विद्या चाविद्या च । यदेव विद्यया करोति...तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति." An objector here urges that the result of an action does not depend upon the intelligence of the performer of it, but on the due performance of the act itself, and he supports his view with the following homely illustration "दृष्टं हि लोके हरीतकीं भक्षयतोस्तद्रसाभिज्ञेतरयोर्विरेचनम्." The Sidhāntin disallows this, and gives another illustration:—" दृष्टं हि लोके वणिक्शबरयोः पद्मरागादिमणिविक्रये वणिजो विज्ञानाधिक्यात्फलाधिक्यम् । तस्माद्यदेव विद्यया विज्ञानेन युक्तः सन्करोति कर्म...तदेव कर्म वीर्यवत्तरमविद्वत्कर्मणोऽधिकफलं भवति." ॥

The nyāya is quoted, in a slightly different form, by Ānandagiri in his comment on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 3. 42; and again, by Amalānanda, in the same connection, in company with the drug-illustration.

मण्डूकवसाक्ताक्षाणां वंशेषूरगभ्रमः ॥

Mistaking bamboos for snakes on the part of those whose eyes have been smeared with the fat of frogs. This curious illustration, taken from *S'lokavārtika*, page 520, is found in the following passage of *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 314 :—" न च मण्डूकवसाक्ताक्षाणामिवानवगतास्मृतोरगाणामपि प्रथमाक्षसन्निपाताद्वंशेषूरगारोप इति साम्प्रतम् । सर्वासामेव भ्रान्तीनां प्रमाणगृहीतारोप्यारोपविषयग्रहणपुरःसरत्वनियमात् । तदनुसारेण मण्डूकवसाक्ताक्षाणामपि वंशेषूरगभ्रमो व्याख्येयः । वंशानां तावदस्ति भूयः सारूप्यमुरगेण तेन चैते तन्मात्रेण रूपेण शक्नुवन्ति गृहीताः स्मारयितुमुरगम् । एवमपि यदन्येषां भ्रमो न भवति तत्र सर्पाकारव्यावृत्तवंशग्रहो हेतुः मण्डूकवसाञ्जनं च वंशाकारपिधानमात्रहेतुः" ॥

The *S'lokavārtika* passage containing the nyāya forms the second quotation in the following excerpt from *Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* ii. 64 :—" संकोचकानां निश्शेषक्षीणत्वान्न चात्र 'काणतां जनयेद्दीपो निस्बवृन्दाकरेणुमान्' इतिवत्किञ्चिन्निमित्तमन्तरेण स्वतःप्राप्तप्रकाशैकदेशभङ्गः स्यात् । 'मण्डूकवसयाक्ताक्षा वंशानुरगबुद्धिभिः' इतिवद्वा केनचिद्धेतुना प्रागनुकूलेषु प्रतिकूलबुद्धिर्युक्ता " ॥ Another instance of the nyāya is to be found in *Parimala*, page 43, line 9.

मात्स्यन्यायः ॥

The simile *drawn from fish.* It is used to illustrate the oppression of the weak by the strong. In Raghunāthavarman's list, it follows the सुन्दोपसुन्दन्याय, and he explains it thus:—"अयं [सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायः] तुल्यबलयोर्विरोधे प्रसरति । प्रबलनिर्बलविरोधे सबलेन निर्बलबाधविवक्षायां तु मात्स्यन्यायावतारः । अयं प्राय इतिहासपुराणादिषु दृश्यते । तथाहि वासिष्टे प्रह्लादाख्याने तत्समाधिं प्रस्तुत्योक्तम् । 'एतावताथ कालेन तद्रसातलमण्डलम् । बभूवाराजकं तीक्ष्णं मात्स्यन्यायकदर्थितम्' ॥ यथा प्रबला मत्स्या निर्बलांस्तान्नाशयन्ति तथाराजकेऽमुकदेशे प्रबला जना निर्बलान्नरान्नाशयन्तीति न्यायार्थः " ॥ The verse quoted here is

Yogavāsiṣṭha 5. 37. 7. There is a good example of the usage of this nyāya in *Kāmandakīya-Nītisāra* ii. 40 which reads thus:—"परस्परामिषतया जगतो भिन्नवर्त्मनः । दण्डाभावे परिध्वंसी मात्स्यो न्यायः प्रवर्तते" ॥ My friend Mr. Tawney has given me a reference to the commentary on i. 13 of the same work, and also to *Kathāsaritsāgara* cii. 63 which I here subjoin together with his translation (vol. ii, page 390):—"नास्त्येवाराजकं किञ्चिद्धत कोऽपि प्रजास्वहो । राजशब्दः सुरैः सृष्टो मात्स्यन्यायभयादयम् " ॥ "There is no race in the world without a king; I do believe the gods introduced the magical name among men in their alarm, fearing that otherwise the strong would devour the weak, as great fishes eat the little." Kullūka gives "जले मत्स्यानिवाहिंस्युः" as a various reading in the second line of *Manu* vii. 20, and adds "अत्र बलवन्तो दुर्बलान्हिंस्युरिति मत्स्यन्याय एव स्यादित्युक्तम् " ॥ For this, also, I am indebted to Mr. Tawney.

मारणाय गृहीतोऽङ्गच्छेदं स्वीकरोति ॥

One who has been seized in order to be put to death, [gladly] *agrees to the amputation of a limb* [as an alternative]. The nearest approach to this nyāya of Raghunātha's is found in the following verse of *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (vi. 72):—

" मारणीयः करं छित्त्वा मुक्तश्चेत्किमभद्रकम् ।
मनुष्यदुःखैर्नरकान्मुक्तश्चेत्किमभद्रकम् " ॥

On the former part of this, the commentator says:—"यो हि मारणमर्हति स यदि हस्तमात्रं छित्त्वा मुच्यते तदा न काचित्क्षतिरस्ति प्रत्युत लब्धलाभमात्मानं मन्यते । अत्यल्पमिदं मरणदुःखात्करच्छेदनदुःखमिति "।

मालतीगन्धगुणविद्दर्भे न रमते ह्यलिः ॥

The bee that knows the excellence of the perfume of jasmine cares not for darbha grass. This is found in the following passage of *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 1031 :—

"अत एवागमज्ञस्य या क्रिया सा क्रियोच्यते ।
आगमज्ञोऽपि यस्तस्यां यथाशक्त्या प्रवर्तते ॥
चिन्तामणिस्वरूपज्ञो दौर्गत्योपहतो नहि ।
तत्प्राप्त्युपायवैचित्र्ये सत्यन्यत्र प्रवर्तते ॥
न चासौ तत्स्वरूपज्ञो योऽन्यत्रापि प्रवर्तते ।
मालतीगन्धगुणविद्दर्भे न रमते ह्यलिः" ॥

माषराशिप्रविष्टमषीन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a grain of soot in a heap of spotted beans.* Perhaps akin to a needle in a haystack. It seems to have originated in that very ancient drama the *Mṛicchakaṭika* where it is found (on page 40) in the following Prākrit passage :— "शकारः ॥ भावे भावे बलिए क्खु अन्धआले माशलाशिपविट्ठा विअ मशीगुडिआ दीशन्ती दीशन्ती जेव पणट्ठा वशन्तशेणिआ" ॥ (=भाव बलवत्यन्धकारे माषराशिप्रविष्टेव मशीगुडिका दृश्यमानैव प्रनष्टा वसन्तसेना). In vol. ix of the Harvard Oriental Series, Dr. A. W. Ryder (in imitation of the शकार) renders it thus :—"But mashter, it's pitch dark and it's like hunting for a grain of soot in a pile of shpotted beans. Now you shee Vasantasenā and now you don't."

The nyāya is quoted in Udayana's *Kiraṇāvali*, page 79 :— "स तु माषराशिप्रविष्टमशीवन्महाप्रकाशसमाहारान्नेक्ष्यते", and again on pages 208 and 451 of Venkaṭanātha's *Sarvārthasiddhi*, the latter being as follows :—"यथा माषराशौ मषी यथा वा नीलोत्पलवने कादम्बस्तन्नेदाग्रहात्तदपृथग्भावेनाभिमन्यते व्यवह्रियते च."

मिथिलायां प्रदीप्तायां न मे दह्यति किञ्चन ॥

If Mithilā should be in flames nothing of mine would be burnt up. This is the second line of a verse in *S'āntiparva*, chapter 178, the first line being "अनन्तं बत मे वित्तं यस्य मे नास्ति किञ्चन". It is used to indicate the freedom from anxiety of one who has nothing to lose; like Juvenal's "*Cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator.*" S'ankara quotes the phrase in his exposition of the words "न हास्य कर्म क्षीयते ।" in *Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad* 1. 4. 15:—"न हास्य कर्म क्षीयते । कर्माभावादेवेति नित्यानुवादः । यथाविदुषः कर्मक्षयलक्षणं संसारदुःखं सन्ततमेव न तथा तदस्य विद्यत इत्यर्थः । मिथिलायां प्रदीप्तायां न मे दह्यति किञ्चनेति यद्वत् " ॥ It appears also in the following verse of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, page 278 :—

" तथाहि मिथिलानाथो मुमुक्षुर्निर्ममः पुरा ।
आहेदं मिथिलादाहे न मे किञ्चन दह्यते " ॥

मुण्डितशिरोनक्षत्रान्वेषणम् ॥

Enquiring as to a suitable date for the shaving of one's head when one has already performed that ceremony! It occurs in the following passage of the *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 171:—"यत्पुनः कालान्तरे तन्निश्चयकरणे दूषणमितरेतराश्रयत्वं वा मुण्डितशिरोनक्षत्रान्वेषणवद्वैयर्थ्यं वेति वर्णितं तत्रादृष्टे विषये प्रामाण्यनिश्चयपूर्विकायाः प्रवृत्तेरभ्युपगमान्नेतरेतराश्रयं चक्रकं वा" ॥ This saying was explained to me by my learned friend the Principal of the Government Sanskrit College at Benares. It is similar to two given by Raghunāthavarman, namely, "कृते कार्ये किं मुहूर्तप्रश्नेन," and "न हि विवाहानन्तरं वरपरीक्षा क्रियते." See also कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षा in the *Third Handful.*

मूषासिक्तताम्रन्यायः ॥

The simile of [molten] *copper poured into a mould* [and assuming its shape]. Raghunāthavarman expounds it thus:— "चक्षुरादिद्वारा बहिर्निःसृतस्यान्तःकरणस्य मूषासिक्तताम्रन्यायेन विषयाकारता भवति । तदुक्तं भगवत्पादैः । 'मूषासिक्तं यथा ताम्रं तन्निभं जायते तथा । रूपादीन्व्याप्नुवच्चित्तं तन्निभं दृश्यते ध्रुवमिति". This verse is S'ankarācārya's *Upades'asāhasrī* xiv. 3, on which Rāmatīrtha comments as follows:—"मूषान्तःसुषिरा मृत्प्रतिमा । यथाग्निसंपर्काद्द्रवीभूतं ताम्रं मूषायां निषिक्तं निक्षिप्तं सत्तन्निभं जायते तत्समानाकृति भवति तथा चित्तमपि रूपादीन्विषयान्व्याप्नुवत्तन्निभं दृश्यते तदाकारं जायत इत्यर्थः" ॥

I may add that the nyāya which immediately follows this in Raghunātha's list, namely व्यञ्जकव्यंग्यन्याय, is based on the very next verse of the *Upades'asāhasrī* ["व्यञ्जको वा यथा लोकः &c."], and his explanatory remarks are taken *verbatim* from Rāmatīrtha's comment. The nyāya we are now examining appears also in *Brahmasūtrabhāshya* 1. 1. 12 in the expression "मूषानिषिक्तद्रुतताम्रादिप्रतिमावत्", and in *Taittirīyavārtika* (p. 94):—"विद्यादन्नमयेनैव मूषायां द्रुतताम्रवत् । सर्वान्प्राणमयादींस्तान्रचितान्पुरुषाकृतीन्."

मूषिकभक्षितबीजादावङ्कुरादिजननप्रार्थना ॥

Looking for the production of germs when the seed has been eaten by a mouse! This seems to belong to the same category as the काकदन्तपरीक्षा. It occurs in the Bauddha chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 14 of Jīvānanda's edn.). The whole passage is too long for quotation, but the nyāya-portion is as follows:—"द्वितीये स्थायित्ववृत्त्याशा मूषिकभक्षितबीजादावङ्कुरादिजननप्रार्थनामनुहरेत्" ॥

मृतं दुण्डुभमासाद्य काकोऽपि गरुडायते ॥

Even a [cowardly] *crow can assume the bearing of an eagle, when it comes upon a dead lizard!* This is the first line of *Bodhicaryāvatāra* vii. 72, the second being

" आपदाबाधतेऽल्पापि मनो मे यदि दुर्बलम् " ॥

How true to nature this is!

यः कारयति स करोत्येव ॥

He who causes a thing to be done by another is himself the real doer of it. "Facit per alium facit per se". This nyāya is of common occurrence. There is a good instance of it in Ānandagiri's comment on *Brahmasūtrabhāshya* 1. 2. 11. Explaining *Muṇḍaka Upanishad* 3. 1. 1, S'ankara says:—"एवमेकेनापि पिबता द्वौ पिबन्तावुच्येते । यद्वा जीवस्तावत्पिबतीश्वरस्तु पाययति पाययन्नपि पिबतीत्युच्यते । पाचयितर्यपि पक्तृत्वप्रसिद्धिदर्शनात्" ॥ on which Ānandagiri remarks:—"पाययन्निति । प्रधानकर्तरि प्रयोगो गुणकर्तरि कथमित्याशंक्याह पाचयितरीति । यः कारयति स करोत्येवेति न्यायादित्यर्थः" ॥ See also *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 187, line 1.

यत्कृतकं तदनित्यम् ॥

Anything that has been made is non-eternal. In other words, that which has a beginning has also an end; except of course, the Naiyāyika's प्रध्वंसाभाव, which has a beginning but no end! The nyāya is found in the *Nyāyabindu*, page 108, and its converse, यदनित्यं तत्कृतकम्, on page 116. The following are additional examples of its use. *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 240, line 3:—"अतो यत्कृतकं तदनित्यमित्यादिन्यायानुसारेणानित्यत्वादिकं मोक्षस्य प्राप्नोति" ॥ *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, page 187 line 8 from bottom:—"एवमनित्यं शब्दं बुभुत्समानायानित्यः शब्द

इत्यनुक्त्वा यदेव किंचिदुच्यते कृतकत्वादिति वा यत्कृतकं तदनित्यमिति वा कृतकश्च शब्द इति वा तत्सर्वमस्यानपेक्षितमापाततोऽसंबद्धाभिधानं तथा चानवहितो न बोद्धुमर्हतीति । यत्कृतकं तत्सर्वमनित्यं यथा घटः कृतकश्च शब्द इति वचनमर्थसामर्थ्येनैवापेक्षितशब्दानित्यत्वनिश्चायकमित्यवधानमत्रेति चेन्न परस्पराश्रयत्वप्रसंगात्'' ॥ Part of this latter passage is quoted in *Citsukhī* i. 23 (Paṇḍit, vol. V. page 27).

यदश्वेन हृतं पुरा तत्पश्चाद्गर्दभः प्राप्तुं केनोपायेन शक्नुयात् ॥

By what means can a donkey overtake [so as to bring back] *that which has been carried off long before by* [one mounted on] *a horse?* This phrase, borrowed from *Tantravārtika* (page 730), is introduced into the *Nyāyamanjarī* (page 262) in the course of a discussion on the relative value and authority of *S'ruti* and *Smṛiti,* in the following verse :—

"सोऽयमाभाणको लोके यदश्वेन हृतं पुरा ।
तत्पश्चाद्गर्दभः प्राप्तुं केनोपायेन शक्नुयात्" ॥

According to Kumārila, a man who has accepted the teaching of s'ruti will not allow it to be upset by a contradictory smṛiti, and *vice versā.* This is expressed, as follows, in two passages of *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 3. (as pointed out by the editor of *Nyāyamanjarī.*):—"न च श्रुतिजनितप्रत्ययस्य स्मृतिजनितो बाधकत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ स्मार्त्तस्य बाधकः श्रौतो बलवत्त्वात्प्रतीयते । प्रत्यक्षे चानुमाने च प्रागेतद्व्यवधारितम् ॥ ...... न च शीघ्रहृतेऽर्थेऽस्ति चिरादागच्छतो गतिः । अश्वैरपहृतं को हि गर्दभैः प्राप्तुमर्हति" ॥ Page 92. Again on page 94 :—"यो हि श्रुतिं प्रथममश्रुत्वा स्मृतिमेवैकां पश्यति तस्याप्रतिहतश्रुत्यनुमाने वृत्ते ॥ न पश्चाच्छ्रूयमाणापि श्रुतिः स्यात्प्रतिबन्धिका । गर्दभेनापनीतं हि हरेन्नाश्वश्चिराद्गतः" ॥

यद्विशेषयोः कार्यकारणभावोऽसति बाधके तत्सामान्य-योरपि ॥

This nyāya is found in Raghunātha's larger work, the *Laukikanyāyaratnākar* (India Office MS. 582, page 185 *a*), and on page 6 of *S'ikhāmaṇiṭīkā*. Prof. Cowell, however, quoted and explained it in a footnote to his translation of Haridāsa's comment on *Kusumānjali* v. 4. I quote a portion of the comment to elucidate the note. "You may not say that 'the volition of the conscious agent is the cause in effort only, and not in all action generally,' because even though a particular kind of volition may be the cause in the case of effort, this does not preclude volition generally; otherwise, because a particular seed is the cause of a particular shoot, it would follow that seeds in general [*i. e.* the class, seed] could not be the causes of shoots in general." The following is the footnote. "This argument depends on two principles,–*a*. *The same relation of cause and effect which exists between particulars, exists likewise between their respective classes,* 'यद्विशेषयोः कार्यकारणभावस्तत्सामान्ययोरपि' and *b. the general causes only produce their effects when conjoined with the particular causes,* 'सामान्य-सामग्री विशेषसामग्रीसहितैव कार्यं जनयति.' Thus Archbishop Whately has made a book on Logic,—man can therefore make logical books; only in each particular case we require the concurrents, education, leisure &c."

यादृशो यक्षस्तादृशो बलिः ॥

As is the Yaksha so should be the offering. This is included in Raghunātha's list, but without any definition of its meaning. It is embedded, however, in the philosophical part of his

treatise, as follows:—" यस्त्वनेकजन्मार्जितपापपुञ्जजन्यदुराग्रहादेकभक्तिच्छलेनान्यं निन्दति असकृद्बोध्यमानोऽपि चर्जुमार्गेणाभेदं नोपैति भ्रामयति च मन्दान्स यादृशो यक्षस्तादृशो बलिरिति न्यायात्तत्प्रतिपादितोत्कर्षापकर्षविपरीतोत्कर्षापकर्षोपपादनेन विजित्य पश्चात्पूर्वोक्तरीत्यात्यन्ताभेदोपपादनेन बोधनीयः । एवं हि स मारणाय गृहीतोऽङ्गच्छेदं स्वीकरोतीति न्यायेनाभेदं स्वीकरिष्यति" ॥

I have found the nyāya in use in the following works of Vācaspatimis'ra's and of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. In the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, page 115:—"अहृदयवाचामहृदया एव प्रतिवाचो भवन्ति । यक्षानुरूपो बलिरिति हि लौकिकानामाभाणकः ॥" Also in the *Bhāmatī* 4. 1. 15 (page 723):—"न च कार्यमपि भयकम्पादि वस्तुसत् । तस्यापि विचारासहत्वेनानिर्वाच्यत्वात् । अनिर्वाच्याच्चानिर्वाच्योत्पत्तौ नानुपपत्तिः । यादृशो यक्षस्तादृशो बलिरिति सर्वमवदातम्" ॥ The two which follow are from the *Nyāyamanjarī*. Page 54:—

" अभावश्च क्वचिल्लिङ्गमिष्यते भावसंविदः ।
वृष्ट्यभावोऽपि वाय्वभ्रसंयोगस्यानुमापकः ॥
तस्माद्युक्तमभावस्य नाभावेनैव वेदनम् ।
न नाम यादृशो यक्षो बलिरप्यस्य तादृशः " ॥

On page 637:—

" यादृग्यक्षो बलिरपि तथेत्येवमाधाय बुद्धौ
यस्तु ब्रूयात्कलुषमफलस्तस्य शुद्धोऽपि हेतुः " ।

It occurs also in S'rīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī*, page 144, line 13, and, finally, in the vṛitti on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* ii. 49, where it is immediately followed by "पिशाचानां पिशाचभाषयैवोत्तरं देयमिति न्यायाच्च." The general sense of the nyāya would seem to be that of " tit-for-tat ", " a Roland for an Oliver."

यावद्वचनं वाचनिकम् ॥

Conveying the meaning actually expressed [and therefore needing nothing to supplement it]. Kumārila puts it thus in *Tantravārtika* 3. 5. 19:—"कश्चात्र विशेषः । स यदि वाचनिकस्ततो यावद्वचनमेव कर्तव्यः" ॥ Compare, too, the latter part of S'abara on 2. 3. 2. It occurs twice in *Bhāmatī*. On 4. 1. 4 (page 710) we read:—"यस्माद्यस्य यन्मात्रात्मतयोपासनं विहितं तस्य तन्मात्रात्मतयैव प्रतिपत्तव्यं यावद्वचनं वाचनिकमिति न्यायान्नाधिकमध्याहर्तव्यमतिप्रसङ्गात्" ॥ Again on 4. 3. 4 (page 742) as follows:—"न चामानवस्य पुरुषस्य विद्युदादिषु वोढृत्वदर्शनादर्चिरादीनामपि वोढृत्वमुन्नेयं यावद्वचनं हि वाचनिकं न तदवाच्ये सञ्चारयितुमुचितम्" ॥ Ānandagiri, too, quotes the nyāya in his comment on 4. 3. 4. He says:—"अमानवपुरुषस्य विद्युदादावातिवाहिकत्वदृष्टेरर्चिरादीनामपि तदुन्नेयमित्यर्थः । यावद्वचनं वाचनिकमिति न्यायान्न तेषामातिवाहिकत्वसाधकमेतदिति शंकते तदिति" ॥ It is found also in the philosophical portion of *Laukikanyāyasangraha* (I. O. MS. 1031, page 45 *b.*):—"या तु पिशाचमोचनाख्याने पिशाचस्यापि तत्स्नानात्पैशाच्यनाशोक्तिः सा निषादस्थपतीष्टिवद्यावद्वचनं तावद्वाचनिकमिति न्यायात्तन्मात्रविषयैव । न च लिङ्गस्य काशीप्रवेशात्पापनाशे वचोऽस्ति तस्मात्काश्युत्पन्नविषयाणि तत्तल्लिङ्गदर्शनादिनैकद्व्यादिजन्मपापक्षयबोधकानि वचांसीत्याहुः" ॥ See, too, Nāges'a's Uddyota, vol. i. p. 574.

राजपुत्रव्याधन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the king's son* [who was brought up] *as a hunter.* The story is that a young prince, abandoned by his parents at his birth, was adopted by a hunter and brought up as his own son. The boy remained in ignorance of his real origin until he was discovered by a kindly person and restored to his rightful position. S'ankarācārya seems to have been the first to utilize the tale, and he gives it as follows in his bhāṣya on *Brihadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2. 1. 20:—

"अत्र च संप्रदायविद आख्यायिकां संप्रचक्षते । कश्चित्किल राजपुत्रो जातमात्र एव मातापितृभ्यामपविद्धो व्याधगृहे संवर्धितः । सोऽमुष्य वंशतामजानन्व्याधजातिप्रत्ययो व्याधजातिकर्माण्येवानुवर्तते न राजास्मीति राजजातिकर्माण्यनुवर्तते । यदा पुनः कश्चित्परमकारुणिको राजपुत्रस्य राजश्रीप्राप्तियोग्यतां जानन्नमुष्य पुत्रतां बोधयति न त्वं व्याधोऽमुष्य राज्ञः पुत्रः कथंचिद्व्याधगृहमनुप्रविष्ट इति स एवं बोधितस्त्यक्त्वा व्याधजातिप्रत्ययकर्माणि पितृपैतामहीमात्मनः पदवीमनुवर्तते राजाहमस्मीति."

Sure'svara refers to this several times in his large Vārtika. On page 71 we read:—"तच्चाविद्यानिरास्येव व्याधभावनयाञ्जितः । राजसूनोः स्मृतिप्राप्तौ व्याधभावो निवर्तते." Then, on pages 970-2, he devotes ten verses to the nyāya, and returns to it once more on page 1845.

The author of the *Siddhāntales'a* (on page 20) cites it as the "व्याधकुलसंवर्धितराजकुमारदृष्टान्त," and it is reproduced, in a slightly different form, in the comments of Aniruddha and Vedāntin Mahādeo on *Sānkhyasūtra* iv. 1. See also *Bhāmatī* 1. 4. 22. Raghunāthavarman links with the above the सिंहमेषन्याय which tells of a lion's cub being brought up as a ram; but I have not yet met with it elsewhere.

राजपुरप्रवेशन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the manner of entering a royal city.* It is found in both of Raghunāthavarma's treatises, but the following explanation of it is taken from the *Vācaspatyam*:—"विशृंखलतया राजपुरप्रवेशे राजपुररक्षकैस्ताडनादिकं क्रियेतेति भिया श्रेणीभूततया यथा तत्पुरप्रवेश एवं सुशृंखलतया यत्र कार्यकरणस्य विवक्षा तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ Raghunātha points out that we do not grasp the meaning of a long sentence as a whole, but that the sense of each word enters the mind singly, on the principle of राजपुरप्रवेश,—"तत्र हि क्रमेणैव बहूनां पुरुषाणां प्रवेशो भवति न युगपत्."

I have met with the nyāya in Nāges'a Bhaṭṭa's comment on Kaiyaṭa. In *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 58 (under vārtika 1) we read "अनानुपूर्व्येणापि संनिविष्टानां यथेष्टमभिसंबन्धो भवति। तद्यथा। अनड्वाह-मुदहारि या त्वं हरसि शिरसा कुम्भं भगिनि साचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति। तस्य यथेष्टमभिसंबन्धो भवति। उदहारि भगिनि या त्वं कुम्भं हरसि शिरसा-नड्वाहं साचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति" ॥ Kaiyaṭa remarks on this:— "पाठक्रमादार्थक्रमो बलीयानिति यथेष्टमत्राभिसंबन्धः", and on these words Nāges'a says "आर्थक्रमो नाम राजपुरप्रवेशन्यायेन स्वस्वाकांक्षितार्थान्वय-क्रमः। एवं च कल्पितासन्नवाक्याद्बोधविषये तात्पर्यं नियामकमिति भावः" ॥ The passages here quoted will be found on pages 389 and 390 of vol. i. of the edition of *Mahābhāṣya* with the *Pradīpa* and *Uddyota*, published at the Nirṇayasāgar Press in 1908.

राजार्थौपयिकं नित्यमुष्ट्रो वहति कुंकुमम् ॥

This is the second line of a verse on page 372 of the *Tantra-vārtika.* To make it intelligible I quote a portion of the context as interpreted by Professor Gangānātha Jhā in his translation (page 511, last line):- " It has been urged above that, if the *Apūrva* inhere in the Soul, then it becomes only an end in itself desirable by men. But this does not affect our position; because one thing becomes subservient to another only when its sole use lies in the serving of some purpose of this latter, and not merely when it rests in this ; for instance, *though the Red Dye is carried by the camel* (and as such rests upon its back), *yet it serves the purposes of the king* (for whom it is carried)."

रुधिरसम्पर्कवतो विषस्य शरीरे प्रसर्पणम् ॥

The circulation within the body of poison which has entered the blood. Used as a warning against the beginnings of evil in however small a degree. The figure is found in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* vii. 69 :—

" विषं रुधिरमासाद्य प्रसर्पति यथा तनौ ।
तथैव छिद्रमासाद्य दोषश्चित्ते प्रसर्पति " ॥

The commentary runs thus:—" अणुमात्रस्यापि दोषस्यावकाशो न दातव्यः । अन्यथा तन्मात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेशे चित्ते तत्प्रसरावरोधस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । यथा हि स्वल्पव्रणेऽपि रुधिरसम्पर्कवतो विषस्य शरीरे । तस्मादणुमात्रक्लेशप्रहारनिवारणेऽपि तात्पर्यं कुर्यात्." Compare "The beginning of strife is as when one letteth out water; therefore leave off contention before there be quarrelling."

रुमाक्षिप्तकाष्ठन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *wood thrown into the salt-lake* [or mine] *Rumā.* The *Medinī* kos'a explains Rumā as " विशिष्टलवणाकरे ", and it is said to be situated near Ajmere. The tradition is that anything thrown in there becomes saline itself. The earliest mention of Rumā, with which I am acquainted, is in the following verse of *Tantravārtika* (page 132) :—

" यथा रुमायां लवणाकरेषु मेरौ यथा वोज्वलरुक्मभूमौ ।
यज्जायते तन्मयमेव तत्स्यात्तथा भवेद्वेदविदात्मतुष्टिः " ॥

Kumārila seems here to regard Rumā as the *region* in which the salt mines are situated, rather than as the mine itself; and this may give some ground for the footnote by the editor of the *Medinī*, (Calcutta, 1869) where he defines विशिष्टलवणाकरः as "लवणखनिभूयिष्टदेशविशेषः." In his translation of the above verse, Prof. Gangānātha Jhā omits Rumā altogether. He says :— "Just as in the case of salt mines, and in that of Meru the land of bright gold, whatever is produced in them, becomes salt and gold (respectively),—so also in the case of the inner satisfaction of one who knows the Veda (which imparts Vedic authority to all that it touches)."

We have an example of the nyāya in Vācaspati Mis'ra's comment on *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* iv. 14. The sūtra is "परिणामैकत्वाद्वस्तुतत्त्वम्" on which he says:—"बहूनामप्येकः परिणामो दृष्टः। तद्यथा। गवाश्वमहिषमातङ्गानां रुमानिक्षिप्तानामेको लवणत्वजातीयलक्षणः परिणामो वर्तितैलानलानां च प्रदीप इति." Then Venkaṭanātha uses the illustration in *Tattvamuktākalāpa* v. 28, and in his vṛitti thereon as follows:—

"स्वादुष्णः कृष्णवर्त्मा सलिलमपि तथा शीतमस्तु प्रकृत्या
स्पर्शोऽन्योऽप्यत्र दृष्टस्स तु भवतु रुमाक्षिप्तलावण्यवच्चेत्" ।

"उष्णः कृष्णवर्त्मा तथैव जलमपि शीतमित्युपलभ्यते प्रकृत्या । अत्र कश्चिदाह अन्योऽपि स्पर्शो दहने सलिले च कदाचिदुपलभ्यते स तु रुमाक्षिप्तकाष्ठादिलवणन्यायेन तस्यैव परिणतिविशेष इति." In the vṛitti on ii. 1 of the same, the author says:—"गुणसंक्रमो न क्वचिदपि। न चात्र रुमाक्षिप्तकाष्ठन्यायः" ॥

रूढिर्योगमपहरति ॥

Popular usage overpowers etymological meaning. There is a capital illustration of this in the *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* .3 (pages 134, 135) where Bādarāyaṇa's first sūtra is under discussion:—"ननु जिज्ञासाशब्दो विचारे रूढः । भाष्यकारादिभिस्तत्र विचारविवक्षया प्रयुक्तत्वात् । अतो रूढिर्योगमपहरतीति न्यायेनावयवार्थस्वीकारो न युक्तस्ततोऽर्थशब्दोऽप्यधिकारार्थो भविष्यतीति विचारस्य प्रारब्धुं शक्यत्वादिति चेन्नैवम् । रूढिर्योगमपहरतीति न्यायस्यात्राप्रसरात् ।........ तत्र यः शब्द एकत्रार्थे रूढोऽपरत्र यौगिको यथा च्छागे रूढोऽजशब्द आत्मनि यौगिकस्तत्राजं पश्येत्युक्ते रूढिर्योगमपहरतीति न्यायः प्रसरति । इह तु जिज्ञासाशब्दो न विचारे रूढः" ॥ The following verse is quoted in the *Nyāyapradīpa*, a commentary on *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 5:—"लब्धात्मिका सती रूढिर्भवेद्योगापहारिणी । कल्पनीया तु लभते नात्मानं योगबाधतः" ॥ The editor cites a very modern author who ascribes the verse to Kumārila. See also *Pancapādikāvivaraṇa*, pp. 132-3; *Vedāntakalpataru*, p. 207; and Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāshya*, 1. 3. 42.

रेखागवयन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the sketch of the Bos Gavaeus* (Gayāl). Raghunāthavarmā explains and applies it as follows:—कीदृशो गवय इति ग्रामीणेन पृष्टो वन्यो लिखित्वा दर्शयामास स चर्जुबुद्धित्वाद्रेखागवयमेव गवयं मेने । पश्चाद्वने गवयं दृष्ट्वा रेखायां तद्बुद्धिं तत्याजेति लौकिकी गाथा । तथैष पुरुष इत्यादिश्रुतेः पूर्वोक्ततात्पर्यानभिज्ञोऽनात्मानमेवात्मतया जानीते । गुरुशास्त्रोपदेशेनात्मनि ज्ञाते तदात्मबुद्धिमपवदति." It is found on page 457 of Vācaspatimis'ra's *Tātparyaṭīkā*, and again on page 363 of *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*. The latter passage reads thus:—"यथा तात्त्विकारुन्धतीप्रतिपत्त्युपायतया नानापुरुषैः कल्प्यमानायां तत्प्राच्योदीच्यादिनक्षत्ररूपायां स्थूलारुन्धत्या यथा वा रेखागवयन्यायेन नित्यशब्दप्रतिपत्त्युपायतया नानाव्याकरणैः परस्परभिन्नप्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागेन कृत्रिमशब्द इति भावः" ॥

A third example is found in the following extract from Kaiyaṭa on *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 46:—"असत्यप्रकृतिप्रत्ययोपदेशेन सत्यस्य पदस्य व्युत्पादनं क्रियते रेखागवयेनेव सत्यगवयस्य." See also *S'rībhāṣya* page 322, and page 77 of Dr. Thibaut's translation.

लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यां वस्तुसिद्धिः ॥

[The existence, or nature, of] *an object is established by means of some distinguishing characteristic, and by a recognized form of proof* [such as sense-perception, scripture &c.]. "यथा गन्धवत्त्वादिलक्षणेन प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणेन च पृथिव्यादिसिद्धिः" ॥ Or, just as the wonders of creation establish the "eternal power and Godhead" of the invisible Deity, to which Scripture also bears testimony.

Raghunāthavarmā quotes the nyāya in the following passage on page 28 of the Benares edition of his work:—"एवमग्नीन्द्रादित्येश्वरवादा अपि तन्माहात्म्योपपादकश्रुतीतिहासपुराणवचनान्याश्रित्य तत्रैव

प्रपञ्चिता ज्ञेयाः। तत्तद्भक्ता अपि सर्गादिहेतुत्वरूपेश्वरलक्षणं श्रुत्यादिप्रमाणं च तत्र तत्र दर्शयन्तो लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यां वस्तुसिद्धिरिति न्यायेनेश्वरत्वं साधयन्ति." Commenting on the opening verse of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, the author of the *S'ikhāmaṇi* says:—"ननु ब्रह्मणि लक्षणप्रमाणाभावेन तस्यैवासिद्धेः कथं जीवब्रह्माभेदः शास्त्रार्थ इति चेन्न तावत्प्रमाणाभावो भूतभौतिकोत्पत्तेरेव प्रमाणत्वात्." Amaradāsa's ṭikā on this begins as follows:—"लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यां वस्तुसिद्धिरिति न्यायमाश्रित्याशंकते नन्विति."

लाङ्गलं जीवनम् ॥

A plough is existence. That is, it is a *means* of existence; cause and effect being here identified as in आयुर्घृतम्. The nyāya is found in Sures'vara's *Sambandhavārtika*, page 9, as follows:—"यथोक्तविद्याबोधित्वाद्ग्रन्थोऽपि तदभेदतः। भवेदुपनिषन्नामा लाङ्गलं जीवनं यथा." On which Ānandagiri remarks:—"साध्यसाधनयोरभेदोपचारेण साध्यशब्दस्य साधने प्रयोगे दृष्टान्तमाह लाङ्गलमिति." We may compare with this the phrase "The plough supports the bullocks", which occurs in *Brahmasūtrabhāshya* 3. 2. 4:—"यथा लाङ्गलं गवादीनुद्वहतीति निमित्तमात्रत्वादेवमुच्यते न तु प्रत्यक्षमेव लाङ्गलं गवादीनुद्वहति".

वधूमाषमापनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the measuring out* [or distribution] *of beans by the daughter-in-law.* I am much indebted to Mr. Govind Dās, Honorary Magistrate of Benares, for giving me what seems to be the real meaning of this hitherto-puzzling nyāya. He believes it to be the adaptation of a Maithila proverb with which the following story is connected. "A very miserly old Brāhman used to have a *fistful* of grain given daily by his wife to every beggar who came to the door. The old man having

married his son, the idea struck him that if he got his daughter-in-law to do the distribution instead of his old and ugly wife, the smaller fist would measure out a smaller quantity of grain! But, unluckily for him, the girl was very beautiful, so even persons who were not in need began to drop in, disguised as beggars, in order to admire her! The result was that, while each measure was less, the total amount given away was very much more."

It occurs in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 87, line 12, as follows:- "न चानवस्था अवश्यवेद्यत्वानभ्युपगमान्निश्चयवदन्यथा त्वनिश्चितनिश्चयस्य नाद्यनिश्चयोऽपि सिध्येत न चासावात्मन्यनिश्चय इति तदिदं वधूमाषमापनवृत्तान्तमनुहरति" ॥

वध्यघातकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *destroyer and its prey*. Used of two things which cannot exist together. It occurs in *Taittirīyavārtika* 2. 1. 66 (page 53):—" प्रतिपद्य पदार्थं हि विरोधात्तद्विरोधिनः । पश्चादभावं जानाति वध्यघातकवत्पदात्." Ānandagiri explains it thus:—"यथावच्छ्येनमूषकादिना दूषितां भूमिमुपलभ्य तद्विरोधिनो घातकस्य मार्जारादेरभावोऽर्थादवगम्यते तथा सत्यादिपदात्पदार्थं परमार्थत्वादिकं प्रतीत्य प्रतीतपरमार्थत्वादिविरोधिनोऽसत्यत्वादेरभावोऽर्थापत्त्या ज्ञायते न हि सत्यादेरसत्यादेश्चैकाधिकरणत्वं घटते". See also Pras'astapāda's *Vais'eshikabhāshya*, pages 112, 113; and the latter part of *Citsukhī* iv. 4. (Paṇḍit vi. 390). Compare the बाध्यबाधकभाव of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* i. 55 (पञ्चास्योरणयोः), and iii. 85 (आखुनकुलयोः).

वनसिंहन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *a lion in a forest*. Used of things which mutually aid or protect each other. This, and the ह्रदनक्रन्याय which is of similar import, occur together in the following

प्रपञ्चिता ज्ञेयाः । तत्तद्भक्ता अपि सर्गादिहेतुत्वरूपेश्वरलक्षणं श्रुत्यादिप्रमाणं च तत्र तत्र दर्शयन्तो लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यां वस्तुसिद्धिरिति न्यायेनेश्वरत्वं साधयन्ति." Commenting on the opening verse of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, the author of the *S'ikhāmaṇi* says:—"ननु ब्रह्मणि लक्षणप्रमाणाभावेन तस्यैवासिद्धेः कथं जीवब्रह्माभेदः शास्त्रार्थ इति चेन्न तावत्प्रमाणाभावो भूतभौतिकोत्पत्तेरेव प्रमाणत्वात्." Amaradāsa's ṭikā on this begins as follows :—"लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यां वस्तुसिद्धिरिति न्यायमाश्रित्याशंकते नन्विति."

लाङ्गलं जीवनम् ॥

A plough is existence. That is, it is a *means* of existence; cause and effect being here identified as in आयुर्घृतम्. The nyāya is found in Sures'vara's *Sambandhavārtika*, page 9, as follows:—"यथोक्तविद्याबोधित्वाद्ग्रन्थोऽपि तदभेदतः । भवेदुपनिषन्नामा लाङ्गलं जीवनं यथा." On which Ānandagiri remarks:—"साध्यसाधनयोरभेदोपचारेण साध्यशब्दस्य साधने प्रयोगे दृष्टान्तमाह लाङ्गलमिति." We may compare with this the phrase "The plough supports the bullocks", which occurs in *Brahmasūtrabhāshya* 3. 2. 4 :—"यथा लाङ्गलं गवादीनुद्वहतीति निमित्तमात्रत्वादेवमुच्यते न तु प्रत्यक्षमेव लाङ्गलं गवादीनुद्वहति".

वधूमाषमापनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the measuring out* [or distribution] *of beans by the daughter-in-law.* I am much indebted to Mr. Govind Dās, Honorary Magistrate of Benares, for giving me what seems to be the real meaning of this hitherto-puzzling nyāya. He believes it to be the adaptation of a Maithila proverb with which the following story is connected. "A very miserly old Brāhman used to have a *fistful* of grain given daily by his wife to every beggar who came to the door. The old man having

married his son, the idea struck him that if he got his daughter-in-law to do the distribution instead of his old and ugly wife, the smaller fist would measure out a smaller quantity of grain! But, unluckily for him, the girl was very beautiful, so even persons who were not in need began to drop in, disguised as beggars, in order to admire her! The result was that, while each measure was less, the total amount given away was very much more."

It occurs in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 87, line 12, as follows:– "न चानवस्था अवश्यवेद्यत्वानभ्युपगमान्निश्चयवदन्यथा त्वनिश्चितनिश्चयस्य नाद्यनिश्चयोऽपि सिध्येत न चासावात्मन्यनिश्चय इति तदिदं वधूमाषमापनवृत्तान्तमनुहरति" ॥

वध्यघातकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *destroyer and its prey.* Used of two things which cannot exist together. It occurs in *Taittirīya-vārtika* 2. 1. 66 (page 53):—" प्रतिपद्य पदार्थं हि विरोधात्तद्विरोधिनः । पश्चादभावं जानाति वध्यघातकवत्पदात्." Ānandagiri explains it thus:—"यथावच्छ्येनमूषकादिना दूषितां भूमिमुपलभ्य तद्विरोधिनो घातकस्य मार्जारादेरभावोऽर्थादवगम्यते तथा सत्यादिपदात्पदार्थं परमार्थत्वादिकं प्रतीत्य प्रतीतपरमार्थत्वादिविरोधिनोऽसत्यत्वादेरभावोऽर्थापत्त्या ज्ञायते न हि सत्यादेरसत्यादेश्चैकाधिकरणत्वं घटते". See also Pras'astapāda's *Vais'eshikabhāshya*, pages 112, 113; and the latter part of *Citsukhī* iv. 4. (Paṇḍit vi. 390). Compare the बाध्यबाधकभाव of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* i. 55 (पञ्चास्योरणयोः), and iii. 85 (आखुनकुलयोः).

वनसिंहन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *a lion in a forest.* Used of things which mutually aid or protect each other. This, and the ह्रदनक्रन्याय which is of similar import, occur together in the following

passage of the *Vedāntakalpataruparimala* (page 100):—
"सोऽयं वनसिंहह्रदनक्रन्यायः । किरातैर्हन्तुं शक्योऽपि सिंहो महद्वनं शरणं प्रविश्य दुराधर्षस्तेभ्यो न बिभेति वनं च तत्सिंहाधिष्ठानानुगृहीतं तैर्दुष्प्रवेशं भवति" ॥ Similarly, the lake shelters the alligator, and the alligator protects the lake. There is another reference to the वनसिंहन्याय on page 627 of the same work :—"तथा च वनसिंहन्यायेन प्रमाणतर्कन्यायेन वोभयोरप्यंशभेदेन परस्परापेक्षायामपि न परस्पराश्रयदोषः" ॥ The source of the nyāya is doubtless *Udyogaparva* xxxvii. 46, for the reference to which I am indebted to Professor Dr. R. Pischel. The verse is as follows :—

"न स्याद्वनमृते व्याघ्रान्व्याघ्रा न स्युरृते वनम् ।
वनं हि रक्ष्यते व्याघ्रैर्व्याघ्रान् रक्षति काननम्" ॥

Compare also verse 64 of the same.

वरगोष्ठीन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the discussion of matters with a view to obtaining a husband* [for one's daughter]. It is thus explained by Raghunāthavarman :—"गोष्ठिरन्योन्यवार्ता वरलाभाय गोष्ठिर्वरगोष्ठिस्तया यथा वरवधूबन्धूनामैकमत्ये सति विवाहरूपमेकं कार्यं निष्पाद्यते तथेत्यर्थः" ॥ I have met with the expression twice in the *Pancapādikā* (pages 72, 73), in a description of the erroneous views of common people (such as the Laukāyatikas &c.) in regard to the *ātman*. The passages are as follows:—"एवमिन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनानि आत्मेत्यपरे । इन्द्रियाणां चक्षुरादिमनःपर्यन्तानामेकैकस्मिन्नसत्येव शरीरे रूपादिज्ञानानामभावात्तेषामेव व्यस्तानां चेतनत्वमहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वं च मन्यन्ते क्रमेण च वरगोष्ठीवदितरेतरगुणभावं च" ॥ Again :—"यदि तावद्व्यस्तानां युगपत्परिकल्प्येत ततः स्वार्थप्रयुक्तत्वात्प्रवृत्तेरङ्गाङ्गिभावो नावकल्पेत । न चाङ्गाङ्गिभावमन्तरेण संघात उपपद्यते । तस्मान्न व्यस्तेषु युगपद्भोगः । अस्तु तर्हि क्रमेण विरोधाद्वरगोष्ठीवदिति । नैतदेवं युक्तम्" ॥

It needs a more intimate acquaintance with वरगोष्ठी than we Westerns possess in order to grasp the full significance of the nyāya, and I must confess to a certain amount of haziness as to

its exact sense in the passages here cited. In a later part of his treatise Raghunātha gives us the maxim "यद्विवाहस्तद्गीतगानम्" appended to which is the remark "केचित्तु प्रागुदाहृतं वरगोष्ठिन्याय-मेतदर्थकत्वेन व्याचक्षते." The way in which he applies the latter will be apparent from the following excerpt from the philosophical portion of his work :—"एवं हि वादिनो यद्विवाहस्तद्गीतगानमितिन्यायानुसारीणि स्वस्वेष्टदेवमाहात्म्यवाक्यानि पश्यन्तोऽन्यानि तु पश्यन्तोऽपि दुराग्रहपिनद्धदृष्टित्वादपश्यन्त इव तदेकवाक्यतादिकं चाजानन्तोऽन्धगजन्यायेनान्योन्यं विवदतेऽबुद्धैव च मतान्तरं कूपमण्डूकन्यायान्निराकुर्वन्तो बुद्धैरुपहसनीयतां यान्ति" ॥ Compare Kumarila's "कन्यावरणार्थागतमूर्खवरगोत्रप्रश्नोत्तरवत् । यदेव भवतां गोत्रं तदस्माकमपीतिवत्" ॥ *Tantravārtika*, page 169-70. Prof. Gangānātha Jhā points out that if the would-be bridegroom was really of the same *gotra*, it would make the marriage impossible!

विक्रीतगवीरक्षणम् ॥

Retaining possession of a cow after it has been sold to some one else. This illegality is dealt with by Nārada and Yājnavalkya in the "विक्रीयासम्प्रदानप्रकरणम्", "The non-delivery of a sold chattel." In chapter viii. 1, the former defines it thus :—

" विक्रीय पण्यं मूल्येन क्रेतुर्यन्न प्रदीयते ।
विक्रीयासम्प्रदानं तद्विवादपदमुच्यते " ॥

The latter lays down the law on the subject in chapter ii. 254-8. Udayana's application of the above in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 58, is as follows :—

" यदनात्मान एवैताश्चतस्त्रः कोटयो भासन्ते न वा प्रतिभान्तीति । तत्राप्रतिभानमनुत्तरम् । प्रतिभाने तु ग्राह्यलक्षणायोगेऽपि ग्राह्यभाव इति चेदेवमेतत् ।...प्रकाशमानत्वं तु नीलादीनामशक्यापह्नवम् । तावन्मात्रं चास्माकमभिमतमिति चेत्तदेतद्विक्रीतगवीरक्षणम् " ॥

The drift of this is not very clear.

वृक्षप्रकंपनन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the shaking of a tree.* A man is supposed to be up a tree whilst others are standing below it. One of the latter points to a particular branch which he wishes to be shaken, and the others point out other branches for the same purpose; so the man shakes the whole tree at once and thus satisfies every body by the one effort! Raghunātha applies this in the following way:—"यत्रैकस्य वस्तुनो मतभेदेन बहूनि रूपाणि तत्तच्छास्त्रेषु प्रतिपाद्यमानान्युपलभ्य क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्त्विति न्याया-द्वस्तुनि विकल्पासंभवं मत्वा विरुद्धानां समुच्चयस्याप्यसंभवेन तेष्वेकमतप्रति-पादितं सर्वाविरुद्धं वस्तु स्वीक्रियते तत्र वृक्षप्रकंपनन्यायः प्रवर्तते" ॥ In his larger work, Raghunātha says that the simile is also found as वृक्षप्रचलनन्याय, and in this form I have met with it in *Mahā-bhāṣya,* vol. i. page 23 (bottom), "वृक्षः प्रचलन्सहावयवैः प्रचलति." Also in 6. 1. 1 (vārt. 13).

वृश्चिकभिया पलायमान आशीविषमुखे निपतितः ॥

Running away through fear of a scorpion, he falls into the jaws of a poisonous snake! Avoiding Scylla, he falls into Charybdis! The nyāya occurs in the following passage of the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā,* page 53:—"यद्यपि रागादिनिवृत्तिहेतु-नैरात्म्यदर्शनं तथापि नास्ति कर्म नास्ति कर्मफलमिति दृष्टेः परमं निदानम्। एवं प्रेत्यभावाभावज्ञानस्य च । तथा च दुःखहेतोर्हेयवर्गस्याभावाश्च तद्धानाया-नेन घटितव्यम् । न चाघटमानो ह्ययं हातुमर्हति सोऽयं वृश्चिकभिया पलाय-मान आशीविषमुखे निपतितः" ॥ It is found also in *Kusumānjali* ii. 3 (page 328), in *Vidvanmaṇḍana,* page 4, and in *Nyāya-makaranda,* page 223. Of somewhat similar import is the nyāya "एकामसिद्धिं परिहरतो द्वितीयापद्यते", which see.

वृश्चिकीगर्भन्यायः ॥

For this see the अश्वतरीगर्भन्याय.

व्यालनकुलन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the snake and the mungoose.* The well-known innate antipathy of these two for one another (*Pāṇini* 2. 4. 9.) is a commonly-used illustration of inherent opposition between two things. Mr. Tawney has reminded me of the story in *Panchatantra* V. 2. which speaks of the enmity between them in the following words :—"अत्रान्तरे दैववशात्कृष्णसर्पो बिलान्निष्क्रान्तः । नकुलोऽपि तं स्वभाववैरिणं मत्वा भ्रातू रक्षणार्थं सर्पेण सह युद्ध्वा सर्पं खण्डशः कृतवान्" ॥ The nyāya is employed by Udayana in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 53, as follows :—"स्वसंविदि तद्रूपत्वादिति चेत्तत्किमङ्गपरिणतशान्तेराश्रमपदामिव विज्ञानमासाद्य व्यालनकुलादेरिव नीलधवलादेः शाश्वतिकविरोधत्यागो निभृतवैराणां तत्फलत्यागो वा । न तावत्प्रथमः परस्परनिषेधविधिनान्तरीयकविधिनिषेधयोरविरोधे जगति विरोधोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्" ॥ It is more commonly known as अहिनकुलन्याय.

शतपत्रपत्रशतभेदन्याय: ॥

The simile of *the* [apparently simultaneous] *piercing* [with a needle] *of one hundred lotus leaves.* It is found under the figure समुच्चय in *Kuvalayānanda*, in connection with the following example :—

" बिभ्राणा हृदये त्वया विनिहितं प्रेमाभिधानं नवं
शल्यं यद्विदधाति सा विधुरिता साधो तदाकर्ण्यताम् ।
शेते शुष्यति ताम्यति प्रलपति प्रम्लायति प्रेंखति
भ्राम्यत्युल्लुठति प्रणश्यति गलत्युन्मूर्च्छति त्रुट्यति ॥

अत्र कासांचित्क्रियाणां किञ्चित्कालभेदसंभवेऽपि शतपत्रपत्रशतभेदन्यायेन यौगपद्यं विरहातिशयद्योतनाय विवक्षितमिति लक्षणानुगतिः" ॥

In the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, also, we have the same idea somewhat differently expressed in the description of असंलक्ष्यक्रमव्यंग्य. The following is the passage (on page 102) with Mr. Pramadādāsa Mitra's translation :—

"अत्र व्यंग्यप्रतीतेर्विभावादिप्रतीतिकारणकत्वात्क्रमोऽवश्यमस्ति किन्तूत्पलपत्रशतव्यतिभेदवल्लाघवान्न संलक्ष्यते" ॥ "Now, the perception of the suggested, caused as it is by, and hence succeeding, the perception of the Accessories &c., has necessarily a process, but from its quickness it is not perceived, like the *process of the apparently simultaneous* piercing through of a hundred lotus leaves *placed one upon another.*" The expression "उत्पलशतपत्रव्यतिभेदवत्" is used by Aniruddha in his comment on *Sānkhyasūtra* ii. 32; and Dr. Garbe thinks that he took it from the *Sāhityadarpaṇa.* See his Preface to the *Sānkhyasūtravṛitti.* There are two examples of this nyāya in S'rīdhara's *Nyāyakandali.* On page 23:—"यद्गच्छति तत्सन्निहितव्यवहितार्थौ क्रमेण प्राप्नोति तत्कथं शाखाचन्द्रमसोस्तुल्यकालोपलब्धिरिति चेदिन्द्रियवृत्तेराशुसञ्चारित्वात्पलाशशतव्यतिभेदवत्क्रमाग्रहणनिमित्तोऽयं भ्रमो न तु वास्तवं यौगपद्यम्." The other is on page 158.

A much older example is found in *S'lokavārtika*, page 311 (verse 157), to which I append Mr. Gangānātha Jhā's translation:—"यत्प्रदीपप्रभाद्युक्तं सूक्ष्मकालोऽस्ति तत्र नः । दुर्लक्षस्तु यथा वेधः पद्मपत्रशते तथा." "You have brought forward the case of the lamp and the light emitted by it, as an instance of the simultaṇeity of the cause and the effect. But in this case also, there is a minute point of time (intervening between the appearance of the lamp and that of the light), though this is imperceptible; just as is the case with the piercing (with a needle) of the hundred petals of the lotus." Professor Jacobi has kindly pointed out an instance of it in *Nyāyavārtika*, page 37, in the form उत्पलदलशतव्यतिभेदवत्, from which, perhaps, Aniruddha took the nyāya rather than from the very modern *Sāhityadarpaṇa.* The same expression उत्पलपत्रशतव्यतिभेदवत् is found in the Jaina work *Syādvādamanjarī* (page 92). Besides these, I have met with the nyāya in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 334, line 2 (in the form शीघ्रतरबाणहेतुकशतपत्रशतव्यतिभेदवत्); in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 498 (as सूच्यग्रभिद्यमानकोकनददलकदम्बकवत्); in *Tarkabhāṣāṭīkā*, page 24; in *Tārkikarakṣāṭīkā*, page 126 (as शतपत्रशातनवत्); and in *Citsukhī* ii. 9 (शतपत्रपत्रशतव्यतिभेदानुभववत्).

शते पञ्चाशत् ॥

Fifty [is contained] *in a hundred.* The greater includes the less. In the *Vācaspatyam* the nyāya is thus defined :— "व्यापकशतसंख्यायां यथा व्याप्यपञ्चाशत्संख्या निविष्टा एवं यत्र व्यापके व्याप्यस्य निवेशस्तत्रास्य प्रवृत्तिः" ॥ I have met with it only in the *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 121, line 12, where a highly technical passage from S'abara 6. 1. 43 is discussed, regarding the pronouncement of the names of Pravaras at new and full moon sacrifices. A reference to Kunte's षड्दर्शनचिन्तनिका, page 1776, would throw light on this dark passage.

शवोद्वर्तनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *perfuming a dead body.* For the application and illustration see अरण्यरोदनन्याय.

शाखाचन्द्रन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the moon upon a bough.* Molesworth defines it thus :—"A Sanskrit phrase adduced as a simile or an illustration when an object seen or a matter debated has its position or relation assigned to it as at, on, in consistency with &c. a particular object or matter, simply from the appearance of contiguity or connection which, under one line of view or one train of reasoning, it ordinarily presents; whilst actually and truly it is remote from it so widely as to preclude altogether affirmation of connection. We say the sun sinks in the ocean by the same law as we say the moon is upon a bough of a tree, speaking in both cases from the appearance presented." It is thus akin to the अरुन्धतीप्रदर्शनन्याय. The following example is found in *Taitirīyabhāshyavārtika* 2. 1. 232 (page 88):— तरुशाखाग्रदृष्ट्यैव सोमं यद्वत्प्रदर्शयेत् । निष्कोशं कोशदृष्ट्यैव प्रतीचि ब्रह्म दर्श्यते" ॥ And in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 202, we

read:—"नन्वत्र सूत्रे ब्रह्मस्वरूपलक्षणं नोक्तं न च तदन्तरेण स्वरूपमवगम्यते प्रकृष्टप्रकाशात्मत्वमनुक्त्वा शाखाग्रे चन्द्र इत्येवोक्ते चन्द्रस्वरूपानवगमात्" ॥

सकृत्कृते कृतः शास्त्रार्थः ॥

To do a thing once is sufficient to satisfy the demands of the S'āstra. The nyāya is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 6. 1. 84 (vārt. 4), 108 (vārt. 3), and in 6. 4. 104 (vārt. 3). Also in S'abara 11. 1. 28, 35; and 12. 3, 10. It seems to resemble the Marāṭhī phrase शास्त्रापुरता, which Molesworth thus defines:—"To be enough indeed for the supplying, serving, or fulfilling of any matter or point required by the S'āstra, but without excess beyond; to exist in just sufficient quantity, or to be performed with just sufficient definiteness of action, as to warrant the name or designation borne, and to preclude disallowal of its existence or its performance; *to be enough to swear by.*" The Sanskrit phrase occurs also in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 154 (line 2 from bottom):—"ननु सकृत्कृते कृतः शास्त्रार्थ इति न्यायेन सकृदध्ययनादेव नित्याध्ययनविधिसिद्धेरावृत्तिर्न लभ्येतेति चेन्न" ॥ See too *Bhāmatī* 4. 1. 12, and compare कपिञ्जलन्याय.

सकृत्प्रवृत्तायाः किमवगुण्ठनेन ॥

A woman who has fallen once need veil her face no more. This occurs in *Tantravārtika*, pages 703, 704, in the course of the discussion (under 3. 1. 12) of the meaning of the expression "अरुणया पिङ्गाक्ष्यैकहायन्या सोमं क्रीणाति". On page 703 we read:—"अरुणाशब्दस्तावदवश्यमेव केनचिद्गुणिना सम्बन्धनीयः। एकहायनीशब्दस्यापि क्रियासम्बन्धात्स्वातन्त्र्यमपनीतम्। तत्र पदान्तरसम्बन्धेऽपि सकृत्प्रवृत्तायाः किमवगुण्ठनेनेतिवत्तस्य तावत्येव श्रुतिपीडेति." The nyāya is quoted by Pārthasārathi in *S'āstradīpikā* 1. 4. 4 (page 177, line 6 from bottom), while discussing the subject of words like Agnihotra &c., as the names of sacrifices.

सदृशात्सदृशोद्भवः ॥

Like produces like. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa denies that this is a fixed principle, on the ground that scorpions are produced from cowdung. He puts it thus (page 466):—

"न चैष नियमो लोके सदृशात्सदृशोद्भवः ।
वृश्चिकादेः समुत्पादो गोमयादपि दृश्यते" ॥

This "old wives' fable" regarding the scorpion was deeply rooted in the Indian mind! It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 4. 30, and is used as an illustration by S'ankarācārya in his bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 2. 1. 6. Rāmānuja followed suit. Udayana, too, has it in his vṛitti on *Kusumānjali* ii. 2, and the commentator Haridāsa remarks that a scorpion can be produced from cowdung as well as from a scorpion.

Thanks, however, to the now well-established Law of Biogenesis, we are better informed at the present time. To quote Henry Drummond:—"It is now recognized on every hand that Life can only come from the touch of Life. Huxley categorically announces that the doctrine of Biogenesis, or life only from life, is 'victorious along the whole line at the present day.' And even whilst confessing that he wishes the evidence were the other way, Tyndall is compelled to say, 'I affirm that no shred of trustworthy experimental testimony exists to prove that life in our day has ever appeared independently of antecedent life'."

सन्दिग्धे न्यायः प्रवर्त्तत इति न्यायः ॥

When there is doubt reason comes into play. This is found in Jnānottama's comment on *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* iv. 3. He says:—
"सन्दिग्धे न्यायः प्रवर्त्तत इति न्यायात्सन्दिग्धस्यैव विचार्यत्वात्तत्परिशोधयितुम-

विप्रतिपन्नमर्थं तावद्दर्शयति." Akin to this is the nyāya "सन्दिग्धं सप्रयोजनं च विचारमर्हति," which is found in the earlier part of the same work (namely in the comment on i. 29), and which Raghunātha expounds thus in his smaller work :—"विचारपाटवेन यावद्यावद्विवेकदार्ढ्यं भवति तावत्तावद्भ्रमशैथिल्यं जायते तरतमभावापन्नसाधनायत्तं फलं तरतमभावापन्नमिति न्यायात्। विचारविषयत्वं च नाज्ञातस्य नापि निश्चितस्य किंतु सन्दिग्धस्य सन्दिग्धं सप्रयोजनं च विचारमर्हतीति न्यायात्."

सर्वनाशे समुत्पन्ने अर्धं त्यजति पण्डितः ॥

When the loss of all is impending, a wise man will give up half [if by so doing he can save the other half]. It occurs twice in the *Pancatantra*, namely in iv. 27, and v. 42, as follows :—

"सर्वनाशे समुत्पन्ने अर्धं त्यजति पण्डितः ।
अर्धेन कुरुते कार्यं सर्वनाशो हि दुस्तरः ॥"

In the second passage, the final word is दुःसहः. See Dr. Bühler's note on समुत्पन्ने अर्धं. The first half of this couplet is quoted in Kumārila's *Tantravārtika*, page 91, but there the reading is ह्यर्धं.

सर्वं ज्ञानं धर्मिण्यभ्रान्तं प्रकारे तु व्यत्ययः ॥

No cognition is erroneous in respect of a thing as possessed of certain properties; but there may be error in regard to the exact form of the thing. For example, a man sees a glittering object on the ground, and supposes it to be silver; but it turns out to be nacre and not silver. There is no mistake in his cognition of the shining object, but his conception of the *nature* of the object is erroneous. The nyāya is found in *Citsukhī*

ii. 18 (The Paṇḍit, vol. v. page 496):—"सर्वं ज्ञानं धर्मिण्यभ्रान्तं प्रकारे तु व्यत्यय इति वदद्भिरिदं रजतमिति विभ्रमज्ञानमिदमंशे प्रमाणमप्रमाणं रजतांशेऽभ्युपगम्यते परीक्षकैः" ॥

Underlying the words "सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकयोस्तु प्रमायामप्रमायां चान्तर्भावः" ॥ on page 25 of the *Saptapadārthī*, we find the following comment:—"रजते एवेदं रजतमिति सविकल्पकं प्रमा । अरजते रजतज्ञानं भ्रम इत्यर्थः । निर्विकल्पकं तु प्रमायामेवान्तर्भवति । तस्य प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातजस्य वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रविषयस्य क्वाप्यबाधात् । सर्वं ज्ञानं धर्मिण्यभ्रान्तं प्रकारे तु व्यत्यय इति न्यायात् । निर्विकल्पकस्य च प्रकाराभावात्" ॥

Another interesting example is to be found in *Tattvamuktākalāpa* iv. 104. I subjoin the second half of the verse and a portion of the author's own vṛitti on it:—

"आत्मस्वात्मांशयोश्च क्वचिदपि न भवेद्भ्रान्तिरंशान्तरेऽपि स्यादेषा न स्वरूपे क्वचन परमसौ द्विप्रकारे प्रकारे" ॥ "अंशान्तरेऽपि विषयांशेऽप्येषा भ्रान्तिः । स्वरूपे क्वचन न स्यात्सर्वं ज्ञानं धर्मिण्यभ्रान्तमिति वचनात् । तथा च विषयेऽपि स्वरूपांशे सर्वज्ञानसाधारण्यात्प्रामाण्यस्य स्वाभाविकत्वमेव युक्तमित्यर्थः । तर्हि कुत्र भ्रान्तिरित्यत आह परमिति । असौ भ्रान्तिर्द्विप्रकारे प्रकारे । द्विप्रकारे स्वरूपनिरूपकधर्मे निरूपितस्वरूपविशेषकधर्मे चेत्यर्थः । इदं रजतमित्यत्र स्वरूपनिरूपकधर्मिवैपरीत्यम् । पीतः शंख इत्यत्र निरूपितस्वरूपविशेषकधर्मवैपरीत्यमिति विभागः" ॥

On page 403 of Vidyāsāgara's ṭikā on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* the nyāya is ascribed to लीलावतीकार. I would commend to students a helpful note (No 34) at the end of Professor M. N. Dvivedi's edition of the *Tarkakaumudī*, as bearing on the principle enunciated in this nyāya.

सविशेषणे हीति न्यायः ॥

In this contracted form the nyāya is quoted by the author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (chapter vii, page 411); in its entirety

it reads thus:—"सविशेषणे हि विधिनिषेधौ विशेष्ये बाधे सति विशेषण-मुपसंक्रामतः" ॥ The following is Mr. Arthur Venis' rendering of it (in The Paṇḍit, vol. vii. page 460):—"An affirmation or a negation, when made of a subject together with its predicate, applies to the predicate if a bar exists to the affirmation or negation being attached to the subject". An extract from *Rational Refutation of Hindu philosophical Systems* (page 232) may tend to elucidate the above. "When the Vedāntins give to intelligence appropriated to the internal organ the name of subject of right notion, we are to understand, that the character which they ascribe to intelligence associated with the internal organ, really belongs to that organ. They have a maxim,–which all the other Systems subscribe to,–that 'An affirmation, or a negation, when predicated of anything together with its associate, if debarred from the object substantive, is to be referred to the object adjective'. In their opinion, the quality of being a cognizer cannot be assigned to the soul, and, consequently, is debarred from it."

The nyāya is found in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 31, line 5, and in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 72, line 3 from bottom; but, in both cases, without the words "विशेष्ये बाधे सति." It is quoted, too, in *Laukikanyāyasangraha*, page 69, line 15.

सहैव दशभिः पुत्रैर्भारं वहति गर्दभी ॥

Though possessing ten sons the mother-donkey carries the load! This evidently well-known saying, taken from *Tantra-vārtika*, page 807, is found in *Bhāmatī* 3. 4. 33 (page 691) in the following connection:—"सहकारित्वं च कर्मणां न कार्ये विद्यायाः किं तूत्पत्तौ कोऽर्थो विद्यासहकारीणि कर्माणीत्ययमर्थः । सत्सु कर्मसु विद्यैव स्वकार्ये व्याप्रियते । यथा सहैव दशभिः पुत्रैर्भारं वहति गर्दभीति सत्स्वेव

दशपुत्रेषु सैव भारस्य वाहिकेति" ॥ The saying is quoted by Ānandagiri also, in his comment on the same portion of the bhāshya. See, too, *Vedāntas'ikhāmaṇi*, p. 168.

सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायः ॥

The simile of *Sunda and Upasunda.* Used of conflicting and mutually destructive things. It is thus explained by Raghunāthavarmā in his *Laukikanyāyasangraha*:-"अन्योन्यनाश्यनाशकभावविवक्षायां सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायः । यथा हि सुन्दोपसुन्दसञ्ज्ञौ सहोदरावसुरौ तिलोत्तमार्थं वध्यघातकभावेनोभावपि नष्टाविति भारते प्रसिद्धम् । तथा वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेनोत्पन्नानां कार्यशब्दनाश्यानामन्त्योपान्त्यशब्दौ परस्परेण नाश्यावन्त्य उपान्त्येनोपान्त्यश्चान्त्येनेति केचित्तार्किकाः" ॥

The story of Sunda and Upasunda is told at great length in *Ādiparva* ccix-ccxii, but is condensed into six verses in *Kathāsaritsāgara* xv., of which the following is Mr. Tawney's translation:—"There were two brothers, Asuras by race, Sunda and Upasunda, hard to overcome, in as much as they surpassed the three worlds in valour. And Brahmā, wishing to destroy them, gave an order to Vis'vakarman, and had constructed a heavenly woman named Tilottamā, in order to behold whose beauty even S'iva truly became four-faced, so as to look four ways at once, while she was devoutly circumambulating him. She, by the order of Brahmā, went to Sunda and Upasunda, while they were in the garden of Kailāsa, in order to seduce them. And both those two Asuras distracted with love, seized the fair one at the same time by both her arms, the moment they saw her near them. And as they were dragging her off in mutual opposition, they soon came to blows, and both of them were destroyed." The simile is met with in *Sānkhyatattvakaumudī* 13, as follows:—"ननु परस्परविरोधशीला गुणाः सुन्दोपसुन्दवत्परस्परं ध्वंसन्त इत्येव युक्तं प्रागेव तेषामेकक्रियाकर्तृतायाः" ॥ See also Kāmanda-

kīya *Nītisāra*, ix. 61. In *Sarvārthasiddhi* (on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* ii. 53) we have the expression "सुन्दोपसुन्दाविषनाशकविषन्यायेन." This nyāya is used, says Raghunātha, when the things in opposition are of equal strength; but when they are of unequal strength, and the weaker go to the wall, the *Mātsyanyāya* is employed.

सुभगाभिक्षुकन्यायः ॥

The simile of *Subhagā and the mendicant.* The following is Raghunātha's explanation of it:—"एकत्र विरुद्धानेकधर्मसमावेशासंभवविवक्षायां तु सुभगाभिक्षुकन्यायः प्रवर्तते। यथा सुभगत्वं भिक्षुकत्वं स्त्रीत्वं पुंस्त्वं च तथाविधपदद्वयसामानाधिकरण्यात्प्रतीयमानमपि विरुद्धत्वादेकस्मिन्युगपन्न संभवति तथैकस्मिन्नीशरूपाप्तवचने प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यलक्षणविरुद्धं धर्मद्वयं न संभवतीति केचित् । अन्ये तु यथा सुभगाभिक्षुकौ प्रबलघातकभयात्कंचिच्छरणं प्रपन्नौ स च शरणागतत्यागदोषश्रवणात्सर्वप्रयत्नेनोभयो रक्षणे प्रबलारिकृतस्वघातभयेन त्यागे वा प्राप्तेऽपि सुभगां रक्षति भिक्षुकं त्यजतीति यत्तत्र तस्येच्छैव नियामिका न तु किंचिद्विनिगमकमस्ति तथा प्रकृतेऽपीशवचनत्वादुभयोः प्रामाण्ये पौरुषेयत्वान्मूलप्रमाणसापेक्षतया धर्मादौ तदभावादप्रामाण्ये वा प्राप्तेऽप्युक्तविभागे तार्किकेच्छैव नियामिकेत्यर्थमाहुः" ॥ This seems to me very unsatisfactory, but I can suggest nothing better. The only work in which I have met with the nyāya is the *Âtmatattvaviveka* (page 54), where it is wrongly printed as सुभगाभिकन्याय. It would need a long extract to make it intelligible, so I must refer the reader to the work itself.

सोपानारोहणन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the ascent of a staircase.* Used of knowledge arrived at gradually, by easy steps. "Line upon line, precept

upon precept, here a little and there a little." There is an instance of its use in *Bhāmatī* 1. 3. 8 (page 201):—"एवं चानात्मविद आत्मानं विविदिषोर्नारदस्य प्रश्ने परमात्मानमेवास्मै व्याख्यास्यामीत्यभिसन्धिमान्सनत्कुमारः सोपानारोहणन्यायेन स्थूलादारभ्य तत्तद्भूमव्युत्पादनक्रमेण भूमानमतिदुर्ज्ञानतया परमसूक्ष्मं व्युत्पादयामास" ॥

सौभरिन्यायः ॥

The illustration afforded by *Saubhari*. The story of this sage is told in Book 4, chapter 2, of the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, and, with less detail, in Book 9, chapter 6, of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. We there learn that, after remaining immersed in a piece of water for twelve years, the Muni was so much impressed by the happiness of the little fish which disported themselves around their great progenitor named Sammada, that he determined to marry and raise up progeny himself! He accordingly went to king Māndhātā, the father of fifty charming daughters, and asked for one of them in marriage. Taken somewhat aback by the appearance of this old and emaciated suitor, but fearing to displease him, the king replied that it was the custom for princesses to select their own husband, but that if any one of them chose him as such, he could take her to wife. He was accordingly conducted to the ladies' apartments; but, on the way there, he transformed his repelling person into one of handsome and youthful appearance, and the consequence was that each of the fifty maidens fell violently in love with him and demanded him as a husband, and so he married them all! Each of them lived in a beautiful mansion by herself, surrounded by every luxury. After a time, the king went on a visit to them to see how they fared. The first one pointed to her lovely surroundings and told of her husband's goodness to her, but added that there was one thing

which troubled her very much, namely, that her husband was *always* with her, and therefore her sisters could never enjoy his society at all. The king then visited each of the others in turn, and heard exactly the same thing from each; and so the necessary inference is that the sage *entered into fifty bodies* at one and the same time, and this is the sole point of the nyāya! It occurs in *Bhāmatī* 4. 4. 11 as follows:—"सौभरेरभिविनिर्मित-विविधदेहस्यापर्यायेण मान्धातृकन्याभिः पञ्चाशता विहारः पौराणिकैः स्मर्यते." Venkaṭanātha is the only other writer in whose works I have met with it. On page 65 of the *Nyāyasiddhānjana* we read:—
"भास्करमते तु नित्यसर्वज्ञस्योपाधियोग एव परिहास्यः । उपाधिभिश्छेदनाद्य-योगेन ब्रह्मण एव संसारित्वानपायः । उपाधिसञ्चारे प्रतिक्षणं बन्धमोक्षप्रसङ्गः सौभर्यादिवदुपाधिभेदेऽपि प्रतिसन्धानस्य दुस्त्यजत्वात् । छेदाभ्युपगमे चाच्छेद्यत्व-वादविरोधः" ॥ In his vṛitti on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* iii. 22, where the same subject is discussed, we find the following:—

"न च स्वेनान्यदेहादेरधिष्ठानादिसम्भवः ।
सौभरिन्यायतस्तत्तत्प्रतिवन्दिप्रसङ्गतः" ॥

It occurs again in the text and comment of verse 31.

स्फटिकलौहित्यन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the redness of the crystal.* Such redness is owing to the proximity of a red object, such as a rose &c. The illustration is much used by writers on Vedānta &c. For example, we read in *Paramārthasāra*, verses 16 and 61:—

" नानाविधवस्तूनां वर्णान्धत्ते यथामलः स्फटिकः ।
तद्वदुपाधेर्गुणभावितस्य भावं विभुर्धत्ते ॥ १६ ॥
विगतोपाधिः स्फटिकः स्वप्रभया भाति निर्मलो यद्वत् ।
चिद्दीपः स्वप्रभया तथा विभातीह निरुपाधिः ॥ ६१ ॥"

So, too, Aniruddha on *Sānkhyasūtra* ii. 35:—"यथा जपाकुसुमसं-सर्गात्स्फटिके लौहित्यं तदपगमात्स्फटिकः स्वरूपेणावतिष्ठते"॥ See also *Atmabodha*, 14; and a verse, by some unknown author, quoted in

the Paṇini section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 144 Bib. Ind., and 163 in Jīvānanda's edn.). In the *Kuvalayānanda* (page 289) under the figure अतद्गुण, we read:—"अन्यदीयगुणग्रहणाग्रहणे च रक्तस्फटिकवस्त्रमालिन्यादिन्यायेनान्यदीयगुणेनैवानुरञ्जनाननुरञ्जने विवक्षिते" ॥ See also *Vivaraṇaprameya*, page 214.

स्वभावो दुरतिक्रमः ॥

Nature is hard to overcome. This is no doubt based on *Hitopades'a* iii. 56:—

"यः स्वभावो हि यस्य स्यात्तस्यासौ दुरतिक्रमः ।
श्वा यदि क्रियते राजा तत्किं नाश्नात्युपानहम् ॥"

Raghunātha applies it in the following manner:—"ननु सविलासाज्ञानबाधकस्वभावत्वं चेद्बोधस्य तदा स्वभावो दुरतिक्रम इति न्यायात्तत्त्वज्ञस्य ज्ञानोदयानन्तरं सविलासाज्ञानबाधनाद्देहपातस्तात्कालिकः स्यात्तथा चोच्छिन्नसंप्रदायकत्वादुपनिषदामबोधत्वलक्षणाप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्ग इति शंकानिरासाय यदाज्ञानस्य नाशेऽप्यारब्धकर्मणा प्रतिबन्धान्न देहादिक्षय आरब्धकर्मणश्च भोगलक्षणकार्यक्षयादेव क्षय इति समाधीयते तदेषुवेगक्षयन्यायप्रवृत्तिः । धनुषः सकाशान्मुक्तस्येषोर्बाणस्य कर्मणः प्रारब्धवेगक्षयादेव क्षय इति प्रसिद्धम्" ॥

The expression occurs also in the following verse of the *Kusumānjali* (i. 7):—

"एकस्य न क्रमः क्वापि वैचित्र्यं च समस्य न ।
शक्तिभेदो न चाभिन्नः स्वभावो दुरतिक्रमः" ॥

स्वविषमूर्च्छितो भुजङ्ग आत्मानमेव दशति ॥

The snake stupified by its own poison bites its own body! This saying is found in Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 67, line 6:—"यदि हि न ज्ञातं किञ्चिदस्तीत्यादिप्रतिज्ञार्थः प्रतिज्ञां स्पृशेत्कथमयमर्थः प्रत्येतव्यः । नचेत्कथं सानुपपन्ना । तदुपपन्नत्वे च कथं पुनः प्रतिज्ञार्थ उपपद्यते । तदिदमायातं स्वविषमूर्च्छितो भुजङ्ग आत्मानमेव दशतीति" ॥

स्वामिभृत्यन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the relation as master and servant.* "It is used to mark the relation of the feeder and the fed, or the supporter and the supported, subsisting between any two objects." Āpṭe's *Sanskrit Dictionary.* It is of very common occurrence. For instance, in S'ankara's bhāshya on *Brahmasūtra* 2. 1. 4 in a discussion as to the relation between Brahma and the world, he says:—"नहि साम्ये सत्युपकार्योपकारकभावो भवति। नहि प्रतीपौ परस्परस्योपकुरुतः । ननु चेतनमपि कार्यकारणं स्वामिभृत्यन्यायेन भोक्तुरुपकरिष्यति । न । स्वामिभृत्ययोरप्यचेतनांशस्यैव चेतनं प्रत्युपकारकत्वात्" ॥ Also in 2. 3. 43, we read:—"ततश्च जीवेश्वरयोरप्युपकार्योपकारकभावाभ्युपगमात्किं स्वामिभृत्यवत्संबन्ध आहोस्विदग्निविस्फुलिङ्गवदित्यस्यां विचिकित्सायामनियमो वा प्राप्नोति" ॥ See, too, Rāmatīrtha on *Vedāntasāra* 19 (page 141, last line).

ह्रदनक्रन्यायः ॥

The simile of *an alligator in a lake.* Used of things which mutually aid or protect each other. See वनसिंहन्याय.

लौकिकन्यायाञ्जलिः

तृतीय भागः

A THIRD HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS.

अकाले कृतमकृतं स्यात् ॥

A thing done at a wrong time [might as well be left undone, for it] *would be regarded as not done.* It occurs in the following passage of Mādhava's *Nyāyamālāvistara* 10. 1. 1:—"किं चतुर्धाकरणादूर्ध्वमावाह्यते किंवा प्रयाजेभ्यः पुरा । नाद्यः । अकाले कृतमकृतं स्यादिति न्यायेनावाहनस्य निरर्थकत्वात्."

Again, in S'abara on Jaimini 6. 2. 25, with reference to the times prescribed for the Agnihotra, and New and Full Moon sacrifices, we read "तस्मादन्येषु कालेषु अविहितत्वात्कृतमप्यकृतं स्यात्."

Compare the following which is quoted on page 284 of *Nyāyakandalī* :—

> "स्वकाले यदकुर्वंस्तत्करोत्यन्यदचेतनः ।
> प्रत्यवायोऽस्य तेनैव नाभावेन स जन्यते" ॥

And somewhat similarly we have Patanjali 1. 2. 64 (vārt. 43):—"अशास्त्रोक्ते क्रियमाणे विगुणं कर्म भवति विगुणे च कर्मणि फलानवाप्तिः" ॥

अक्षिपात्रन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the eyeball.* An illustration of *extreme sensitiveness*—in persons or things. The following from *Yogabhāṣya* ii. 15 (page 78) is an example of its application to a person:—"एवमिदमनादिदुःखस्रोतो विप्रसृतं योगिनमेव प्रतिकूलात्मकत्वादुद्वेजयति । कस्मात् । अक्षिपात्रकल्पो हि विद्वानिति । यथोर्णातन्तुरक्षिपात्रे न्यस्तः स्पर्शेन दुःखयति न चान्येषु गात्रावयवेष्वेवमेतानि दुःखान्यक्षिपात्रकल्पं योगिनमेव क्लिश्नन्ति नेतरं प्रतिपत्तारम्." This is very well put, also, in the *Maṇīprabhā* on the same sūtra. See, too, *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 442, line 8. It looks as if this nyāya, like many others found

in orthodox works, came from a Buddhist source. Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin has kindly pointed out the following verses on page 476 of the *Madhyamakavritti*:—"ऊर्णापक्ष्म यथैव हि करतलसंस्थं न विद्यते पुंभिः। अक्षिगतं तु तदेव हि जनयत्यरतिं च पीडां च॥ करतलसदृशो बालो न वेत्ति संस्कारदुःखतापक्ष्म। अक्षिसदृशस्तु विद्वान् तेनैवोद्विजते गाढम्." ॥ The word अक्षिपात्र is not in any of our dictionaries. In the *Yogavārtika* it is defined thus:—"अक्ष्णः पात्रेणाधारेण गोलकेन तुल्यो विद्वानिति." ॥

अग्निहोत्रन्यायः ॥

The rule as to *the Agnihotra sacrifice* [consisting of morning and evening libations]. It forms the subject of Jaimini 6. 2. 23–26, where the injunction "यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति" is discussed. The interpretation put upon these words by the pūrvapakṣin is that the householder is to do nothing else but offer the Agnihotra during his whole life! Kunte thus summarizes his argument:—"From the time of the establishment of a sacred fire to the time of death the Agnihotra is to be performed continuously, without the remission of a moment. This is the duty of an Ârya. He cannot rest for a moment. The Agnihotra is not a constituent part of any other sacrifice. It is an independent sacrifice by itself. It therefore accomplishes the purpose of a person; and must therefore be unremittingly adhered to; and it does not matter if, in performing a principal act, minor acts are neglected. It is therefore reasonable to perform the Agnihotra-sacrifice alone continuously for life." The reply to all this is that the meaning of the *vidhi* is simply that it is to be offered every morning at daybreak, and every evening, according to the injunction "प्रदोषमग्निहोत्रं होतव्यं व्युष्टायां प्रातः." For a description of the Agnihotra, see *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa*, Kāṇḍa 2, Adhyāyas 3 and 4; also a very useful excursus of Kunte's on pages 410–420 of his *Ṣaḍdars'anacintanikā*. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 4. 32 shows how Vedantists apply the injunction relating to the Agnihotra.

अङ्गुलिदीपिकया ध्वान्तध्वंसविधिः ॥

Attempting to dispel the darkness with a lamp no bigger than your finger! Endeavouring to bring about a great result by the use of manifestly inadequate means. It occurs in the following passage of *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 52:—"न चास्माकमिव तवाप्यत्र मूकतैव शरणं सर्वथा वचनविरोधे ह्युदासीनस्य सा शोभते । न चात्र विधौ विरोधः कश्चित् । न च त्वमुदासीनः प्रयोजने प्रवृत्तत्वात् । तस्मादलमङ्गुलिदीपिकया ध्वान्तध्वंसविधिमनुष्ठाय." I am indebted to Mr. Arthur Venis for an explanation of this nyāya.

अङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृश्यते ॥

The tip of a finger cannot be touched by itself. Akin to the sayings "A man cannot mount on his own shoulder," and "The edge of a sword cannot cut itself." It occurs in *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* page 466, line 10 from bottom:—"यथाङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृश्यत एवं ज्ञानं न तेनैव ज्ञानेन ग्रहीतुं शक्यते." Then in *Madhyamakavritti*, page 62, we have the double simile:—"यथापि नाम तस्यैवासिधारया सैवासिधारा न शक्यते छेत्तुं न तेनैवांगुल्यग्रेण तदेवांगुल्यग्रं शक्यते स्प्रष्टुमेवमेव न तेनैव चित्तेन तदेव चित्तं शक्यं द्रष्टुम्." ॥ We meet with it again in Pārthasārathi's comment on the S'ūnyavāda section of the *S'lokavārtika* (page 288):—"न हि पाकः पच्यते छिदा वा छिद्यते। नापि करणकर्मत्वं कर्तृकर्मत्वं वा एकस्य संभवति। न ह्यङ्गुल्यग्रेणैवाङ्गुल्यग्रं स्पृश्यते नाप्यङ्गुल्यग्रमात्मानं स्पृशति । तेनासां विधानां दृष्टान्ते क्वचिदप्यदर्शनाज्ज्ञानेऽपि नास्ति संभवः."

I do not understand the double statement here about the finger-tip. Pārthasārathi could not mean that the tip of one finger cannot be touched by the tip of another finger! The second part of the statement looks like a marginal gloss which has got into the text.

The following verse is found in *Prakaraṇapancikā*, page 63, and in *Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 268:—

अङ्गुल्यग्रं यथात्मानं नात्मना स्प्रष्टुमर्हति ।
स्वांशेन ज्ञानमप्येवं नात्मानं ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥

See also *Nyāyamakaranda*, pages 131, 183; *S'rībhāṣya* page 169; and *Sarvārthasiddhi*, page 391.

अङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्ते ॥

There are a hundred herds of elephants on the tip of my finger! This illustration of an absurdity occurs frequently. In *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 232 *g*, we read:—"अत्र केचिच्चोदयन्ति । व्यर्थोऽयं व्युत्पत्तिनिरूपणप्रयासः । शब्दस्यार्थासंस्पर्शित्वात् । न ह्यङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इत्यादिशब्दैः कश्चिदर्थः प्रमीयते । यत्राप्तवाक्ये प्रमीयते तत्रापि मानान्तरनिबन्धना सा प्रमितिर्न शब्दनिबन्धनेति." Then in *Citsukhī* ii. 32:—"आप्तोदीरितवाक्येषु मालतीमाधवादिषु । व्यभिचारान्न तद्युक्तमाप्तत्वस्यानिरुक्तितः ॥ ३२ ॥ स्वकपोलकल्पितमालतीमाधवादिवाक्येषु प्रामाण्याभावादतिव्याप्तिः । न हि पुराप्त एव सन्नाटकनाटिकादिप्रबन्धविरचनमात्रेणानाप्तो भवति भवभूतिः । उक्तं चैतदुम्बकेन 'यदाप्तोऽपि कस्मैचिदुपदिशति न त्वयाननुभूतार्थविषयं वाक्यं प्रयोक्तव्यं यथाङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इति' । तत्रार्थव्यभिचारः स्फुटः." Compare S'ālikā p. 13, verse 4.

In the commentary on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, page 104, the saying is modified to "अङ्गुल्यग्रे करिशतं विहरति," and another of a like kind is added, namely "मम कर्णकुहरं प्रविश्य सिंहः क्रीडति;" and in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 65, Udayana gives us "मम कर्णे प्रविश्य गजो गर्जति भेषजमुच्यताम्." The Umbaka quoted above is perhaps the Umbeka* referred to by Hall (on page 166 of his

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* Hall found this name (together with those of Prabhākara, Vāmana, and Revaṇa) in a verse of the *vritti* by Chāritra Sinha Gaṇi on the *Ṣaḍdars'anasamuccaya*. What is manifestly the same verse is found also in the *vritti* ascribed to *Maṇibhadra*; but there the name Utpala is substituted for Umbeka. The verse is as follows:—" उत्पलः कारिकां वेत्ति तन्त्रं वेत्ति प्रभाकरः । वामनस्तूभयं वेत्ति न किंचिदपि रेवणः " ॥ From the fact that all the other authors and works mentioned in Gaṇi's vritti are found in the latter also, I am inclined to think that the two are identical.

Index) as an authority on Mīmāṃsā. In the Catalogus Catalogorum, the latter is identified with Maṇḍanamis'ra, which is one of the names by which Sures'varācārya is known.

अत्यन्तबलवन्तोऽपि पौरजानपदा जनाः। दुर्बलैरपि बाध्यन्ते पुरुषैः पार्थिवाश्रितैः॥

Even very powerful men from town and country are held in check by weaker men who have the king's support. This verse from the *Tantravārtika* (page 863), found also, as a quotation, in *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakās'a*, page 35, is thus applied by Raghunātha:—"यत्र निर्बलेनापि प्रबलसहायेन प्रबलो बाध्यते तत्र 'अत्यन्तबलवन्तोऽपि पौरजानपदा जनाः। दुर्बलैरपि बाध्यन्ते पुरुषैः पार्थिवाश्रितैः' इति न्यायोऽवतरति। स्पष्टार्थोऽयम्। उदाहरणं तु श्रुत्यपेक्षया दुर्बलाया अपि स्मृतेराचमनरूपप्रबलपदार्थाश्रितत्वेन प्राबल्यम्। अतः श्रौतक्रमत्यागेन वेदकरणानन्तरं क्षुते आचमनमेव कार्यमिति दिक्." We may compare with this the following from Sures'vara's large vārtika, page 753:—

"आशंसते बलीयांसमबलीयानपि स्वयम्।
धर्मं बलं समाश्रित्य जेतुं लोके तथा यथा॥
राज्ञा बलेनाल्पबलो बलीयांसं कुटुम्बिनम्।
जेतुमाशंसते तस्माद्धर्मः स्याद्बलवत्तमः"॥

अदित्सोर्वणिजः प्रतिदिनं पत्रलिखितश्वस्तनदिनभणनन्यायः॥

The simile of *the merchant who was unwilling to give, and who wrote every day saying that he would give on the morrow!* It occurs in the following passage of Malliṣeṇa's *Syādvādamanjarī* (page 128):—"सौगताः किलेत्थं प्रमाणयन्ति सर्वं सत्क्षणिकं यतः सर्वं तावद्घटादिकं वस्तु मुद्गरसन्निधौ नाशं गच्छद्दृश्यते। तत्र येन स्वरूपेणान्त्यावस्थायां घटादिकं विनश्यति तच्चैतत्स्वरूपमुत्पन्नमात्रस्य विद्यते। तदानीमुत्पादानन्तरमेव तेन नष्टव्यमिति व्यक्तमस्य क्षणिकत्वम्। अथेदृश एव स्वभावस्तस्य हेतुतो जातो यत्कियन्तमपि कालं स्थित्वा विनश्यति। एवं तर्हि मुद्गरादिसन्निधानेऽपि एष

एव तस्य स्वभाव इति पुनरप्यनेन तावन्तमेव कालं स्थातव्यमिति नैवं विनश्येदिति सोऽयमदित्सोर्वणिजः प्रतिदिनं पत्रलिखितश्वस्तनदिनभणनन्यायः" ॥ Those who, in an Indian cantonment, have ever undertaken the thankless task of the collection of *promised* subscriptions to a fund, are very familiar with the "*kal āo*," or "*parsoṅ ke din āo*," with which their messenger is often greeted, with perhaps stronger language superadded! Human nature is much the same everywhere. Compare *Proverbs* iii. 28.

अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

A truth or conclusion which implies another truth or conclusion. This is the third of four kinds of सिद्धान्त defined in *Nyāyasūtras* 1. 1. 28–31, the others being (1) सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त, (2) प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त, and (4) अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्त. Ballantyne's rendering of the four is (1) a dogma of all the schools, (2) a dogma peculiar to some school, (3) a hypothetical dogma, and (4) a dogmatic corollary. In *Tārkikarakṣā* i. 29 (page 126) we have the following description of *manas*:—"युगपद्ज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति । एवं चाणुतयैव मनसः सिद्धिः । अन्यथा युगपदनेकेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानाद्युगपद्ज्ज्ञानोदयप्रसंगात्"। On this, Mallinātha comments thus:—"एवं चेति । जगत्कर्तुः सर्वज्ञत्वादिवन्मनसोऽणुत्वमधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायाद्धर्मिग्राहकादेव सिद्धमित्यर्थः" ॥ There is another example in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 83, line 9; and a third in Yāmunācarya's *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, page 17, line 1.

For an example of the three other kinds of siddhānta, see *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, page 36, lines 16–27.

अधिकारन्यायः ॥

The rule regarding the *qualifications* [required of a sacrificer]. Jaimini 6. 1. 1–3 deals with part of this. The decision is that he must be desirous of heaven, according to the vidhis "दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत," "ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत." The

principal thing here is the desire for heaven, whilst the sacrificial act is subordinate. The remainder of the pāda deals with the physical and social fitness demanded. See under आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां &c., below. For a full description of the four kinds of injunction, of which *adhikāravidhi* is the third, see Laugākṣi-bhāskara's *Arthasangraha*, page 4, with Dr. Thibaut's translation, page 7 &c.

अनधीते महाभाष्ये व्यर्था स्यात्पदमञ्जरी । अधीतेऽपि महाभाष्ये व्यर्था सा पदमञ्जरी ॥

The Padamanjarī would be of no use to one who had not read the Mahābhāṣya, and would be equally useless [because unnecessary] *if the latter had been read!* This saying is used by Raghunātha to illustrate the position of the Gaṇapatas who regard the worship of Gaṇapati as essential and all-inclusive. A portion of the argument is as follows:—"अतः श्रेयःकामैः सर्वैरपि स एवाराध्यः । तत्पूजां विनान्यपूजाया वैयर्थ्यस्मरणेन फलजनकत्वायोगात् । अवश्यापेक्षितानपेक्षितयोरपेक्षितं स्मरणीयमिति न्यायेन कृताकृतप्रसङ्गी यो विधिः स नित्य इति न्यायेन च तदाराधनस्यावश्यकत्वात् । कृते च तस्मिन्विद्यार्थी लभते विद्यां धनार्थी लभते धनम् । पुत्रार्थी लभते पुत्रान्मोक्षार्थी परमं पदमित्या-दिवचनेभ्यः सर्वेष्टलाभसंभवेनानधीते महाभाष्ये व्यर्था स्यात्पदमञ्जरी । अधीतेऽपि महाभाष्ये व्यर्था सा पदमञ्जरीति न्यायेनान्याराधने प्रयोजनाभावात्." The second nyāya quoted here is a slight modification of Nāgoji's *paribhāṣā* XLii, "कृताकृतप्रसङ्गि नित्यं तद्विपरीतमनित्यम्." In the Preface to vol. 2 of his edition of the Mahābhāṣya Dr. Kielhorn, referring to the above dictum of the Paṇḍits, says,— "Whatever truth there be in this remark, I can say for myself that I have been much assisted by Haradatta's learned work, even though it is based to a great extent on the Mahābhāṣya itself and on Kaiyaṭa's commentary"; and he points out that, though the Padamanjarī is primarily a commentary on the Kāśikā, yet its author discusses, often at great length, most of

the arguments advanced in the Mahābhāṣya. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has several verses of the same type as that regarding the Padamanjarī. They will be found on pages 29, 39, 55, 61, 182, 447, and 448 of his *Nyāyamanjarī*. I quote that on page 182 as a sample:—

कार्यं चेदवगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ।
कार्यं चेन्नावगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ॥

अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा भवति प्रतिषेधो वा ॥

[A rule containing] *an injunction or a prohibition* [enjoins or forbids only] *that which is nearest* [to it in some other rule]. Here is one of Raghunātha's grammatical nyāyas, included in both of his works. My translation is based on that of Dr. Kielhorn in his well-known edition and translation of the *Paribhāṣendus'ekhara*, where it appears as Paribhāṣā LXI. Nāgojī-Bhaṭṭa took it, of course, from the *Mahābhāṣya*, and I have noted the following ten instances of its occurrence:—1. 1. 43 (vārt. 3); 1. 2. 48 (vārt. 7); 1. 3. 12 (vārt. 7); 1. 3. 14 (vart. 3); 1. 3. 58 (vārt. 3); 1. 4. 17; 3. 1. 67 (vārt. 5); 7. 1. 21 (vārt. 1); 7. 2. 3 (vārt. 2); and 7. 3. 85 (vārt. 4).

अनन्यलभ्यः शब्दार्थः ॥

The meaning of a word is that which cannot be known from any other source [such as implication &c.]. This is Mr. Venis' rendering (in the Paṇdit, vol. vi, page 97) of the maxim in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (chap. iv. page 280). It occurs in *Tantravārtika* (page 340) in a more extended form, namely "यावानेव हि अनन्यलभ्योऽर्थः शब्दाद्गम्यते स सर्वः शब्दार्थः" ॥ Prof. Gangānātha Jhā (on page 474, line 10 of his translation) translates thus:—"In the case of any word, all that is not cognizable by means of any other word is held to be the meaning of that word." This, however, seems, to overlook the words

"शब्दाद्गम्यते." The nyāya is found in its usual form in *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, page 35, line 10. In the *Pūrṇaprajna* section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 85 of Jīvānanda's edition) we have the cognate nyāya "अनन्यलभ्यः शास्त्रार्थः", "the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes is not to be taken from other sources than these" (Prof. Gough's translation, page 101).

A remark of Udayana's, as to word-meanings, may be of interest. It is found in *Kusumānjali*, vol. 2, page 132:—"यः शब्दो यत्र वृद्धैरसति वृत्त्यन्तरे प्रयुज्यते स तस्य वाचको यथा स्वर्गशब्दः सुखविशेषे प्रयुज्यमानस्तस्य वाचकः" ॥

अनिषिद्धमनुमतम् ॥

That which is not objected to is agreed to. "Silence gives consent." It occurs in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* vii. 36:—

एतस्याः संप्रदानं च श्रुत्वा संसोढवानसि ।
अनिषिद्धं ह्यनुमतमिति न्यायोऽपि वर्तते ॥

The nyāya is found in a slightly different form in *Nyāya-vārtika*, page 41:—"तत्रान्तरे मन इन्द्रियमिति पठ्यते । तच्चेह न प्रतिषिध्यते । अप्रतिषेधादुपात्तं तदिति । न । शेषाभिधानवैयर्थ्यात् । शेषाण्यपीन्द्रियाणि तैः परिपठितानि तस्मात्तान्यपि न वक्तव्यानि यद्यप्रतिषेधादुपादानं स्यादिति । न। तन्त्रयुक्त्यनवबोधात् । न भवता तन्त्रयुक्तिः परिज्ञायते । परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतमिति हि तन्त्रयुक्तिः" ॥

In his comment on this passage, Vācaspatimis'ra (on page 97 of *Tātparyaṭīkā*) quotes a line of Dignāga's:—"तद्दूषितं दिग्नागेन 'अनिषेधादुपात्तं चेदन्येन्द्रियरुतं वृथा'." There is another example in *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 205.

अन्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गयोरन्तरङ्गं बलीयः ॥

Of the proximate [or, closely related] *and the remote* [or, distantly related], *the former is the stronger.* I find it most difficult to give a rendering of this nyāya. It seems to belong primarily to the grammarians, though found also in philosophical works. It is included in Sīradeva's list of paribhāṣās, but not in that of Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa. The terms अन्तरङ्ग and बहिरङ्ग are, however, explained by the latter, under his paribhāṣa "असिद्धं बहिरङ्गमन्तरङ्गे," in the following manner, and I subjoin Dr. Kielhorn's translation. As this eminent scholar gives no English equivalent of the two terms here described, it may fairly be assumed that no satisfactory one is to be found. "अन्तर्मध्ये बहिरङ्गशास्त्रीयनिमित्तसमुदायमध्येऽन्तर्भूतान्यङ्गानि निमित्तानि यस्य तदन्तरङ्गम् । एवं तदीयनिमित्तसमुदायाद्बहिर्भूताङ्गकं बहिरङ्गम्." "*Antaranga* is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie within (or before) the sum of the causes of a *bahiranga* rule ; in like manner (that rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie without (or beyond) the sum of the causes of that (*antararga* rule) is *bahiranga.*" The Professor adds the following in a footnote:—"अन्तरङ्ग and बहिरङ्ग are two Bahuvrīhi-compounds and denote a rule, or an operation, or that which is taught in a rule. The word अङ्ग here neither denotes a member of the body, nor is it the grammatical term अङ्ग as defined in P. 1. 4. 13; but it is equivalent to उपकारक 'that which assists (an operation),' or, in other words, it denotes the निमित्त, that is, 'the cause' of an operation."

The nyāya is employed by S'abara on Jaimini 12. 2. 27, and by Ânandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 4; and there is another example of it in the following passage of the *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* (page 15):—"कार्यस्य तावदुपादानापेक्षा प्रथममुत्पद्यते पश्चाद्विरोधिसंसर्गाभावापेक्षा तथा चान्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गयोरन्तरङ्गं बलवदिति न्यायेनान्तरङ्गोपादानविषयत्वमेव तयोर्न्याय्यम्" where Dr. Thibaut (in his translation in *Indian Thought,* vol. i, page 80) renders it

"the principle that what is intimately connected has greater force than what is remotely connected."

It is quoted also by Ānandagiri in his comment on verse 367 of Sures'vara's *Sambandhavārtika*—"अन्तरङ्गं हि विज्ञानं प्रत्यज्ञात्रैकसंश्रयात् । बहिरङ्गं तु कर्म स्याद्बाह्यद्रव्याश्रयत्वतः" ॥ Mr. S. B. Aiyar's rendering of the terms *antaranga* and *bahiranga* in this verse is 'subjective' and 'objective,' respectively.

अन्यवेश्मस्थिताद्धूमान्न वेश्मान्तरमग्निमत् ॥

From seeing smoke rising from one house we do not infer that there is a fire in another house. This is from *Tantravārtika* (page 180, line 9) on Jaimini's sūtra "अनुमानव्यवस्थानात्तत्संयुक्तं प्रमाणं स्यात्" (1. 3. 15).

अन्यार्थमपि प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति ॥

A thing, though made for one purpose, may also serve for another. This is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 23 (vārt. 4), 1. 3. 12 (vārt. 5), and 6. 1. 50, as follows:—"यत्तावदुच्यते न चान्यार्थं प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवतीत्यन्यार्थमपि प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति । तद्यथा । शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते ताभ्यश्च पानीयं पीयत उपस्पृश्यते च शालयश्च भाव्यन्ते." It is quoted by S'abara on Jaimini 3. 1. 12 (page 220), and is referred to by Kumārila in his long and interesting discussion of शेष (an accessory—that which serves the purpose of something else) in the opening part of the third chapter of the *Tantravārtika*. On page 668, line 13, we read:— "न हि कश्चिदपि शालिकुल्यास्थमुदकं पिबन्मदर्थमेताः प्रणीता इत्यध्यवस्यति । तस्मादन्यत्तादर्थ्यमन्यश्चोपकार इति विज्ञायते." Patanjali's illustration is found in *Pancapādikā*, page 45, and is employed by Vidyāraṇya in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* (page 118, line 9), where it is styled कुल्याप्रणयनन्याय. Compare the nyāya "जामात्रर्थं श्रपितस्य सूपादेरतिथ्युपकारकत्वम्" in the Second Handful.

अपच्छेदन्यायः ॥

The law regarding *the interruption* [of a procession of priests]. It is thus explained by Goldstücker:—"Used in the liturgical writings of the interruption of a procession of priests caused by the inadvertence of one or several amongst them; thus, it being the rule that at the first Savana of the Jyotishṭoma the priests must proceed one after the other 'in the black-ant fashion,' the one that comes after holding his preceder by the hem of his garment, an interruption caused by the dropping of the hem, on the part of one priest would be एककर्तृकोऽपच्छेदः &c." This curious ceremony is discussed in Jaimini 6. 5. 49-56, where certain penalties are prescribed for letting go the garment (कच्छ-विमोचन). The matter is well and concisely put in the Nyāyamālāvistara on the above portion of Jaimini, and much information is contained in Kunte's notes on the same sûtras.

The nyāya is employed by writers on Vedānta. It is found, for example, in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 10, line 8:—"ज्येष्ठस्यापीति। अपच्छेदन्यायेन पूर्वस्य परेण बाधमाशंक्य तदपेक्षस्येति विशेषितं तेनोत्तरस्य पूर्वापेक्षायामुपक्रमाधिकरणन्याय एव प्रवर्तत इति सूचितमित्यर्थः" ॥ The passage of the *Vedāntakalpataru* here explained is found on page 6, line 8:—"ज्येष्ठस्यापि पौर्वापर्यन्यायेन बाधमाशंक्याह तदपेक्षस्येति." The पौर्वापर्यन्याय is a part of the अपच्छेदन्याय, and derives its name from sūtra 54, namely "पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत्," the subject of the adhikaraṇa being that when the priests, walking in procession, let go their hold one after another, the one who does so last is liable to a penalty. This same sūtra is quoted in full in *Bhāmatī*, page 5, last line, and is immediately followed by a verse from Kumārila's *Tantravārtika*, page 819; where, however, the reading of the first line is पौर्वापर्यबलीयस्त्वं instead of the पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वं of the *Bhāmatī*. The same verse is quoted by Vācaspatimis'ra at the bottom of page 59 of his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, where the reading agrees with that of the Bhāmatī. The अपच्छेदन्याय is found in Venkaṭanātha's *Sarvārthasiddhi*, pages 210, 359, and 374; and also in *S'rībhā-*

ṣya, page 143, where Dr. Thibaut (on page 26 of his translation) renders it "As in the case of the Udgātṛi and Pratihartṛi breaking the chain in succession." The whole ceremony is very clearly explained on page 156 of the *Tattvadīpana*, and the passage will repay perusal.

अपवादैरुत्सर्गा बाध्यन्ते ॥

General rules are set aside by special ones. This well-known grammatical rule, found thus in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 1. 24 (vārt. 5) and in a variety of forms in paribhāṣās, is admitted to these pages chiefly because, in two of his poems, Kālidāsa has adopted it as a sort of मात्स्यन्याय to illustrate a phase of human affairs, namely the subordination of the weak to the strong.

One instance is in *Kumārasambhava* ii. 27:—

" लब्धप्रतिष्ठाः प्रथमं यूयं किं बलवत्तरैः ।
अपवादैरिवोत्सर्गाः कृतव्यावृत्तयः परैः" ॥

The other is in *Raghuvaṃs'a* xv. 7:—

" यः कश्चन रघूणां हि परमेकः परंतपः ।
अपवाद इवोत्सर्गं व्यावर्तयितुमीश्वरः" ॥

In a note on this latter passage Mr. Shankar P. Paṇḍit says "Whatever may be the value of the simile as regards the similitude, it certainly cannot be said to be very poetical, being derived altogether from a pedant's life." At the end of his comment on the former verse, Mallinātha adds "इत्यलमतिगहनावगाहनेन",which may possibly indicate some feeling of disapproval on his part also. It is on the principle enunciated in this nyāya that the law forbidding the taking of life is superseded by the Vedic ritual which demands animal sacrifices; and it is interesting to note the famous Jaina Hemacandra's denunciation of the whole argument in the eleventh verse of his *Vītarāgastuti*, the first half of which stands thus:—

" न धर्महेतुर्विहितापि हिंसा
नोत्सृष्टमन्यार्थमपोद्यते च" ।

In his vṛitti on the verse Malliṣeṇa states the case from the Mīmāṃsaka's standpoint as follows:—"योऽयं न हिंस्यात्सर्वभूतानीत्यादिना हिंसानिषेधः स औत्सर्गिको मार्गः सामान्यतो विधिरित्यर्थः । ततश्चापवादेनोत्सर्गस्य बाधितत्वान्न श्रौतो हिंसाविधिर्दोषायोत्सर्गापवादयोरपवादो विधिर्बलीयानिति न्यायात्." (*Syādvādamanjarī*, page 84).

In connection with the above quotation from Hemacandra, see the डमरुकमणिन्याय.

अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत् ॥

Scripture attaches a meaning [to an act &c.] *when such* [a meaning] *has not been established* [and could not be established in any other way]. I take this to be the drift of this somewhat difficult nyāya which forms part of Jaimini's sūtra 6. 2. 18. In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 3. 18 there is a discussion as to the aim of certain S'rutis which prescribe the rinsing of the mouth, before and after eating, in connection with the *prāṇavidyā*. Were they intended to enforce आचमन as an act of cleanliness, and also as an act of ritual directed to prāṇa? The decision is that the former was already provided for by smṛiti, and that s'ruti merely attached to it its significance as a religious ceremonial. Bhāratītīrtha sums up the case in *Adhikaraṇamālā* 3. 3. 9, as follows:—"इति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः 'अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत्' इति न्यायेन मानान्तराप्राप्तमनग्नताचिन्तनमेव विधेयम्...आचमनं तु शुद्ध्यर्थतया स्मृतिबलादेव प्राप्तमिति न विधीयते...तस्मादाचमनस्य प्राप्तत्वादनग्नताबुद्धिरेव प्राणोपासकं प्रति विधेया." The nyāya is found also in *Tantravārtika*, page 145, line 3, and again on page 232; in *S'rībhāṣya*, page 554 (where it is rendered by Dr. Thibaut, on page 133 of his translation, "Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other means"); and in *Nyāyakandali*, page 5 (where Prof. Gangānātha Jhā's interpretation of it is "An injunction has its use only in a case where its object has not been accomplished by other means"). Other references to it are *Citsukhī* i. 7 (Paṇḍit, vol. iv. page

475); the Rāmānuja section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 69, line 12, of Jīvānanda's edition); and *Sarvārthasiddhi* pages 93, 263. In *Tattvadīpana*, page 544, the nyāya is quoted as "अनधिगते शास्त्रमर्थवत्."

अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वम् ॥

The more worthy should come first. These words form part of Patanjali's comment on a vārtika on Pāṇini's rule 2. 2. 34 in regard to the position of words in a dvandva compound. The whole sentence is as follows:—"अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वं निपततीति वक्तव्यम् । मातापितरौ श्रद्धामेधे" ॥ Its use is not restricted to grammar, however, as the following extract from the first paragraph of Sāyaṇa's introduction to his commentary on the Ṛigveda shows:– "ऋग्वेदस्य प्राथम्येन सर्वत्राम्नातत्वादभ्यर्हितं पूर्वमिति न्यायेनाभ्यर्हितत्वात्तद्व्याख्यानमादौ युक्तम्" ॥ Again, at the commencement of the twelfth chapter of the *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara*, we read as follows:—"अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वमिति न्यायमाश्रित्य तन्त्रप्रसङ्गप्रतिपादकयोरेकादशद्वादशाध्याययोः पूर्वोत्तरभाव उपपादितः" ॥ And in Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 4. 28:—"प्रधानवादस्यैव प्राधान्येन निरासे हेत्वन्तरमाह स चेति । न केवलमभ्यर्हितत्वात्तस्य प्राधान्यं स्मृतिमूलत्वादपीत्याह."

अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

The principle of *an implied axiom* [or, dogmatic corollary]. This is taken from *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 31 which Dr. Ballantyne rendered as follows:—"A 'dogmatic corollary' is the mention of a particular fact in regard to anything, not expressly declared in an aphorism, [our knowlege of the fact coming so immediately] from what *is* recognized [by the maker of the aphorisms, as to render a demonstration superfluous—the fact being thus entitled to rank not as a deduction but as a dogma]." The nyāya is applied by Udayana in *Kiraṇāvali*, page 20, line 4 from bottom. See also under अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्याय.

अम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलाबूनि ग्रावाणः प्लवन्ते ॥

Gourds sink in water, but stones float! This is often quoted as an illustration of an absurdity. It is as old as the *Mahābhārata* and appears at the end of chapter LXIV of the Sabhāparvan:— "मज्जन्त्यलाबूनि शिलाः प्लवन्ते मुह्यन्ति नावोऽम्भसि शश्वदेव." I have met with it twice in S'abara's bhāshya. In 1. 1. 5 (page 11):—"एवंजातीयकं प्रमाणविरुद्धं वचनमप्रमाणम्। अम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलाबूनि ग्रावाणः प्लवन्त इति यथा." In 4. 3 10:—"न चैवंजातीयकं प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धं वचनं प्रमाणं भवति। यथाम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलाबूनि शिलाः प्लवन्ते पावकः शीत इति."

Other references are *Sankṣepas'ārīraka* ii. 2 (Paṇḍit, vol. vii, page 169); and, in Prākṛita, just after verse viii. 31 of *Bālarāmāyaṇa*.

अयमपरो गण्डस्योपरि स्फोटः ॥

Here is another boil on the top of a previous one! An illustration of difficulty upon difficulty; trouble upon trouble. It occurs in *Bhāmatī* 2. 2. 37 as follows:—"न हीश्वराधीना जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण कपूयं कर्म कर्तुमर्हन्ति। तदनधिष्ठितं वा कपूयं कर्म फलं प्रसोतुमुत्सहते। तस्मात्स्वतन्त्रोऽपीश्वरः कर्मभिः प्रवर्त्यत इति दृष्टविपरीतं कल्पनीयम्। तथा चायमपरो गण्डस्योपरि स्फोट इतरेतराश्रयः प्रसज्येत कर्मणेश्वरः प्रवर्तनीय ईश्वरेण च कर्मेति." In the same form it is put into the mouth of Rākṣasa in *Mudrārākshasa* v (page 220). The oldest examples, however, are in Prākṛit. In the opening part of *S'akuntalā* ii. we find it as "तदो गण्डस्स उवरि पिण्डिआ संवुत्ता" (or, in Dr. Pischel's edition ,"जदो गण्डस्स उवरि विप्फोडओ संवुत्तो"); and in *Viddhas'ālabhanjikā* i. (page 12), as "अवरो गण्डस्स उवरि पिण्ठओ संवुत्तो."

अरुणैकहायनीन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a red* [cow] *one year* old. This nyāya, found in *Tantravārtika* 1. 2. 41, in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 294 (line 2 from bottom), and in *Vedāntakalpatauruparimala*, page 619

(line 4), is the आरुणिन्याय of Jaimini 3, 1. 12, and is based on the following words connected with the ritual of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice—"अरुणया पिङ्गाक्ष्यैकहायन्या सोमं क्रीणाति," "he buys Soma with a red-coloured, yellow-eyed [cow] of a year old." The Mīmāṃsaka delights in hair-splitting, and in trifling with language; and we have a typical instance of this idiosyncrasy in the way in which this simple sentence is dealt with. Because the cow is not actually mentioned, and the word अरुणा denotes a quality (redness), an objector says "how can one buy Soma with a mere quality?" S'abara's reply to this occupies ten octavo pages, whilst that of Kumārila fills twenty-nine! The objection is concisely put in the *Nyāyamālāvistara*, part of which is as follows:—

"अरुणाशब्दोऽरुणिमानं गुणमाचष्टे । गुणिविषयतया प्रयुज्यमानस्यापि 'नागृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टे बुद्धिः' इति न्यायेन गुणबोधकत्वात् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गुणमात्रे तद्व्युत्पत्तेश्च । तस्य चारुणिमगुणस्य तृतीयाश्रुत्या सोमक्रयसाधनत्वं प्रतीयते तच्चानुपपन्नम् । अमूर्तस्य गुणस्य वासोहिरण्यादिवत्क्रयसाधनत्वासंभवात्" ॥ The reply to this is:—"यद्यप्यमूर्तो गुणस्तथापि हायनवदक्षिवच्च गोद्रव्यमवच्छिनत्ति । तच्च द्रव्यं साधनमिति तद्द्वारा गुणस्य क्रयेणान्वयो भवति । एवं सति वाक्यभेदो न भविष्यति" ॥

There is a long discussion on the nyāya in Rāmānuja's *S'rībhāṣya* 1. 1. 13, commencing on page 813 of the Benares edition. See Dr. Thibaut's translation, page 222.

अवतप्तेनकुलस्थितम् ॥

A mungoose's standing on hot ground. Used of a fickle, changeable person who never sticks to a thing. It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 1. 47, as follows:—"यथावतप्ते नकुला न चिरं स्थातारो भवन्त्येवं कार्याण्यारभ्य यो न चिरं तिष्ठति स उच्यतेऽवतप्तेनकुलस्थितं त एतदिति." It occurs a second time in 6. 2. 49 (vārt. 6), in company with the expression उदकेविशीर्णं. The compound तीर्थकाक which is found in 2. 1. 42, has much the same meaning. Patanjali says:—"यथा तीर्थे काका न चिरं स्थातारो भवन्त्येवं यो गुरुकुलानि गत्वा न

चिरं तिष्ठति स उच्यते तीर्थकाक इति." In Marāṭhī, however, the name is applied to "a person ever watchful after some booty or spoil," a meaning which seems more in accord with the character of the crow than that assigned to it by Patanjali!

अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी ॥

For this paribhāṣā see under रथकारन्याय. It is quoted by Kumārila in *Tantravārtika* 1. 4. 11, more than once, but one example will suffice:—"लब्धात्मिका हि समुदायप्रसिद्धिरवयवप्रसिद्धिं बाधते तस्यास्त्वात्मलाभो यत्र प्रमाणान्तरेण पूर्वानुभूतावयवार्थरहितेऽर्थे शब्द-प्रयोगो दृश्यते। यथाश्वत्वकर्णत्वरहिते वृक्षेऽश्वकर्णशब्दस्य." As a parallel to this, we might take our word cockroach, which is neither a cock nor a roach! For other examples of the paribhāṣā see *Tantravārtika* pages 538, 1002, 1048, and 1149.

I have met with another reference in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 150, line 12:—"अत्र च घ्राणादिशब्दाः पंकजादिपदवदवयवार्थं निमित्तीकृत्य क्वचित्क्वचित्सामान्यविशेषे वर्तन्ते अवयवार्थस्य प्रतीयमानस्यासति बाधके परित्यागायोगात्। अश्वकर्णादौ वृक्षविशेषवाचके वाजिकर्णायोगेन बाधकेनावयवार्थ-परित्यागात्." See also *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 385, line 10; and page 534, line 15.

अविरविकन्यायः ॥

The principle of the words *avi* and *avika*. Though both mean 'a sheep,' yet a derivative in the sense of the flesh of a sheep (आविक) can be formed only from the latter. It occurs in *Mahābhāṣya* 4. 1. 88 (vārt. 2) as follows:—"तत्र द्वयोः शब्दयोः समानार्थयोरेकेन विग्रहोऽपरस्मादुत्पत्तिर्भविष्यत्यविरविकन्यायेन । तद्यथा । अवेर्मांसमिति विगृह्य अविकशब्दादुत्पत्तिर्भवति आविकमिति" ॥ Similarly in 8. 1. 89 (vārt. 6); 4. 2. 60; 4. 3. 131; 5. 1. 7; 5. 1. 28; and 6 2. 11 (vārt. 2). This inaccurate compound is one of the instances brought forward by Kumārila of the way in which grammar &c. are set aside by learned writers. On this, see the nyāya "अश्वारूढाः &c." below.

In *Nyāyamanjarī*, pages 413 and 414, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa joins in the attack on this irregular compound, and on grammatical deformities found in the works of such writers as Manu, As'valāyana, Vālmīki, and Dvaipāyana. The following is a portion of his comment:—"भाष्यकारोऽपि अविरविकन्यायेनेति द्वन्द्वगर्भे तत्पुरुषे प्रयुयुक्षिते 'सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः' इति प्राप्तमपि लोपं न कृतवान्। 'अन्यथाकृत्वा चोद्यमन्यथाकृत्वा परिहार' इत्यत्र च 'अन्यथैवंकथमित्थंसु सिद्धाप्रयोगश्चेत्' इति प्राप्तमपि णमुलमुपेक्ष्य क्त्वाप्रत्ययं प्रायुङ्क्त" ॥

The quotation "अन्यथाकृत्वा &c." is from Patanjali on *Pāṇini* 4. 1. 7 (vārt. 3), and the sūtra quoted is 3. 4. 27. See Kumārila's remarks on this expression in *Tantravārtika* page 201. They would apply equally to "कथंकृत्वा चोदितं &c." in 7. 1. 3 (vārt. 5).

अश्वारूढाः कथं चाश्वान्विस्मरेयुः सचेतनाः ॥

How could men of intelligence be mounted on horses and yet forget their horses! Yet grammarians and others sometimes ignore their own rules! In *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 18 (according to the numbering of the Benares edition), Kumārila comments at great length on the corrupt forms of words employed by even learned writers. On page 200, he says "अन्तो नास्त्यपशब्दानामितिहासपुराणयोः" and then instances the curious word उभाभ्य which is made to mean "a blow given by an elephant with both tusks" (युगपदुभाभ्यां दन्ताभ्यां प्रहारः). On the following page he says:—"येऽपि व्याकरणस्यैव परे पारे प्रतिष्ठिताः । सुतरां तेऽपि गाव्यादितुल्यानेव प्रयुञ्जते ॥ सूत्रवार्तिकभाष्येषु दृश्यते चापशब्दनम् । अश्वारूढाः कथं चाश्वान्विस्मरेयुः सचेतनाः" ॥

A variant of this is found in *S'ālikā*, page 16, verse 41:—

" नन्वेवं तुरगारूढस्तुरङ्गं विस्मृतो भवान् ।
वेदप्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थमुत्थितस्तत्प्रहीणवान्" ॥

Mallinātha probably had this in mind when, in his comment on Varadarāja's *Tārkikarakṣā* (page 20), he wrote:—"तदे-

तत्तुरगाधिरूढस्य तुरगविस्मरणं यद्वेदप्रामाण्यसाधने प्रवृत्तस्य मीमांसागुरोस्तत्प्रमाद इति सोपहासं परिहरति."

It is very clear, however, that the nyāya came from a Buddhist source, since it is found in the following *kārikā* of Nāgārjuna's, on page 502 of the *Madhyamakavritti* (for the reference to which I am indebted to Prof. Poussin):—

" स त्वं दोषानात्मनीयानस्मासु परिपातयन् ।
अश्वमेवाधिरूढः सन्नश्वमेवासि विस्मृतः" ॥

In a footnote, the Professor gives a variant from another Buddhist work, namely, "घोटामेवाभिरूढः सन् &c."

असाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति ॥

Names are given in consideration of some speciality. This was perhaps taken from *Sānkhyasūtra* V. 112:—"सर्वेषु पृथिव्युपादानमसाधारण्यात्तद्व्यपदेशः पूर्ववत्." "In all [bodies] earth is the material: in consideration [however] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case." This is Dr. Ballantyne's rendering. The nyāya is found in the early part of the Akṣapāda section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, and I append Prof. Cowell's translation:—"ननु प्रमाणादिपदार्थषोडशके प्रतिपाद्यमाने कथमिदं न्यायशास्त्रमिति व्यपदिश्यते। सत्यम्। तथाप्यसाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति न्यायेन न्यायस्य परार्थानुमानापरपर्यायस्य सकलविद्यानुग्राहकतया सर्वकर्मानुष्ठानसाधनतया प्रधानत्वेन तथा व्यपदेशो युज्यते."

"But here an objector may say, 'If these sixteen topics, proof &c., are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name of the Nyāya S'āstra [as reasoning, *i. e. Nyāya*, or logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?']. We allow the force of the objection; still, as names are proverbially said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name Nyāya was rightly applied to Gotama's

System, since 'reasoning', or inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit." See also *S'ālikā*, page 98, line 8: and *Bhāmatī* 1-3-14 (page 208).

असिधारामधुलेहनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *licking honey from the edge of a sword!* This is found in the Jaina chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 45 of Jīvānanda's edn.), as follows:—"सदसद्वेदनीयस्य सुखदुःखो-त्पादकत्वमसिधारामधुलेहनवत्," which Prof. Cowell renders, "An object recognized as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge—this is *vedanīya*." Compare *Bodhicaryāvatāra* vii-64:—"कामैर्न तृप्तिः संसारे क्षुरधारामधूपमैः"॥

अहृदयवचसामहृदयमुत्तरम् ॥

Heartless words get heartless answer. Like receives like. This occurs in *Vedāntatattvaviveka*, (The Paṇḍit for May 1903), page 14, line 4 from bottom:—"तत्र चाहृदयवचसामहृदयमुत्तरमिति न्यायेन सदन्यत्वं प्रपञ्चस्योक्तं न तु तत्त्वाभिप्रायेण." In the *Tātparya-ṭīkā* it takes the form of "अहृदयवाचामहृदया एव प्रतिवाचो भवन्ति," and is combined with "यादृशो यक्षस्तादृशो बलिः". The passage will be found under that nyāya in the second Handful.

In his *Nyāyadīpāvali*, page 2, Ānandabodhācārya quotes the nyāya in accordance with Vācaspatimis'ra.

आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी ॥

Power [of understanding on the part of the hearer] *co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense.* This is Dr. Thibaut's rendering of the nyāya as it appears in Laugākshibhāskara's

Arthasangraha (page 16) in a passage explanatory of *adhikāra-vidhi.* The portion connected with the nyāya, and the translation, are as follows:—"एवं सामर्थ्यमपि । आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायात्समर्थं प्रत्येव विधिप्रवृत्तेः"॥ "In the same manner, capability (to perform the duty is an understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those who are capable (by bodily strength and health, mental power &c.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the words 'power (of understanding on the part of the hearer) co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense' (the verbs although possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not able to understand it)." The commentator, Rāmes'vara S'ivayogibhikshu, explains that blind, deaf, and lame persons are excluded as being incapable of performing various parts of the sacrificial ritual.

A much earlier instance of the employment of the nyāya is met with in Sures'vara's *Sambandhavārtika*, verse 75, which I here subjoin, together with Ānandagiri's comment.

"सहकर्त्री भवेच्छक्तिरिति न्यायाद्भवेद्यदि ।
मनुष्यगोचरोऽपीति नाख्यातासंभवात्तथा ॥ ७५ ॥

आख्यातानामर्थं बोधयतामधिकारिशक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायाद्विधेयार्थानुष्ठानशक्तमधिकारिणं विना विधेर्विधित्वायोगात्काम्यादि मुमुक्षुर्वर्जयेदित्याख्यातस्य मनुष्यं प्रति स्वार्थं बोधयतो मनुष्यशक्तिसापेक्षत्वाद्दैवमात्रगोचरत्वमस्यासिद्धमिति शंकते । सहकर्त्रीति । यत्राख्यातमस्ति तत्र तत्सहकर्त्री कर्तृशक्तिरिष्टा न च मोक्षकामी काम्यादि वर्जयेदित्याख्यातं ख्यात्यतो न मनुष्यगोचरतोक्तहेतोरिति समाधत्ते नाख्यातेति" ॥

The verse immediately preceding is the following:—"न तु याद्दच्छिकी सिद्धिर्वक्तव्येह विपश्चिता । दैवगोचर एवैष न तु मानुषगोचरः" ॥ The two are rendered as follows in a translation (by Mr. S. V. Aiyar) which appeared in The Paṇḍit:—"A wise man ought not to speak of success as depending on mere accident. Such a thing would be within the scope, not of human effort, but of destiny. It cannot be said that it is also within the scope

of human effort, on the principle that injunction implies endeavour; for there is no injunction (*ākhyāta*) to that effect."

The nyāya probably originated with S'abara who makes use of it in his bhāṣya on Jaimini 1. 4. 30, where the reading is आख्यातशब्दानामर्थं &c. The expression "सर्वाख्यातसहकारिशक्त्यनुसारेण" in *Tantravārtika* 2. 2. 27, page 558, line 9, incorporates the same nyāya.

आम्रे फलार्थे निमिते छाया गन्ध इत्यनूत्पद्येते ॥

Though a mango-tree is planted for the sake of its fruit, yet shade and fragrance are also incidentally produced. This illustration is employed by Āpastamba in his *Dharmasūtra* 1. 7. 20. 3 which I quote together with Dr. Bühler's translation (in Sacred Books of the East, vol. ii):—"तद्यथाम्रे फलार्थे निमिते छाया गन्ध इत्यनूत्पद्येते। एवं धर्मं चर्यमाणमर्था अनूत्पद्यन्ते."

"Worldly benefits are produced as accessories to the fulfilment of the law, just as in the case of a mango-tree, which is planted in order to obtain fruit, shade and fragrance are accessory advantages." Plain and intelligible as this is, it is invariably misquoted, and instead of निमिते (from the root मि प्रक्षेपणे) we find निर्मिते, or the clearly impossible निमित्ते. The nyāya is found in S'ankara's bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 4. 3. 14, and in every edition known to me the text and comment stand thus:—"नच नित्यनैमित्तिकानुष्ठानात्प्रत्यवायानुत्पत्तिमात्रं न पुनः फलान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति प्रमाणमस्ति फलान्तरस्याप्यनुनिष्पादिनः सम्भवात्। स्मरति ह्यापस्तम्बः। तद्यथाम्रे फलार्थे निर्मिते छायागन्धावनूत्पद्येते एवं धर्मं चर्यमाणमर्था अनूत्पद्यन्त इति." Then the ṭīkākāra is made to say "निमित्त आरोपिते सतीति यावत्." We find it again in Sures'vara's *Sambandhavārtika*, verses 96 and 97:—

"फलं नित्यस्य नापीह दुरितक्षयमात्रकम्।
फलान्तरश्रुतेः साक्षात्तद्यथाम्रस्मृतेस्तथा ॥

'आम्रे निमित्त' इत्यादि ह्यापस्तम्बस्मृतेर्वचः ।
फलवत्त्वं समाचष्टे नित्यानामपि कर्मणाम् ॥''

Here, again, the unfortunate commentator is made to misquote the Sūtra, with निमित्ते for निमिते, and to give it the meaning belonging to the latter, namely "निहिते रोपिते." The translator of the vārtika was apparently satisfied with the reading in verse 97, which he rendered "The mango being the cause &c." But did Sures'vara really put it thus?

Āpastamba's simile is found also in Rāmatīrtha's comment on the *Vedāntasāra*, page 90 of my edition.

I may add that the verb निमि occurs frequently in Vedic literature, and means *to set up, erect,* or *fix.* The root पद् in combination with the two prepositions अनु and उत् has no place in the dictionaries, and may be peculiar to Apastamba.

आर्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते ॥

A wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind. This illustration is taken from the Jaina section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 44 of Jīvānanda's edn). The text, and Professor Cowell's translation, are as follows:—यथार्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते तथा कषायजलार्द्रं आत्मा योगानीतं कर्म सर्वप्रदेशैर्गृह्णाति । यथा वा निष्टप्तायःपिण्डे जले क्षिप्तेऽम्भः समन्ताद्गृह्णाति तथा कषायोष्णो जीवो योगानीतं कर्म समन्तादादत्ते.'' "As a wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins, collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions which are brought to it by *yoga.* Or as, when water is thrown on a heated lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the *jīva,* heated by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought by *yoga.*" In a footnote, the Professor adds:—"Yoga seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act."

आषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठा ॥

When the wind is blowing in the month Āshāḍha [*i. e.* in the rainy season, when strong winds prevail] *and the lordly elephant is being driven about, nothing but the sea can be the final resting place of the donkey.* That is to say, if the mighty elephant can with difficulty withstand the force of the wind, the puny donkey must inevitably be blown into the sea! I am greatly indebted to Mr. D. Sundara Rājas'armā of Madras for giving me a reference to this nyāya in the *Vedāntas'ikhāmaṇi* (a work which I had not then read). It appears in a passage on page 393, and I append an extract from Amaradāsa's comment on it:—
"वामदेवादीनामुत्पन्नब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराणामप्यमुक्तावर्वाचीनानामाषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठेति न्यायेन मुक्तिर्दूरोत्सारिता स्यात्." "आषाढवाते इति आषाढवायुसम्बद्धे द्विपेन्द्रे गजेन्द्रे चलति इतस्ततो दोलायमाने सति चक्रीवतो रासभस्य वारिधिरेव समुद्र एव काष्ठा विश्रामावधिरित्यर्थः" ॥

Raghunātha's application of the simile is somewhat different, and makes it the equivalent of the प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्याय. He says:—"याभिर्युक्तिभिरतिप्रबलशुष्कतर्ककर्कशत्वेन प्रसिद्धोऽपि द्वैतसत्यत्ववादी वैशेषिकादिर्जय्यस्ताभिरितरे क्षुद्राश्चार्वाकादयस्तु दूरतो निरस्ता भवन्तीति विवक्षायामाषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठेति न्यायप्रवृत्तिः । चलतीति सप्तम्यन्तं पदं देहलीदीपन्यायेनोभयत्र सम्बध्यते । चक्रीवान् गर्दभः । स्पष्टमन्यत्" ॥

In a manuscript of the *S'ikhāmaṇi* copied for me in Poona the nyāya stands thus:—"आषाढमासे वलद्विपेन्द्रे चक्रिवतोऽरे भवति धुकाष्ठावधिरेव काष्ठा." Though partly inaccurate this clearly furnishes a variant of the simile. The reading of the India Office manuscript (No. 568, page 73 b) differs materially from above and seems hopelessly corrupt. It puts it as follows:—
"आषाढमासे चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रिवतो धावतो धावति काष्ठवाहौरिति न्यायेन!" Does this, in spite of its inaccuracy, indicate the existence of another variant?

इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटी ॥

On one side a tiger, on the other a precipice! A serious dilemma! There is a good example in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* iii. 166:—"कुटुम्बमपि मे प्रेयः प्रेयांस्त्वमपि हे सखे। किं करोमि द्विधाचित्त इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटी." Another is found in *Syādvādamanjarī*, page 151:—"अवास्तवत्वग्राहकं प्रमाणं सांवृतमसांवृतं वा स्यात्। यदि सांवृतं कथं तस्मादवास्तवाद्वास्तवस्य शून्यवादस्य सिद्धिः प्राप्ता। तथा च वास्तव एव समस्तोऽपि प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारः। अथ तद्ग्राहकं प्रमाणं स्वयमसांवृतं तर्हि क्षीणाः प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारा वास्तवत्वप्रतिज्ञातेनैव व्यभिचारात्। तदेवं पक्षद्वयेऽपीतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटीति न्यायेन व्यक्त एव परमार्थतः स्वाभिमतसिद्धिविरोधः" ॥ In the following verse on page 896 of *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā* we have the nyāya as a compound:—

"इतो हि मैथुनस्याज्ञा इतः सागरवारणम्।
स व्याघ्रदुस्तटीन्यायः संजातो मे सुदुस्तरः" ॥

इष्यमाणस्यैव प्राधान्यं न त्विच्छायाः ॥

The thing wished for is of more importance than the wish. This occurs in *Vedāntakalpatarūparimala*, page 56, as follows:—" ननु विध्यन्वयित्वेनाविवक्षितमपि प्रैपानुवचनमनुवाद्यतया यथाविधेयदण्डान्वयि एवमिच्छापि प्रारभ्यमाणब्रह्मज्ञानान्वयिनी सती ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य प्रयोजनत्वं ब्रह्मणः सन्दिग्धत्वं च गमयेत्। इच्छेष्यमाणसमभिव्याहारे चेष्यमाणप्राधान्यं यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादौ क्लृप्तम्। अत इहापीच्छाप्राधान्यं विहायेष्यमाणप्राधान्यमभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तम् " ॥ Again, on page 62 of the same:—" प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानमिति सामान्यन्यायादिच्छेष्यमाणसमभिव्याहताविष्यमाणं प्रधानमिति स्वर्गकामपदादिषु क्लृप्तो विशेषन्यायो बलवानिति भावः" ॥ So too, in Rāmānuja's *Srībhāṣya*, page 31:—"ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा। इच्छाया इष्यमाणप्रधानत्वादिष्यमाणं ज्ञानमिह विधीयते" ॥ This is repeated *verbatim* in the Rāmānuja section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, page 69 (Jīvānanda's edn).

उदरे भृते कोशो भृतः ॥

When his stomach is full his coffers are full. Used of a lazy fellow who has no ambition beyond his daily food. "Whose god is his belly." It occurs in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* iii. 113:—"दारिद्र्येण मदीयेन बिभर्ष्युदरमप्यदः । उदरे च भृते कोशो भृत इत्येव मन्यसे."

उपवासाद्वरं भिक्षा ॥

It is better to beg than to starve. This is one of Raghunātha's nyāyas and he applies it thus:—

"येषां तु धीमान्द्याद्भूयो भूयः श्रूयमाणोऽप्यभेदो न बुद्धिमारोहति तैस्तूपवासाद्वरं भिक्षेति न्यायेन भेदबुद्ध्यापि स्वप्रेमास्पदविग्रहावच्छिन्नेशाराधनं कार्यं तत्प्रसादान्मेधोदये शालिसमृद्धौ कोद्रवाशनत्यागन्यायेन त्याज्या भेदधीः" ॥

It is found in *Pancadas'ī* ix. 119, 120:—

"अस्त्येवोपासकस्यापि वास्तवी ब्रह्मतेति चेत् ।
पामराणां तिरश्चां च वास्तवी ब्रह्मता न किम् ॥
अज्ञानादपुमर्थत्वमुभयत्रापि तत्समम् ।
उपवासाद्यथा भिक्षा वरं ध्यानं तथान्यतः" ॥

उपसंजनिष्यमाणनिमित्तोऽप्यपवाद उपसंजातनिमित्तमप्युत्सर्गं बाधते ॥

This is another of Raghunātha's grammatical nyāyas. It is not met with in the *Mahābhāṣya*, but forms one of Nāgojībhaṭṭa's paribhāṣās. The following is Prof. Kielhorn's rendering of it:—"An *apavāda*, even though the causes of its (application) are still to present themselves, supersedes a general rule the causes (of the application) of which are already present." In connection with this paribhāṣā we have the देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्याय which see below.

उभयतःपाशा रज्जुः ॥

A rope which binds at both ends. An embarrassing position; a dilemma. The following is from the Jaimini section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 133, Bib. Ind., or 150 of Jīvānanda's edition), with Professor Cowell's translation (page 198):—
"अभावः कारणमेव न भवतीति चेत्तदा वक्तव्यमभावस्य कार्यत्वमस्ति न वा। यदि नास्ति तदा पटप्रध्वंसानुपपत्त्या नित्यताप्रसङ्गः। अथास्ति किमपराद्धं कारणत्वेनेति। सेयमुभयतःपाशा रज्जुः" ॥

"If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its 'emergent non-existence' or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you at both ends."

The earliest occurrence of the nyāya is in Patanjali 6. 1. 68 (vārt. 2 and 5); and it is found in *Tantravārtika* 3. 6. 42 (page 1113) as follows:—"यद्यपि न बाधस्तथापि विकल्पस्तावत्प्राप्नोति न हि तुल्यार्थानां क्वचित्समुच्चयो दृष्टः सेयमुभयतःपाशा रज्जुः" ॥ Maṇḍanamis'ra used it in *Vidhiviveka*, page 83; and we find instances of it in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 436, line 16; in *Kusumānjali* iii. 6 (page 374); in the same author's *Lakṣaṇāvali*, page 56; in *Khaṇḍana*, page 530; and in the opening part of *Citsukhī* (Paṇḍit, vol iv. page 466).

एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत् ॥

A thing that is changed in one part does not thereby become something else (literally, like something else). For example, as Patanjali says under 1. 1. 56 (vārt. 10), the cutting of a dog's ears or tail does not turn it into a horse or a donkey, but it is still a dog! Other passages of the Mahābhāṣya where this paribhāṣā occurs are as follows:—S'ivasūtra 2, vārtika 4 (*i. e.* vol. i. page 21); 2. 4. 85 (vārt. 10); 4. 1. 83; 6. 1. 69

(vārt. 3); 6. 4. 149 (vārt. 2); and 8. 3. 85. The paribhāṣā is No 37 in Dr. Kielhorn's edition of the *Paribhāṣendus'ekhara*, and my rendering of it is based upon his. It is included in Raghunātha's list of nyāyas, and is quoted as such by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 589, line 6. For further illustrations of the paribhāṣā, see under श्वा कर्णे वा &c.

एकसम्बन्धिदर्शनेऽन्यसम्बधिस्मरणम् ॥

On seeing one thing we are reminded of others connected with it. The nyāya is found in this form in the *Nyāyapradīpa* on *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 44, where the presence of smoke is said to remind the spectator of the invariably connected fire. In Amaradāsa's tīkā on *S'ikhāmaṇi*, page 93, it is quoted as "एकसम्बन्धिज्ञानमपरसम्बन्धिस्मारकम्". In both of Raghunātha-varman's books it appears as एकसम्बन्धिदर्शनमन्यसम्बन्धिस्मारकम्, and, in the larger of the two, he illustrates it thus:—"यथा हस्तिपकदर्शनं हस्तिस्मारकं तथा नद्यादिज्ञानस्य कुशकाशजलतुंबिकाजलकानां तत्सम्बन्धिनां स्मरणहेतुत्वम्." Tārānātha (s. v. न्याय) quotes the saying in the form एकसम्बन्धिज्ञानम् &c. He reverses the above illustration by saying that the elephant reminds one of the driver; and adds that a word reminds one of its meaning, a statement which, in these degenerate times, is not universally true! See, too, *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 167, line 18.

कपिञ्जलन्यायः ॥

The rule as to *the Kapinjalas* [a kind of partridge]. In *Vājasaneyi-Saṁhitā* xxiv. 20, we read वसन्ताय "कपिञ्जलानालभेत," and the question arises, *how many* of the birds are to be sacrificed? Jaimini devotes eight sūtras [11. 1. 38-45] to the discussion of this point, and finally decides that *three*, the lowest figure representing *plurality* (two being merely duality), will satisfy the requirements of the s'ruti. S'abara's lengthy argument is very concisely summed up in the *Nyāyamālā-vistara*, as follows:—

"कपिञ्जलेषु त्रित्वाद्या ऐच्छिकास्त्रित्वमेव वा।
आद्यो बहुत्वसाम्यान्न त्रित्वेनैव कृतत्वतः ॥

अश्वमेधे 'वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानालभत' इति त्रित्वचतुष्ट्वादिसंख्यानां बहुत्वसाम्यादिच्छया या काचिद्बहुत्वसंख्या स्वीकार्येति चेत्। न। त्रित्वेनैव शास्त्रस्य कृतत्वात्। यो हि चतुष्ट्वादिसंख्यामुपादत्ते तेन न तदन्तर्भूतं त्रित्वं वर्जयितुं शक्यं त्रित्वमुपाददानेन त्वनन्तर्भूतं चतुष्ट्वादिकं वर्जयितुं शक्यते अतोऽवश्यंभावित्वेन प्रथमभावित्वेन लाघवेन च त्रित्व उपात्ते शास्त्रार्थसिद्धौ ततोऽधिकपक्षिहिंसायां प्रत्यवायात्। तस्मात्त्रित्वमेवोपादेयम्" ॥

There is an admirable example in *Nyāyakandalī*, page 50, where, in commenting on Pras'astapāda's "इहेदानीं चतुर्णां महाभूतानां सृष्टिसंहारविधिरुच्यते," S'rīdhara says:—"महाभूतानामित्युक्ते त्रयाणामेव परिग्रहः कपिञ्जलानालभेतेतिवद्बहुत्वसंख्यायास्तावत्येव चरितार्थत्वात्। अतश्चतुर्णामित्युक्तम्."

It is found also in *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 12 (page 394), and 3. 5. 26 (page 1049); in *Parimala*, page 550, line 3; and in *S'ikhāmaṇi*, page 303. Commenting on *Manu* viii. 105, where certain offerings are directed to be made to Sarasvatī, Kullūka decides that, in accordance with the *kapinjala-nyāya* three are sufficient. The nyāya is clearly of the type of सकृत्कृते कृतः शास्त्रार्थः and in accord with the Marāṭhī phrase शास्त्रापुरता.

कंबलनिर्णेजनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the cleansing of a coarse blanket* [by beating it on the feet, and so dusting them at the same time]! One of the numerous examples of the accomplishment of two objects by one operation:—"killing two birds with one stone." It is found in S'abara 2. 2. 25:—"अपि च दधि उभयमसमर्थं कर्तुं फलं साधयितुं होमं च। ननु कंबलनिर्णेजनवदेतद्भविष्यति। निर्णेजनं हि उभयं करोति। कंबलशुद्धिं पादयोश्च निर्मलताम्" ॥ The कंबल (the कांबळ of the Marāṭhas) is made of extremely coarse and rough material, and

generally black or black and grey. In the case of the very poor, it is often their sole garment by day as well as their only covering at night.

करिबृंहितन्यायः ॥

The nyāya of *the trumpeting of an elephant.* The word करि is really redundant, since the whole meaning is conveyed by बृंहित alone—बृंहितं करिगर्जितमित्यमरः—but the addition, in this and similiar cases, is made for some special purpose. Raghunātha defines it thus:—"विशिष्टवाचकानामपि पदानां सति पृथग्विशेषणवाचकपदसमवधाने विशेष्यमात्रपरतायां करिबृंहितन्यायः प्रवर्तते." This principle may be exemplified by the following verse from *Kāvyaprakās'a* vii. 10:—

"सौन्दर्यसम्पत्तारुण्यं यस्यास्ते ते च विभ्रमाः ।
षट्पदान्पुष्पमालेव कान्ताकर्षति सा सखे" ॥

Here the author of the *Kāvyapradīpa* remarks (page 295):—"मालाशब्दो यद्यपि पुष्पस्यैव स्रजि शक्तस्तथापि न पुष्पपदमपुष्टार्थम् । लक्षणयोत्कृष्टत्वप्रतिपादकत्वात् । अयमेव करिबृंहितन्यायः." So too, the *Udāharaṇacandrikā*:—"अत्र निरुपपदान्मालाशब्दादेव पुष्पस्रक्प्रतीतेः पुष्पपदमुत्कृष्टपुष्पत्वे संक्रमितवाच्यम् । एवमेव करिबृंहितादिष्वपि बोध्यम्."

The following additional nyāyas are cited by Raghunātha as belonging to the same class:—गजघटान्याय, नीलेन्दीवरन्याय, पर्वताधित्यकान्याय, पर्वतोपत्यकान्याय, वाजिमन्दुरान्याय, मृगवागुरान्याय. In each case the first word might be omitted without affecting the meaning.

कलञ्जन्यायः ॥

The law of [abstention from] *the flesh of an animal killed with a poisoned arrow.* "Some hold the Kalanja to be the flesh of a deer killed by a poisoned arrow; others, hemp or bhang;

others, a kind of garlic." (Cowell's note on page 81 of his translation of *Kusumānjali*). But this can hardly be correct as the garlic and bhang are mentioned in addition. It may be noticed, however, that ताम्रकूट is given as an equivalent of कलञ्ज, the meaning of which is the tobacco plant. It is deduced from Jaimini 6. 2. 19, 20,—an adhikaraṇa designed to teach the evil result of doing forbidden things. The words "न कलञ्जं भक्षयितव्यं न लशुनं न गृञ्जनं च" are discussed, and the question arises as to whether this is an instance of पर्युदास or of प्रतिषेध,—whether it means अभक्षणं कर्तव्यं or भक्षणं न कर्तव्यम्. The subtle intellect of the Mīmāṁsaka sees a great difference between these two, the former being something to be done, and the latter being something to be avoided! The siddhāntin decides in favour of the latter. I would advise my readers to study pages 39-41 of Dr. Thibaut's excellent translation of *Arthasangraha*, in order to get, if possible, a clear understanding of this peculiar tenet. Many years ago, when in India, I heard a statement made by a Brahman, to the effect that the words "put no oil in the lamp," did not mean "don't put oil in the lamp," but rather "put in the lamp" some "no-oil"; in other words, it was not a prohibition of an act but an injunction to do something! This is just the position of the Mīmāṁsaka, who, in regard to the rule that a Snātaka must not look at the rising or setting sun, says that "not-looking is something to be done." The above nyāya is quoted by Ânandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 4. 28, and 4. 1. 13, and is found in *Sankṣepas'ārīraka*, i. 417-420, and in *S'rībhāṣya* 1. 1. 4 (page 687).

कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम् ॥

Like the erection of a temple including the pot-shaped finial [which is placed on the summit at its completion]. Used ironically of one who considers that he is doing something as meritorious as the building of a complete temple.

In a footnote to page 73 of his translation of *Prabandha-cintāmaṇi*, Mr. Tawney says:—"Dr. Burgess informs me that *kalaśa* is really the finial of the spire, which is shaped like a vase or urn." Then, on page 135, there is the following foot-note:—"Mr. Cousens writes in a letter, which Dr. Burgess has kindly shown me, 'I understand that the term *kalaśadaṇḍa-pratiṣṭhā* refers solely to the setting up of the *kalaśa* or pot-finial, the *daṇḍa* being the pole or stick which supports the finial and upon which it is set up. With a small *kalaśa* made solid, it would not be required, the neck of the same taking its place, but it is always required with the larger and more com-plex *kalaśas*, especially those made of hollow metal." Fre-quent mention is made by Merutunga of the erection of a कलश and ध्वज as the completion of a temple. The two are mentioned on pages 119 and 211, whilst on pages 219 and 222 we have the कलशदण्डप्रतिष्ठा referred to above. On pages 120 and 224, the कलश is mentioned alone. In Hemacandra's *Pariśiṣṭapar-van* i. 14, we find कुंभ for कलश—"तत्र चैत्येषु सौवर्णध्वजकुम्भमरीचयः".
The illustration occurs in S'ārngadhara's ṭīkā on Udayana's definition of *dravya* in his *Lakṣaṇāvali* (page 4). The definition is— " तत्र गुणात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणं द्रव्यम् ," and, whilst explaining it, the commentator attacks the views of Citsukha Muni as follows:—"यत्त्वत्र तत्त्वप्रदीपिकाकारेणोत्पत्त्यनन्तरक्षणे अव्याप्ति-मुद्भाव्य गुणवत्त्वात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वे च परिहारमाशंक्योत्पत्त्यनन्तरक्षण-विशिष्टे कदाचिदपि गुणानुदयात्पुनरव्याप्तेस्तदवस्थत्वान्नैवमिति परिहृतम् । तत्कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम्." It is necessary here to bear in mind the tenet of the logicians—" उत्पन्नं द्रव्यं क्षणमगुणं तिष्ठति. " The *Tattvapradīpikā*, better known as *Citsukhī*, is described by Hall as "a confutation of the Nyāya philosophy, on the basis of the Vedānta." The wrath of the logicians would of course, therefore, be kindled against it. The passage complained of above is the s'loka ii. 4 with the vṛitti. The former stands thus:—"अव्याप्तेरप्यतिव्याप्तेर्द्रव्यं नैव गुणाश्रयः । आद्ये क्षणे गुणाभावाद्गुणा-दावपि वीक्षणात्."

काकदधिघातकन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a crow as a destroyer of curds.* An example of *upalakṣaṇa*, where one represents many, or a part stands for the whole. So if any one were warned to keep the crows off the curds, it would imply that all other possible raiders were also to be warded off. It is thus put by Bhartṛihari in *Vākyapadīya* ii. 314:—

"काकेभ्यो रक्ष्यतां सर्पिरिति बालोऽपि चोदितः।
उपघातपरे वाक्ये न श्वादिभ्यो न रक्षति" ॥

This is reproduced, with slight variations, in *Tantravārtika*, page 731, and is quoted in the same form in *Bhāmatī* 1. 4. 3 (page 287). Raghunātha's application of it is as follows:— "तदुक्तमीश्वरगीतायाम्। 'ये त्विमं विष्णुमव्यक्तं मां च देवं महेश्वरम्। एकीभावेन पश्यन्ति न तेषां पुनरुद्भवः' इति। अत्र हरिहरयोर्ग्रहणं काकदधिघातकन्यायेन विधेरप्युपलक्षणम्". The *Īs'varagītā* forms part of the uttarabhāga of the *Kūrma Purāṇa*, and the verse here quoted is xi. 8. In the fourth chapter of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (page 285) this is given as an example of *Jahadajahallakṣaṇā*. "जहदजहल्लक्षणोदाहरणं तु काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतामित्यादिकमेव। तत्र शक्यकाकपरित्यागेनाशक्यदध्युपघातकत्वपुरस्कारेणाकाके काके च काकशब्दस्य प्रवृत्तेः" ॥ This kind of *lakṣaṇā* is termed *bhāgalakṣaṇā* in *Vedāntasāra* 23; and *bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā* in *Vivaraṇaprameya*, page 229. In the ग्रहैकत्वन्याय, too, a part represents the whole.

काकाधिकरणत्वन्यायः ॥

The being *something on which a crow is perched.* This illustration seems to have originated with Patanjali, and is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 26 (vārtikas 3 and 4):—"अनुबन्धोऽन्यत्वकर इति चेत्तन्न। किं कारणम्। लोपात्। लुप्यतेऽत्रानुबन्धः। लुप्तेऽत्रानुबन्धे नान्यत्वं भविष्यति। तद्यथा। कतरद्देवदत्तस्य गृहम्। अदो यत्रासौ

काक इति । उत्पतिते काके नष्टं तद्गृहं भवति । एवमिहापि लुप्तेऽनुबन्धे नष्टः प्रत्ययो भवति । यद्यपि लुप्यते जानाति त्वसौ सानुबन्धकस्येयं संज्ञा कृतेति । तद्यथा । इतरत्रापि कतरद्देवदत्तस्य गृहम् । अदो यत्रासौ काक इति । उत्पतिते काके यद्यपि नष्टं तद्गृहं भवत्यन्ततस्तमुद्देशं जानाति."

It occurs in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* (page 195) in the course of a discussion on Bādarāyaṇa's second sūtra:—"ततः कारणसंबन्धिनो जन्मादेरलक्षणत्वमिति चेन्मैवम् । काकाधिकरणत्ववदुपपत्तेः । काकाधिकरणत्वं हि न गृहेऽन्तर्भवति । तथा च सति काकविगमे गृहैकदेशभङ्गबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । अतो गृहस्याधिकरणत्वं नामौपाधिको धर्मः स च परिशेषाल्लक्षणे एवान्तर्भवति । तन्निरूपकस्य काकस्य यथा लक्षणत्वं तथा ब्रह्मणोऽपि कारणत्वमौपाधिको धर्मो लक्षणान्तःपाती." Similarly in *Sankṣepas'ārīraka* i. 206:—"यत्रैप काक इदमेव तु देवदत्तवेश्मेति लाक्षणिकवृत्तिरिहाभ्युपेता । काकास्पदत्वमवधीर्य तथापि वेश्ममात्राकृतिर्भवति लाक्षणिकी तु बुद्धिः" ॥ With slight modifications it is found also in *Tantravārtika*, page 277, line 8:—"यथानभिधीयमानमपि काकनिलयनं देवदत्तगृहशब्दस्य स्वार्थमभिदधतश्चिह्नभूततां प्रतिपद्यते तद्वदाकृतिश्चिह्नं व्यक्त्यभिधाने भविष्यति." See, also, *Khaṇḍana.*, page 502.

काचिन्निषादी पुत्रं प्रसूते कश्चिन्निषादस्तु कषायपायी ॥

A Niṣādī gives birth to a son, and a Niṣāda drinks the decoction of herbs [prepared for her]! For the context of this आभाणक see under "मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते."

काण्डानुसमयन्यायः ॥

The law relating to "the performance of all prescribed acts of ritual in orderly succession for a particular object before performing the same acts in the same order for a second object." This is Sir Monier-Williams' definition based on the commentary on Âs'valāyana's *Grihyasūtra* 1. 24. 7 which prescribes certain gifts commencing with विष्टर and ending with गो. The

commentator says "ऋत्विजां मधुपर्कदाने द्वे गती संभवतः। पदार्थानुसमयः काण्डानुसमय इति । तत्र पदार्थानुसमयो नाम सर्वेषां वरणक्रमेण विष्टरं दत्त्वा ततः पाद्यं ततोऽर्घ्यमिति । काण्डानुसमयो नाम एकस्यैव विष्टरादिगोनिवेदनान्तं समाप्य ततोऽन्यस्य सर्वं. ततोऽन्यस्येति." In a case of this kind, where there is merely a bestowal of gifts, and not the performance of sacrificial ritual, the definition given by Molesworth is more suitable:—"The order, when a suit or set of things is to be given to each individual of a multitude, *of giving at once* all the articles composing the suit or set, as distinguished from पदार्थानुसमय."

The nyāya represents the purport of Jaimini 5. 2. 3. Kunte says that the word अभ्यावृत्ति used in the sūtra means *kāṇḍānusamaya.* His notes on sūtras 1–3 contain some very interesting items of information, of especial value to us of the West. See पदार्थानुसमयन्याय, below.

कुल्याप्रणयनन्यायः ॥

The figure of *the laying down of a water-course for irrigation.* An example of a thing made for one purpose subserving other purposes also. It is found in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha,* page 118, line 9:—"अतो न विधेयप्रत्यये तात्पर्यमिति कुल्याप्रणयनन्यायेनोभयार्थत्वाविधेयत्वात् । यथा शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते ताभ्य एव पानीयं च पीयते तद्वत् ॥"

For the source of this nyāya, see अन्यार्थं प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति.

कूटकार्षापणन्यायः ॥

The simile of [the unwitting employment of] *base money* [in one's business]. It is used by Kumārila (in *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 3, page 95) in the course of an argument on the relative value of S'ruti and Smṛiti. He maintains that if any teaching of the latter is found to be in opposition to that of the former, it must be given up; just as a man who finds that he has been

using counterfeit coins must at once abstain from so doing. The portion containing the nyāya is as follows:—"यो हि कूटकार्षापणेन कंचित्कालमज्ञो लोकमध्ये व्यवहरति न तेन विवेकज्ञानजनितव्युत्पत्तिनापि तथैव व्यवहर्तव्यम्."

In *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 8 (page 149, line 3 from bottom), Kumārila compares words to coins which can be tested by intelligent people. He says:—"शब्दापभ्रंशवदेव गौणभ्रान्त्यादिप्रयोगनिमित्ता अर्थापभ्रंशा भवन्ति ते शास्त्रस्थैरेवाविप्लुतार्थक्रियानिमित्तपुण्यार्थिभिः शक्यन्ते साध्वसाधुकार्षापणमध्यादिव तत्परीक्षिभिर्विवेक्तुम्."

The nyāya is found in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 162, as follows:—"नापि बाधकाभावपरिच्छेदात्प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः स हि तात्कालिको वा स्यात्कालान्तरभावी वा। तात्कालिको न पर्याप्तः प्रामाण्यपरिनिश्चये। कूटकार्षापणादौ किंचित्कालमनुत्पन्नबाधकेऽपि कालान्तरे तदुत्पाददर्शनात्." It occurs again on page 169, line 3, on page 187, line 4 from bottom, and on page 531, line 1.

कूपखानकन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the well-digger*. It is applied by Raghunātha as follows:—"यथा कूपखानके पतितं पंकादि कूपान्निःसृतेनाम्भसा प्रक्षाल्यते तथा तत्तद्विग्रहावच्छिन्नेशभेदबुद्धिजो दोषस्तदुपासनाजन्यसुकृतमहिम्नोत्पन्नेनाद्वैतबोधेन समूलं निवर्त्यत इति ज्ञेयम्॥" The illustration is as old as Patanjali who made use of it in the introductory chapter of the *Mahābhāṣya* (vol. i. page 11) when discoursing on the importance of the study of grammar, and on the merit which accrues to the user of correct words. He says:—"अथवाभ्युपाय एवापशब्दज्ञानं शब्दज्ञाने। योऽपशब्दाञ्जानाति शब्दानप्यसौ जानाति। तदेवं ज्ञाने धर्म इति ब्रुवतोऽर्थादापन्नं भवत्यपशब्दज्ञानपूर्वके शब्दज्ञाने धर्म इति। अथवा कूपखानकवदेतद्भविष्यति। तद्यथा कूपखानकः कूपं खनन्यद्यपि मृदा पांसुभिश्चावकीर्णो भवति सोऽप्सु संजातासु तत एव तं गुणमासादयति येन स च दोषो निर्हण्यते भूयसा चाभ्युदयेन योगो भवत्येवमिहापि यद्यप्यपशब्दज्ञानेऽधर्मस्तथापि यस्त्वसौ शब्दज्ञाने धर्मस्तेन स च दोषो निर्घानिष्यते भूयसा चाभ्युदयेन योगो भविष्यति."

कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षा ॥

This is identical in meaning with मुण्डितशिरोनक्षत्रान्वेषणम् for which see the Second Handful. It occurs in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 164:—"अनिश्चितप्रामाण्यस्य तु प्रवृत्तौ पश्चात्तन्निर्णयो भवन्नपि कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षावदफल एवेत्युक्तम्." Lower down on the same page, there is another nyāya of similar import, in the following verse:—

"समर्थकारणज्ञानाद्योऽपि प्रामाण्यनिश्चयम् ।
ब्रूते सोऽपि कृतोद्वाहस्तत्र लग्नं परीक्षते." ॥

कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसम्प्रत्ययः ॥

The rule that "whenever it may appear doubtful whether an operation has reference to that which is expressed by the technical or to that which is expressed by the ordinary meaning of a particular term, the operation refers (only) to that which is expressed by the technical meaning of the term in question." This is Professor Kielhorn's rendering of the nyāya as quoted in Nāgojibhaṭṭa's vṛitti to Paribhāṣā ix:—"ननु संख्याग्रहणे बह्वादीनामेव ग्रहणं स्यात्प्रकरणस्याभिधानियामकत्वसिद्धात्कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति न्यायात्" ॥ It is taken from the Mahābhāṣya where it appears several times. In 1. 1. 23 (vārt. 3), it is followed by the example "लोके गोपालकमानय कटजकमानयेति यस्यैषा संज्ञा भवति स आनीयते न यो गाः पालयति यो वा कटे जातः". Siradeva includes it in his collection of paribhāṣās.

केवलैर्वचनैर्निर्धनाधमर्णिक इव साधून् भ्रामयन् ॥

Like an impecunious debtor deceiving the money-lenders with empty promises. This occurs in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 20, as follows:—"अवस्तुत्वादिति चेन्नन्वेतदपि कुतः सिद्धम् । सर्वसामर्थ्यविरहादिति चेत्सोऽयमितस्ततः केवलैर्वचनैर्निर्धनाधमर्णिक इव साधून्भ्रामयन्परस्पराश्रयदोषमपि न पश्यति".

क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्तु ॥

Action may vary, but substance cannot. This is plainly set forth in *S'ānkarabhāṣya* 1. 1. 2 (page 37) as follows:—"कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म। यथाश्वेन गच्छति पद्भ्यामन्यथा वा न वा गच्छतीति।......न तु वस्त्वेवं नैवमस्ति नास्तीति वा विकल्प्यते". Similarly in 2. 1. 27 (page 471):—"क्रियाविषये हि...... विकल्पाश्रयणं ......इह तु विकल्पाश्रयणेनापि न विरोधपरिहारः संभवत्यपुरुषतन्त्रत्वाद्वस्तुनः".

Then, in Ānandagiri's comment on 1. 4, 1 (page 325), we find the expression क्रियायामिव वस्तुनि-विकल्पाभावात्," and on page 359, "न हि वस्तुनि विकल्पोऽस्ति." It occurs also on the first page of the Rāmānuja chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"न च सदसत्त्वयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोः समुच्चयासंभवे विकल्पः किं न स्यादिति वादितव्यं क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्त्विति न्यायात्." "Nor should any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why should there not be an alternation between existence and non-existence, there being the rule that it is action, not *Ens*, that alternates?" This rendering is Professor Gough's. The nyāya is found, too, in *S'āstradīpikā* 1. 3. 8 (page 154, line 6), and *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* iii. 82.

क्रोष्टुः क्व च नीराजना ॥

What connection has a camel with the lustration of arms? None at all; and the phrase is used to indicate that certain things are not connected. The नीराजनाविधि (as described in chapter 267 of the Agni Purāṇa) was a ceremony performed by kings or generals before going forth to battle, and consisted of the purification of the component parts of the army, including that of the horses, the elephants, and the weapons The वाजिनीराजनाविधि is mentioned in *Raghuvaṁs'a* iv. 25, on

which Mallinātha remarks:—"वाजिग्रहणं गजादीनामप्युपलक्षणं तेषामपि नीराजनाविधानात्." The illustration appears in *Upamiti-bhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 522:—"नद्यादिवस्तुभेदार्थं कथितं मे कथानकम् । त्वयेदं तत्र मे भाति क्वोष्ट्रो नीराजना क्व च" ॥

क्षते क्षारमिव ॥

Like salt on a wound. "क्षारं क्षते क्षिप् has become proverbial, and means 'to aggravate the pain which is already unbearable,' 'to make bad worse,' 'to add insult to injury'." (Āpṭe's Dictionary). He cites *Uttararāmacarita* iv. 7:—"य एव मे जनपूर्वमासीन्मूर्त्तो महोत्सवः । क्षते क्षारमिवासह्यं जातं तस्यैव दर्शनम्." Also *Mṛicchakaṭika* V. 18. I have met with it again in *Upamiti-bhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 5, verse 42:—"कथां कामार्थयोस्तस्मान्न कुर्वीत कदाचन । कः क्षते क्षारनिक्षेपं विदधीत विचक्षणः" ॥ There is another example on page 993 of the same.

गर्गशतदण्डनन्यायः ॥

The figure of *the infliction of a fine of one hundred on the Gargas.* There are two paribhāṣās which are frequently found together in the Mahābhāṣya, *viz.* "प्रत्येकं वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः" and "समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः." Professor Kielhorn (in his translation of Nāgojībhaṭṭa) renders them (the latter slightly modified) thus:—"What is stated (in grammar of several things) must be understood (to have been stated) of each of them separately." And "sometimes (it) also (happens that what is stated in grammar of several things) must be understood (to have been stated) of all of them collectively." Patanjali's illustration of the former is "देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्रा भोज्यन्ताम्," where, of course, each separate person is to be fed; and his illustration of the latter is "गर्गाः शतं दण्ड्यन्ताम्" where the Gargas collectively are to be fined a hundred. The passages where these occur are 1. 1. 1 (vārt. 12); 1. 1. 7 (vārt. 1); 2. 1. 4; 2. 3. 46; 6. 1. 5 (vārt. 2); 8. 3. 58; and 8. 4. 2 (vārt. 3).

The two paribhāṣās and examples are quoted by S'abara on Jaimini 3. 1. 12 (page 223), and the second one is referred to as follows by Kumārila in his vārtika on the same passage (page 712):—" पुरः पुनराह सत्यमेष न दोष इति। क्रियाप्राधान्ये तु तद्व-शीकृतविशेषणसमुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः। गर्गशतदण्डनहोमाभिषवभक्षवदिति परिहारः। न तु दण्डस्य दण्ड्यसंस्कारत्वाद्भोजनादिवत्प्रतिगर्गमावृत्तिः प्राप्नोति। नैष दोषः।

शारीरो निग्रहो यत्र तत्र प्रत्येकभिन्नता।
हिरण्यादानदण्डस्तु समुदाये समाप्यते" ॥

This paribhāṣâ occurs also in *Tantravārtika* 1. 4. 3 (page 294, line 15), and in 1. 4. 8 (page 300); whilst the former one is quoted in 1. 4. 18 (page 314).

गर्तस्थमृतसर्पन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a snake lying dead in a hole.* It is employed by Vijnāna Bhikṣu (in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1. 1. 2, page 36) when explaining the line " प्राक्सृष्टेः प्रलयादूर्ध्वं नासीत्किंचिद्द्विजोत्तम " from the *Nārasiṃha Purāṇa.* He says " नासीदिति विरतव्यापारतया कारणरूपेण गर्तस्थमृतसर्पवद्विलीनमासीदित्यर्थः ॥" Again, on page 96 of the same:—" एवं सर्वत्र तां च प्रकृतिं गुणत्रयरूपिणीं नित्यामपि निर्व्यापारतया गर्तस्थमृतसर्पवत्करणकारणविविक्ते चिन्मात्रे विलापयन्ति." On the next page we have it again, in a similar connection, as मृतसर्पवत्.

गार्हपत्यन्यायः ॥

The rule as to the [application to the] *Gārhapatya-fire* [of a mantra in which reference is made to Indra]. This represents Mīmāṃsāsūtras 3. 2. 3, 4 where the Vedic mantra " निवेशनः सङ्गमनो वसूनामित्यैन्द्र्या गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठते" is discussed. The question is raised whether, since the mantra makes mention of Indra, the adoration is addressed to him or to the Gārhapatya (one

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of the three sacred fires perpetually maintained by a householder, and from which fires for sacrificial purposes are lighted). Jaimini's decision is in favour of the latter on the ground that direct enunciation (*s'ruti*) is stronger than suggestive power (*linga*). The following extract from *Arthasangraha* page 6, with Dr. Thibaut's translation (page 11), will explain this:—"सेयं श्रुतिर्लिङ्गादिभ्यः प्रबला।...अत एव ऐन्द्र्या लिङ्गान्नेन्द्रोपस्थानार्थत्वम्। किंतु ऐन्द्र्या गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठत इत्यत्र गार्हपत्यमिति द्वितीयाश्रुत्या गार्हपत्योपस्थानार्थत्वम्." "Direct enuniciation is stronger than suggestive power and the other proofs (by which one thing is shown to be subsidiary to another); ...for this reason we do not conclude at once on the ground of suggestive power that a verse (apparently) addressed to Indra (that is, a verse containing a mention of Indra's name, or one of his attributes &c.) is really to be used for addressing Indra; but rather decide if we find at the same time a direct enunciation as, for instance, 'with a verse bearing Indra's mark he addresses the Gārhapatya', that in consequence of the direct enunciation of the second case termination (Gārhapatyam) the verse is subsidiary to the act of addressing the Gārhapatya-fire." The words "निवेशनः सङ्गमनो वसूनाम्", which, amongst other places, are found in the *Atharvasamhitā* x. 8. 42, are rendered by Professor Whitney "The reposer, the assembler of good things"; and by Mr. Griffith, "Luller to rest, and gatherer up of treasures." As quoted in *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa* 7. 2. 1. 20, Prof. Eggeling translates it "The harbourer and gatherer of riches"! Who shall decide between these learned doctors? The Gārhapatyanyāya is explained and applied in *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 25 (page 613), and in other works on Vedānta. Owing to the word ऐन्द्री in sūtra 3, the adhikaraṇa is sometimes styled ऐन्द्रीन्याय.

गोदोहनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the milk-pail.* It is laid down that a sacrificer who wishes for cattle must bring the water for his sacrifice in a milk-pail. But that is not done in other cases. The *godohana* is therefore used as an illustration of something which is *occasionally*, and not universally, connected with an act or performance as an essential part of it. It occurs in *S'ānkarabhaṣya* 3. 3. 42, as follows:—"सन्ति कर्माङ्गव्यपाश्रयाणि विज्ञानानि 'ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत' इत्येवमादीनि । किं तानि नित्यान्येव स्युः कर्मसु पर्णमयीत्वादिवदुतानित्यानि गोदोहनादिवदिति विचारयामः". Then, at the close of the same:—"तस्माद्यथा क्रत्वाश्रयाण्यपि गोदोहनादीनि फलसंयोगादनित्यान्येवमुद्गीथाद्युपासनानीत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्." It appears again in 3. 3. 65; 3. 4. 45, and in 4. 1. 6. Sures'vara quotes it also in his vārtika on the *Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3. 3. 51:—"न च गोदोहनन्यायः काम्यकर्मसु युज्यते । तेषां मुक्तिफलत्वे हि न मानं विद्यते यतः" ॥

For the mantra regarding the use of this pail, see S'abara and *Nyāyamālāvistara* on Jaimini 4. 1. 2. Other references to the nyāya are *Tantravārtika* 3. 6. 43 (page 1118); and *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 166, line 4, in connection with which a verse is quoted from *S'lokavārtika* (page 63) where mention is made of the *godohana*. Kunte's long note on the sūtra of Jaimini referred to above will be found useful.

गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसम्प्रत्ययः ॥

When a word has both a primary and a secondary meaning, an operation takes effect (only) *when the word conveys its primary meaning.* This is an abridgment of Professor Kielhorn's rendering of Nāgojibhaṭṭa's fifteenth *paribhāṣā*; and the following extracts from the *vṛitti* may help to explain it:—"A word which is employed in a secondary sense is so

employed (only) because (the character of that which it denotes in) its primary sense is ascribed (to that which it denotes in a secondary sense)." "For example, the word गो 'ox' conveys the secondary meaning 'one who is only fit for bearing burdens, an unintelligent person,' because (such a person has) certain qualities such as stupidity &c. (in common with an ox)".

The nyāya appears in the above form in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 15, and 6. 3. 46; but in 1. 4. 108, and in 8. 3. 82, the word कार्य is omitted. In this shortened form it is quoted by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 2. 13 (page 185), and 1. 3. 14 (page 246). Then in 4. 3. 12, S'ankara says "परं हि ब्रह्म ब्रह्मशब्दस्य मुख्यमालंबनं गौणमपरम् । मुख्यगौणयोश्च मुख्ये संप्रत्ययो भवति". In *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 346, line 3, we read:—"ननु सन्दिग्धं वस्तु प्रायदर्शनान्निर्णीयते । गौणमुख्यग्रहणविषये च मुख्ये सम्प्रत्ययः".

In S'abara's bhāṣya on Jamini 3. 2. 1 (which deals with the *Barhirnyāya*) we have a very interesting discussion on गौण and मुख्य, in the course of which he says "नह्यनभिधाय मुख्यं गौणमभिवदति शब्दः". The conclusion arrived at is thus expressed:—"तस्मान्मुख्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये कार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति सिद्धम्."

ग्रहैकत्वन्यायः ॥

The illustration furnished by [the mention of the washing of] *one cup only.* This is the title of the adhikaraṇa comprising Mīmāṃsāsūtras 3. 1. 13-15 in which the passage relating to the cleansing of the soma-cups is discussed. The direction given is "दशापवित्रेण ग्रहं संमार्ष्टि", "he cleanses the cup with a fringed filtering-cloth." But there are many such *grahas* in use; is only one of them to be washed? The decision is that all may be cleansed; and this, according to Mādhava (who is closely followed by Kṛishṇa Yajvan in the *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*), is

because one represents the whole, and also on the ground of the rule that "a subordinate act is to be repeated in the case of each principal thing." The cup is here the 'principal,' and the act of cleansing is 'subordinate,' and is therefore to be repeated until each one has been cleansed. The passage stands thus in the *Nyāyamālāvistara*:—" ग्रहमिति द्वितीयया ग्रहस्योद्देश्यतया प्रयोजनवत्तया च प्राधान्यं गम्यते । ग्रहं प्रति गुणः संमार्गः । 'प्रति प्रधानं च गुण आवर्तनीय इति* न्यायेन यावन्तो ग्रहाः सन्ति ते संमार्जनीयाः" ॥

Kumārila explains this in the following kārikā of *Tantravārtika* 3. 1. 14:—

"व्यक्तीरुद्दिश्य यत्कर्म स्वजात्याद्युपलक्षिताः ।
विहितं गुणभावेन तत्सर्वार्थं प्रतीयते"

For further applications of the nyāya by him, see pages 339 (line 4 from bottom) and 551 (line 13). For its use outside the Mīmāṃsā, see *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 287, line 4; and *Vedāntas'ikhāmaṇi*, page 120. The grammarian Nāges'a-bhaṭṭa, too, in his exposition of Kaiyaṭa on 1. 1. 14 (page 319) writes thus:—"ग्रहं संमार्ष्टीत्यादौ तु ग्रहार्थत्वात्संमार्गस्य ग्रहस्य प्राधान्यमिति न तद्गतसंख्या विवक्षितेति भावः" ॥ See, too, Kaiyaṭa on the closing part of Patanjali 1. 1. 69 (vol. i. p. 169 *b* of Benares edition; or page 450 (column 1) of the Nirṇayasāgar edition of 1908).

ग्राव्णि रेखेव ॥

Like a delineation on stone. Used of something unalterably fixed. "तन्मां वज्रकुमाराय सम्प्रदत्तान्यथा तु मे । मरणं शरणं तात ग्राव्णि रेखेव गीरियम्." *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* xii. 275. Compare Job's words (xix. 23):—"Oh that my words were now written ......that with an iron pen and lead they were graven in the rock for ever."

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* For this, see below.

चन्दनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *Sandal-oil.* Bādarāyaṇa uses this as an illustration in sūtras 2. 3. 23, 24. As the application of a drop of the oil to one part of the body produces a pleasant sensation in the whole of it, so soul, abiding in one part, namely in the heart, is yet perceived as present in the entire frame. S'ankara's exposition of the former sūtra is as follows:—

"यथा हरिचन्दनबिन्दुः शरीरैकदेशसंबद्धोऽपि सन्सकलदेहव्यापिनमाह्लादं करोत्येवमात्मापि देहैकदेशस्थः सकलदेहव्यापिनीमुपलब्धिं करिष्यति । त्वक्संबन्धाच्चास्य सकलशरीरगता वेदना न विरुध्यते । त्वगात्मनोर्हि संबन्धः कृत्स्नायां त्वचि वर्तते । त्वक्च कृत्स्नशरीरव्यापिनीति".

चित्राङ्गनान्यायः ॥

The simile of *a woman in a picture.* An illustration of that which has only an appearance of reality. Raghunātha connects with this the चित्रानलन्याय and चित्रामृतन्याय, and, in his larger work, भगवान्वसिष्ठः is quoted as follows:—"चित्रामृतं नामृतमेव विद्धि चित्रानलं नानलमेव विद्धि । चित्राङ्गना नूनमनङ्गनेति वाचाविवेकस्त्वविवेक एवेति". Like his other quotations from Vasiṣṭha, this, too, is from the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, where it stands as verse 4. 18. 69. Others of a like nature are 4. 1. 11 and 12:—"चित्रोद्यानमिवोत्फुल्लमरसं सरसाकृति । प्रकाशमपि निस्तेजश्चित्रार्कानलवत्स्थितम् ॥ अनुभूतं मनोराज्यमिवासत्यमवास्तवम् । चित्रपद्माकर इव सारसौगन्ध्यवर्जितम्" ॥ Also 6. 57. 28:—"चित्राग्निदाहो विज्ञातो यथा दाह्येषु निष्फलः । तथाहंभावसर्गादि ज्ञातं निष्फलतामियात्" ॥

छायापिशाचीन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *a shadow mistaken for a she-goblin!* It is found in Nṛisiṃhasarasvati's commentary on the last section of the *Vedāntasāra*, as follows:—"नन्वप्राप्तस्य क्रियासाध्यस्य

वस्तुनो विद्यमानानर्थनिवृत्तेश्च पुरुषार्थत्वं दृष्टमत्र तदभावात्कथं पुरुषार्थत्वमिति चेन्न तयोरेव पुरुषार्थत्वमिति नियमाभावात्स्वच्छायायामारोपितरक्षसो विस्मृतकण्ठगतचामीकरस्य भ्रान्तपुरुषस्याप्तवाक्येन तयोर्निवृत्त्याप्त्योरपि पुरुषार्थत्वदृष्टेः। अत्र संग्रहः। 'आत्माज्ञानमलं निरस्तममलं प्राप्तं च तत्त्वं परं कण्ठस्थाभरणादिवद्भ्रमवशाच्छायापिशाची यथा। आप्तोक्त्याप्तिनिवृत्तिवच्छ्रुतिशिरोवाक्याद्गुरोरुत्थिताद्ध्वस्तध्वान्तनिरासतः परसुखं प्राप्तं तयोरुच्यत' इति॥

जलतुंबिकान्यायः॥

The simile of *a gourd in water.* The idea is that of a gourd, thickly covered with mud, and therefore sinking in the water, but gradually resuming its buoyancy as the mud is washed off. The Digambara Jains use the figure to illustrate the release of the soul from the encumbrance of the body. Raghunātha puts it thus:—"यथा पंकलिप्ता तुंबिका नदीसमुद्रादौ मज्जन्ती पंके क्षीणेऽवकाश आगत्य तिष्ठति तथा जीवो देहादिपंके क्षीणेऽलोकाकाशे गत्वा तिष्ठति। अयमेव तस्य मोक्ष इति दिगम्बराः। इति जलतुंबिकान्यायः" ॥

This description, without mention of the nyāya, is found in very similar language in the Jaina chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 48 of Jīvānanda's edition), and also in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, for which see the पञ्जरमुक्तपक्षिन्याय below. The former passage is as follows:—"यथा वा मृत्तिकालेपकृतमलाबुद्रव्यं जलेऽधःपतति पुनरपेतमृत्तिकाबन्धमूर्ध्वं गच्छति तथा कर्मरहित आत्मा असङ्गत्वादूर्ध्वं गच्छति बन्धच्छेदादेरण्डबीजवच्चोर्ध्वगतिस्वभावाच्चाग्निशिखावत्." The figure of the castor-oil seed is found in the *Parimala* passage also. The term अलोकाकाश which appears in Raghunātha's definition, is the name of a subdivision of one of the five categories (*astikāya*) of the Jaina system. It is explained as follows by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 33 (page 563):—"आकाशास्तिकायो द्वेधा लौकिकाकाशोऽलौकिकाकाशश्च। लोकानामन्तर्वर्ती लोकाकाशः। तदुपरि मोक्षस्थानमलोकाकाशः". This is

referred to in a verse quoted by Mādhava in the immediate context of the passage already cited from the *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, namely :—"गत्वा गत्वा निवर्तन्ते चन्द्रसूर्यादयो ग्रहाः । अद्यापि न निवर्तन्ते त्वालोकाकाशमागताः" ॥ Professor Cowell's rendering is:—"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, moon, and the rest; but never to this day have returned any who have gone to Ālokākās'a." This should of course be Alokākās'a, as the long vowel includes the preposition आ 'up to,' 'as far as,' "those who have *reached* Alokākās'a" (आ अलोकाकाशम्).

जातेष्टिन्यायः ॥

The law regarding *the oblation on the birth of a son.* This is the subject of Jaimini 4. 3. 38, 39. The question arises whether the offering is for the benefit of the father or the son (तत्र सन्देहः किमात्मनिःश्रेयसाय उत पुत्रनिःश्रेयसाय), and the answer is that it benefits the latter. In the commentary on *Lakṣaṇāvali* this is applied as follows:—"नहि चैत्रानुष्ठिताग्निहोत्रजनितमपूर्वं चैत्रसमवेतं मैत्रं स्वर्गफलभागिनं कर्तुमुत्सहते । पुत्रेष्टिपितृयज्ञवदेतत्स्यात् । न । तत्राप्यतिशयस्य पुत्रादिसमवेतत्वेनैवाभ्युपगमात्."

जामातृशुद्धिन्यायः ॥

The story of *the son-in-law's revision* [of a book]. This is the original of the Maraṭhī जांवईशोध which Molesworth defines as " A phrase, founded on a popular story, to express the examination of a piece of a composition by a shallow-witted fellow incapable of discerning its merit." The popular story, as given on pages 6-9 of Merutunga's *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, is to the effect that Vararuci, having been instructed by Vikramāditya to find a suitable husband for his daughter, the princess Priyangumanjarī, he in revenge for a supposed insult offered

him by her when his pupil, palmed off upon her an ignorant cowherd as a man of learning! The king accepted him, and he became his son-in-law. "In accordance with the advice of the paṇḍit, the herdsman preserved unbroken silence; but the princess, wishing to test his cleverness, entreated him to revise a newly-written book. He placed the book in the palm of his hand, and with a nail-parer proceeded to remove from the letters in it the dots and the oblique lines at the top indicating vowels, and thus to isolate them, and then the princess discovered that he was a cowherd. After that the 'son-in-law's revision' became a proverb everywhere." This quotation is from Mr. C. H. Tawney's admirable translation of Merutunga's work; the original being as follows:—"पण्डितोपदिष्टं सर्वथा मौनमेवालम्बमानो [महिषीपालः] राजकन्यकया तद्वैदग्ध्यजिज्ञासया नवलिखितपुस्तकस्य शोधनायोपरुद्धः । करतले पुस्तकं विन्यस्य तदक्षराणि बिन्दुमात्रारहितानि नखच्छेदिन्या केवलान्येव कुर्वन् राजपुत्र्या महिषीपाल एव निर्णीतः । ततःप्रभृति जामातृशुद्धिरिति सर्वतः प्रसिद्धिरभूत्."

In the subsequent part of the story we are informed that the cowherd eventually became the famous poet Kālidāsa! For a similar account from a Buddhist source, see *Indian Antiquary*, vol iv. page 103; also vol vii. page 116.

ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकम् ॥

Knowledge [of Brahma] *abolishes nothing but the ignorance* [which obscures that Impersonality]. This is a bit of Vedantism pure and simple, and has scant claims to a place amongst popular maxims. It is admitted solely because Raghunātha includes it in his list. His explanation is as follows:—"अस्मिंश्चाध्यासेऽज्ञानं कारणम् । तत्त्वज्ञानेन वातदीपन्यायेन तन्निवृत्तावस्नेहदीपन्यायेन तदध्यासोऽपि निवर्तते । न च ज्ञानेनैवोभयनिवृत्तिः कुतो न स्यात् । ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमिति न्यायविरोधात् । द्विविधा हि निवृत्तिः । विरोधिना सामग्रीनिवृत्त्या च । यथा वातादिना दीपनाशो यथा च तैलवर्त्त्यादिनिवृत्त्या दीपनिवृत्तिः । तत्राद्या निवृत्तिरज्ञानस्य द्वितीया कार्यवर्गस्येति बोध्यम्" ॥

The so-called nyāya is found in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 8, line 9, and in *Pancapādikā*, page 1.

डमरुकमणिन्यायः ॥

The डमरुक or डमरु, is a sort of small drum, shaped like an hour-glass, and held in one hand: The मणि is, I suppose, the small piece of wood attached to the string tied round the middle of the drum, which strikes each end alternately as it is shaken in the hand, and thus fulfils a double purpose. The gāruḍīs, or conjurors, use a drum of this kind; and Apṭe's dictionary tells us that the Kāpālikas carry one. (For a description of the latter, see Wilson's *Religion of the Hindus* Vol. i. pages 21 and 264.) The nyāya is found in *Syādvādamanjarī*, page 84, where in explaining the words "नोत्सृष्टमन्यार्थमपोद्यते च" in Hemacandra's eleventh kārikā, Malliṣeṇa says, "अन्यार्थमिति मध्यवर्ति पदं डमरुकमणिन्यायेनोभयत्रापि सम्बन्धनीयम्." See the nyāya "अपवादैरुत्सर्गा बाध्यन्ते" and compare also, the घण्टालोलान्याय on page 35 of *Syādvādamanjarī*.

तटादर्शिशकुन्तपोतन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a young bird which* [has got out to sea on a floating log and] *is unable to discover the shore.* Its application is obvious. It occurs in the second line of verse 19 of Hemacandra's in *Syādvādamanjarī*, as follows:—"ततस्तटादर्शिशकुन्तपोतन्यायात्त्वदुक्तानि परे श्रयन्तु." Malliṣeṇa explains it thus:—"तटं न पश्यतीति तटादर्शी यः शकुन्तपोतः पक्षिशावकस्तस्य न्याय उदाहरणम्। तस्माद्यथा किल कथमप्यपारपारावारान्तःपतितः काकादिशकुनिशावको बहिर्निर्जिगमिषया प्रवहणकूपस्तंभादेस्तटप्राप्तये मुग्धतयोड्डीनः समन्ताज्जलैकार्णवमेवावलोकयंस्तटमदृष्ट्वैव निर्वेदादावृत्त्य तदेव कूपस्तंभादिस्थानमाश्रयते गत्यन्तराभावादेवं तेऽपि कुतीर्थ्याः प्रागुक्तपक्षत्रयेऽपि वस्तुसिद्धिमनासादयन्तस्त्वदुक्तमेव चतुर्थं भेदाभेदपक्षमनिच्छयापि कक्षीकुर्वाणास्त्वच्छासनमेव प्रतिपद्यन्ताम्."

तत्क्रतुन्यायः ॥

The principle of *meditation on that* [*viz.* Brahman]. Or, *one who meditates on that*. This is taken from *Brahmasūtra* 4. 3. 15, "अप्रतीकालंबनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथाऽदोषात्तत्क्रतुश्च". The bhāṣya on the last term is as follows:—"तत्क्रतुश्चोभयथाभावस्य समर्थको हेतुर्द्रष्टव्यः । यो हि ब्रह्मक्रतुः स ब्राह्ममैश्वर्यमासीदेदिति श्लिष्यते 'तं यथा यथोपासते तदेव भवति' इति श्रुतेः । न तु प्रतीकेषु ब्रह्मक्रतुत्वमस्ति प्रतीकप्रधानत्वादुपासनस्य । नन्वब्रह्मक्रतुरपि ब्रह्म गच्छतीति श्रूयते यथा पञ्चाग्निविद्यायां 'स एनान्ब्रह्म गमयति [छा॰ ५. १०. २] इति । भवतु यत्रैवमाहत्यवाद उपलभ्यते तदभावे त्वौत्सर्गिकेण तत्क्रतुन्यायेन ब्रह्मक्रतूनामेव तत्प्राप्तिर्नेतरेषामिति गम्यते". I subjoin Dr. Thibaut's rendering, with a few additions of my own in parentheses. "The words, 'and the meditation on that,' state the reason for this twofold relation [*viz.* of those who meditate on Brahman with qualities, and those who worship by means of symbols or images]. For he whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation, 'In whatever form they meditate on him, that they become themselves.' In the case of symbols, on the other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the symbol being the chief element in the meditation.—But scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed on Brahman go to it; so in the knowledge [rather, the *doctrine* (vidyā)] of the five fires, 'He leads them to Brahman.'—This may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration. We only mean to say that, where there is no such declaration, the general rule is that those only whose purpose is Brahman [*i. e.* whose mind is fixed on B.] go to it, not any others." This is a noteworthy passage. It practically condemns the use of symbols, or images, in worship, by declaring that the mind of the upāsaka is directed to the *pratīka*, and not to Brahman (or Īs'vara). The s'ruti, "तं यथा यथोपासते &c.," which is quoted also in 3. 4. 52, may mean much more than S'ankara sees in it; for it is an undoubted fact that, *in*

the present life, the worshipper becomes assimilated to the object of his worship; that the characteristics of that object, as conceived by him, become his own characteristics; and that a man never rises above the moral or spiritual level of that which he worships. This was clearly set before the Jewish nation in the teaching of Psalms CXV and CXXXV, where, with reference to the making and worshipping of images, we read "They that make them shall be like them, every one that trusteth in them" (Revised version).

The तत्क्रतुन्याय, which, in its full form seems to be तत्क्रतुस्तद्भवति (as in Ānandagiri on the closing part of 4. 3. 15), is constantly quoted in the *Vedāntakalpataruparimala.* It will be found on pages 229 (three times), 230 (line 9), 235 (line 11), 246 (line 6), 478 (line 1), 591 (line 4 from bottom), 669 (line 10), and 730 (lines 9 and 15). Also *Pancadas'ī* ix. 145.

तत्प्रख्यन्यायः ॥

The principle that *there is another scriptural passage declaratory of it* (namely, of the *secondary* matter connected with a sacrifice, such as the *deity* to whom it is offered, the *materials* to be used, &c). The nyāya represents Jaimini's sūtra 1. 4. 4 (तत्प्रख्यं चान्यशास्त्रम्), and is one of the four means by which Mīmāṃsakas prove that an injunction comes under the head of नामधेय ('name'), and is not a गुणविधि ('an injunction relating to the *accessories* of the sacrifice,' provision being made for them in other scriptural passages). The three other tests are styled मत्वर्थलक्षणा ('possessive indication') वाक्यभेद ('split of the sentence' caused by the inclusion of two or more distinct topics), and तद्व्यपदेशन्याय (which see below).

The following extracts from the *Arthasangraha,* with Dr Thibaut's renderings, illustrate the nyāya.

"कर्मस्वरूपमात्रबोधको विधिरुत्पत्तिविधिः। यथाग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति। ...ननु

यागस्य द्वे रूपे द्रव्यं देवता च। तथा च रूपाश्रवणेऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति कथमुत्पत्तिविधिः। अग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य तु तत्प्रख्यन्यायेन नामधेयत्वादिति चेन्न। रूपाश्रवणेऽप्यस्योत्पत्तिविधित्वात्। अन्यथा रूपश्रवणाद्दध्ना जुहोतीत्ययमेवोत्पत्तिविधिः स्यात्। तथा चाग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति वाक्यमनर्थकं स्यात्॥ (Page 4)

"That injunction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called 'originative injunction,' as, for instance, the passage 'He is to offer the Agnihotra oblation.' But it may be objected, the two forms (aspects) of a sacrifice are the material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage 'He is to offer the Agnihotra-oblation,' in which neither of these two forms is mentioned, be considered an originative injunction, the word Agnihotra (which seemingly indicates the divinity of the sacrifice, *viz.* Agni) being merely a name (and not indicating the divinity) according to the principle of (the existence of another scriptural passage) declaratory of it. To this objection we reply:—The passage is an originative injunction although neither of the two forms of the sacrifice is mentioned in it. Otherwise the passage 'He is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk' would have to be considered as the originative injunction (of the Agnihotra) as it contains a statement of one of the two forms (*viz.* the material), and then the passage 'He is to offer the Agnihotra' would be purposeless." (Page 7).

Again on page 20 of the same:—

"एवं च प्रयाजेषु समिदादिदेवतानां समिधः 'समिधो अग्न आज्यस्य व्यन्तु' इत्यादिमन्त्रवर्णेभ्यः प्राप्तत्वात्। समिधो यजतीत्यादिषु समिदादिशब्दास्तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रात्कर्मनामधेयाः"॥

"In the same manner the pieces of firewood called *samidh* and other things are established as the divinities of the Prayāja oblations by means of the Mantras 'the samidhs may partake of the butter &c.,' and therefore the words 'samidh' &c. which occur in the injunctions 'He sacrifices the samidh &c.' are to

be taken as names of certain sacrifices (not as denoting secondary matters) on account of another scriptural passage declaratory of it."

The nyāya is explained in almost identical language in Āpadeva's work *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakās'a*, and is applied in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 150, line 7. We find it, also, in Nāges'a's *Uddyota* (vol. 3. page 623), under sūtra 2. 3. 3.

तत्स्थानापन्ने तद्धर्मलाभः ॥

One who takes the place of somebody else takes upon himself also the functions of the latter. This is Professor Kielhorn's rendering of the maxim as found in Nāgojībhaṭṭa's comment on paribhāṣā CXVI. It may have originated with Kaiyaṭa. On Pāṇini's sūtra 1. 1. 56 (स्थानिवदादेशः &c.) Kātyāyana says "स्थान्यादेशपृथक्त्वादादेशे स्थानिवदनुदेशो गुरुवद्गुरुपुत्र इति यथा." Patanjali follows with the remark "लोकत एतत्सिद्धम्। तद्यथा। लोके यो यस्य प्रसंगे भवति लभतेऽसौ तत्कार्याणि। तद्यथा। उपाध्यायस्य शिष्यो याज्यकुलानि गत्वा अग्रासनादीनि लभते." Then Kaiyaṭa says "लोकत इति। लोके हि वचनमन्तरेणापि तत्स्थानापत्त्या तद्धर्मलाभो दृष्टः"॥ Under sūtra 1. 1. 4, Nāges'a Bhaṭṭa prepares us for this with the remark (on page 209 of his *Pradīpoddyota*) "अशास्त्रीयस्यापि तस्य 'तत्स्थानापन्ने तद्धर्मलाभ' इति लोकन्यायेनातिदेश इति स्थानिवत्सूत्रे वक्ष्यते".

तदन्तापकर्षन्यायः ॥

This nyāya, which is found in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 581, line 9, and again in line 8 of the next page, is taken from the तदादितदन्तन्याय of Jaimini 5. 1. 23, 24, the अनुयाजाद्युत्कर्ष-प्रयाजान्तापकर्षाधिकरण, which Kunte renders "The subject of the forward transference of acts which follow the Anuyāja-offerings and the backward transference of acts which precede Prayāja-

offerings together with the offerings themselves." Regarding the तदादितदन्तन्याय he says:—"*Tadādi* signifies *the first part of that*; the *Tadanta* signifies *the last part of that.* These are Bahuvrīhi compounds, and therefore signify that of which the first part is taken, and that of which the last part is taken. When forward transference is to be made, the Tadādi is taken and when backward transference is to be made, the Tadanta is taken. The following illustration will explain this. When the Anuyāja-offerings are to be transferred in point of time, the Sūktavāka and the Shanyuvāka which follow it, are to be transferred along with it, because the Anuyāja is the first part. Again, when Prayāja-offerings are to be transferred in point of time, the Āghāra and the Sāmiḍheni which precede it, are to be transferred along with it, because the Prayāja is the last part."

तदागमे हि तद्दृश्यत इति न्यायः ॥

The law that *a certain thing is seen to appear when a certain other thing appears* [thus establishing a connection between them]. Raghunāthavarman expounds it thus:— "जाग्रदादौ बुद्धौ सत्यां दुःखादयो दृश्यन्ते सुषुप्त्यादौ तन्निवृत्तौ नोपलभ्यन्त इति तद्धर्मा एव नात्मधर्माः सुषुप्तावप्युपलब्धिप्रसंगादित्यत्र तदागमे हि तद्दृश्यत इति न्यायोऽवतरति । दृश्यते हि तैलादनुद्भूतस्पर्शतेजोऽवयवागमे सन्तापोपलब्धिरिति तद्धर्म एव न तैलादिधर्म इति." I have met with it in the following passage of the *Tantravārtika* (page 348), and quote Prof. Gangānāth Jhā's translation of it:—

"तथा क्रमवतोर्नित्यं प्रकृतिप्रत्ययांशयोः ।
प्रत्ययश्रुतिवेलायां भावनात्मावगम्यते ॥

न केवलमेतावेवान्वयव्यतिरेकौ यौ परस्परपरित्यागेन लक्ष्येते तस्मिन्नेव हि पदे तदागमे हि तद्दृश्यत इत्यनेन न्यायेन विवेकोऽवधार्यते".

"The Root and the Affix are always found to appear in a definite order of sequence; and, as a matter of fact, we find

that it is only when the Affix is heard to be pronounced, that we have an idea of the *Bhāvanā*; and this, too, leads us to the conclusion that the *Bhāvanā* is denoted by the affix. Because the invariable concomitance of any two objects is not only such that one cannot exist in the absence of the other, but also of a kind which we find in the present case, where we find that it is only where a particular word—the Affix for instance—is pronounced that there is a denotation of the *Bhāvanā*; and as such, in accordance with the rule that when one object is always seen to appear when another appears, there is always an invariable concomitance between the two, we must admit that the *Bhāvanā* is denoted by the Affix." (p. 483).

I may add that the passage here cited from the *Tantra-vārtika* is closely connected with that quoted under the nyāya "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः" which see below.

तद्व्यपदेशन्यायः ॥

The principle of *a name indicating resemblance to something*. This is the title of Jaimini's sūtra 1. 4. 5, where the sentences "अथैष श्येनेनाभिचरन्यजेत", "अथैष सन्दंशेनाभिचरन्यजेत" and "अथैष गवाभिचरन्यजेत" are discussed, and it is decided that श्येन, सन्दंश, and गो are not the materials of the various sacrifices, but their *names*. This is well put in Colebrooke's Essay on the Mīmāṃsā:—

"It is a question whether the hawk-sacrifice (*s'yenayāga*) which is attended with imprecations on a hated foe, be performed by the actual immolation of a bird of that kind. The case is determined by a maxim that 'a term intimating resemblance is denominative.' *Hawk*, then, is the name of that incantation; 'it pounces on the foe *as* a falcon on his prey." So *tongs* is a name for a similar incantation; 'which seizes the enemy from afar *as* with a pair of tongs'; and *cow*, for a sacrifice to avert such imprecations."

This nyāya, as pointed out under तत्प्रख्यन्याय, is one of the proofs applied in the Mīmāṃsā in support of the नामधेय division of the Veda, and Laugākṣibhāskara (on page 20) explains it thus:—

"श्येनेनाभिचरन्यजेतेत्यत्र श्येनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं तद्व्यपदेशात् । तेन व्यपदेशादुपमानात्तदन्यथानुपपत्तेरिति यावत् ।...यदा तु श्येनसंज्ञको यागो विधीयते तदार्थवादेन श्येनोपमानेन तस्य स्तुतिः कर्तुं शक्यत इति श्येनशब्दः कर्मनामधेयं तद्व्यपदेशादिति" ॥

In this passage, and in a similarly worded one in *Āpadevī*, उपमान is given as the equivalent of व्यपदेश, whilst Kumārila employs सादृश्य. The dictionaries, however, are silent as to any such sense of the word. In his translation Dr. Thibaut renders it "comparison."

तप्तं तप्तेन संबध्यते ॥

Hot goes with hot. Like loves like. This is found in the following passage of *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 25 (page 620):—"न च सन्निधानमपि संबन्धकारणम् । अयमेति पुत्रो राज्ञः पुरुषोऽपसार्यतामित्यत्र राज्ञ इत्यस्य पुत्रपुरुषपदसन्निधानाविशेषान्मा भूदविनिगमना । तस्मादाकांक्षा निश्चय-हेतुर्वक्तव्या ।......सत्यपि सन्निधाने आकांक्षाभावादसंबन्धः । तथा चाभाणकः । तप्तं तप्तेन संबध्यत इति । तथा चाकांक्षितमपि न यावत्सन्निधाप्यते तावन्न संबध्यते.॥" Mr. M. R. Telang has given me another excellent example in *Vikramorvaśī* ii. 16:—"साधारणोऽयमुभयोः प्रणयः स्मरस्य तप्तेन तप्तमयसा घटनाय योग्यम्." Compare, too, "रत्नं रत्नेन सङ्गच्छते" of *Mricchakaṭika;* (page 40). It might be used as the equivalent of "Birds of a feather flock together"?

तप्तायःपीताम्बुवत् ॥

The simile of [a drop of] *water consumed by hot iron* [when thrown upon it]. Rāmtīrtha employs it when expounding the words "न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति" in the last section of the Vedāntasāra. He says:—

"निर्गुणब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारवतः प्राणा नोत्क्रामन्ति किन्तु प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मण्येव तप्तायः-पीताम्बुवल्लीयन्त इत्यत्र प्रमाणमाह न तस्येति." In Nṛisiṁha-sarasvati's comment on the same portion the nyāya is expanded and made clearer :—

"अस्य जीवन्मुक्तस्योपाधिविगमसमये प्राणाख्यं लिङ्गशरीरमतितप्तलोहक्षिप्त-नीरबिन्दुवत्प्रत्यगभिन्नपरमानन्दे लीनत्वात्स्थूलशरीरं नोत्तिष्ठतीति। अत्र श्रुतिमाह न तस्येति."

Neither of them, however, was the originator of the simile; for it is clearly an adaptation of the line "सन्तप्तायसि संस्थितस्य पयसो नामापि न ज्ञायते" which forms the commencement of *Pancatantra* i. 250, and also of Bhartṛihari's *Nītis'ataka* 67.

तमःप्रकाशनिदर्शनम् ॥

The illustration [of the co-existence] *of light and darkness.* It is found in *Pancapādikā*, page 3, as follows :—"कोऽयं विरोधः कीदृशो वा इतरेतरभावोऽभिप्रेतो यस्यानुपपत्तेस्तमःप्रकाशवदिति निदर्शनम् । यदि तावत्सहानवस्थानलक्षणो विरोधस्ततः प्रकाशभावे तमसो भावानुपपत्तिः । तदसत् । दृश्यते हि मन्दप्रदीपे वेश्मन्यस्पष्टं रूपदर्शनमितरत्र च स्पष्टम् । तेन ज्ञायते मन्दप्रदीपे वेश्मनि तमसोऽपीषदनुवृत्तिरिति".

The substance of this is reproduced in *Vivaraṇaprameya-sangraha*, page 10.

तृणभक्षणन्यायः ॥

The custom of *taking grass in the mouth* [*lit.* of eating grass], as a token of submission. This interesting illustration is found in *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 93 :—वैरिणोपि हि मुच्यन्ते प्राणान्ते तृणभक्षणात् । तृणाहाराः सदैवैते हन्यन्ते पशवः कथम्." Mr. Tawney renders it thus:—"Since even enemies are let off, when near death, if they take grass in their mouths, how can you slay these harmless beasts [deer &c.] which always feed on grass?" In a note on page 210, it is stated that we have here an allusion to a most ancient custom. There is a reference to it in *Harṣa-*

carita (Bombay edn. 1892) page 132, line 11, on which, the translators, Cowell and Thomas, remark, "To carry a straw in the mouth was a sign of surrender; compare Acworth's Marāṭhā Ballads, page 43 :—

'And' twixt the teeth a straw is fit
For curs who arm but to submit.'"

These two lines are deduced from the three words "द्यावें तोंडांत तृण" of the original.

Merutunga refers to this custom again on page 300 :—"नाथो नः परमर्द्धनेन वदनन्यस्तेन संरक्षितः । पृथ्वीराजनराधिपादिति तृणं तत्पत्तने पूज्यते." "Grass is now worshipped in Paramardin's city, because, when taken in the mouth, it preserved our lord Paramardin from Pṛithvīrāja, the king of men." (Tawney's translation, page 189).

The late Colonel Meadows Taylor, who was so thoroughly acquainted with Indian life, put the following into the mouth of one of his characters in *Seetā* (chapter XLVII):—"We have a good many prisoners, for I could not kill the wretches *who had put grass in their mouths* and were crying for quarter."

तैलकलुषितशालिबीजादङ्कुरानुदयनियमः ॥

The certainty of the non-appearance of shoots from grains of rice spoilt by [contact with] *oil.* It occurs in *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 545, line, 17 :—"क्रियाभोगशक्त्योः सत्योरपि तत्प्रतिबन्धात्कार्यानुदयः संभवति तैलकलुपितशालिबीजादङ्कुरानुदयनियमवत्". In *S'ānkarabhāṣya* 2. 3. 31, we read :—"यथा लोके पुंस्त्वादीनि बीजात्मना विद्यमानान्येव बाल्यादिष्वनुपलभ्यमानान्यविद्यमानवदभिप्रेयमाणानि यौवनादिष्वाविर्भवन्ति नाविद्यमानान्युत्पद्यन्ते षण्ढादीनामपि तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्." Of the आदि in षण्ढादीनाम् Ānandagiri says :—"तैलकलुपितबीजादिग्रहार्थमादिपदम्." See also *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 60. Compare the मूषिकभक्षितबीजादावङ्कुरादिजननप्रार्थना, in Second Handful.

दग्धबीजन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the burnt seed.* An illustration of that which has for ever ceased to be an operative cause. It appears in a verse of *Syādvādamanjarī*, page 208:—

दग्धे बीजे यथात्यन्तं प्रादुर्भवति नांकुरः ।
कर्मबीजे तथा दग्धे न रोहति भवांकुरः ॥

The following is from the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 206:—

राजप्रतिग्रहदग्धानां ब्राह्मणानां युधिष्ठिर ।
दग्धानामिव बीजानां पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

Merutunga ascribes it to a Purāṇa. Vijnāna Bhikṣu quotes from some Smṛiti another of a like kind, under *Yogavārtika* ii. 3:—

बीजान्यग्न्युपदग्धानि न रोहन्ति यथा पुनः ।
ज्ञानदग्धैस्तथा क्लेशैर्नात्मा सम्पद्यते पुनः ॥

See also a verse ascribed to a Chārvāka in *Prabodhacandrodaya*, page 35.

दत्तमेकधा सहस्रगुणमुपलभ्यते ॥

That which is given once is received back a thousand times. This is found in Merutunga's work, page 266, and I append Mr. Tawney's rendering:—"अथ वीरधवलस्यायुःपर्यन्ते प्रतितीर्थं प्रस्थितेन दत्तमेकधा सहस्रगुणमुपलभ्यत इति रूढेः श्रीतेजःपालेन जन्मसुकृतं ददे." "Then, when Vīradhavala's life was approaching its termination, Tejahpāla, who was on his way to a holy place, in accordance with the proverb that what is given once is received back a hundred (?) times, gave him the merits of his last birth." Though the illustration is fable, the principle is true. "Give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom." Among the Turks there is the saying "Who gives alms sows one and reaps one thousand." (Rev. T. Long's *Eastern proverbs and emblems*, page 187).

दत्तर्णाधमर्ण इव स्वप् ॥

To sleep like a debtor whose debt has been paid. To sleep like a top! It occurs in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan*, ii. 563:—"इति स्नुषाया दौःशील्यामर्षचिन्तां विहाय सः । सुष्वाप दत्तर्ण इवाधमर्णस्तत्र निर्भरम्."

दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः ॥

Curds and cucumber are fever personified! That is, they *cause* fever. This is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 59 (vārtika 6), and 6. 1. 32 (vārt 6), as follows:—"अन्तरेणापि निमित्तशब्दं निमित्तार्थो गम्यते । तद्यथा । दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः । ज्वरनिमित्तमिति गम्यते । नड्वलोदकं पादरोगः । पादरोगनिमित्तमिति गम्यते । आयुर्घृतम् । आयुषो निमित्तमिति गम्यते"॥ This closely resembles Raghunātha's दधिपयसी प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः which I have not yet met with anywhere. See आयुर्घृतं and लाङ्गलं जीवनम् in Second Handful.

दवदाहस्य वेत्रबीजविनाशकत्वं रूपान्तरजनकत्वं च ॥

The forest-fire which destroys the seeds of the Ratan is also [by that means] *the promoter of the growth of another form* [namely, the plantain]. This is found in *Citsukhī* i. 15, as follows:—"यथा च दवदाहस्य वेत्रबीजविनाशकत्वं रूपान्तरजनकत्वं च तथा दोषाणामपि यथार्थज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वमयथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वं च किं न स्यात्." The same idea, with the express mention of the plantain tree, is found under i. 14, and also in the following passage of the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā* page 57:—"दृष्टं च दुष्टानामपि कारणानामौत्सर्गिककार्यप्रतिबन्धेन कार्यान्तरोत्पादकत्वम् । तद्यथा वेत्रबीजानां दावाग्निदग्धानां कदलीप्रकाण्डजनकत्वं भस्मकदुष्टस्य चौदर्यस्य तेजसो बहुतरान्नपानपात्रकत्वम्." The same passage is found in *Bhāmatī* page 18, line 7; and, one of the same nature, in *S'ikhāmaṇi*, page 134, line 8; whilst, in *Sarvārthasiddhi* ii. 46 (page 207), Venkaṭa says "दग्धवेत्रबीजस्य रम्भांकुरारम्भकत्वं दृश्यते." See also *Maṇiprabhā* iii. 14 (page 55), and *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 75, line 6.

दीर्घशष्कुलीभक्षणन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the eating of an elongate* [confection called] *S'aṣkulī* [said, by the commentator on *Yājnavalkya-smṛiti* i. 173, to be स्नेहपक्वगोधूमविकारः]. The nyāya is well defined in the following extract from the *Vis'iṣṭādvaitin* (vol. i. p. 102), for which I am indebted to my friend Dr. Grierson:— "*S'ashkulī* is a stick-like edible, which a person begins to eat from one end. While he so eats there are several sensations present, such as the hardness or the softness of the thing; its surface, round, square &c., uniform or indented; its taste, smell, color &c. All the sensations do not affect the person simultaneously, but one after another. When he is intent on the taste, he is non-intent on the color; when he is intent on the smell he is non-intent on the surface; though all the sensations seem to come to him simultaneously, by reason of the infinitesimal interval of time dividing one sensation from another."

Nyāyasūtra i. 16 defines *Mind* as that in which knowledge [of more things than one] does not arise simultaneously; and we find the following in Mallinātha's comment on *Tārkikarahṣā* 29, where that sūtra is referred to :—"न च दीर्घशष्कुलीभक्षणादौ ज्ञानयौगपद्यसंभवादसंभवि लक्षणमिति वाच्यम् । शतपत्रशातनवदाशुभावनिबन्धनो यौगपद्याभिमानो यत इति सर्वमवदातम्" ॥ Again, in the *Nyāyapradīpa* on the definition of मनस् in *Tarkabhāṣā* (p.126) we read:— "अण्विति । विभुत्वे दीर्घशष्कुलीं भक्षयतः पुंसो रूपरसाद्यनेकविषयाणि ज्ञानानि युगपज्जायेरन् । आत्मेन्द्रियविषयसंबन्धात्मिकायाः सामग्र्याः सत्त्वादणुत्वे त्विन्द्रियाप्राप्तेर्न युगपज्ज्ञानानि भविष्यन्तीति भावः" ॥

In a discussion on the same subject in *Nyāyamanjarī* page 497, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa brings forward three examples of *apparent* simultaneity, the first of which is quaintly versified as follows:—

"सुगन्धि शीतलां दीर्घामश्नन्तः पूपशष्कुलीम् ।
कपिलब्राह्मणास्सन्ति युगपत्पञ्चबुद्धयः" ॥

दूरस्थवनस्पतिन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *distant trees* [*i. e.* of two trees standing apart, but which, owing to their distance from the spectator, seem to be one]. It is contained in the *Laukikanyāyaratnākara* (IO MS. 582, page 219 *a*), but not in the smaller work. Its author most probably derived it from *Citsukhī*, where the following passage is found at the beginning of the second chapter :—" ननु क्षीरनीरयोर्विद्यमानभेदयोरपि स्वरूपग्रहणे भेदग्रहो न दृश्यत इति चेन्नैवं तत्र समानाभिहारलक्षणदोषप्रतिबन्धादेव तदग्रहोपपत्तेः । एतेन दूरस्थवनस्पत्योरपि भेदग्रहप्रसंगः प्रत्युक्तः "॥ The Muni then quotes *Sānkhyakārikā* vii. "अतिदूरात् &c."; and the same kārikā, with a somewhat similar context, is cited in the Pūrṇaprajna section of *sarvadars'anasangraha.* The simile of the two trees is met with in the much older work *Sankṣepas'ārīraka* (i. 44), namely :—" दूरस्थयोर्ननु वनस्पतिवस्तुनोस्तद्भेदो न दृष्टिविषयोऽवगते च ते नः"॥ We have it again in the *Pancapādikā* (page 7, line 13).

It is interesting to compare with Īs'varakṛiṣṇa's causes of *anupalabdhi* those assigned by Patanjali in *Mahābhāṣya* 4. 1. 3 (vol. ii. page 197). He says :—"षड्भिः प्रकारैः सतां भावानामनुपलब्धिर्भवत्यतिसंनिकर्षादतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तरव्यवधानात्तमसावृतत्वादिन्द्रियदौर्बल्यादतिप्रमादादिति."

देवदत्तशौर्यन्यायः ॥

The figure of *Devadatta's bravery.* Equivalent to Horace's "Cælum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt." The illustration is used by S'ankara in his bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 10:—"एकस्यामपि शाखायां श्रुता गुणाः श्रुता एव सर्वत्र भवन्ति गुणवतो भेदाभावात् । न हि देवदत्तः शौर्यादिगुणत्वेन स्वदेशे प्रसिद्धो देशान्तरं गतस्तद्देश्यैरविभावितशौर्यादिगुणोऽप्यतद्गुणो भवति । यथा च तत्र परिचयविशेषाद्देशान्तरेऽपि देवदत्तगुणा विभाव्यन्ते" ॥ The देवदत्तशौर्यनिदर्शन is mentioned again in the bhāṣya on the next sūtra. Compare with this the following from *Tantravārtika*, 3. 6. 41 (page 1108) :—"यथैव देवदत्तस्य स्थानोपवेशनगमनशयनाद्यवस्थाभेदेऽपि देवदत्तत्वं

नापैति &c." See, also, *Slokavārtika*, page 780; and compare the following from *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 1 (vārt. 13):—"ननु च भो अभेदका अपि गुणा दृश्यन्ते । तद्यथा । देवदत्तो मुण्ड्यपि जट्यपि शिख्यपि स्वामाख्यां न जहाति." Commenting on this, Kaiyaṭa says:—"मुण्डेन हि कृते चौर्ये कुंतलित्वावस्थायामपि चौरोऽयमिति व्यपदिश्यते."

देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the slaying of the murderer of Devadatta.* The point is that the death of the murderer does not bring his victim to life again. It is applied by Raghunātha as follows:—"नन्वज्ञानबाधके ज्ञाने विनष्टे पुनरज्ञानोदयेन बन्धप्रसङ्ग इति शंकायां देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्यायावतारः । यथा देवदत्तहन्तरि हतेऽपि न देवदत्तस्य जीवनं तथा प्रकृतेऽपि." He probably took it from Nāgojībhaṭṭa's comment on *paribhāṣā* LXIV [उपसंजनिष्यमाणनिमित्तः &c., which see above] where it reads thus:—"अत्र देवदत्तस्य हन्तरि हते देवदत्तस्योन्मज्जनं नेति न्यायस्य विषय एव नास्ति । हते देवदत्त उन्मज्जनं न । देवदत्तहननोद्यतस्य तु हनने भवत्येवोन्मज्जनम्" ॥ Nāgojī, on the other hand, derived it from the *Mahābhāṣya*, where (in 1. 1. 57, vārtika 4) it appears as "न ह्यन्यस्यासिद्धत्वादन्यस्य प्रादुर्भावो भवति । न हि देवदत्तस्य हन्तरि हते देवदत्तस्य प्रादुर्भावो भवति." So, too, in 6. 1. 86 (vārt. 3). It is quoted in the consolidated form in *Pradīpoddyota* 1. 1. 5 (page 213).

धारावाहिकबुद्धिः ॥

A persistent state of cognition. This is Mr. Arthur Venis' rendering of the expression as it occurs in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (The Paṇḍit, vol. iv., page 105), and he elucidates it in a footnote as follows:—"It may be described as a series of states throughout which the same object is presented in consciousness. Each state of consciousness lasts only for a moment, a *kshaṇa* or unit of appreciable time, and perishes. A second state then succeeds and is lost, and so on." We find the expression (in the plural) in the *Prakaraṇapancikā*, page 127, and as धारावाहिकज्ञानानि on page 40; whilst, on page 56, the author

refers to it as the धारावाहिकन्याय. I have met with it elsewhere also. Yet, strange to say, the Vācaspatyam is the only Sanskrit dictionary that contains it. The term धारावाहिन् (with °वाहिक also) is there defined as "सन्तत्या पातुके क्रमेणाविच्छेदेन जायमाने च," and then follows a quotation from Vedāntaparibhāṣā which immediately succeeds that referred to above:—"किञ्च सिद्धान्ते धारावाहिकबुद्धिस्थले न ज्ञानभेदः [किन्तु यावद्धटस्फुरणं तावद्धटाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिरेकैव न तु नाना"] "Moreover, according to (Vedantic) tenet, there is no variation of knowledge in the case of a persistent cognition; but as long as there is a presentation of the jar so long the modification of the internal organ in the form of the jar is one and the same and not various" (Venis). As found in Marāṭhī, it has the meaning "Closeness or intentness of thought; undiverted and unintermitting prosecution (of any subject of meditation or study)" (Molesworth). Strictly speaking, I ought not to include this expression in my pages; but as Böhtlingk, Monier-Williams, and Apṭe have ignored it, I admit it in the hope that it may assist some perplexed student of Indian philosophy. And let me add that readers of Mr. Venis' excellent translations will find there many valuable explanations of technicalities, which they will search for in vain elsewhere.

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ॥

Acts which impel others to action are not always of the same kind. This is the first line of a verse in Kumārila's *S'lokavārtika* (page 710), the context of which is as follows:—

"न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ।
चलनेन ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुंक्ते छेदनं प्रति ॥
सेनापतिस्तु वाचैव भृत्यानां विनियोजकः ।
राजा सन्निधिमात्रेण विनियुङ्क्ते कदाचन" ॥

A remark of S'ankarāchārya's in his comment on *Muṇḍaka-Upanishad* 3. 1. 1, illustrates this. He says:—"स त्वनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति पश्यत्येव केवलम्। दर्शनमात्रेण हि तस्य प्रेरयितृत्वं राजवत्."

नड्वलोदकं पादरोगः ॥

Water in a bed of reeds is disease of the feet. That is, it causes disease in the feet. See under दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः।

नर्तकन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a dancer*. *One* dancer gives pleasure to *many* spectators, just as one lamp gives light to many persons. It occurs in *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara* 11. 1. 10 as follows:—

"प्रत्यङ्गिकार्याण्यङ्गानि तन्त्रेणोताङ्गिनो यतः।
एकैकस्योपकारत्वं तस्मात्प्रत्यङ्ग्यनुष्ठितिः॥
विधानवदनुष्ठानं सकृदेवोपकारकम्।
तद्देशकालकर्तॄणामेकत्वान्नर्तकादिवत्" ॥

The last pāda is thus explained:—"यथा बहूनां पुरतो नृत्यन्नर्तकः सर्वेषां सुखं युगपन्निर्वर्तयति तद्वत्"।

Of the same kind, apparently, is the following expression of the *Nyāyavārtika* i. 10 (page 70):—"कृतसंकेतानां वृद्धानामेकस्मिन्नर्तकीभ्रूक्षेपे युगपदनेकप्रत्ययवत्", which is reproduced in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, page 354 (line 9 from bottom) in these words:—"उक्तमेतद् यथा नर्तकीभ्रूलताभङ्गे एकस्मिन्बहूनां प्रतिसन्धानमिति."

नसि प्रोतोष्ट्रन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a camel with a rope fastened in its nostrils.* It is found in verse 78 of *Tattvamuktāvali* :—

"माया यस्य वशं गता बलवती त्रैलोक्यसंमोहिनी
विज्ञेयः प्रभुरीश्वरः स भगवानानन्दसच्चिद्घनः ।
यस्तस्या वशमागतः खलु नसि प्रोतोष्ट्रकल्पः सदा
ज्ञातव्यः स हि जीव इत्थमनयोरस्त्येव भेदो महान्" ॥

"He under whose control is that mighty illusion which deceives the three worlds, He is to be recognized as the Supreme Lord, the adorable, essentially thought, existence, and joy; but he who is himself always under her control, like a camel drawn by a string through his nostrils, is to be recognized as the individual soul,—vast indeed is the difference between the two." The translation is Prof. Cowell's. The dictionaries give references to three works where the figure is used, but always as नस्योत, and, either in text or comment, applied to a bullock, not to a camel. The passages will be found in *Tait. Saṃhitā* 2. 1. 1. 2, *Vanaparva* xxx. 26, and *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 6. 3. 12. The second one reads thus :—"ईश्वरस्य वशे तिष्ठेन्नान्येषां नात्मनः प्रभुः । मणिः सूत्र इव प्रोतो नस्योत इव गोवृषः" ॥

Compare, too, Māgha xii. 10, with its description of a vain attempt to load a pack-bullock though held by its nose-cord (नस्या).

न हि करकंकणदर्शनायादर्शापेक्षा ॥

One does not need a looking-glass in order to look at a bracelet on the wrist. The nearest approach to this that I have met with is in the *Karpūramanjarī*, page 17, line 2 :—"अहवा हत्थकंकणं किं दप्पणेण पेक्खीअदि," which is, in Sanskrit, "अथवा हस्तकंकणं किं दर्पणेन दृश्यते."

न हि काकिन्यां नष्टायां तदन्वेषणं कार्षापणेन क्रियते ॥

If a man has lost a cowrie he does not spend a kārshāpaṇa in the search for it. That would be like expending a sovereign in order to recover a farthing! It occurs in the following portion of S'abara's bhāshya 4. 3. 39:—"न हि कपाले नष्टे तदन्वेषणार्था इष्टिर्युक्ता। न हि काकिन्यां नष्टायां तदन्वेषणं कार्षापणेन क्रियते" ॥

न हि क्वचिदश्रवणमन्यत्र श्रुतं निवारयितुमुत्सहते ॥

A thing's not being heard in one place does not get rid of the fact of its being heard elsewhere. This is applied by S'ankara in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 4. 1 (page 681) as follows:—"ननु केषुचित्प्रदेशेषु न प्राणानामुत्पत्तिः श्रूयत इत्युक्तं तदयुक्तं प्रदेशान्तरेषु श्रवणात्। न हि क्वचिदश्रवणमन्यत्र श्रुतं निवारयितुमुत्सहते." It is quoted as a nyāya in *Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā* 2. 3. 2 (sūtra 8). Compare with it *S'lokavārtika* iv. 161:—"न क्वचित्संकराभावात्सर्वत्रैव निवर्तते। क्वचिच्च संकरं दृष्ट्वा संकरोऽन्यत्र कल्प्यते," and see Dr. Gangānāth Jhā's rendering of that and the previous verse.

Compare too a saying of Vācaspatimis'ra's on *Yogabhāṣya* ii. 22:—"न हि रूपमन्धेन न दृश्यत इति चक्षुष्मतापि दृश्यमानमभावप्राप्तं भवति."

न हि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति ॥

An Iguana creeping along does not on that account become a snake. This is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 23 (4) as follows:—"न खल्वप्यन्यत्प्रकृतमनुवर्तनादन्यद्भवति न हि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति। ......यदप्युच्यते न खल्वन्यत्प्रकृतमनुवर्तनादन्यद्भवति न हि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति भवेद्द्रव्येष्वेतदेवं स्यात्। शब्दस्तु खलु येन येन विशेषेणाभिसंबध्यते तस्य तस्य विशेषको भवति." The same passage reappears in 1. 3. 12 (5), and in 6. 1. 50.

न हि ग्रामस्थः कदा ग्रामं प्राप्नुयामित्यरण्यस्थ इवाशास्ते ॥

A man who is already in a village does not express a longing to get there, such as a man might who was out in the jungle! This is found in, *Brihadāraṇyakabhāṣya* 1. 3. 28, page 87:—"न हि प्राणात्मन्युत्पन्नात्माभिमानस्य तत्प्राप्त्याशंसनं सम्भवति। न हि ग्रामस्थः कदा ग्रामं प्राप्नुयामित्यरणस्थ इवाशास्ते। असंनिकृष्टविषये ह्यनात्मन्याशंसनं न तस्यात्मनि सम्भवति."

न हि त्रिपुत्रो द्विपुत्र इति कथ्यते ॥

A man who has three sons could not be designated as a man with two sons. Therefore, if an order were given to bring the father of two sons, it would not do to bring one who had three! This nyāya of Raghunāthavarman's, taken from the *Kās'ikāvṛitti* (with the substitution of कथ्यते for व्यपदिश्यते), is based on the words "न हि द्विपुत्र आनीयतामित्युक्ते त्रिपुत्र आनीयते," which form part of Patanjali's comment on Pāṇini's sūtra 6. 4. 96 (छादेर्घेऽद्व्युपसर्गस्य). The meaning of that sūtra is that when the affix घ (*i. e.* the kṛit- affix अ) follows, the root (technically described as छादि) is shortened to छद when there are *not two* upasargas. So we say प्रच्छद, and दन्तच्छद; but समुपच्छाद because there *are two* upasargas. But would the root vowel be shortened if there were *more than two* upasargas? No; for we say समुपाभिच्छाद. Yet the sūtra seems to make no provision for this. Patanjali comments on it as follows:—"अद्विप्रभृत्युपसर्गस्येति वक्तव्यम्। इहापि यथा स्यात्। समुपाभिच्छाद इति। तत्तर्हि वक्तव्यम्। न वक्तव्यम्। यत्र त्रिप्रभृतयः सन्ति द्वावपि तत्र स्तस्तत्राद्व्युपसर्गस्येत्येव सिद्धम्। न वा एष लोके सम्प्रत्ययः। न हि द्विपुत्र आनीयतामित्युक्ते त्रिपुत्र आनीयते। तस्मादद्विप्रभृत्युपसर्गस्येति वक्तव्यम्" ॥

Patanjali was fond of this kind of illustration. The following one is employed again and again in various parts of the bhāṣya, and always in connection with the *paribhāṣā* नञिवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे तथा ह्यर्थगतिः। It reads thus:—"अब्राह्मणमानयेत्युक्ते

ब्राह्मणसदृश आनीयते नासौ लोष्टमानीय कृती भवति." It occurs in 3. 1. 12 (vārt. 4); 3. 3. 19; 6. 1. 45; 6. 1. 71 (vārt. 7); 6. 1. 135 (vārt. 12); 6. 3. 34 (vārt. 7); 7. 1. 37 (vārt. 7). The words अब्राह्मणमानय appear also in 2. 2. 6. The paribhāṣā just quoted is rendered by Prof. Kielhorn thus:—"(An expression) formed by the addition of the negative नञ् or (of the particle of comparison) इव (to some word or other) denotes something which is different from and yet similar to (what is denoted by the latter), because it is so that (such expressions) are (generally) understood (in ordinary life)." With the paribhāṣā, Nāgojī has also taken the illustration. In Kaiyaṭa's comment on a portion of the bhāṣya under sūtra 1. 1. 57 we find the expression "न हि त्रिपुत्रो द्विपुत्रव्यपदेशं लभते."

न हि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनोऽप्रसिद्धगोश्रवणात्ककुदादिमदर्थप्रतिपत्तिर्भवति ॥

From hearing the unfamiliar word 'cow', an inhabitant of Cocoanut Island would gain no perception of an object possessed of a hump &c. This sentence is found in the *Nyāyavārtika* on sūtra 3. 1. 67. Again, in Pras'astapāda's *Vais'esikabhāṣya*, page 182, we read:—"अनुमानविषयेऽपि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनः सास्नामात्रदर्शनात्को नु खल्वयं प्राणी स्यादित्यनध्यवसायो भवति." The commentator, S'rīdhara, remarks on this:—"नारिकेलद्वीपे गवामभावात्तत्रत्यो लोकोऽप्रसिद्धगोजातीयः."

With some hesitation I have admitted the above into my collection of 'inferences from familiar instances,' on account of the reference to the unfamiliar Cocoanut Island, and its cow-less condition! The following passage from Professor Beal's translation of Hiuen Thsang's work (Vol. ii. page 252) is suppossed to refer to this island:—"The people of this island are small of stature, about three feet high; their bodies are those of men, but they have the beaks of birds; they grow no grain, but live only

on cocoanuts." The editor and translator of Itsing's Record thinks that the island in question is one described by that pilgrim as lying to the north of Sumatra, and therefore probably one of the Nicobar group. See page xxxviii of that work.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refers more than once to the ignorance of these islanders. See *Nyāyamanjarī* page 118, line 5; page 121, line 23; and page 391. Also *Tātparyaṭikā*, p. 66. In *Sarvārthasiddhi*, page 561, amongst strange things found in ordinary life, Venkaṭanāth includes "नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनामपक्वान्नेनैव देहधारणम्." It is interesting to note that, according to Pras'astapāda (page 267, line 6), the people of south India were at that time as unacquainted with the *camel* as those islanders were with the cow! Srīdhara says:—"उष्ट्रो दाक्षिणात्यस्यात्यन्ताननुभूताकारत्वादाश्चर्यभूतोऽर्थः" ॥

न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हति ॥

It is not likely that a man who could flee on his feet would crawl on his knees. This is a part of S'ankara's argument on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 1. 10:—"तस्मात्कर्मैव शीलोपलक्षितमनुशयभूतं योन्यापत्तौ कारणमिति कार्ष्णाजिनेर्मतम् । न हि कर्मणि संभवति शीलाद्योन्यापत्तिर्युक्ता । न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हतीति." "It is, therefore, the opinion of Kārsṇājini that the remainder of works only—which is connoted by the term 'conduct'—is the cause of the soul's entering on new births. For as work may be the cause of new births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause. If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will surely not creep on his knees." This is Dr. Thibaut's rendering.

न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदृतौ धृतम् ॥

Even cow's milk would cease to be pure if placed in a vessel made of dogskin. This nyāya of Raghunātha's is found in the following passage of *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara*, 1. 3. 4:—

"शाक्योक्ताहिंसनं धर्मो न वा धर्मः श्रुतत्त्वतः ।
न धर्मो न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदृतौ धृतम् ॥
ब्रह्मचर्यमहिंसां चापरिग्रहं च सत्यं च यत्नेन रक्षेदिति श्रुतावहिंसादिर्धर्मत्वेनोक्तः । स एव धर्मः शाक्येनाप्युक्तः । तस्माच्छाक्यस्मृतिर्धर्मे प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । स्वरूपेण धर्मस्यापि गोक्षीरन्यायेन शाक्यसंबन्धे सत्यधर्मत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तदीयग्रन्थेनाहिंसादिर्नावगन्तव्यः । तस्मान्न सा स्मृतिर्धर्मे प्रमाणम्" ॥

Mādhava, no doubt, took it from Kumārila's vārtika on sūtra 7 of the same adhikaraṇa, where he speaks of the moral teaching of S'ākyas and others as "श्वदृतिनिक्षिप्तक्षीरवदनुपयोग्यविस्त्रंभणीयं च." The simile in this form is found, too, in Yāmunācārya's *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, page 11 line 8, in a context of the same import. Colebrooke's excellent summary of the teaching of this part of the Mīmāṁsādars'ana, given in his *Essays* (i. 337), may be usefully quoted here:—"Besides the evidence of precept from an extant revelation or recorded hearing (*s'ruti*) of it, another source of evidence is founded on the recollections (*smṛiti*) of ancient sages. They possess authority as grounded on the Veda, being composed by holy personages conversant with its contents...The *S'ākyas* (or *Bauddhas*) and *Jainas* (or *Ārhatas*), as Kumārila acknowledges, are considered to be Kshatriyas. It is not to be concluded, he says, that their *recollections* were founded upon a Veda which is now lost. There can be no inference of a foundation in *revelation* for unauthentic recollections of persons who deny its authenticity. Even when they do concur with it, as recommending charitable gifts and enjoining veracity, chastity, and innocence, the books of the S'ākyas are of no authority for the virtues which they inculcate. Duties are not taken from them: the association would suggest a surmise of vice, tainting what else is virtuous." Raghunātha uses the nyāya as a warning to a *guru* to be careful in the selection of his disciples; for असत्पात्रे सदुपदेशोऽप्यपवित्रतां याति. On this point see *Vishṇu-smṛiti* xxix. 9, and Manu ii. 114.

न हि भिक्षुको भिक्षुकान्तरं याचितुमर्हति सत्यन्यस्मिन्नभिक्षुके ॥

A beggar ought not to ask alms of another beggar, so long as there is any one [to beg from] *who is not a beggar!* The saying appears in this form in *S'āstradīpikā* 8. 3. 5; but S'abara, in the same adhikaraṇa (sūtra 11), puts it thus:—"न च भिक्षुका भिक्षुकादाकांक्षन्ति सत्यन्यस्मिन्प्रसवसमर्थेऽभिक्षुके." See, also, the *Nyāyamālāvistara* on the same portion. The following, from *Ivanhoe* (Chap. xi), runs parallel with the nyāya:—" He is too like ourselves for us to make booty of him, since *dogs should not worry dogs where wolves and foxes are to be found.*"

न हि भूमावम्भोरुहं सदिति दुष्टाक्षस्यापि नभसि तदवभासते ॥

Not even to a man whose sight is defective does a lotus on the ground appear to be in the sky! It appears in *Citsukhī* i. 17 (Paṇḍit, vol. iv, page 594):—" न च देशान्तरे सत्त्वादत्रासत्त्वाच्च ख्यातिबाधयोरन्यथाप्युपपत्तिः । अन्यत्र सत्ताया इह प्रतीत्यहेतुत्वात् । न हि भूमावम्भोरुहं सदिति दुष्टाक्षस्यापि नभसि तदवभासते."

न हि यद्देवदत्तस्य युध्यमानस्य स्थानमवगतं तदेव भुञ्जानस्यापि भवति ॥

The position occupied by Devadatta when eating is not that which he occupies when fighting! The force of this *dṛiṣṭānta* is best seen from the *dārṣṭāntika* in *Tantravārtika*, p. 575:—

"एकत्वेऽपि हि शब्दस्य शक्तिभेदः प्रयोजने ।
तत्र कार्यान्तरस्थानं न स्यात्कार्यान्तरेष्वपि ॥

न शब्दैकत्वेन यत्किञ्चित्कार्ये स्थानं दृष्टसामर्थ्यं तदेवान्यत्रापीति शक्यते वक्तुम् । न हि यद्देवदत्तस्य युध्यमानस्य स्थानमवगतं तदेव भुञ्जानस्यापि भवतीति गम्यते । कार्यप्रयुक्ता हि स्थानविशेषादयो न स्वरूपप्रयुक्ताः" ॥

न हि विधिशतेनापि तथा पुरुषः प्रवर्तते यथा लोभेन ॥

Not even a hundred injunctions could move a man to action as readily as the desire for gain does. This is found in *Tantravārtika* 3. 4. 34 (page 999):—

"ऋत्विग्भ्यो दक्षिणां दद्यादिति दानं विधीयते ।
लोभादेवार्जनाङ्गत्वात्प्राप्तस्तेषां प्रतिग्रहः ॥

न हि दद्यादित्यस्य प्रतिगृह्णीयादित्ययमर्थो भवति । भवेदपि सामर्थ्याद्यदि तदाक्षेपमन्तरेण दानविधिर्नोपपद्यते । स तु लोभप्राप्तप्रतिग्रहबलेनोपपद्यमानो न शक्नोत्याक्षेप्तुम् । न हि विधिशतेनापि तथा पुरुषः प्रवर्तते यथा लोभेन" ॥
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (on page 361) puts the matter quaintly thus:—

" चपेटापरिहाराय मोदकप्राप्तयेऽपि वा ।
प्रवर्तते बटुर्नासौ जुहुधीति नियोगतः" ॥

Compare *Nyāyakaṇikā*, page 407:—"न च विधिमात्रमपि प्रवृत्तिहेतुः । अनिच्छतो विधीनां शतेनाप्यप्रवृत्तेः" ॥ See, too, verses 1040 and 1041 of *Sambandhavārtika*, and *Anubhūtiprakās'a* xiii. 277.

But many centuries before any of these worthies the same view had been expressed by Patanjali in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 3 72:—"क्रियाफलं कर्तारमभिप्रैति । याजका यजन्ति गा लप्स्यामह इति । कर्मकराः कुर्वन्ति पादिकमहर्लप्स्यामह इति." See another quotation from the same source under the nyāya "प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य &c."

न हि सर्वः सर्वं जानाति ॥

Everybody does not know everything. Near the end of the *Laukikanyāyasangraha* Raghunātha describes his effort in the following verse:—

" व्याख्यातं न्यायवृन्दं निजमतिसनतिक्रम्य यावन्मयाप्तं
पारं प्राप्तुं तु शक्तो न हि भवति गुरुः कः पुनर्मादृशो ना ।
सर्वः सर्वं न वेत्ति प्रथितमिदमतो नास्ति मेऽत्रापराधः
शिष्टा ज्ञेयाः स्वयं वै सुविमलमतिभिः सम्यगाराधितार्थैः" ॥

He then connects various nyāyas with the pādas of the

above; namely, यावच्चैलं तावद्व्याख्यानम् and यावत्स्नाता तावत्पुण्यम् with the first pāda, and, the maxim which we are now considering, with the third. I think the second of these should read यावत्स्नानं. In the larger work the reading is यावत्स्नातं. Our present nyāya is found in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 501, as follows:—"विमर्शः प्राह नैवात्र कोपः कार्यस्त्वया यतः। सर्वः सर्वं न जानीते सिद्धमेतज्जगत्त्रये"॥ On the other hand, we have the following query in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 94:—"तथापि चानुभवकल्पनायां सर्वः सर्वदा सर्वं जानाति न तु निश्चिनोतीति किं न स्यात्."

न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यते ॥

If a power is not of itself present [in a person or thing], *it cannot be supplied by another.* In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 24 we have part of a discussion as to Brahman's ability to produce the world without extraneous aid. It is urged that he has this power in himself, just as the power to produce curds resides in milk. The objection is then raised that since curds are not produced without the action of heat, milk is not independent of other agencies, and so the argument breaks down. The reply is as follows:—"यदि स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यान्नैवौष्ण्यादिनापि बलाद्दधिभावमापद्येत । न हि वायुराकाशो वौष्ण्यादिना बलाद्दधिभावमापद्यते । साधनसामग्र्या च तस्य पूर्णता संपाद्यते." On this last clause Ānandagiri says:—"साधनेति। न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यत इति न्यायाद्विद्यमानैव क्षीरादिशक्तिः साधनसामग्र्योपचीयत इत्यर्थः." The nyāya is taken from *S'lokavārtika* ii. 47 (page 59), of which verse it forms the second line. The first line is "स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गम्यताम्." Dr. Gangānāth Jhā's rendering of the verse is as follows:—"You must understand that authoritativeness is inherent in all means of right notion. For a faculty, by itself non-existing, cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency." The whole verse is quoted in *Nyāyakaṇikā*, page 168; and in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 165. Compare with the above maxim the following from *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 29:—"न हि यो यस्य स्वतो धर्मो न संभवति सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात्तस्य संभविष्यति."

न ह्यन्धस्याज्यावेक्षणोपेते कर्मण्यधिकारोऽस्ति ॥

A blind man is not qualified for work involving the examination of butter. This is found in *Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā* 3. 4. 2 (sūtras 18-20), where it is followed by "नापि पङ्गोर्विष्णुक्रमाद्युपेते कर्मण्यधिकारः." It was doubtless taken from *Tantravārtika* .1 4. 24 (page 332), where we read:—नन्वनेनैव न्यायेन यथा शक्नुयादिति वाक्यशेपादन्धादीनामाज्यावेक्षणादिरहितः कर्माधिकारः स्यात्." This sūtra 24 is Jaimini's sūtra 30, under which we have S'abara's "आख्यातशब्दानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी" which see above.

न ह्यन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति ॥

The falseness of one person does not prove somebody else to be false. This is from S'abara 1. 1. 2 (page 5, line 6):—"ननु-सामान्यतोदृष्टं पौरुषेयं वचनं वितथमुपलभ्य वचनसाम्यादिदमपि वितथमवगम्यते। न अन्यत्वात्। न ह्यन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति। अन्यत्वादेव। न हि देवदत्तस्य श्यामत्वे यज्ञदत्तस्यापि श्यामत्वं भवितुमर्हति"॥ See the same in verse in *S'lokavārtika*, page 100; on which Pārthasārathi says:—"न ह्यनाप्तवाक्यस्य वैतथ्ये सत्याप्तवाक्यस्यापि वैतथ्यम्." That Kumārila, however, had a poor opinion of human veracity in general, is shown from the following verse on page 88:—"सर्वदा चापि पुरुषाः प्रायेणानृतवादिनः। यथाद्यत्वे न विस्रंभस्तथातीतार्थकीर्तने." Again, on page 178:—"न च पुंवचनं सर्वं सत्यत्वेनावगम्यते। वागिह श्रूयते यस्मात्प्रायादनृतवादिनी." Compare with this nyāya "न हि खदिरगोचरे परशौ पलाशे द्वैधीभावो भवति," and "अन्यवेश्मस्थिताद्धूमान्न वेश्मान्तरमग्निमत्."

न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यति ॥

It is not the fault of the post that a blind man cannot see it. Vācaspatimis'ra quotes this on page 87 of his *Tātparyaṭīkā*, prefacing it with the words "यथाहुर्निरुक्तकाराः." It will be found on page 112 of the second volume of the *Nirukta*. We meet with it again in the opening sentence of *Kusumāñjali* v.:—"नन्वीश्वरे प्रमाणोपपत्तौ सत्यां सर्वमेतदेवं स्यात्तदेव तु न पश्याम इति चेत्। न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यति."

नागृहीते विशेषणे विशिष्टबुद्धिरुदेति ॥

Particular [or distinguishing] *knowledge does not arise until that which particularizes* [or defines, the object in question] *has been grasped.* It is in this form that the nyāya is found in *Kusumānjali* iii. 21 (page 527), but in *Tantravārtika*, page 258 it appears in the contracted form "नागृहीतविशेषणेतिन्यायेन," and, on page 287, as "अगृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिर्न दृष्टा." In Mādhava's *Nyāyamālāvistara* 3. 1. 6, it is quoted as "नागृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिः," and in *Saptapadārthī*, page 2, line 6, as "नागृहीतविशेषणा विशेष्यबुद्धिः." In his commentary on *Tārkikarakṣā*, Mallinātha twice (namely, on pages 47 and 107) cites the maxim in the contracted form adopted by Kumārila, whilst Raghunāthavarman's version of it is "नाज्ञातविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिर्विशेष्यं संक्रामति."

In *Nyāyasūtravṛitti* ii. 126 (=2. 2. 58) it appears as नागृहीतविशेषणान्याय, and Dr. Ballantyne renders it, "Cognition which does not apprehend the distinction, cannot infer [the nature of] what is to be distinguished." The nyāya occurs five times in *Nyāyamanjarī*, and each time in a different form! The references are as follows:—page 320, line 19; 433, line 4 from bottom; 449, line 3 from bottom; 538, line 6; and 543, line 7.

In Sir Monier Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary विशिष्टबुद्धि is defined as "differenced or distinguishing knowledge (*e. g.* the knowledge of 'a man carrying a staff' which distinguishes him from an ordinary man)"; whilst Molesworth explains विशिष्टज्ञान as "knowledge of an object distinguished or characterized by something (whether a property or an accident) standing out in some speciality (inherent or attached)."

Identical in meaning with the above, though differing somewhat in form, is S'abara's "न ह्यप्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्टं के चन प्रत्येतुमर्हन्ति" (1. 3. 33, page 82).

नासाधितं करणम् ॥

That which itself is not an accomplished fact cannot be an instrument [with which to bring about some other result]. In the *Mīmāṇsāparibhāṣā*, page 31, this nyāya is quoted in the discussion on the expression "अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति". The passage is as follows:—"न च होमस्य प्रत्ययवाच्यायामर्थभावनायां करणत्वात्तन्नामत्वेऽग्निहोत्रेणेति तृतीया स्याज्ज्योतिष्टोमेनेतिवदिति वाच्यं द्वितीयाया एव लक्षणया करणार्थकत्वात् । नासाधितं करणमिति न्यायेनासाधितस्य करणत्वायोगात्." ॥ For a rendering of this, see page xxxi of Prof. Gangānātha Jhā's Introduction to his translation of *Sloka-vārtika.*

Krishṇa Yajvan perhaps took the nyāya from the *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara,* where, in connection with the same subject, under the तत्प्रख्यन्याय, we find the following kārikā :—

"नासाधिते हि धात्वर्थे करणत्वं ततोऽस्य सा ।
साध्यतां वक्ति संस्कारो नैवाशंक्यः क्रियात्वतः" ॥

नासिकाग्रेण कर्णमूलकर्षणन्यायः ॥

The figure of *pulling the root of the ear with the tip of one's nose!* It occurs in Sures'vara's *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtika* 4. 3. 1184, as follows :—

"समस्तव्यस्ततामेवं सति व्याचक्षतेऽत्र ये ।
कर्षन्ति नासिकाग्रेण कर्णमूलं सुखेन ते" ॥

On which Ānandagiri remarks :—"असंभावितार्थवादिनां भ्रान्तत्वं दृष्टान्तेनाह कर्षन्तीति." It may be compared with the acrobat's sitting on his own shoulders, and with the edge of a sword's cutting itself.

निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविदा ॥

What need has a healthy man of one skilled in the science of medicine? "They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." In the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi* (pages 106-7) there is a story about the poet Bāṇa and his brother-in-law the poet Mayūra, who were favourites of the King Bhoja. The former, owing to the curse pronounced by his sister (the wife of the latter), was attacked by leprosy; but being healed by the intervention of the Sun, he appeared at court—to quote from Mr. Tawney's translation—"with his body anointed with golden sandal-wood, and clothed in a magnificent white garment. When the king saw the healthy condition of his body, Mayūra represented that it was all due to the favour of the Sun-god. Then Bāṇa pierced him in a vital spot with an arrow-like speech. 'If the propitiating of a god is an easy matter then do you also display some wonderful performance in this line." Mayūra replied as follows:—
"निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविदा तथापि तव वचः सत्यापयितुं निजपादौ पाणी च छुर्या विदार्य त्वया षष्ठे काव्ये सूर्यः परितोषितोऽहं तु पूर्वस्य काव्यस्य षष्ठेऽक्षरे भवानीं परितोषयामीति प्रतिश्रुत्य सुखासनमासीनश्चण्डिकाप्रासाद-पश्चाद्भागे निविष्टो 'मा भांक्षीर्विभ्रमम्' इति षष्ठेऽक्षरे प्रत्यक्षीकृतचण्डिकाप्रसा-दात्प्रत्यग्रप्रथमानवपुःपल्लवः स्वसंमुखं च तत्प्रसादमालोक्याभिमुखागतैर्नृपति-प्रमुखराजलोकैः कृतजयजयारवो महता महेन पुरं प्राविक्षत्."

As pointed out by Mr. Tawney in a footnote, the poem here ascribed to Mayūra is the *Caṇḍīs'ataka* of which Bāṇa was the author. It was published in the Kāvyamālā for 1887, and the first verse commences thus:—

"मा भांक्षीर्विभ्रमं भ्रूरधर विधुरता केयमास्यास्यरागं
पाणे प्राण्येव नायं कलयसि कलहश्रद्धया किं त्रिशूलम्"।

निषादस्थपतिन्यायः ॥

The topic of *a king who is a Niṣāda by caste.* This forms the subject of Jaimini 6. 1. 51, 52 and is thus expounded by Kunte (in Ṣaḍdars'anacintanikā, page 1788):—"The term *Nishādasthapati* occurs in the Veda. The question is—how is it to be interpreted? Is the term *Nishādasthapati* a Karmadhāraya compound or Tatpuruṣa compound? The Karmadhāraya overrules the Tatpuruṣa; because, in the latter, a case not directly seen has to be understood, and because metonymy is thus involved. A direct statement is always to be preferred to metonymy. The Karmadhāraya makes a direct statement and therefore does not involve metonymy. He who is a Niṣāda is a Sthapati; and therefore a superior Niṣāda is entitled to perform the Raudra sacrifice." In other words, the compound when dissolved is not निषादानां स्थपतिः but निषाद एव स्थपतिः.

In explaining the term ब्रह्मलोक in S'ankara's bhāṣya on *Vedāntasūtra* 1. 3. 15, Vâcaspatimis'ra says (on page 213, line 3 from bottom):—"अत्र तावन्निषादस्थपतिन्यायेन षष्ठीसमासात्कर्मधारयो बलीयानिति स्थितमेव तथापीह षष्ठीसमासनिराकरणेन कर्मधारयस्थापनाय लिङ्गमप्यधिकमस्तीति तदप्युक्तं सूत्रकारेण"। The nyāya is quoted by Rāmānuja in his exposition of the same sūtra, and Dr. Thibaut translates as follows:—"That this explanation of the 'Brahma-world' is preferable to the one which understands by Brahma world 'the world of Brahman' is proved by considerations similar to those by which the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā sūtras prove that 'Nishāda-sthapati' means a headman who at the same time is Nishāda." The nyāya is also explained in full in *Vedāntakalpataru* on this passage, and again in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala.* It is quoted by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 3. 24, and by Nāges'a on Kaiyaṭa 1, 1. 3. For the origin of the Niṣāda, see Manu x. 8.

पञ्जरमुक्तपक्षिन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a bird let loose from its cage.* Used to illustrate the upward flight of the soul when released from the body. It occurs in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 443, as follows :—"ऊर्ध्वगमनं जीवस्य स्वभावः। देहे स्थितिस्तत्प्रतिबन्धककर्माधीनेति मतमाश्रित्योक्तम्। केचित्तु चिरकालशरीरावस्थितप्रयुक्तबन्धमुक्तावूर्ध्वगमनं मन्यन्ते। ते खल्वेवमाहुः। बन्धमुक्तस्योर्ध्वगमनं दृष्टं यथा पञ्जरमुक्तशुकस्य यथा वा वारिनिर्भिन्नपरिणतैरण्डबीजस्य यथा वा दृढपंकलिप्तजलनिमज्जनप्रक्षीणपंकलेपशुष्कालाबूफलस्य." It will be noticed that there are three illustrations in the last clause,—the third being really the जलतुंबिकान्याय, which see above.

पदार्थानुसमयन्यायः ॥

Sir M. Monier-Williams defines it thus :—"The performance of one ritual act for all objects in orderly succession before performing another act for all objects in the same order." When it is not a matter of sacrificial ritual, but merely of the bestowal of gifts, the definition given by Captain Molesworth is more suitable; namely—"The order or method (when a set or number of things is to be given to each individual of a multitude) of giving first one article of the set to each person all round; going round again with another article; and again with a third; and thus, until all the articles composing the set shall have been received by each person." The nyāya summarizes the teaching of Jaimini 5. 2. 1, 2. See काण्डानुसमयन्याय, and Karkācārya on Kātyāyana's *S'rautasūtra* i. 114.

परतन्त्रं बहिर्मनः ॥

As to externals mind is dependent on others. This oft-quoted nyāya would seem to have originated with Maṇḍanamis'ra. It is found in the following verse of his *Vidhiviveka*, page 114:—

"हेत्वभावे फलाभावात्प्रमाणे सति न प्रमा ।
चक्षुराद्युक्तविषयं परतन्त्रं बहिर्मनः" ॥

Students of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha* will remember that the second line is quoted (without mention of its source) in the first chapter of that work, and Prof. Cowell translated it thus—"The eye &c. have their objects as described, but mind externally is dependent on the others." The dependence of *manas* is pointed out in three other passages of *Vidhiviveka,* on pages 120, 161, and 178. The nyāya is found in *Citsukhī* i. 12 (The Paṇḍit, vol. iv, page 513) in the words "न च मनसो बहिरर्थैः सम्बन्धः परतन्त्रं बहिर्मन इति न्यायात्." It is employed also by the author of *Vidyāsāgarī* on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, page 307 :—"रजतज्ञानस्यैन्द्रियकत्ववादी वक्तव्यः किंतन्मानसमुत बहिरक्षजम् । नाद्यो मनसो बहिरर्थेऽस्वातन्त्र्यादेतच्च तत्त्वविवेके सर्वज्ञदूषणप्रस्तावे मण्डनमिश्रैरभिहितम्." He then cites the verse "हेत्वभावे &c." Is this *Tattvaviveka* identical with Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka,* or is it the name given to a section of it?

परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः ॥

This is the first line of *Kusumānjali* iii. 8, the second being "नैकतापि विरुद्धानामुक्तिमात्रविरोधतः" ॥ The following is Professor Cowell's translation of the verse and of a portion of Haridāsa's explanatory comment:—"In the case of contradictories, there can be no middle course; nor can you assume the two contradictories to be identical, because the fact of their contradiction is directly asserted." "'There can be no middle course,' *i. e.* you cannot make some third supposition different from either, from the very fact that they *are* contradictories [and therefore the one or the other must be true]; nor can you assume them to be identical." Raghunātha's explanation of the first line, in his larger work, coincides with this. He says :—"न प्रकारान्तरस्य ताभ्यामन्यस्य प्रकारस्य स्थितिः किन्तु तदन्यतरस्येत्यर्थः" ॥

The nyāya is quoted in the vṛitti on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* iii. 48, and in the last sentence of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* iii (page 561); and the whole verse in the commentary on Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvali*, page 47, and in the second chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*. In *Tattvadīpana*, page 234, line 13, it appears in a somewhat modified form, namely, "परस्परप्रतिस्पर्धिनोरन्यतरनिषेधेऽन्यतरव्यवस्थेति न्यायात्."

पर्जन्यवत् ॥

Like the rain [which falls on all places alike]. It is found in the following passage of *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 2. 9 and 6. 1. 127:— "कृतकारि खल्वपि शास्त्रं पर्जन्यवत् । तद्यथा । पर्जन्यो यावदूनं पूर्णं च सर्वमभिवर्षति"। This is quoted by Nāgojībhaṭṭa under paribhāṣā cxi—पर्जन्यवल्लक्षणप्रवृत्तिः," which Professor Kielhorn translates thus:—"The rules of grammar are like the rain [in this that they are] applied [both where they produce a change and where they do not; just as the rain falls upon that which already is full of water as well as upon that which is empty]."

There is another example of this in the Pāṇini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"प्रकृत्यादिविभागकल्पनावत्सु लक्ष्येषु सामान्यविशेषरूपाणां लक्षणानां पर्जन्यवत्सकृदेव प्रवृत्तौ बहूनां शब्दानामनुशासनोपलंभाच्च." "And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots &c., (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words." The translation is Prof. Cowell's. We meet with it again in a most interesting passage of *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 3. 42, where S'ankara tells us that just as the rain causes the production of barley, rice, shrubs, &c., by its action on the seeds, so God, making use of men's previous works, impels them to either good or evil! There can be little doubt that the mischievous saying, "कर्ता आणि करविता ईश्वर आहे," current among the Marāṭhās, was derived from this source.

On page 226 of Merutunga's work the following verse is quoted as from *Kāmandakīyanītisāra.* It is not to be found, however, in the printed edition of that work, but stands as verse 161 of *Hitopades'a* i :—"पर्जन्य इव भूतानामाधारः पृथिवीपतिः। विकलेऽपि हि पर्जन्ये जीव्यते न तु भूपतौ "॥ "The king is the mainstay of creatures, like the rain-cloud. For even if the raincloud be somewhat wanting, it is possible to live, but not if the king is wanting in any respect" (Tawney, page 138).

पर्णमयीन्यायः ॥

The simile of [the spoon] *made of the Parṇa wood.* Various spoons are used in the sacrifices, as described in the footnote to Professor Eggeling's translation of *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1. 3, 1. 1; and, of these, the *juhū* is *always* made of the wood of the Parṇa (*i. e.* the Palās'a) tree. This is in accordance with *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 3. 5. 7, where the praises of that tree are sung, and blessings promised in connection with the use of the *juhū* made of its wood, as pointed out in S'abara on Jaimini 3. 6. 1–8. The पर्णमयीत्व of the जुहू employed in the sacrifices is therefore used to illustrate something *invariably* present, in contradistinction to that which is so *occasionally,* as in the case of the *godohana.* For a passage containing both of these, see under गोदोहनन्याय. Other examples will be found in *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 61; *Parimala,* pages 624 to 626; and *S'ālikā* page 157.

पलालकूटस्य सादृश्यं कुञ्जरादिना ॥

Seeing resemblance to an elephant in a heap of straw. An illustration of mere semblance of resemblance (सादृश्याभासता). A real likeness is said to be that which stands the test of a close examination. The figure is contained in Kumārila's *S'lokavārtika,* page 446.

"यत्र त्वसदृशादेव कल्पयित्वोपजायते ।
सादृश्यप्रत्ययस्तत्र तदाभासत्वकल्पना ॥ ४० ॥
बाधकप्रत्ययाच्चैषा सादृश्याभासता मता ।
यथा पलालकूटस्य सादृश्यं कुञ्जरादिना ॥ ४१ ॥
समीपस्थोऽपि जानाति सादृश्यं नेति तत्र हि
न बाध्यते समीपादौ यत्तु सादृश्यमेव तत्" ॥ ॥४२ ॥

Prof. Gangānāth Jhā renders the passage thus:—

"40. In a case where a notion of similarity is brought about by means of objects that are not really similar, we have only a (false) semblance of similarity.

41—42. This is said to be a false semblance of similarity, because it is subsequently set aside by an idea to the contrary, *e. g.* the similarity of an elephant in a stack of hay; in which case when one is sufficiently near the stack, he realizes that there is no real similarity between the stack and the elephant. That notion of similarity which is not set aside even on close proximity to the object, is a case of real similarity." Compare the दूरस्थवनस्पतिन्याय.

पश्यस्यद्रौ ज्वलदग्निं न पुनः पादयोरधः ॥

Thou seest the fire burning on the mountain, but not that which is under thy very feet! "Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye?" The above is the first line of Hemacandra's *Parisiṣṭaparvan* i. 382, the second line being "यत्परं शिक्षयस्येवं न स्वं शिक्षयसि स्वयम्." The next verse continues the rebuke:—"का हि पुंगणना तेषां येऽन्यशिक्षाविचक्षणाः । ये स्वं शिक्षयितुं दक्षास्तेषां पुंगणना नृणाम्." The teaching here is akin to that of the भूलिङ्गन्याय, namely "Practise what you preach."

पाटनमन्तरेण विषव्रणानां नोपशान्तिः ॥

Poisoned wounds will not heal without the use of the lancet. This is found in *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara* 3. 8. 4, as follows:—"न हि दुःखरूपं तपो विना दुःखप्रदं पापं नश्यति । यथा लोके पाटनमन्तरेण विषव्रणानां नोपशांतिः" ॥ This is, perhaps, the source of Raghunâtha's व्रणं शिशमयिषोः शस्त्रग्रहणन्यायः which he makes use of thus:—"निरन्तरं दुःखमयसंसारपरिवृत्तिश्रान्तानां जीवानां कंचित्कालं विक्षेपविगमसमुल्लसदात्मानन्दानुभवेन विश्रान्तिं संपादयितुकामस्य तस्य संहाराय तमोग्रहणस्य दुश्चिकित्स्यव्रणपीडितानां व्रणं शिशमयिषोः शस्त्रग्रहणन्यायेन

'निदानज्ञस्य भिषजो रुग्णहिंसां प्रयुञ्जतः ।
न किंचिदपि नैर्घृण्यं घृणैवात्र प्रयोजिका' ॥

इति शिवपुराणे व्याख्यातेन निरतिशयकरुणाम्बुधित्वलिङ्गात्" ॥ To understand this somewhat involved sentence, it is necessary to bear in mind that संपादयितुकामस्य refers to S'iva, whose benevolent intentions towards humanity are the subject of the immediate context. Contrast with the above the following saying of Sures'vara's (in *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtika* 4. 3. 176), "न दाहज्वरनुत्त्यर्थमग्निना स्याद्भिषक्क्रिया."

पाठक्रमन्यायः ॥

The law of *textual sequence.* It forms the subject of Jaimini 5. 1. 4–7. According to the Mīmāṁsā, there are six kinds of sequence; namely, (1) *S'rutikrama*, or 'direct sequence,' which is treated of in the first sūtra of this chapter. It is known as the श्रुतिबलीयस्त्वन्याय, and is regarded as the strongest of the six. Then (2) *Arthakrama*, or 'logical sequence,' which is discussed in sūtra 2, and in which the sequence is determined by the sense rather than by the order of the text. For example, take the sentence "अग्निहोत्रं जुहोत्योदनं पचति," where the boiling of the rice must necessarily precede the offering of the agnihotra, although the former is mentioned first. Again when we read "जाते वरं ददाति, जातमञ्जलिना गृह्णाति, जातमभि-

प्राणिति," the logical sequence, as S'abara shows, is in the reverse order of the textual. Then comes (3) *Pāṭhakrama*, as above, which S'abara illustrates by the following Vedic passage:—"समिधो यजति तनूनपातं यजति इडो यजति बर्हिर्यजति स्वाहाकारं यजति इति." To quote Kunte:—"These are what are called the five Prayāja oblations; and the sequence in which these texts occur shows the order in which they are to be offered. This is the application of what is called Pāṭhakrama, or textual sequence." Under the राजपुरप्रवेशन्याय in the Second Handful, will be found a passage from *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 58 (vārt. 1) which furnishes a good example of the supersession of this kind of sequence by अर्थक्रम. The next is (4) *Pravṛittikrama*, which forms the subject of sūtras 8–12. Kunte calls it 'practical sequence.' "In a series of acts, to be performed upon a series of objects, a beginning is made from some one object; then, in performing all the acts, the same object is acted upon first. This sequence is called Pravṛittikrama, which signifies sequence determined by the conduct of the individual." It is known as the प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्याय. The remaining two varieties are the स्थानक्रम and मुख्यक्रम.

Kunte's notes on this portion are well worth a reference; and much help, too, is to be had from Dr. Thibaut's translation of the *Arthasangraha*, where (on pages 11-15) the six forms of *krama* are explained under प्रयोगविधि.

The use of these technical terms is not confined to the Mīmāṁsakas, but is very common amongst writers on Vedānta also. Four of the above varieties of *krama* are mentioned in *Bhāmatī* 1. 1. 1, pages 47-49, beginning with the words "मा भूदग्निहोत्रयवागूपाकवदार्थः क्रमः &c.," and enlarged upon in *Vedāntakalpataru*, pages 32–34; then, in *Bhāmatī* 4. 3. 6, we read "पाठक्रमादर्थक्रमो बलवानिति यथार्थक्रमं पश्यन्ते सूत्राणि," and so sūtra 12 is next explained, and afterwards sūtra 7. For the *pāṭhakrama* only, see Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 3. 15 (page 620).

पुरस्तादपवादा अनन्तरान्विधीन्बाधन्ते नोत्तरान् ॥

This grammatical nyāya is *paribhāṣā* LIX in Nāgojībhaṭṭa's treatise, and is taken from *Mahābhāṣya* 6. 1. 89 (under vārtika 2). Professor Kielhorn translates as follows:—"*Apavādas* that precede [the rules which teach operations that have to be superseded by the Apavāda-operations] supersede only those rules that stand nearest to them, not the subsequent rules." It is found also in Patanjali 1. 1. 28; 3. 2. 1 (6); 3. 3. 95; 3. 4. 85; 4. 1. 55 (4); 4. 3. 132 (6); 4. 3. 156 (7); 6. 1. 102 (6); 6. 4. 163 (2); and 8. 3. 112. In not one of these examples, however, do the words "नोत्तरान्" appear.

पूर्वं ह्यपवादा अभिनिविशन्ते पश्चादुत्सर्गाः ॥

Special rules are taken into consideration first, and afterwards general rules. "The meaning is this that he who is guided solely by the rules (of grammar) first looks about to find out where the *Apavāda* applies, and having thus ascertained that a particular form does not fall under that (Apavāda), he employs for its formation the general rule." See Dr. Kielhorn's translation of Nāgojī's *paribhāṣā* 62. It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 4. 85 (vārt. 11); 3. 1. 3 (vārt. 10); 3. 2. 124 (vārt. 10); 4. 1. 89 (vārt. 2); 6. 1. 5 (vārt. 2); 6. 1. 161 and 186.

प्रकल्प्य वापवादविषयं तत उत्सर्गोऽभिनिविशते ॥

This is another of Raghunātha's samples of grammatical rules and is closely connected with पूर्वं ह्यपवादाः &c., to which it forms an alternative. Dr. Kielhorn's translation of it, in the *Paribhāṣendus'ekhara*, is as follows:—"Or (we may say that) first all forms which fall under the *Apavāda* are set aside, and that subsequently the general rule is employed (in the formation of the remaining forms)." It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 4. 85 (vārt. 11); 3. 1. 3. (vārt. 10); 3. 2. 124 (vārt. 10); 6. 1. 5. (vārt. 2); 6. 1. 161; and 6. 1. 186. In each case it is immediately preceded by the paribhāṣā पूर्वं ह्यपवादाः &c., the latter standing alone only in 4. 1. 89 (vārt. 2.).

प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः ॥

The base and the suffix jointly convey the meaning which is understood [from the word]. This is found in Patanjali 3. 1. 67, vārtika 2, and the rendering is that which was given me (in 1903) by my learned friend Dr. Kielhorn, who also explained that प्रत्ययार्थं is equivalent to प्रतीयमानार्थं. This seems to be the only reasonable explanation of the term. The nyāya is used in the above form by S'abara on Jaimini 3. 4. 13 (page 320), and 10. 8. 24 (page 677), and appears also in *Tantravartika* 3. 1. 12 (page 686). It is quoted, however, with a slight addition in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 4, line 14, where it becomes "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः प्राधान्येनेति न्यायेन", and (in *Indian Thought* for January 1907, page 51) it is rendered by Dr. Thibaut, "According to the principle 'that the root and the affix of a verb conjointly signify *principally* what the affix denotes',"—a rendering which differs materially from that given above. In this altered form it is found again in the Rāmānuja section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, where Mr. Gough gives as its English equivalent "The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly, and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead." This would seem to be based on an expression of Mādhava's in *Nyāyamālāvistara* 3. 4. 8, namely, "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतस्तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येनेति शाब्दिकैरुद्घोषणात्." To say that whilst the root and the suffix unitedly convey the meaning, the latter is the more important factor, is a very different thing from asserting that the two parts together convey the meaning of one of them! Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, on page 403 of the *Nyāyamanjari*, says truly, "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ परस्परापेक्षमर्थमभिदधाते न च प्रकृत्या प्रत्ययार्थोऽभिधीयते नियोगस्य धातुवाच्यत्वान्न च प्रत्ययेन प्रकृत्यर्थोऽभिधीयते यागादेः लिङ्वाच्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । न च तौ पृथक्पृथक् स्वकार्यं कुरुतः" ॥

One more example of the nyāya may be adduced from *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 1 (page 348), with Prof. Gangānāth Jhā's

translation :—"शास्त्रे तु सर्वत्र प्रत्ययार्थो भावनेति व्यवहारः । तत्रायम-भिप्रायः ।

प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सदा ।
प्राधान्याद्भावना तेन प्रत्ययार्थोऽवधार्यते" ॥

"In the Mīmāṃsā S'āstra, however, the Bhāvanā is always held to be signified by the affix. The sense of this theory may be thus briefly explained. The sense of the affix is always expressed by the root and affix taken together; and as the Bhāvanā is the most important factor in this joint signification, it is held to be signified by the affix."

The word भावना means 'a creative energy,' or 'productive energy', or 'tendency to realize something'. So Dr. Thibaut. In the *Arthasangraha* (page 2) it is defined as "भवितुर्भवनानुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः", "the particular activity of some productive agent (*bhāvayitṛi*) which tends to bring about the existence of something which is going to be (*bhavitṛi*); which is capable of future existence" (Trans p. 3). It is further declared to be twofold, as शाब्दी and आर्थी. For the meaning of these, see, specially, Professor Cowell's translation of the Jaimini section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, page 182.

प्रतिनिधिन्यायः ॥

The rule as to *the substitution* [of one material for another, in a sacrifice]. This subject is dealt with in Jaimini 6. 3. 13-17, the five sūtras being styled "नित्यकर्मणोऽनित्यप्रारब्धकर्मणश्च प्रतिनिधिना समापनाधिकरणम्." Other aspects of प्रतिनिधान are discussed in all the subsequent sūtras of the pāda. Kunte's summary of the teaching of this pāda is well worth reading.

The nyāya occurs in the following passage of S'ankara's bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 40, and I append Dr. Thibaut's translation :—"भोजनलोपेऽप्यद्भिर्वान्येन वा द्रव्येणाविरुद्धेन प्रतिनिधान-

न्यायेन प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्यानुष्ठानमिति." "Even in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered to the Prāṇas has to be performed by means of water or some other not altogether unsuitable material, according to the Mīmāṁsā principle that in the absence of the prescribed material some other suitable material may be substituted." It must not, however, be supposed that the choice of the "suitable material" was left to the sacrificer; the substitute was as rigidly prescribed as that for which it might be substituted. For instance, the juice of the Pūtīka plant was the only allowable substitute for that of the Soma plant, and Nīvāra for rice. Rāmānuja mentions both in *S'rībhāṣya*, page 508, and Patanjali speaks of one, in his discussion of आदेश, in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 56 (vārt. 13). The passages from the two authors stand thus:—"सोमाभावे च पूतीकग्रहणं श्रुतिचोदितं सोमावयवसद्भावादिति न्यायविदो विदुः । व्रीह्यभावे च नीवारग्रहणं व्रीहिभावतः" ॥ (R)

" वेदेऽपि सोमस्य स्थाने पूतीकतृणान्यभिषुणुयादित्युच्यते" ॥ (P)

प्रति प्रधानं गुण आवर्तनीयः ॥

A subordinate act is to be repeated in the case of each principle thing. The nyāya in this form is found in *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara* 3. 1. 7, and in the *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, page 36, in connection with what is termed the ग्रहैकत्वन्याय which is based on the Vedic injunction "दशापवित्रेण ग्रहं संमार्ष्टि." Mādhava says:—"ग्रहमिति द्वितीयया ग्रहस्योद्देश्यतया प्रयोजनवत्तया च प्राधान्यं गम्यते । ग्रहं प्रति गुणः संमार्गः । प्रतिप्रधानं च गुण आवर्तनीय इति न्यायेन यावन्तो ग्रहाः सन्ति ते संमार्जनीयाः" ॥ In *Jaiminīyasūtravṛitti* the nyāya is quoted as "प्रतिप्रधानमङ्गावृत्तिः". Prof. Gangānātha's rendering (on page xxxiii of the Introduction to his translation of *S'lokavārtika*) is, "with regard to each Primary, the Secondary is to be repeated". See the ग्रहैकत्वन्याय in connection with this.

प्रत्यक्षे किमनुमानम् ॥

When there is sense-perception, what need is there of inference? So Raghunātha; but I have nowhere met with the saying in this form. It is a well-known principle however. Kumārila says in *Tantravārtika*, page 87:—"वेदवाक्यानुमानं हि तावदेव प्रवर्तते । तदर्थविषयं यावत्प्रत्यक्षं नोपलभ्यते ॥ प्रत्यक्षे श्रूयमाणे तु न विद्येतानुमानिकम् । न हि हस्तिनि दृष्टेऽपि तत्पदेनानुमिष्यते" ॥ Amalānanda, too, in *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 368:—"प्रत्यक्षे च यागविधावानुमानिकविधिकल्पनाऽनुपपन्ना".

In S'abara 3. 1. 12 (page 216) we read प्रत्यक्षमनुमानाद्बलीयः, but Patanjali points out (in *Mahābhāṣya* 3. 2. 124) that this is not always the case. He says:—"भवति वै प्रत्यक्षादप्यनुमानबलीयस्त्वम् । तद्यथा । अलातचक्रं प्रत्यक्षं दृश्यतेऽनुमानाच्च गम्यते नैतदस्तीति". There are two references to this in *Nyāyamanjarī*. On page 461 (line 7 from bottom) we read:—"यद्यपि च नैष नियमः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्षं बलीय इति त्वरिततरपरिभ्रमितचक्रीभवदलातग्राहिणः प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानबाधितत्वदर्शनादिति &c.". And on page 609 (line 6 from bottom):—"अथ मनुषे नियम एवैष प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्षमेव बलीय इति तदेवानुमानस्य बाधकमुचितं नानुमानान्तरमिति । तदसत् । अलातचक्रादौ प्रत्यक्षमप्यनुमानेनानन्यथासिद्धेन बाध्यत एव । ननु भ्रमणविरतौ परिमितपरिमाणोल्मुकग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमेव तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकं नानुमानमिति । मैवम् । अनवरतपरिभ्रमणसमुद्भूतचक्रावभाससमय एवानुमानेन तद्भ्रान्ततानिश्चयात्" ॥ For अलातचक्र see also *Nyāyasūtra* 3. 2. 59; *Bhāmatī*, page 373, line 15; *S'ālikā*, page 36; and *Vākyapadīya*, i. 131.

With the quotation from Kumārila compare the following from *Nyāyakaṇikā* page 268, and *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 27:—"न हि प्रत्यक्षेण करिणि दृष्टेऽपि चीत्कारेण तमनुमिमते प्रेक्षावन्तः" ॥ S'ankara Mis'ra cites this in his comment on *Vais'eṣikasūtra* 3. 2. 10.

प्रपानकरसन्यायः ॥

The simile of *sherbet.* Used to illustrate the production of some new thing by the union of others, just as sherbet is the result of the commingling of various ingredients. It appears in *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, 46, as follows:—" प्रतीयमानः प्रथमं प्रत्येकं हेतुरुच्यते। ततः संवलितः सर्वो विभावादिः सचेतसाम् । प्रपानकरसन्यायाच्चर्व्यमाणे रसो भवेत् ॥ यथा खण्डमरिचादीनां सम्मेलनादपूर्व इव कश्चिदास्वादः प्रपानकरसे सञ्जायते विभावादिसम्मेलनादिहापि तथेत्यर्थः ". This is meant to show how Flavour is single, though spoken of as resulting from a composition of causes. Dr. Ballantyne translates thus:—"First each reason is mentioned separately as being percei ved; and [then we say] let all this commingled—the Excitants and the rest—constitute, like the [composite] Flavour of sherbet, the flavour tasted by the intelligent. As from the commingling of sugar, pepper &c., a certain unprecedented relish is produced in the shape of the flavour of the sherbet, so is it here also, from the commingling of the Excitants &c., such is the meaning."

The same illustration is found in *Nyāyamanjarī* (page 372) with पानक instead of प्रपानक. " पदार्थेभ्योऽन्य एव वाक्यार्थः पानकादिवत् । यथा पानकं शर्करानागकेशरमरिचादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव यथा च सिन्दूरहरिताललाक्षादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव चित्रं...तथा पदेभ्यो वाक्यं पदार्थेभ्यो वाक्यार्थः" ॥ Also *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 219, line 26.

प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रवाहः केन वार्यते ॥

Who can resist a stream [of argument] *flowing* [steadily on] *because established by proof?* This seems to be the sense of the nyāya as quoted at the beginning of the Ārhata section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha.* The passage is as follows:—" अथ मन्येथाः प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रवाहः केन वार्यत इति न्यायेन यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकमित्यादिना प्रमाणेन क्षणिकतायाः प्रमिततया &c." Professor Cowell renders it thus:—" But the opponent may maintain 'The un-

broken stream (of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it? In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, whatever is, is momentary &c.'" In a footnote to page 62 of his translation of this portion of Sarvadars'anasangraha in *Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques*, Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin has recorded Professor Leumann's comment on the above rendering which he considers inaccurate in respect of the nyāya. The criticism is just,—but, unfortunately, the printer has made a mess of the rendering which the critic proposes to substitute for Mr. Cowell's.

प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि ॥

Unseen influences [springing from actions, and eventually producing certain effects], *however numerous, may be assumed* [as the causes of those effects], *if of established credibility.* This nyāya is the first line of a verse in *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 5, where the important dogma of the existence of *apūrva* is discussed. The second line is "अदृष्टशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो ह्यप्रमाणकः:" ॥ The whole verse is quoted in Sures'vara's *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtika*, page 1124, and again on page 1797; whilst the first line is found in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 437, as follows:—"न चानेकादृष्टकल्पनाभयान्मुख्यार्थपरित्यागो न्याय्यः प्रमाणसिद्धे नियोगपर्यनुयोगानुपपत्तेः । यथाहुः । श्रुतसिद्ध्यर्थमश्रुतोपलब्धौ यत्नवता भवितव्यं न तु श्रुतशैथिल्यमादरणीयमिति । तथा प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि." There is another example in *Citsukhī* i. 23 (Paṇdit, vol. v, page 27):—"एतेनोभयपदलक्षणास्वीकारे गौरवदोषो निरस्तो वेदितव्यः । बुभुत्सितार्थप्रतिपादनप्रयोजनतया गौरवस्यैवोचितत्वात्प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपीति न्यायात्." A third will be found in *Khaṇḍana*, page 74, on which the commentator says, "यत्रादृष्टे प्रमाणं प्रवर्तते तददृष्टमपि...प्रामाणिकैरभ्युपगम्यते." See, too, *Tattvadīpana*, page 416, and *Bhāmatī*, page 463.

Raghunāthavarman gives the verse in a different form. According to him, the first line is "बालाग्रशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो निष्प्रमाणकः," whilst "प्रमाणवन्ति &c." is the second. In the numbered part of his larger work it is called the बालाग्रशतभागोऽपि nyāya; but, towards the end of the volume, he quotes (without acknowledgment) the above-cited passage of *Citsukhī* (together with a good deal of the context) which contains the nyāya in its proper form. On page 514 of his translation of the *Tantra-vārtika*, Prof. Gangānātha Jhā renders the whole verse thus:—"It is a rule, in all cases, that a large number of unseen agencies may always be assumed, when all of them are justified by some authority; while even the hundredth part of an unseen agency should not be assumed, if there is no authority for it."

It may be well to call attention here to this transcendental power *adṛṣṭa*, or *apūrva*, invented by the philosophers in order to account for present things without divine intervention. In his article on Mīmāṁsā (*Essays*, vol. i, page 343), Colebrooke says:—"The subject which most engages attention throughout the *Mīmāṁsā*, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. A *virtue* meantime subsists, unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world, the relative effect. That unseen virtue is termed *apūrva*, being a relation superinduced, *not before* possessed." Goldstucker (s. v. अपूर्व) quotes Kumārila to the effect that Mīmāṃsakas apply that term *exclusively* to the unseen influence which follows a *sacrificial* act; that attending action of other kinds being styled संस्कार. The passage will be found in *Tantravārtika* page 367. A helpful description of *apūrva* is given also in *Rational Refutation of Hindu Philosophical Systems* (pages 149 and 150), where it is rendered by Fitzedward Hall "requitative efficacy." In K. M, Banerjea's excellent work *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*.

page 140, अदृष्ट is defined as follows:—"Technically, in the usage of philosophers, it means a power or influence inhering in things both animate and inanimate. As inherent in the former it implies an unseen power, both intellectual and active; as inherent in the latter it signifies a material power, perhaps partly the effect of previous combinations and motions......This unseen moving power in men is again the consequence of works done in a previous life, and hence it stands sometimes for *dharma* and *adharma* (virtue and vice) and *karma* (works)." I imagine that it would tax the ingenuity of even a Mīmāṃsaka to produce *proof* of अदृष्ट and its working; yet they tell us that it is not to be accepted without proof!

प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ॥

Even a stupid person does not adopt a course of action without a motive. This oft-quoted line is found in the *S'lokavārtika* (page 653) in connection with an argument regarding a Creator of the universe. The need of a motive for action is pointed out on page 4 also of the same work. The following passage from *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 191, is a reminiscence of Kumārila's argument that if the Creator acted without a motive his intelligence would be at fault:—"किं किमपि प्रयोजनमनुसन्धाय जगत्सर्गे प्रवर्तते प्रजापतिरेव वा । निष्प्रयोजनायां प्रवृत्तावप्रेक्षापूर्वकारित्वादुन्मत्ततुल्योऽसौ भवेत् " ॥ On page 339 of the *Nyāyakaṇikā* Vācaspati Mis'ra says:—"प्रेक्षावतां हि प्रवृत्तिः प्रयोजनवत्ताव्याप्ता प्रयोजनवत्ताभावे न भवति शिंशपावत्त्वमिव तरुत्वाभाव इत्यर्थः " ॥

We find the nyāya quoted in full by Ānandagiri in his comment on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 1. The two passages are the following:—"तत्त्रिगुणं प्रधानं मृद्वदचेतनं चेतनस्य पुरुषस्यार्थं साधयितुं स्वभावेनैव विचित्रेण विकारात्मना विवर्तत इति ॥" "चेतनस्येति । अर्थशब्दो भोगापवर्गार्थः । अचेतनस्य प्रयोजनपरिज्ञानाभावादप्रवृत्तिः । प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य मन्दोऽपि न प्रवर्तत इति न्यायादित्याशंक्याह स्वभावेनेति."

Patanjali (in *Mahābhāṣya* 3. 1. 26, vārt. 14) tells us that with whole classes of people *the motive* which actuates them is a purely selfish one. He says:—

"नेह कश्चित्परोऽनुग्रहीतव्य इति प्रवर्तते। सर्वे इमे स्वभूत्यर्थं प्रवर्तन्ते। ये तावदेते गुरुशुश्रूषवो नाम तेऽपि स्वभूत्यर्थमेव प्रवर्तन्ते पारलौकिकं नो भविष्यतीह च नः प्रीतो गुरुरध्यापयिष्यतीति। तथा यदेतद्दासकर्मकरं नामैतेऽपि स्वभूत्यर्थमेव प्रवर्तन्ते भक्तं चेलं च लप्स्यामहे परिभाषाश्च न नो भविष्यन्तीति। तथा य एते शिल्पिनो नाम तेऽपि स्वभूत्यर्थमेव प्रवर्तन्ते वेतनं च लप्स्यामहे मित्राणि च नो भविष्यन्तीति" ॥

Compare a passage from the same scurce under the nyāya "न हि विधिशतेनापि &c."

Bhartṛihari reproduces Patanjali's view in the following verse (*Vākyapadīya* iii. page 255):—

"निमित्तेभ्यः प्रवर्तन्ते सर्व एव स्वभूतये।
अभिप्रायानुरोधेऽपि स्वार्थस्यैव प्रसिद्धये" ॥

प्रस्तरप्रहरणन्यायः ॥

The rule as to *the throwing into the sacrificial fire of a handful of Darbha grass.* Kunte says:—"The Prastaraprahararaṇanyāya is well known among the Mīmāṁsakas. Prastara is a handful of Darbha-grass ready for use before a sacrifice is begun. It is spread on the sacrificial ground (Vedi) and serves as a seat for the sacrificial vessels. When a sacrifice is finished it is thrown into the sacrificial fire as an offering. A Vaidika text states.—'The handful of grass is to be thrown into the fire with the Sūktavāka.'" The nyāya forms the subject of Jaimini 3. 2. 11-14 which is otherwise termed "सूक्तवाकस्य प्रस्तरप्रहरणाङ्गताधिकरणम्." The question which has to be decided is thus put by the author of the *S'āstradīpikā*:—
"दर्शपूर्णमासयोः श्रूयते सूक्तवाकेन प्रस्तरं प्रहरतीति। तत्र संशयः। किं प्रस्तरप्रहरणस्य सूक्तवाकस्य च कालार्थः संयोगोऽथवाङ्गाङ्गिभावः"।

The decision is that the Sūktavāka mantra is subordinate to the act of offering up the grass, whilst the latter serves the double purpose of a resting-place for the vessels and an offering to the gods.

The term प्रतिपत्ति which is found in sūtra 14 is thus explained by Kunte:—"The rule is that all things connected with a sacrifice are somehow or other to be used in performing the same; nothing is to be thrown away, nothing is to be preserved. The final disposal of sacrificial things for the sake of getting rid of them is called Pratipatti."

प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्यायः ॥

See this explained under पाठक्रमन्याय.

फलवत्सहकारन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a fruitful mango-tree.* Such a tree not only produces luscious fruit, but also affords shade and fragrance for the weary traveller in the hot season. Some of us know from experience how charming a camping-ground a mango-grove is! Raghunātha's explanation of the nyāya in connection with the worship of Gaṇes'a is as follows:—"एकफलाकांक्षया तदाराधनमन्यदपि फलं प्रयच्छतीति विवक्षायां तु फलवत्सहकारन्यायः । यथा सहकार 'आम्रश्चूतो रसालोऽसौ सहकारोऽतिसौरभ' इत्यभिधानादतिसौरभ आम्रवृक्षोऽतिमधुरपक्वफलनमितशाखः स्वमुपसन्नाय छायार्थिने जनाय फलं परिमलं चाप्रार्थितमपि ददाति तथा प्रकृतेऽपीत्यर्थः ॥" The quotation here is from *Amarakoṣa.* IV. 33 (page 87). The thought expressed in the above seems to be that of *Āpastambadharmasūtra* 1. 7. 20. 3. *viz.* "आम्रे फलार्थे निर्मिते छाया गन्ध इत्यनूत्पद्येते," which see above.

बर्हिर्न्यायः ॥

The question of *Kus'a grass.* This is based on the sentence "बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामि," "I cut grass as a seat for the gods," which forms the subject of Jaimini 3. 2. 1. 2. The question is whether the word बर्हिस् is to be taken in its primary sense or in a secondary one; and the conclusion is "मुख्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्रत्ययः," which see above in the form गौणमुख्ययोः &c.

बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेतः ॥

The mind of even those who are highly educated is distrustful of itself. This is the second line of the second verse in *S'akuntalānāṭak.* In *Tārkikarakṣā* (page 208), in an exposition of वाद, we find the following:—"वादे तु दैवादागताः सदस्या वादिप्रतिवादिभ्यां संप्रतिपत्त्या प्रामादिककथाभासशंकाव्यावर्तनायाङ्गीक्रियन्ते न जल्पवितण्डयोरिव प्रमेयादिव्यवस्थापनार्थमङ्गत्वेनोपादीयन्ते" ॥ On which, Mallinātha comments as follows:—"वादे विशेषमाह वादे त्विति । दैवादागतानां वा किं प्रयोजनमत आह प्रामादिकेति । बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेत इति न्यायादिति भावः" ॥

For the benefit of any who may consult the original, I may add that the quotation from the *Nyāyavārtika* which immediately follows in Varadarāja's text, is found on page 161 of that work; and that from Vācaspatimis'ra's ṭikā, on page 224.

बहुराजकदेशन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a country with several kings* [working in opposition to one another]. It occurs in chap. XIX of the *Anubhūtiprakās'a*, which deals with the Kena Upaniṣad. The passage is contained in verses 12 and 13:—

"वाक्चक्षुःश्रोत्रमुख्यानि प्रेरयेत्करणानि कः ।
ईश्वरश्चेत्किमेकोऽसौ बहवोऽमीत्युतेर्यताम् ॥
प्रवर्त्यानामनन्तत्वाद्वैलक्षण्याच्च नैकता ।
नैकमत्यं बहुत्वे स्याद्बहुराजकदेशवत्" ॥

The nyāya is sufficiently explained by the example. Raghunātha links it with the बहुवृकाकृष्टमृगन्याय which is otherwise unknown to me.

बहूनामनुग्रहो न्याय्यः ॥

The association of many is good policy. Raghunāthavarman explains thus:—"अनुग्रहः साहाय्यम्। न्याय्यो न्यायादनपेतोऽर्थात्तदुपेतः कार्यसाधक इति यावत्," and then quotes *Pancatantra* i. 331 by way of illustration:—"बहूनामप्यसाराणां मेलनं कार्यसाधकम्। तृणैः संपाद्यते रज्जुस्तया नागोपि बध्यते"॥ For the many variants of this verse see *Indische Sprüche* 4425, and Peterson's *Subhāshitāvali* 2742. The maxim is found in *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara* 7. 1. 5, and in Nāges'a on Kaiyaṭa, page 16.

बालस्य प्रदीपकलिकाक्रीडयैव नगरदाहः ॥

The burning of a city just by a child's playing with the wick of a lamp. "Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth." I assume that कलिका means the bud-like charred excresence which often forms on the top of a wick in an open oil-light. The saying is found in *Kusumānjali* v. 3, page 89:—"ननु तस्य सर्वदा सर्वत्राविशेषे कार्यस्य सर्वदोत्पत्तिप्रसंग इति निरपेक्षेश्वरपक्षे दोषः, सापेक्षे उपेक्षणीय एवास्त्विति बालस्य प्रदीपकलिकाक्रीडयैव नगरदाहः परन्तु तत्र स्थेमभाजो जगत एवाकारणत्वप्रसङ्गात्."

Udayana seems to use the phrase ironically, but I do not quite grasp the drift of this. We meet with प्रदीपकलिका again in *Syādvādamanjarī*, page 157:—"सा च क्षणसन्ततिस्तद्दर्शनप्रसिद्धा प्रदीपकलिकावन्नवनवोत्पद्यमाना."

बुभुक्षितस्य किं निमन्त्रणाग्रह उत्कण्ठितस्य किं केकारवश्रावणम् ॥

What need has a hungry man of a pressing invitation [to eat]; *why direct the attention of a longing one to the cry of*

the peacock? In the Kumārapāla chapter of *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 212, we are told that that king having given Hemacandra (a Jain) a pressing invitation to join him in a pilgrimage to the temple of Somanātha (dedicated to S'iva), the hermit replied as follows:—"बुभुक्षितस्य किं निमन्त्रणाग्रह उत्कण्ठितस्य किं केकारवश्रावणमिति लोकरूढेस्तपस्विनामधिकृततीर्थाधिकाराणां को नाम नृपतेरत्र निर्बन्धः" ॥ "What need is there to show much zeal about inviting one who is hungry? Why make one who is longing, listen to the cry of the peacock? So runs the popular proverb, and, in accordance with it, I ask, why does your Majesty exert yourself to press hermits, whose very profession is the visiting of sacred places?" This is Mr. Tawney's rendering, on page 130 of his translation. Indian writers often tell us that the cries of the peacock intensify the longings of separated lovers! For example, *Raghuvaṁs'a* xiii 27:—"स्निग्धाश्च केकाः शिखिनां बभूवुर्यस्मिन्नसह्यानि विना त्वया मे."

ब्राह्मणग्रामन्यायः ॥

The figure of *a village in which Brāhmans abound.* This is in Raghunatha's list, but hardly deserves a place amongst nyāyas. In *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 188, a distinction is drawn between the expression प्रचुरब्राह्मणो ग्रामः and ब्राह्मणप्रचुरो ग्रामः, the meaning, in the former case, being a village in which Brāhmans are more numerous than in some other village, and, in the latter, a village in which the Brāhmans outnumber the other castes. The passage is as follows:—"प्राचुर्यस्य धर्मिविशेषणत्वेन निर्देश एव व्यधिकरणसजातीयाल्पत्वस्य निरूपकत्वं दृष्टम् । यथा प्रचुरब्राह्मणो ग्राम इत्यत्र प्राचुर्यस्य ग्रामान्तरगतब्राह्मणाल्पत्वं निरूपकं दृष्टमिति । तस्य स्वधर्मिविशेष्यत्वे तु समानाधिकरणविजातीयाल्पत्वमेव निरूपकमत एव ब्राह्मणप्रचुरो ग्राम इति प्रयोगे तद्ग्रामगतशूद्राल्पत्वापेक्षं प्राचुर्यं प्रतीयते." See also *Tantravārtika*, p. 1066 line 2. Akin to this is the सद्ग्रामन्याय.

भर्छुन्यायः ॥

The illustration afforded by *Bharchu*. We learn from the commentary on *Sankṣepas'ārīraka* i. 14 that Bharchu was a Brāhman and highly esteemed by the king of his country. This, however, brought him into disfavour with the jealous hangers-on at the royal court; and, to get rid of him, they one day blind-folded him and carried him off to a forest; at the same time telling the king that he was dead and had become a goblin! After a long time he returned to the town in company with some foresters, but was prevented by his enemies from entering it. On one occasion, when in a pleasure-ground outside the city, the king actually saw him; but, in consequence of the false statement that had been made, he supposed it to be his ghost! Eventually the whole thing came to light, and the king discovered that he had been deceived and that the supposed ghost was really his old protégè Bharchu himself.

The verse containing the nyāya is as follows:—

"पुरुषापराधमलिना धिषणा
निरवद्यचक्षुरुदयापि यथा ।
न फलाय भर्छुविषया भवति
श्रुतिसंभवापि तु तथात्मनि धीः" ॥

As under the next verse we have a further short comment on the illustration, and as the verse itself furnishes another good example of the *maṇimantranyāya* in the First Handful, I subjoin both:—

"पुरुषापराधविगमे तु पुनः
प्रतिबन्धकव्युदसनात्सफला ।
मणिमन्त्रयोरपगमे तु तथा
सति पावकाद्भवति धूमलता" ॥

"मानमेययोरुपनिषद्ब्रह्मणोर्निर्दोषत्वात्परिशेषात्प्रमातृदोष एव फलप्रतिबन्धक इति

शास्त्रीयेण विचारेण तस्यापगमे सत्यप्रामाण्यशंकारूपप्रतिबन्धाभावात्पुनस्तस्मादेव निर्दोषवेदवाक्यात्सफला धीरुदेति यथा भर्तुर्दुर्जनैररण्ये प्रक्षिप्तो जीवन्नेव पुनरागत इत्युपपत्त्या भर्तृज्ञानाप्रामाण्यशंकाकारणपुरुषापराधविगमे सति तद्विषया भर्तुरेवायमिति सफला धीरुदेति."

Raghunāthavarman gives a different version of the story, but names no authority in support of it. He calls it a "लौकिकी गाथा."

भस्मन्याज्याहुतिः ॥

Offering clarified butter on ashes [instead of on the sacrificial fire]. An illustration of wasted, or misdirected, effort. *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 240:—"अकार्यवारणोद्युक्तो मूढे यः परिखिद्यते । वाग्विस्तरो वृथा तस्य भस्मन्याज्याहुतिर्यथा ॥ नोपदेशशतेनापि मूढोऽकार्यान्निवर्त्यते । शीतांशुग्रसनात्केन राहुर्वाक्यैर्निवारितः" ॥ There is another instance in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* i. 58:—"दध्यौ चैवं स राजर्षिरहो तेषां कुमन्त्रिणाम् । सन्मानो यो मयाकारि स भस्मनि हुतं ध्रुवम्."

The nyāya was doubtless derived from *Chhāndogya Upanishad* 5. 24. 1:—"स य इदमविद्वानग्निहोत्रं जुहोति यथाङ्गारानपोह्य भस्मनि जुहुयात्तादृक्तत्स्यात्." It is found also in *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* i. 16:—

"अन्तरेण विधिं मोहाद्यः कुर्यात्साम्परायिकम् ।
न तत्स्यादुपकाराय भस्मनीव हुतं हविः" ॥

भाण्डानुसारिस्नेहवत् ॥

The simile of [a remnant of] *oil adhering to* [the sides of] *a vessel* [out of which oil has been poured]. In the bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 1. 8, there is a lengthy and important discussion as to whether, on returning to earth, in some new birth, after a residence in the moon, a man brings with him a remnant of the works which took him there,—this remnant being techni

cally styled *anus'aya*. S'ankara affirms that he does, and says:—
"कः पुनरनुशयो नामेति । केचित्तावदाहुः । स्वर्गार्थस्य कर्मणो भुक्तफलस्यावशेषः कश्चिदनुशयो नाम भाण्डानुसारिस्नेहवत् । यथा हि स्नेहभाण्डं रिच्यमानं न सर्वात्मना रिच्यते भाण्डानुसार्येव कश्चित्स्नेहशेषोऽवतिष्ठते तथानुशयोऽपीति" ॥
The question is then asked, why does he not remain in that blissful region until the whole of his merit is exhausted? The answer is, that, just as a servant who has long served in a king's household, finds his wardrobe at last reduced to the slender proportions of a pair of shoes and an umbrella, and is therefore unfit to continue in that exalted position, so, too, a man is unworthy of a residence in the moon who has only a small balance of merit remaining to his credit! Here is this unique reply in S'ankara's own words:—"ननु निरवशेषकर्मफलोपभोगाय चन्द्रमण्डलमारूढाः । बाढम् । तथापि स्वल्पकर्मावशेषमात्रेण तत्रावस्थातुं न लभ्यते । यथा किल कश्चित्सेवकः सकलैः सेवोपकरणै राजकुलमुपसृप्तश्चिरप्रवासात्परिक्षीणबहूपकरणश्छत्रपादुकादिमात्रावशेषो न राजकुलेऽवस्थातुं शक्नोति । एवमनुशयमात्रपरिग्रहो न चन्द्रमण्डलेऽवस्थातुं शक्नोतीति."

This is a portion of the system which is regarded as the highest flight of the Indian mind, and to which some restless folk in Europe and America are betaking themselves, in order to find rest for their souls! There are not a few in India to-day, however, who have found that rest by turning from these gropings in the dark, to the midday light afforded by an accredited revelation. To quote a modern writer:—"The painful, toilsome, searching of the creature into things too high for it, only ends in perplexity and bitter disappointment."

भाण्डालेख्यन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the design on a jar*. Used, apparently, of something variable at will. It is found in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* (page 289 of Medical Hall Press edition) in the following passage:—
"अथान्यत्रास्तु यद्वा तद्वा करणं प्रमाविवक्षितजातिविशेषव्यपदेशकं प्रमाणम् ।

चतस्रः खल्विमाः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमितयो भिन्नबुद्धिव्यपदेशभाजः । न च प्रमाता प्रमेयं वा तद्भेदहेतुः । प्रमाणानि तु यथायथं चतसृष्वसाधारणानीति भिन्नबुद्धिव्यपदेशनिबन्धनानीति । मैवम् । विवक्षितपदं तावल्लक्षणे भाण्डालेख्यमिव पुरुषेच्छानामनियतविषयत्वात्" ॥

The commentator S'ankara Mis'ra explains the nyāya thus:— "भाण्डालेख्यमिवेति । यथालेख्यं रेखोपरेखादि सर्वभाण्डसाधारणं न भाण्डविशेषलक्षणं तथा पुरुषाधीनविवक्षापि न विशेषिकेत्यर्थः" ॥

In the edition of S'rī-Harṣa's work, however, now in course of publication (together with the commentary *Vidyāsāgarī*) in the Chaukhambā Sanskrit Series (page 528), the form of the simile differs, and a different explanation of it is given:— "मैवमिति । भण्डो विप्रलम्भकस्तस्यालेख्यं भण्डालेख्यम् । देवदत्तस्य जाया किमपत्यं जनयिष्यतीति पृष्टे पुत्रो न पुत्रीति विप्रलम्भकस्य कुड्योपर्यालेख्यं न विषयविशेषनियतं निषेधस्योभयथा योजयितुं शक्यत्वात्तथा विवक्षितपदमपि पुरुषेच्छानामनियतत्वेन चतुष्टयजातीयस्य नियमेन प्रत्येतुमशक्यत्वात्कस्यचिच्चतस्रः प्रमितयो विवक्षिताः कस्यचित्पञ्चेति" ॥

The simile is found in *Tātparyaṭīkā* (page 496, last line) as भाण्डालेख्य.

भूतं भव्यायोपदिश्यत इति न्यायः ॥

It is declared [by Mīmāṃsakas] *that an accomplished* [sacrificial] *act is* [not an end in itself, but] *for the bringing about of a result in the future* [such as the attainment of Heaven &c.]. And this, they say, necessitates belief in an *Apūrva* as a connecting link between the two. See the arguments for and against this theory, in Professor Gangānātha Jhā's translation of *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 5. Most of us will be thankful for the aid of so able an interpreter of the teaching of that terribly difficult book!

The nyāya is found, in slightly different form, in the

Sankṣepas'ārīraka i. 143; and, in its usual form, in the commentary. I quote only the second half of the verse :—

"भूतं भव्यप्रधानं भवति हि न पुनः स्वप्रधानं कदाचि-
च्छास्त्रस्थाः शब्दशक्तिस्थितिनिपुणधियो विस्तरादेवमाहुः" ॥

"भूतं भव्यायोपदिश्यत इति जैमिनिशबरस्वामिनोर्मतं तौ च वेदार्थनिर्णयेऽधिकृताविति तदुक्तमेव ग्रहीतुमुचितमित्यभिप्रेत्याह । भूतमिति । सिद्धमित्यर्थः । भव्यं साध्यं प्रधानं यस्य भव्यशेषमित्यर्थः" ॥

In verse 312 of the same chapter we meet with it again, and also in the altered form in which a Vedantist would apply it to his system :—

"भव्याय भूतमिति किंच विधिप्रधाने
काण्डे नयोऽयमिह तद्विपरीतमाहुः ।
भूताय भव्यमिति भूतपरं हि सर्वं
वेदावसानमिति सूत्रकृदाचचक्षे" ॥

"भव्याय भूतमिति । विधिः प्रधानं प्रतिपिपादयिषितो यस्मिन् काण्डे तस्मिन् । इह ब्रह्मकाण्डे । तद्विपरीतं भूतभव्यन्यायविपरीतम् । तद्वैपरीत्यमेवाह । भूताय भव्यमिति । हिर्हेतौ । यतः भूतपरं सत्यसिद्धब्रह्मपरं वेदावसानं वेदान्तं सूत्रकृदाचचक्षे समन्वयसूत्रप्रमुखैः सूत्रैरुक्तवानतो भाष्यकारादय एवमाहुरित्यर्थः" ॥
The above extracts will be found in *The Paṇḍit*, vol. iv, page 583; and vol. v. page 473.

The nyāya occurs again in i. 395 (Paṇḍit, vol. vi. p. 167) in a context dealing with *bhāvanā*, that topic so dear to the Mīmāṃsaka, for a right understanding of which nothing could be better than the perusal of Dr. Thibaut's translation of the *Arthasangraha*, pp. 3-5. Verse 482 of the same chapter contains a fourth example. It appears also in *Tattvadīpana*, page 377, line 7 from bottom, and page 427, line 9 from bottom; also in the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakās'a*, page 16, section 36.

भूमिरथिकन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the man who* [in order to become proficient] *makes drawings of a war-chariot on the ground.* This nyāya is found in S'abara's bhāshya on Jaimini 7. 2. 15, and again (in conjunction with शुष्केष्टिन्याय) in 9. 2. 13. The latter passage is as follows :—" यत्तावदुपाध्यायः शिष्यसन्निधावधीते तद्ग्रहणार्थम् । यच्छिष्यस्तद्धारणार्थम् । ग्रहणधारणे प्रयोगार्थे भूमिरथिकवत् शुष्केष्टिवद्वा । तद्यथा भूमिरथिको भूमौ रथमालिख्य शिक्षां करोति संग्रामे प्राशुभावो भवितेति यथा च छात्रः शुष्केष्टीः प्रयुंक्ते प्रयोगे प्राशुकर्मा भवितास्मीति एवमेतद्द्रष्टव्यम्" ॥

In his *Laukikanyāyaratnākara* (page 186 *b* of India office MS. 582) Raghunāthavarman applies these two nyāyas and the शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्याय as follows:—"परमतनिराकरणं च शिष्याणामभ्यासदार्ढ्येनासंभावनादिसमुच्छेदाय न तु परद्वेषेणेति विवक्षायां भूमिरथिकन्यायः शुष्केष्टिन्यायः शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्यायश्च प्रवर्तते" ॥ His explanations of the three are taken from *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara* 9. 1. 6 and 9. 2. 2.

भ्रष्टावसरन्यायः ॥

The law that [something does not take place] *when the occasion* [for its taking place] *has once gone.* This is Prof. Kielhorn's rendering of the nyāya as it occurs under Nāgojibhaṭṭa's *Paribhāṣā* lxiv. The sentence is as follows—" अत एव निर्देशाद्भ्रष्टावसरन्यायस्यात्र शास्त्रे नाश्रयणम् । ध्वनितं चेदमिको गुण इति सूत्रे भाष्य इति भाष्यप्रदीपोद्द्योते निरूपितम् "॥ The reference is to the *Uddyota* on 1. 1. 3, and the nyāya will be found in vol. i. pages 185, 186, 190.

There is an instance of it in *Tantravārtika* 3. 5. 46 (page 1060):—" यदपि यजमानस्य भ्रष्टावसरं क्रियमाणं विगुणं भवतीति तदपि गुणलोपे मुख्यस्येत्यनेन विरुद्धम्. " The nyāya is expressive of *a lost opportunity.*

मदशक्तिवत् ॥

The simile of *the power of an intoxicant.* It is employed by S'ankara in his bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 53:—"अत्रैके देहमात्रात्मदर्शिनो लोकायतिका देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽभावं मन्यमानाः समस्तव्यस्तेषु बाह्येषु पृथिव्यादिष्वदृष्टमपि चैतन्यं शरीराकारपरिणतेषु भूतेषु स्यादिति संभावयन्तस्तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं मदशक्तिवद्विज्ञानं चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुष इति चाहुः" ॥ Ānandagiri comments on the latter part thus:—"मदेति। यथैकैकस्मात्ताम्बूलादेरदृष्टापि मदशक्तिः संघाते दृश्यते तथेदं ज्ञानमेकैकस्मिन्नदृष्टमपि देहाकारपरिणतभूतेषु संहतेषु भवतीति चाहुरिति योजना." In the Lokāyatika section of *Ṣaḍdars'anasamuccaya*, kārikā 94 reads thus:—"पृथ्व्यादिभूतसंहत्यां तथा देहादिसंभवः। मदशक्तिः सुराङ्गेभ्यो यद्वत्तद्वत्स्थितात्मता." See, too, *S'ālikā*, page 146, line 7 from bottom.

The illustration is found also in *Nyāyamanjarī* (page 439, line 4 from bottom):—"यत्तु मदशक्तिवदित्युक्तं तत्र मदशक्तेर्दृष्टत्वादभ्युपगमो न तु ज्ञानस्य तत्र दर्शनम्."

मधु पश्यसि दुर्बुद्धे प्रपातं नानुपश्यसि ॥

O foolish one! thou seest the honey but dost not see the precipice. This is the second line of *S'āntiparva* cccxi. 7. (cccx Bombay edn.), the first being "स्वादुकामुक कामानां वैतृष्ण्यं किं न गच्छसि." Ānandabodhācārya quotes it in his *Nyāyamakaranda* (page 77) as "मधु पश्यसि दुर्बुद्धे प्रपातं किं न पश्यसि." The editor of that work was apparently unaware of the existence of the passage in the Mokṣadharma, for he considered the आभाणक to be based on the following verse of the *Devībhāgavata*:—"मधु पश्यति मूढात्मा प्रपातं नैव पश्यति। करोति निन्दितं कर्म नरकान्न बिभेति च."

Thanks to the St. Petersburg Lexicon, we can refer to five other passages of the Mahābhārat where the same illustration

is found. In *Vanaparva* ccxxxv. 21 (Calc.), we read:—“मधु प्रपश्यन्ति न तु प्रपातं यद्द्यूतमालंब्य हरन्ति राज्यम्.” In *Udyogaparva* L. 27:—“विषमं नावमन्यन्ते प्रपातं मधुदर्शिनः। संयुगं ये गमिष्यन्ति नररूपेण मृत्युना.” In *Dronaparva* Li. 11:—“न लुब्धो बुध्यते दोषान्मोहाल्लोभात्प्रवर्तते। मधुलिप्सुर्हि नापश्यं प्रपातमहमीदृशम्.” Again in cxxxiii. 10:—“धनं धनेश्वरस्येव हृत्वा पार्थस्य मे सुतः। मधुप्रेप्सुरिवाबुद्धिः प्रपातं नावबुध्यते.” Lastly, in *Strīparva* i. 37:—“मधु यः केवलं दृष्ट्वा प्रपातं नानुपश्यति। स भ्रष्टो मधुलोभेन शोचत्येवं यथा भवान्.”

Compare the following from *Sāstradīpikā* 3. 6. 3, page 340:—“यो हि मधुन्येव दत्तदृष्टिर्दुर्बलां शाखामधिरोहति तस्य विनिपात एव भवति। तद्वदिहापि। ‘मधुदृष्टिवदेवास्य गुणकामं प्रपश्यतः। क्रियाफलविनाशात्मा विनिपातः प्रसज्यते.”

मध्येऽपवादाः पूर्वान्विधीन्बाधन्ते नोत्तरान् ॥

In the *Paribhāṣendus'ekhara*, this paribhāṣā stands between पुरस्तादपवादाः &c., and अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा &c., which see above Professor Kielhorn's translation of the present one is as follows:—“*Apavādas* that are surrounded (by rules which teach operations that have to be superseded by the *Apavāda*-operations), supersede only those rules that precede, not those that follow, them.” “The reason for (the validity of) this Paribhāṣā is this that (an *Apavāda*, when it has become effective) by superseding the rule which presents itself first, no longer wants (to supersede something else).” It appears in *Mahābhāṣya* 3. 2. 1 (vārt. 6); 4. 1. 55 (vārt. 4); 4. 1. 114 (vārt. 4 and 6); 4. 3. 132 (vārt. 6); 4. 3. 156 (vārt. 7); 6. 1. 102 (vārt. 6); 6. 1. 166; 6. 3. 68 (vārt. 5); 6. 4. 148 (vārt. 5); and 7. 2. 44 (vārt. 4). In no case, however, are the words नोत्तरान् found in the paribhāṣā.

मन्दविषन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a slow-poison.* It forms nyāya 150 of the Pūrvabhāga of *Laukikanyāyaratnākara*, and is used in opposition to तीव्रविषन्याय as follows:—"एवं हि संशयादिनिवृत्तिर्मन्दविषन्यायेन सुकरा। बोधादार्ढ्ये प्रतिवाद्यापादितं तु संशयादि तीव्रविषन्यायेन दुष्परिहरं स्यात्। सद्योभुक्तं विषं मन्दमन्यथा तीव्रम्." It occurs in *S'āstradīpikā* 1. 3. 4 (page 148, line 2 from bottom):—"इत्थं च संभवति प्रामाण्ये नाप्रामाण्यं युक्तमिति भवति केषांचिदाकांक्षा सापि मन्दविषन्यायेन निराकर्तव्येत्येवमर्थमिदमधिकरणम्."

महतापि प्रयत्नेन तमिस्रायां परामृशन्। कृष्णशुक्लविवेकं हि न कश्चिदधिगच्छति ॥

Not even by the most thorough examination, could one distinguish between black and white, in intense darkness. The verse is Kumārila's, and is used by him (in *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 1) to illustrate the impossibility of tracing the sources from which Manu and other Smṛiti-authors derived their laws. Just before the s'loka he says:—"न च तद्विज्ञायते कीदृशाद्वाक्यादिदं मन्वादिभिः प्रतिपन्नं किं विधिपरादुतार्थवादरूपादिति." Then, immediately after the verse:—"न च मन्वादिवचनाद्वेदमूलत्वं निश्चिनुमः." This latter clause, as the *Nyāyasudhā* points out, is with reference to Manu's own statement, in chapter ii. 7, to the effect that every precept of his was deduced from the Veda.

महति दर्पणे महन्मुखं तदेव कनीनिकायामणु ॥

The very same face which looks large [when seen] *in a large mirror, appears small* [when reflected] *in the pupil of the eye.* The illustration is found in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 137 line 16:—"एकमपि व्यञ्जकभेदादुत्कर्षवन्निकर्षवद्दृष्टं यथा महति दर्पणे महन्मुखं तदेव कनीनिकायामण्विति."

महार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवार्पणन्यायः ॥

This very curious simile is found in the commentary on S'āntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* i. 4, the first half of which reads thus:—"क्षणसंपदियं सुदुर्लभा प्रतिलब्धा पुरुषार्थसाधनी." The ṭikā commences as follows:—"अष्टाक्षणविनिर्मुक्तस्य क्षणस्य संपत्तिः समग्रता । इयं सुदुर्लभा । सुष्टु दुःखेन लभ्यत इति कथञ्चित्प्राप्या । महार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवार्पणोपमा." In a footnote, the editor tells us that Professor Kern was unable to get any satisfactory meaning out of the nyāya, but proposed the following:—"As the entering of the tortoise's neck into the hole of the yoke formed by the great ocean." Before him, Burnouf, who was equally puzzled, suggested, "It is as unlikly to happen as if a tortoise should put its neck into a hole opening every yuga in the world's ocean." This was all that I knew when writing on it early in 1904. A note, however, contributed to the Journal of the Pali Text Society for 1906-1907, by Mr. Harināth De, M. A., threw considerable light on the subject. He gave extracts from three Pali works in which the simile is more or less directly referred to, and one of them, namely that from the Majjhima Nikāya, is said by him to be "the original passage in which the comparison first occurred." Mr. De did not translate it, but I take the following to be the sense of it. "If a man were to throw into the sea a one-holed yoke, and it were tossed to and fro between north and south, and east and west, and if, once in a hundred years, a tortoise, blind of one eye, were to rise to the surface, would it be likely that its neck would enter that yoke?"

It was not until after I had made use of this in a note on the simile which I contributed to the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society in October 1909, that I became aware that my friend Mr. F. W. Thomas had really explained it six years previously! It came about on this wise. In the September number of the *Indian Antiquary* for 1903, in an article entitled

Mātṛiceṭa and the Mahārājakanikalekha, he quoted a verse from a Tibetan work, and gave the following translation:— "When like the neck of a tortoise, entering the hole of a yoke in the ocean, I had obtained the state of man, attended with the great festival of the good religion." He then added this explanatory remark:—"The reference to the blind tortoise, which rises from the bottom of the ocean once in a hundred years, and by a rare chance happens to insert his neck into a yoke floating on the surface of the ocean, is used to illustrate the extremely rare chance by which a living creature is born as a human being." After pointing out the recurrence of the simile in two other Buddhist works, he added:—"I have noted also a fourth recurrence of it in the Tibetan version of a work entitled *Subhāṣitaratnakaraṇḍakakathā*, and ascribed to Sūra. This reference will now be familiar to M. Lévi, who has himself discovered in Nepal the Sanskrit text of the work... The Sanskrit original here reads...as follows:—

ata evāha bhagavān mānuṣyam atidurlabhaṃ ।
mahārṇavayugachhidre kūrmagrīvārpaṇopamaṃ ॥

Is it not probable that we have here a saying ascribed to Buddha, which we may hope also to find in the Pali literature? [I now learn from Prof. Rhys Davids that it does occur in the *Majjhima Nikāya*: see the edition of Mr. Chalmers iii. page 169]."

This is the passage of the *Nikāya* quoted by Mr. Harinātha De, but as he makes no reference to Mr. Thomas' article I infer that he, too, in 1907, was as unacquainted with it as myself.

Orthodox writers, such as Kumārila, Vācaspati Mis'ra and others, have not hesitated to make use of illustrations employed by Buddhist writers, and that now under consideration forms no exception. I have recently met with a slightly modified form of it in the *Bodhasāra*, a modern Vedantic work by S'rī-Narahari, published, together with a commentary, in the

Benares Sanskrit Series in 1906. On page 223 the author quotes a verse from "*Vāsiṣṭha*" (probably the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*) which I subjoin together with the comment:—

"चलार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवाप्रवेशवत् ।
अनेकजन्मनामन्ते विवेकी जायते पुमान् ॥

चलेति । चलार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवाप्रवेशवत् । चलौ चञ्चलौ यावर्णवौ...तावर्णवौ तरङ्गौ...तयोर्युगं युग्मं तस्य च्छिद्रं मध्यवर्त्याकाशं तत्र स्थितो यः कूर्मः कमठस्तस्य कच्छपस्योभयपार्श्वे बहुकालं निरन्तरं तरङ्गकृतताडनेन विह्वलत्वे ग्रीवाप्रवेशो ग्रीवा कण्ठस्तदुपलक्षिततदाद्यङ्गप्रवेशो यथा जायते तद्वत्पुमान्पुरुषार्थ्यनेकजन्मनामनन्तजन्ममरणोपलक्षितसुखदुःखानां स्पर्शेन खिन्नस्तदन्तःकरणबाह्यकरणानि स्वस्वविषयेभ्यो व्यावर्त्य विवेक्यात्मानात्मविवेकवाञ्जायते भवति ॥"

According to this interpreter, then, we have the tortoise swimming between two boisterous seas (or *waves*, according to him), and becoming so distressed by the buffeting which it receives that it thrusts its neck (which is said to stand for the whole body) into something or other not specified! And this is intended to illustrate the distress caused to a man by the ills of endless existences in this *bhavasāgara*, and also his final enlightenment and restraining of his organs of sense from the external objects which formerly attracted them!

A propos of the above remark as to the adoption by orthodox writers of illustrations taken from so-called heretical authors, I may add that possibly even the great grammarian Patanjali borrowed his "आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे" from a Buddhist source; for, in Childer's Pāli Dictionary under the word *Seyyathā*, we find the following quotation from the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*:—

"*Seyyathāpi, bhante, ambaṃ vā puṭṭho labujaṃ vyākareyya, labujam vā puṭṭho ambaṃ vyākareyya, evam evaṃ* &c." "As a man, Sir, who was asked about a mango, might answer about a bread fruit, and vice versā, even so &c."

महिषीस्नेहप्रतिबद्धभिक्षुदृष्टान्तः ॥

The illustration of *a devotee who was hindered* [in the religious life] *by the affection which he had for a courtezan* [when he was a householder]. It is said to be the subject of a *Gāthā*, and is cited to show that the past, equally with the present or future, may injuriously influence the seeker after the knowledge which leads to emancipation. It is found in *Pancadas'ī* ix. 41:—

" अतीतेनापि महिषीस्नेहेन प्रतिबन्धतः ।
भिक्षुस्तत्त्वं न वेदेति गाथा लोके प्रगीयते " ॥

We are told in the next verse that the Guru, making use of that self-same incident as an instrument for the conveyance of *Brahmajnāna*, brought about its removal and secured the man's emancipation! The commentator puts it thus:—" गुरुस्तस्य तत्त्वोपदेष्टा तदीयं महिषीस्नेहमनुसृत्य तस्यामेव महिष्यां तत्त्वं तन्महिष्युपाधिकं ब्रह्मोक्तवान् ततः सोऽपि महिषीस्नेहलक्षणप्रतिबन्धकापगमेन गुरूपदिष्टं तत्त्वं यथावत् शास्त्रोक्तप्रकारेणैव ज्ञातवानित्यर्थः " ॥

The three verses immediately preceding the above will be found under the हिरण्यनिधिदृष्टान्त.

मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते ॥

A sage meditates [on Brahman] *and a fool is emancipated!* An impossible sequence. Compare *Ezekiel* xviii. 2:—" The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." The nyāya forms part of an interesting passage on page 37 of *Vedāntatattvaviveka*:—" एतेनेदमपास्तं मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यत इत्येतच्छास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरीति न्यायविरुद्धम् ॥ तथा चाभाणकः । काचिन्निषादी तनयं प्रसूते कश्चिन्निषादस्तु कषायपायीति । मुनिकर्तृकश्रवणादिविधिफलस्य साक्षात्कारस्य मूर्खेऽनभ्युपगमात् । तत्फलस्याप्यविद्यानिवृत्तेर्मुनिप्रत्यज्ञात्रगततया तावन्मात्रतया मूर्खनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । दृष्टफलानां यथादर्शमुपपत्तेश्च." For the nyāya शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि, see below.

य एव करोति स एव भुङ्क्ते ॥

He who performs an action will himself reap the fruit thereof [whether in the form of reward or retribution]. This doctrine, common to all the orthodox schools, is found in *Nyāya-vārtika* 3. 1. 4 and is directed against the belief that the body is the soul, and that when the body is cremated, the man, with all his deeds, ceases to exist. This is reasserted in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 403, thus :—"य एव कर्मणः कर्ता स एव तत्फलस्य भोक्तेति सर्वैरास्तिकपथानुसारिभिरभ्युपेयम्." The emphasis, therefore, here is not so much on the fact that *whatsoever* a man soweth that shall he also reap, as that *whosoever* soweth the same shall also reap. This, of course, implies that the reaper will be *conscious* of the fact that he was the sower, for otherwise the precept would be of no moral value. It is difficult to see how any one can hold with the above, and at the same time be a believer in the doctrine of transmigration, the advocates of which are compelled to admit that the subjects of those repeated births have absolutely *no consciousness* of previous existences. I am not unmindful of the fact that the followers of the Yoga system [sūtra iii. 16] profess to attain to a knowledge of the past and the future by means of संयम (that is, by धारणा, ध्यान, and समाधि collectively); but, even if that were so, the number affected would be infinitesimal.

यत्करभस्य पृष्ठे न माति तत्कण्ठे निबध्यते ॥

That for which there is no room on a camel's back is tied to his neck! Illustrates the piling up of misfortunes almost beyond endurance. Perhaps akin to our "It is the last straw which breaks the camel's back." It occurs in *Upamitibhava-prapancā Kathā*, page 394 :—"मया चिन्तितम्। अहो हता दैवेन वयं मन्दभाग्याः। तदिदमाभाणकमायातम्। यदुत यत्करभस्य पृष्ठे न माति तत्कण्ठे

निबध्यत इति । तथाहि वैश्वानरपापमित्रयोगेणैव कुमारस्य गाढमुद्वेजिता वयं यावतेयमपरा कृत्येवास्य भार्या सम्पन्नेति." Krityā is a female deity who is invoked for evil purposes. There is another example on page 895 of the same :—

"महाभारसमाक्रान्तमूर्तेरराराटिकारिणः ।
यत्पृष्ठे माति नोष्ट्रस्य गलके तन्निबध्यते" ॥

यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणाः ॥

Where there is a good outward appearance, there also are good qualities. This is found in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭa-parvan* iii. 233 :—"अस्याकृत्यनुसारेण गुणानपि हि निश्चिनु । यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणा इति लोकेऽपि गीयते." It is contained also in verse 5076 of *Indische Sprüche*, but whether as a quotation or not, I can not say :—"यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणा वसंति नैतद्धि सम्यक्कविभिः प्रणीतम् केनातिचार्वंग्यपि मे हृदिस्था दुनाति गात्रं विरहे प्रियासौ." Professor Böhtlingk took it from Kosegarten's edition of the *Pancatantra* (i. 208), but I cannot find it in the Bombay edition. Some work on शृङ्गाररस is a much more probable source.

यदभिधित्सितं तदभिधीयतां फले व्यक्तिर्भविष्यति ॥

Say what you wish to say about a thing, but its real value will be shown by the advantage derived from it. In the opening part of the *Tārkikarakṣā* the author says :—"प्रारिप्सितस्य ग्रन्थस्य प्रेक्षावदुपादित्साप्रयोजिकामभिमतफलसाधनतामभिधाय श्रोतृबुद्धिमनुकूलयन्वार्तिष्यमाणमेवाग्रे दर्शयति ।

निःश्रेयसफलं प्राहुर्येषां तत्त्वावधारणम् ।
प्रमाणादिपदार्थास्ते लक्ष्यन्ते नातिविस्तरम् ॥"

On which Mallinātha comments thus :—

"ननु यदभिधित्सितं तदभिधीयतां फले व्यक्तिर्भविष्यतीति न्यायात्किं मृपाग्रे वक्ष्यमाणार्थप्रतिज्ञाडंबरविलम्बैरित्याद्यश्लोकाक्षेपमाशंक्य समाधत्ते प्रारिप्सितस्येति । प्रेक्षावतां धीमतामुपादित्सा स्वचिकीर्षा तत्र प्रयोजिकां हेतुभूतामित्यर्थः। प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तेः प्रयोजनज्ञानाधीनत्वात्तज्ज्ञापनायाग्रे प्रतिज्ञा कार्येति भावः ॥"

यद्ग्रहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुस्तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षते ॥

That on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence. This is Professor Cowell's rendering of the nyāya in the Aulukya chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 126, Jīvānanda's edn.):—"न चालोकाभावस्य घटाद्यभाववद्रूपवदभावत्वेनालोकसापेक्षचक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं स्यादित्येषितव्यं । यद्ग्रहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुस्तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षत इति न्यायेनालोकग्रहे आलोकापेक्षाया अभावेन तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षाया अभावात्." "And you need not assert that this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an object possessing colour [*i. e.* light possesses colour, and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark], as we see in the case of a jar's absence; because, by the very rule on which you rely, namely, that on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence."

Most probably Mādhava took this from Udayana's *Kiraṇāvali* where it stands (on page 18) in a similar context. It occurs also in *Lakṣaṇāvaliṭīkā*, page 12.

यववराहाधिकरणन्यायः ॥

In Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 3. 45 we read:—"यववराहाधिकरणन्यायेन लोकप्रसिद्धिः शास्त्रीयप्रसिद्ध्या बाध्येत्याह." There is no adhikaraṇa of this name in Mīmāṁsā or Vedānta, but the reference is doubtless to the शास्त्रप्रसिद्धार्थप्रामाण्याधिकरण, otherwise styled the आर्यम्लेच्छाधिकरण, which comprises Jaimini's sūtras 1. 3. 8 and 9, under which the words यव, वराह, and others having a double meaning, are discussed by the bhāṣyakāra. These two sūtras are quoted by S'ankara on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 4. 42, and explained by Ānandagiri. The matter is well put

in Colebrooke's *Essay on Mīmāṁsa* (page 339):—"A very curious disquisition occurs in this part of the Mimāṁsā, on the acceptation of words in correct language and barbaric dialects, and on the use of terms taken from either. Instances alleged are *yava*, signifying in Sanskrit, barley, but in the barbaric tongue, the plant named *priyangu*; *varāha* in the one a hog, and in the other a cow [or, rather, a crow]; *pīlu*, a certain tree, but among barbarians an elephant; *vetasa*, a ratten cane and a citron [or, rose-apple, *jambu*]. The Mimāṃsā concludes, that in such instances of words having two acceptations, that in which it is received by the civilized (*Āryas*), or which is countenanced by use in sacred books, is to be preferred to the practice of barbarians (*Mlechha*), who are apt to confound words or their meanings." The above is of importance to students of Vedānta; for, in addition to the passages named above, it is discussed in *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 52, and enlarged upon in *Vedāntakalpataru*, pages 461, 462. The brief allusion, too, to the same thing, in *Bhāmatī* 1. 3. 22, in the words:—"न हि गावो वराहमनुधावन्तीति कृष्णविहङ्गानुधावनमुपपद्यते गवामपि तु तादृशसूकरानुधावनम्," is quite unintelligible alone. See too, *S'ālikā* page 192; *Tātparyaṭīka*, page 292; *Kusumānjali*, vol. 2, pages 130, 154; and *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 288, line. 26.

यश्चोभयोः समो दोषो न तेनैकश्चोद्यो भवति ॥

When the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone. This is Professor Cowell's rendering of the nyāya in the Pāṇini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 142, Bib. Ind., and 161 Jīvānanda's edn.) It originated, however, with Patanjali, and is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 6. 1. 9 (vārt. 2) as "यश्चोभयोर्दोषो न तमेकश्चोद्यो भवति." S'abara (on sūtra 8. 3. 14) quotes it as "यश्चोभयो-

दोंषो नासावेकस्य वाच्यः." In a form differing slightly from these it is quoted in *Nyāyakaṇikā* (page 225, line 4 from bottom), and is still further changed in the following verse of Aniruddha's on *Sānkhyasūtra* i. 6 :—

"यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि तादृशः ।
नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे" ॥

For other references to the nyāya, see *Tantravārtika*, page 947 ; *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 95, line 10 from bottom ; and (in the poetical form) *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 88. The Khaṇḍanakāra cites the first two words of the nyāya, on page 531, and ascribes it to Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila).

यस्य नास्ति पुत्रो न तस्य पुत्रस्य क्रीडनकानि क्रियन्ते ॥

Toys are not made for the son of a man who has no son! This is used by S'abara to illustrate Jaimini's sūtra 10. 3. 5— "न चाङ्गविधिरनङ्गे स्यात्." He says:—"नह्यनङ्गे कर्मण्यङ्गस्य विशेषः विधिः स्यात्। भवति च विशेषविधिः 'आश्वबालः प्रस्तर' इति। न ह्यसति प्रस्तरे प्रस्तरविशेषः शिष्येत यथा यस्य नास्ति पुत्रो न तस्य पुत्रस्य क्रीडनकानि क्रियन्ते."

Then, in Pārthasārathi's *Nyāyaratnamālā*, page 111, we find the expression सर्वमिदमजातपुत्रक्रीडनकमापद्यते."

यस्याज्ञानं भ्रमस्तस्य भ्रान्तः सम्यक् च वेत्ति सः ॥

He who has Nescience [as an *upādhi*] *is the subject of delusion* ; [but though] *deluded he is also possessed of sound knowledge*. This is affirmed of the individuated Self, who, though a portion 'as it were' of the undivided and indivisible Self, is also the आश्रय of Nescience. This is one of the mysteries of the *advaitavāda*. For a full description of जीव as found in S'ankarācārya's famous bhāṣya, see Notes to my edition of the *Vedāntasāra*.

The above nyāya is found in Raghunātha's two treatises, but his exposition of it is extremely meagre since he ignores the

second pāda of the line. He says :—" यस्यानात्मनि देहादावात्मभ्रमोऽस्ति तस्याज्ञानमिति कल्प्यते."

The verse of which it forms the first line is quoted in full by Rāmatīrtha in his discussion of the term *adhyāropa* in Section 6 of Vedāntasāra. In the Calcutta editions of 1829 and 1886, the reading of the second pāda is " भ्रान्तः सम्यक्करोति सः," whilst Prof. A. E. Gough, in his translation published in *The Paṇḍit* of August 1872, followed the reading " भ्रान्तोऽसम्यक्करोति सः." In my edition of 1894 (page 104) I adopted the reading " भ्रान्तः सम्यङ्ग वेत्ति सः," but I now see that in so doing I was exemplifying the truth of the first pāda ! There was manuscript authority for it, however, and so *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 443.

In its true form the nyāya is found in the commentary on *Sankṣepas'ārīraka* iii. 8 (The Paṇḍit, vol viii. page 660), and again in *Tattvadīpana*, page 179 (with the mislection भ्रान्ति- for भ्रान्तः). The former passage is as follows :—

"ननु मिथ्यातत्त्वज्ञानयोर्विषयवैषम्येऽपि यस्याज्ञानं भ्रमस्तस्य भ्रान्तः सम्यक् च वेत्ति स इति न्यायादज्ञानभ्रान्तितत्त्वबोधानामेकाश्रयत्वनियमादज्ञानाश्रयचिन्मात्राश्रयत्वमेव भ्रान्त्यादेः स्यात् &c."

If any one can trace Rāmatīrtha's verse to its source I shall be glad. The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is a very likely *ākara*; but with the weight of seventy summers upon me I am not myself prepared to join in the search.

यस्योन्मूलनाय यस्य प्रसक्तिर्भवति ततस्तस्य बलवत्त्वम् ॥

He who is bent on destroying another must be stronger than he. This is contained in an extract (given by Prof. Kielhorn) from Bhairavamis'ra's comment on Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa's paribhāṣā cxii, namely निषेधाश्च बलीयांसः (=प्रतिषेधाश्च बलीयांसो भवन्ति of Patanjali 1. 1. 63, vārtika 6), which runs thus:—" इयं च परिभाषा लोकसिद्धन्यायमूलिकेत्याह । विध्युन्मूलनायेति । प्राप्तस्य विधेर्निवर्तनायेत्यर्थः । एतेन येन नाप्राप्तन्यायेन विधिशास्त्रस्य निषेधशास्त्रेण बाध इति दर्शितम् । लोकेऽपि यस्योन्मूलनाय यस्य प्रसक्तिर्भवति ततस्तस्य बलवत्त्वं कंसा-

कृष्णस्येव." The example given here, of one of superior might overcoming a less mighty one, is that of Krishṇa and the demon Kaṁsa. The death of the latter is described in Vishṇu-Purāna, Book V, chapter xx. Those who are familiar with the English Bible will call to mind the words "When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils." The 'strong man,' here is the Prince of this world—"that old Serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world"—his 'gcods' are human souls and bodies; the 'stronger than he' is Christ, the Prince of Peace,—to whom has been given the commission *"to bring out the prisoners from the prison."*

येन नाप्राप्ते यो विधिरारभ्यते स तस्य बाधको भवति ॥

Here is another of Raghunātha's grammatical nyāyas. It forms paribhāṣā 57 in Nāgojībhaṭṭa's work, and is rendered by Professor Kielhorn as follows:—"A rule which is given (in reference to a particular case or particular cases) to which another (rule) *cannot but apply* (or, in other words, which all fall already under some other rule), supersedes the latter." "The meaning of the words येन नाप्राप्ते is 'while another rule is *necessarily* applying,' for the two negatives (न and अ) import more force to the word (प्राप्ते, than this word would possess without them)." The Professor adds the following in a footnote:—"This paribhāṣā teaches us the meaning of the term *apavāda*, and in doing so tells us the reason why an *apavāda* possesses greater force than *antaranga* and other rules. An *apavāda* is a *special* rule; it is given in reference to particular cases which all fall under some *general* rule (*utsarga*); as it is not applicable in any case which does *not* fall under the general rule, it must necessarily supersede the latter, because it would otherwise not serve any purpose whatever." Kaiyaṭa and Nāges'a generally quote it in the shortened form of येन नाप्राप्तिन्याय.

Under this paribhāṣā Nāgojī introduces and discusses the तक्रकौण्डिन्यन्याय, namely "ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय." The paribhāṣā is found in the following passages of the *Mahābhāṣya*:—1. 1. 6. (vārt. 1.); 1. 1. 28; 3. 4. 85 (vārt. 2); 6. 1. 2 (vārt. 4), where the तक्रकौण्डिन्यन्याय is brought in; 6. 1. 166; 6. 3. 68 (vārt. 5); 6. 4. 163 (vārt 2), with तक्रकौण्डिन्य again; 7. 2. 44 (vārt. 4); 7. 2. 117 (vārt. 2), with तक्रकौण्डिन्य; 8. 2. 23 (vārt. 5); 8. 2. 72; and 8. 3. 112.

रथकारन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the Rathakāra*. There is a Vedic text which says, "In the rainy season a Rathakāra ought to establish a sacred fire." The question then arises, what is meant by the word Rathakāra? Does it mean a chariot-maker, or is it a member of the caste produced by the marriage of a Māhiṣya (the offspring of a Kshatriya and a Vais'ya-woman) with a Karaṇī (the offspring of a Vais'ya and a S'ūdra-woman), which is called Rathakāra? The question is discussed in Jaimini 6. 1. 44–50, and is decided in favour of the latter. The discussion is thus summarized in *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara*:—"आधाने श्रूयते। वर्षासु रथकार आदधीतेति। तत्र रथं करोतीति व्युत्पत्त्या त्रैवर्णिको रथकार इति चेत्। नैवम्। संकीर्णजातिविशेषे रूढत्वात्। वैश्यायां क्षत्रियादुत्पन्नो माहिष्यः। शूद्रायां वैश्यादुत्पन्ना करणी। तस्यां करण्यां माहिष्यादुत्पन्नो रथकारः। तथा च याज्ञवल्क्यः। 'माहिष्येण करण्यां तु रथकारः प्रजायत' इति। तस्य च रथकारस्याधानकालो वर्षर्तुः" ॥

The nyāya is quoted by Nāgojībhaṭṭa in his *vritti* on the ninety-eighth paribhāṣā (अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी), which Prof. Kielhorn renders thus:—"The (conventional) meaning which a word conveys when taken as a whole, is stronger than the (etymological) meaning derived from (a division of the word into) its parts." In other words, रूढिर्योगमपहरति, which Raghunātha exemplifies by this word Rathakāra. The vidhi on which this is based is quoted in full in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 140, line 3.

रात्रिसत्रन्यायः ॥

The rule as to *a night-sacrifice.* This is the topic of Jaimini 4. 3. 17–19, and is largely used by writers on Vedānta as a type of scripture-passage conveying no direct promise of reward, and therefore dependent on an arthavāda-passage for such promise. Though S'ankara does not mention the nyāya in his bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 38, it is evident that he has it in view, and Ānandagiri, and Amalānanda (in the *Kalpataru*), expressly connect his remarks with it. So also the *Kalpataruparimala.* The last-mentioned work quotes it again on page 255 (in connection with *Brahmasūtra* 1. 2. 24):—"तथा सर्वपापप्रदाहोऽपि ब्रह्मलिङ्गप्रश्नोत्तराभ्यां प्राधान्येन प्रतिपिपादयिषिततयोपक्रान्तस्योपासनस्य फलाकांक्षया रात्रिसत्रन्यायेनार्थवादिकफलविपरिणामे कर्तव्ये प्रधानार्थवाद इवाङ्गार्थवादे श्रुतस्यापि फलस्य ग्रहणौचित्यात्."

The nyāya is found also in *Pancapādikāvivaraṇa*, page 122, line 8 from bottom, and again on page 134, line 9 from the bottom. The latter passage is as follows:—"ननु रात्रिसत्रन्यायेनार्थवादगतमेव मोक्षं ब्रह्मज्ञानं वा प्रयोजनं साध्यत्वेन परिणमय्य मोक्षकामो ब्रह्मज्ञानकामो वा विचारयेत् &c." See, too, *S'ālikā*, p. 7 and 157; and *Tattvamuktākalāpa* v. 81.

राधावेधोपमा ॥

The simile of *piercing the central figure of a target.* That is, hitting the bull's eye. It is used of something difficult of accomplishment, and requiring great skill. "In Prākrit the *rādhā* is generally called *puttaliyā*, literally 'a little figure,' as apparently a little human figure was painted in the middle of the butt." This note, contributed by Professor Leumann to Mr. Tawney's translation of Merutunga's work, is probably a correct explanation of the word राधा, rather than the dictionary meaning, "an attitude in shooting." The illustration appears on pages 412, 420, and 434 of *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, as follows:—"सा चेयती भवेत्कस्य सामग्रीयं सुदुर्लभा। राधावेधोपमानेन धर्म-

प्राप्तिः प्रकीर्तिता" ॥ "एनं संसारविस्तारं विलंघ्य कथमप्यदः। मानुष्यं प्राप्य दुष्प्रापं राधावेधोपमं जनः" ॥ "भो भव्याः प्रविहाय मोहललितं युष्माभिराकर्ण्यतामेकान्तेन हितं मदीयवचनं कृत्वा विशुद्धं मनः। राधावेधसमं कथंचिदतुलं लब्ध्वापि मानुष्यकं हिंसाक्रोधवशानुगैरिदमहो जीवैः पुरा हारितम्." Two more examples will be found on pages 575 and 981 of the same.

The above meaning of *rādhā* fully explains the epithet *rādhābhedin* as applied to the renowned archer Arjuna.

रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसम्पदः सम्पन्नाः ॥

On acquiring the mountain Rohaṇa one acquires the wealth of gems contained in it. This occurs in the Pratyabhijnā-section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 106 of Jīvānanda's edn.):—"परमेश्वरतालाभे हि सर्वाः सम्पदस्तन्निष्यन्दमय्यः सम्पन्ना एव रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसंपद इव। एवं परमेश्वरतालाभे किमन्यत्प्रार्थनीयम्। तदुक्तमुत्पलाचार्यैः। 'भक्तिलक्ष्मीसमृद्धानां किमन्यदुपयाचितम्। एनया वा दरिद्राणां किमन्यदुपयाचितमिति.'" Professor Gough renders it thus:—"For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken; as if a man acquired the mountain Rohaṇa (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpalācārya says—'What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?'"

For a story in connection with the mountain Rohaṇa as a mine of wealth, see *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 3.

वटे यक्षन्यायः ॥

The belief as to *a Yakṣa in a Banyan tree.* A popular belief, based solely on the tradition of the elders, that a Yakṣa, or goblin, lives in every Banyan tree. It is used as an illustration of ऐतिह्य ('tradition'), which some regard as a pramāṇa, but which Gautama rejects as such. See *Nyāyasūtra* 2. 2. 1. The *Nyāyasūtravivāraṇa* expounds the term thus:—"ऐतिह्यमिह वृक्षे यक्षः प्रतिवसतीति लोकप्रसिद्धिः । तत्र मूलवक्तृनिर्देशेनाप्तोक्तत्वानिश्चयेन तादृशनिश्चयस्य शाब्दबोधहेतुतया नास्य शब्दप्रमाणेऽन्तर्भावः" ॥ This is the position of the objector who maintains that tradition *is* a distinct pramāṇa; the refutation is contained in sūtra 2. In Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of Nyāya Philosophy,* Book ii, page 66, we have the following rendering of a portion of the *Nyāyasūtravṛitti*:—"A rumour (*aitihya*) is what is expressed in this way—'thus indeed people say' &c. for it is an assertion which has come from one to another, without any first assertor being indicated:—for example, 'In every Bengal fig-tree there is a goblin,' and the like." In a foot-note to page 329 of Colebrooke's *Essays*, vol. i, Professor Cowell gives to *aitihya* the meaning of "fallible testimony (as opposed to infallible *s'ruti*)," whilst Colebrooke himself, on page 427, renders it by 'tradition.' In
Colebrooke himself, on page 427, renders it by 'tradition.' In
Nyāyamanjarī, page 194, the nyāya is applied in the follow-
ing way by the disbeliever in the existence of God:—न च प्रसिद्धि-
मात्रेण युक्तमेतस्य कल्पनम् । निर्मूलत्वात्तथा चोक्तं प्रसिद्धिर्वटयक्षवत्." And
at the top of page 64, there is the following, forming the second half of a verse:—

"ऐतिह्यं तु न सत्यमत्र हि वटे यक्षोऽस्ति वा नेति वा
को जानाति कदा च केन कलितं यक्षस्य कीदृग्वपुः" ॥

In *S'lokavārtika* (page 492) we read "जगति बहु न तथ्यं नित्यमैतिह्यमुक्तं भवति तु यदि सत्यं नागमाद्भिद्यते तत्" which Prof. Gangānātha Jhā renders by "Much of what is known in the world as

'Tradition' is not always true; and whatever happens to be true that does not differ from 'Valid Testimony.'" Pārthasārathi's comment on this is—"पुरुषवचनपरंपरा ऐतिह्यं वटे वटे वैश्रवण इत्यादि । तच्चानिर्णायकत्वात्प्रमाणमेव न भवति । तद्भावेऽप्यागमान्तर्भावात्." See, too, *Tārkikarakṣā*, page 117.

वध्यतां वध्यतां बालः ॥

As Raghunāthavarman had the temerity to include this in his list of nyāyas, I introduce it in order to show its origin and its worthlessness. At the bottom of page 53 of the Benares edition of *Laukikanyāyasangraha*, it stands thus:—"तथा च 'वध्यतां वध्यतां बालो नानेनार्थोऽस्ति जीवता । स्वपक्षहानिकर्तृत्वाद्यः कुलाङ्गारतां गत' इति न्यायविषयतां नातिवर्तते." This verse, and the words which follow it, are taken bodily, from *Citsukhī* i. 16 (The Paṇḍit, vol. iv, page 534); but the real source of the s'loka is *Vishṇu Purāṇa* 1. 17. 31, where it reads "दुरात्मा वध्यतामेषः," the remainder being the same as the above. I got the clue from the *Laukikanyāyaratnākara*, where Raghunātha apologetically says:—"इदं विष्णुपुराणे प्रह्लादमुद्दिश्य हिरण्याक्षवचनं पूर्वैर्न्यायित्वेनोदाहृतत्वात्तत्त्वेनोदाहृतम्."

वर्चोन्यायः ॥

The topic of *glory* [or splendour]. This forms the topic of Jaimini 3. 8. 25-27. The point discussed is whether in using the mantra "ममाग्ने वर्चो विहवेष्वस्तु," "Fire! let there be glory for me in the offerings," the officiating priest (at the new and full moon sacrifices) is to enjoy the fruit, or whether it falls to the sacrificer. The pūrvapakṣin holds the former view, but the decision is that it goes to the latter. In this adhikaraṇa there is mention of *karaṇa-mantras*, but the term is not explained. Kunte says that a karaṇa-mantra is that which regulates sacrificial operations; and that one which is merely chanted in the course of a sacrificial operation is called *akarma-karaṇa-mantra.*

विलूननासिकस्यादर्शदर्शनम् ॥

Showing a looking-glass to a man whose nose has been cut off! An incitement to wrath! It occurs in *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 291, as follows:—" प्रायः सम्प्रतिकोपाय सन्मार्गस्योपदेशनम्। विलूननासिकस्येव यद्वदादर्शदर्शनम्." "As a general rule, pointing out the right way leads to immediate wrath, as the showing of a mirror to one whose nose has been cut off." This is Mr. Tawney's rendering, and I have adopted the reading of his manuscripts in the first line. In the second line, the Mss. read विरुद्धादर्शदर्शनम्.

विश्वजिन्न्यायः ॥

The law regarding *the Vis'vajit-sacrifice.* It forms part of the great sacrifice called *Gavām ayana* which lasts for a year; for a description of which see Dr. Eggeling's translation of *S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, vol. 2, page 427. A quite new explanation of this sacrificial session is propounded in a book by the learned Librarian of the Mysore Govt. Oriental Library, entitled *Gavām Ayana, the Vedic era*. It was favourably reviewed by Prof. L. D. Barnett in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for April 1909. The Vis'vajit is discussed in Jaimini 4. 3. 10-16, and 6. 7. 1-20. In the former, the question is raised of the reward which is to follow the offering of the sacrifice, since none is mentioned in the scripture prescribing it; and the decision is that in this, and in all similar cases, heaven is to be understood to be the reward. This is somewhat quaintly put by S'abara under sūtra 16:—" अनादिष्टफले कर्मणि स्वर्गः फलम्। इति प्रत्ययो लोके। एवमुच्यते। आरामकृद्देवदत्तो नियतोऽस्य स्वर्गः। तडागकृद्देवदत्तो नियतोऽस्य स्वर्ग इति। इत्थमनेन न्यायेन स्वर्गं संप्रत्ययो भवति यस्मात्स्वर्गफलेषु कर्मसु कर्तव्येषु फलवचनं नैवोच्चारयन्ति गम्यत एवेति। तस्मादप्यवगच्छाम एवंजातीयकेषु स्वर्गः फलमिति." The offerer of the Vis'vajit is required to surrender all his property to the sacrificing priests, a point which gives rise to a very curious

discussion in the Sixth Book. Is he then to give away his father and mother; or, if a reigning monarch, is he to part with all the lands of his kingdom? These and many other interesting points are fully argued out by S'abara; and, for some of them, the English reader may with advantage refer to Colebrooke's Essay on the Mīmāmsā, vol. i., page 345.

This nyāya is very frequently quoted by writers on Vedānta and Nyāya. The following are examples. *Bhāmatī*, page 86:—"न च ब्रह्मभूयादन्यदमृतत्वमार्थवादिकं किञ्चिदस्ति येन तत्काम उपासनायामधिक्रियेत, विश्वजिन्न्यायेन तु स्वर्गकल्पनायां तस्य सातिशयत्वं क्षयित्वं चेति न नित्यफलत्वमुपासनायाः"। *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 430:—"सन्निहितकरणोपकारे संभवति न विश्वजिन्न्यायेन स्वर्गकल्पना नापि दर्शपूर्णमासफलस्वर्गस्यानुषङ्गः"। See, too, *Pancapādikāvivaraṇa*, pages 134 (line 9), 137 (line 13), and 164 (line 6 from bottom). *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 524, line 13 from bottom:—"परप्रकरणपरिपठणविरहाच्च नास्य संपदादिविधिवत्प्रधानाधिकारनिवेशित्वमतो विश्वजिदधिकरणन्यायेन स्वर्गकाममधिकारिणमिह यावदुपात्तमध्यवसामस्तावदेव च न पुनरावर्तते &c." There is another good example of it in the early part of the Jaimini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*.

विषकुम्भं पयोमुखम् ॥

A bowl of poison with milk on the surface. A wolf in sheep's clothing. The illustration is found in Merutunga's work the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 153:—"परोक्षे कार्यहन्तारं प्रत्यक्षे प्रियवादिनम्। वर्जयेत्तादृशं मित्रं विषकुंभं पयोमुखम्." "The friend who behind one's back tries to impede one's business, but in one's presence speaks kindly, such a friend one should avoid, a bowl of poison with milk on the surface." This is Mr. Tawney's rendering (on page 92), and he points out in a footnote that the verse is quoted in Böhtlingk's *Indische Sprüche*, and ascribed by him to Cāṇakya.

व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिः ॥

This highly technical nyāya is found in both of Raghunāthavarman's works. I have taken it from a passage in the Bauddha section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 11 in Jīvānanda's edition), and subjoin Professor Gough's rendering (italicizing the words which represent the maxim):—"तत्र क्षणिकत्वं नीलादिक्षणानां सत्त्वेनानुमातव्यम् । यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं यथा जलधरपटलम् । सन्तश्चामी भावा इति । न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षणस्य सत्त्वस्य नीलादिक्षणानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिन्यायेन व्यापकक्रमाक्रमव्यावृत्तावक्षणिकात्सत्त्वव्यावृत्तेः सिद्धत्वाच्च."

"Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue and so forth, is to be inferred from their existence; thus, whatever *is* is momentary (or fluxional) like a bank of clouds, and all these things *are.* Nor may any one object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that *exclusion of the continent is exclusion of the contained.*" In *S'ālikā* page 119, line 14, we find the nyāya as "व्यापकनिवृत्तिर्हि व्याप्यनिवृत्त्या व्याप्ता," and, on page 67, line 2 "व्यापकाभावे व्याप्यं नास्ति."

शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the movements of a bird-catcher.* It is found in S'abara on Jaimini 9. 1. 22, as follows:—"यथा शकुनिग्राहकस्य शकुनिं जिघृक्षतश्छद्मना गतिर्भवति शनैः पदन्यासो दृष्टिप्रणिधानमशब्दकरणञ्च कथमनवबुद्धः शकुनिर्गृह्येतेति एवमिहाप्यनवबुद्धमिव ग्रहीतुं यज्ञं प्रच्छन्नगतिरुपांशुत्वं नाम । यथा शकुनिग्राहकस्य यस्मिन्देशे शनैः पदन्यासो न स तद्देशार्थोऽपि तु तद्देशाभिगतस्य शकुनेरर्थेन क्रियत एवमिहाप्युपांशुत्वं न तद्देशानां पदार्थानामर्थेन क्रियते तद्देशाभिगतस्य यज्ञस्यार्थेन गम्यते"॥ See also भूमिरथिकन्याय.

शंखन्यायः ॥

The simile of [the time for sounding] *the conch-shell.* An offering called उपांशुयाज, or 'low-voiced offering,' is performed *between* the cake-oblation to Agni and that to Agni-Soma at the full-moon, and *between* the cake-oblation to Agni and that to Indra-Agni at the new-moon (Dr. Eggling's trans: of Saṭa-patha-Brāhmaṇa, vol. i. page 192). Sometimes, however, the second oblation is omitted; and then the question arises how is the Upāṁs'uyâja to be offered, since that comes *between* the two? The subject is discussed in Jaimini 10. 8. 62-70, and the above question is answered by S'abara as follows:—"यो हि द्वयोः पुरोडाशयोर्मध्य इति कालोऽवगम्यते स एव पूर्वस्मादुत्तर इति। एवं चेद्यद्यप्येकपुरोडाशायां द्वौ पुरोडाशौ न स्तस्तथापि स पूर्वं आग्नेयोऽस्ति तस्मादुत्तरः स एव कालो योऽसावन्तरालेन लक्षितः। यथा 'नागवेलायामागन्तव्यं,' 'शंखवेलायामागन्तव्यं,' 'पटहवेलायामागन्तव्यं' इति यस्मिन् ग्रामे न नागा न शंखा न पटहस्तस्मिन्नपि स एव कालस्तत्र ह्यागमनं क्रियते। एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम्। तस्मादेकपुरोडाशायामुपांशुयाजः कर्तव्य इति."

The simile might well be called शंखध्वनिवेलान्याय, but I have adopted the name given in the Nyāyamālāvistara on this *adhikaraṇa*, which also explains it more fully :—"शंखन्यायेनोपलक्षकस्याग्नीषोमीयपुरोडाशस्यैवाभावेऽप्युपलक्ष्ये काले यागोऽस्ति। यथा शंखध्वनिवेलायां राजसेवार्थं प्रतिदिनमागन्तव्यमित्युक्ते कस्मिंश्चिद्दिने तं शंखं धमतः पुरुषस्याभावेनोपलक्षकस्य ध्वनेरभावेऽप्युपलक्षिते तस्मिन्काले सेवकाः समागच्छन्ति तथात्रापि द्रष्टव्यम्."

This is very clear, but what is the meaning of नागवेला? To be in harmony with the rest of the sentence it ought to indicate something which, like the sounding of the *s'ankha* or the beating of the *paṭaha*, takes place regularly every day; but how can any such sense be got out of *nāga*, unless it refers to the trumpeting of the royal elephants at some particular time

of the day? The S'āstradīpikā, Nyāyamālāvistara, and Jaiminīyasūtravṛitti ignore the expression altogether.

In Appai Dīkṣita's *Vidhirasāyaṇa*, page 22, we have an instance of the शंखन्याय as follows:—"उपलक्षणापायेऽप्युपलक्ष्यानपायस्य प्रतिदिनं शंखवेलायामागन्तव्यमित्यादौ प्रसिद्धत्वात्। न हि कालविशेषोपलक्षणतयोपात्ते शंखध्वनौ क्वचिद्दिवसे दैवादकृते सति तदुपलक्षितः कालो नास्तीति नावगम्यते." See also *Vidhiviveka*, page 7.

Compare the expression "Cockshut-time," in Shakespeare's *Richard* iii (Act V. Scene 3):—"Thomas the Earl of Surrey, and himself, Much about cock-shut time, from troop to troop. Went through the army, cheering up the soldiers." In Chambers' *Twentieth Century Dictionary* the expression is said to mean "Twilight; probably referring to the time when poultry are shut up." Webster's *International Dictionary* gives a different explanation.

शलभन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the moth*. The destruction of the silly moth by flying into a lighted lamp is a figure often met with in Sanskrit works; as for example in *S'is'upālavadha* ii. 117, *Kumārasambhava* iv. 40, *Rājataranginī* vii. 375, and Kāmandaki i. 43. According to Merutunga, however, the poor moth is moved with envy at the brilliance of the light, and so seeks to diminish it! He says (on page 211, at the bottom):—"उज्ज्वलगुणमभ्युदितं क्षुद्रो द्रष्टुं न कथमपि क्षमते। दग्ध्वा तनुमपि शलभो दीप्रं दीपार्चिषं हरति." "The mean man cannot anyhow endure to behold the exaltation of the man of radiant merit; the moth even burns its own body to extinguish the bright flame of the candle." (Tawney's translation, page 130).

शान्ते कर्मणि वेतालोदयः ॥

When the [prescribed] *ritual* [for the removal or prevention of evil] *is at an end, up comes a goblin!* This implies ultimate failure in spite of effort. It occurs in Citsukha Muni's comment on *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 16, as follows:—" ननु सोऽयं शान्ते कर्मणि वेतालोदयोऽभेदं साधयितुं प्रवृत्तेन भेदश्रुतेरुदाहृतत्वात्." In *Bhāmatī*, page 93, line 17, the nyāya is quoted as "शान्तिकर्मणि वेतालोदयः," which makes the goblin appear *during the performance* of the शान्ति, the rite to avert evil. So, too, in Maṇḍana-Mis'ra's *Vidhiviveka*, page 210. The purport, however, is the same as in the other case. In Ās'valāyana's *Gṛihyaṣūtra* 4. 6. 1, शान्तिकर्म is prescribed when a *guru* dies, or on the loss of a son or of cattle.

शाब्द्याकांक्षा शब्देनैव पूर्यते ॥

Verbal expectancy is satisfied [or fulfilled] *by words only.* This nyāya of Raghunātha's is very frequently met with. It occurs in the last chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 157 of Bib. Ind. and 177 of Jīvānanda's edn.) with पूर्यो as the last word; in *Vedāntakalpatauparimala*, page 680, line 7; in Vaidyanātha's comment on *Kāvyapradīpa* page 232 (in the erroneous form शाब्दा साकांक्षा); in Haridāsa's vṛitti on *Kusumānjali* iii. 15 (page 35), also in Rucidatta's commentary on the same portion (page 478); and, finally, in *Sāhityadarpaṇa* ii. 18 (with प्रपूर्यते).

In paragraph 70 of the *Tarkasangraha* we are told that there are three requisites to the intelligibility of a sentence, namely, expectancy (*ākānkṣā*), compatibility (*yogyatā*), and juxtaposition (*sannidhi*). In para 71, the first of these is thus explained:—" Expectancy means a word's incapacity to convey a complete meaning, this being occasioned by the

absence of another word [which, when it comes as expected, will complete the construction and the sense]." Then in para 72 we read:—"a collection of words devoid of expectancy &c., is no instrument of right knowledge; for example, 'cow, horse man, elephant,' gives no information, from the absence of expectancy'; [the words having no reference one to another, and not looking out for one another]." This is Dr. Ballantyne's translation, accompanying the text; and the same subject is explained by him in his lucid rendering of *Sāhityadarpaṇa* i. 6.

शाल्यादिविषयस्य मुशलादेः करणस्य श्यामाकेऽभिहतिर्भवति ॥

A blow with an instrument such as a pestle, directed towards the rice, falls instead on the s'yāmāka grain. Aiming at a pigeon and killing a crow. It occurs in *Nyāyavārtika*, page 46:—"कथं पुनरन्यविषयं करणमन्यविषयां क्रियां करोति । शाल्यादिविषयस्य मुशलादेः करणस्य श्यामाकेऽभिहतिर्भवति । नानियमादिति यद्विषयं करणं तद्विषया क्रियेति न नियमोऽस्ति । दृष्टा हि वृक्षादिविषयस्य छेदनस्यावयवक्रियेति । वृक्षश्छिद्यतेऽवयवे क्रियेति" ॥

शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि ॥

The fruit promised in Scripture [in connection with a sacrificial or other act] *is for the performer* [of that act]. These are the first words of Jaimini's sūtra 3. 7. 18. They are quoted as a nyāya in a passage of *Vedāntatattvaviveka*, for which see "मुनिर्मनुते, मूर्खो मुच्यते." It is cited by Vācaspati Mis'ra, also, in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 296, line 6 from bottom, and page 403, line 4, and in his *Bhāmatī*, pages 28 and 492. Also in *S'rībhāṣya* 2. 3. 33 (p. 1688), and 3. 4. 45 (p. 2028), where Dr. Thibaut renders it, "the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent." The first part of *Tattvamuktākalāpa* ii. 59 reads thus:—

"अन्यश्चेदन्यकर्मप्रजनितफलभुक् शास्त्रवैयाकुली स्यात् &c.," on which the author comments as follows:—"अन्यस्यान्यकृतकर्मफलभोगे शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरीति व्यवस्थाभङ्गाच्छास्त्रस्य व्याकुलता स्यात् &c." Compare Patanjali on Pāṇini 1. 3. 72.

शिबिकोद्यच्छन्नरवत् ॥

The simile of *men carrying a palanquin.* Used by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa to show how all the words in a sentence *unitedly* convey the sense of the latter. It occurs in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 397, line 12:—"यथा हि बाह्यानि करणानि काष्ठादीनि पाके व्याप्रियन्ते यथा च शिबिकाया उद्यन्तारः सर्वे शिबिकामुद्यच्छन्ति यथा त्रयोऽपि ग्रावाण उखां बिभ्रति तथा सर्वाण्येव पदानि वाक्यार्थमवबोधयन्ति." Again, on page 400, line 11 from bottom:—"शिबिकोद्यच्छन्नरवत्सर्वाणि पदानि कार्ये संहत्य व्याप्रियन्ते इत्येतदपि सत्यमेव." Cf. *Bṛihadārṇyavārtika*, 1. 4. 1600.

शिरोवेष्टनेन नासिकास्पर्शन्यायः ॥

The simile of *touching the nose by encircling the head* [with one's arm]. That is, putting the arm round the head instead of bringing it directly to the face. Raghunāthavarmā classes it with nyāyas expressive of a round-about way of doing things. It is quoted by Vijnānabhikṣu on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 37, in the form शिरोवेष्टनेनांगुल्या नासिकाप्रवेशवत्.

Raghunātha tells us that, by some, it is styled द्रविडप्राणायामन्याय, and in Molesworth's Marāṭhī Dictionary we find द्राविडप्राणायाम defined as "a circuitous or devious mode of speaking or acting, ambages, tortuous procedure." This is not the first time that this fine dictionary has come to our aid when the more-pretentious Sanskrit lexicons have failed us!

But we should like to know how the expression came to have the meaning here assigned to it. Doubtless hereby hangs a tale; can our Indian pandits throw light on it?

शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत् ॥

The simile of *the shining-forth of a thousand lamps standing in the midst of solid rock!* It occurs in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 28, near the end:—"किंचान्यत्प्रदीपवद्विज्ञानमवभासकान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वयमेव प्रथत इति ब्रुवताप्रमाणगम्यं विज्ञानमनवगन्तृकमित्युक्तं स्यात्। शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत्." Dr. Thibaut renders it thus:—"Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves."

शुष्केष्टिन्यायः ॥

The figure of *a sham-sacrifice*. That is, the performance of sacrificial ceremonies, by a pupil, with a view to his becoming proficient in them, without the offering of a real sacrifice. This is classed with भूमिरथिक in S'abara's bhāshya on Jaimini 9. 2. 13, and an extract from the passage will be found under that nyāya. The term शुष्केष्टि, as adopted in Marāṭhī, is thus explained by Molesworth:—"Dry exercise or blank practising; performance or doing, antecedently to the occasion, of a work or matter in which the performer is ignorant or inexpert (in order that the necessary knowledge or ability may be acquired in provision for occasions anticipated)."

श्रुतिबलीयस्त्वन्यायः ॥

See this explained under पाठक्रमन्याय.

श्वः कार्यमद्य कुर्वीत ॥

One should do to-day that which one intends to do tomorrow. "Boast not thyself of tomorrow; for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth." The verse containing this nyāya of Raghunātha's occurs three times in *S'āntiparva*, namely in chapters CLXXV, CCLXXVIII, and CCCXXIII of Calcutta edition. It reads as follows:—

श्वःकार्यमद्य कुर्वीत पूर्वाह्णे चापराह्णिकम् ।
न हि प्रतीक्षते मृत्युः कृतं वास्य न वा कृतम् ॥

It is quoted in the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 111, and Mr. Tawney (on page 68 of his translation) renders it thus:— "One should do to-day the duty of tomorrow, and in the forenoon the duty of the afternoon, for death will not consider whether one has done one's work or not."

Compare the following well-known story. "An old Rabbi was once asked by his pupil when he should fulfil a certain precept of the law, and the answer was 'The day before you die.' 'But,' said the disciple, 'I may die tomorrow.' 'Then,' said the master, 'do it to-day."

श्वपुच्छोन्नामनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the attempt to straighten a dog's tail.* An illustration of wasted effort. It occurs in the following verse of the *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 448:—

न चैष शक्यते कर्तुं नम्रो यत्नशतैरपि ।
को हि स्वेदशतेनापि श्वपुच्छं नामयिष्यति ॥

See also under अरण्यरोदनन्याय in the second Handful.

श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥

Like a milky preparation that has been licked by a dog. Used of something which has become impure and therefore unacceptable. It is found in the following verse of the last chapter of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"फलाभिसन्धेरुपघातकत्वमभिहितं भगवद्भिर्नीलकण्ठभारतीश्रीचरणैः।

अपि प्रयत्नसम्पन्नं कामेनोपहतं तपः ।
न तुष्टयै महेशस्य श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥"

Compare with this the nyāya "न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदृतौ धृतम्."

श्वा कर्णे वा पुच्छे वा छिन्ने श्वैव भवति नाश्वो न गर्दभः॥

A dog, when an ear or its tail has been cut off is still a dog, not a horse or a donkey! This is Patanjali's illustration of the vārtika एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत् (which see above) and is referred to by Nāges'a in his comment on Kaiyaṭa (under S'iva sūtra 2, vārtika 4), as the छिन्नपुच्छश्वदृष्टान्त. Compare also Nāgojībhaṭṭa's paribhāṣā xxxvii. Akin to this illustration is Kumārila's "न हि गोर्गडुनि जाते विषाणे वा भग्ने गोत्वं तिरोधीयते," which is found in *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 34, page 418; and "न हि केवलभोजी देवदत्तोऽन्यैः सह पंक्त्यां भुञ्जानोऽन्यत्वं प्रपद्यते," on page 617.

षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणन्यायः ॥

The rule as to *the use or omission of the Ṣoḍas'istotra* [at the Atirātra-sacrifice]. In very common use as an indication of option being allowable in regard to something. From the introduction to the third volume of Dr. Eggeling's translation of the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, we learn that "the distinctive feature of the Atirātra-sacrifice, as the name itself indicates, is an 'over-night' performance of chants and recitation...At the end of each round, libations are offered, followed by the inevitable potations of Soma-liquor...and the performance partook largely of the character of a regular nocturnal carousal." Then, as to the

S̤'oḍas'in, he says (page xviii)—"As regards the ceremonies preceding the night-performance, there is a difference of opinion among ritualists as to whether the S̤'oḍas'i-stotra is or is not a necessary element of the Atirātra...As'valāyana (5. 11. 1) refers incidentally to the S̤'oḍas'in, as part of the Atirātra, though it is not quite clear from the text of the sūtra whether it is meant to be a necessary or only an optional feature of that sacrifice." There can be little doubt, however, that the learned writers who use the nyāya, regard the use of the stotra as optional. For example, as illustrations of option in action, S'ankara, in his bhāṣya on sūtra 1. 1. 2 (page 37), and again on sūtra 2. 1. 27 (page 471), quotes the Vedic sentences "अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति" "नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति." Then at the close of 1. 4. 13, he says:—अपेक्षाभेदाच्च समानेऽपि मन्त्रे ज्योतिषो ग्रहणाग्रहणे। यथा समानेऽप्यतिरात्रे वचनभेदात्षोडशिनो ग्रहणाग्रहणे तद्वत्"; and in 3. 3. 2, "न हि षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणयोरातिरात्रो भिद्यते." In his comment on 3. 3. 26 (page 893, line 5 from bottom), Ānandagiri makes use of the expression "षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणवद्विकल्पे प्राप्ते," and repeats it three lines lower down. In *Vedāntakalpatarupārimala*, page 539 (line 7 from bottom), we read "षोडशिग्रहणन्यायेन विकल्पो भविष्यति," and on page 656 (line 4), षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणन्यायसञ्चारणे तथैव विरोधपरिहाराय विकल्पोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः." The optional character of the stotra is made use of by Laugākṣibhāskar also, in *Artha-sangraha*, page 24, from line 14 ; and by Nāges'abhaṭṭa in the *Pradīpoddyota* on Mahābhāṣya 1. 1. 44 (vārt. 7).

सकृद्गतिन्यायः ॥

This is Nāgojībhaṭṭa's shortened form of the paribhāṣā सकृद्गतौ विप्रतिषेधे यद्बाधितं तद्बाधितमेव, which Professor Kielhorn renders thus:—"When (two rules), while they apply (simultaneously), mutually prohibit each other, that which is once superseded is superseded altogether." This is illustrated by the following from ordinary life:—"यथा तुल्यबलयोरेकः प्रेष्यो भवति स तयोः पर्यायेण कार्यं

करोति यदा तमुभौ युगपत्प्रेषयतो नानादिक्षु च कार्ये तदोभयोर्न करोति यौगपद्यासंभवात्'' ॥ The paribhāṣā is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 56 (vārt. 25, 26, 27); 1. 4. 2 (vārt. 7); 6. 3. 42 (vārt. 5); 6. 3 139; 6. 4. 62 (vārt. 2); 7. 1. 26; 7. 1. 54; and 7. 1. 73. The illustration is met with in 1. 4. 2 (vārt. 5), and 6. 1. 85 (vārt. 3).

सत्रन्यायः ॥

The rule regarding *a sacrificial session*. For this kind of sacrifice, lasting several days, not less than seventeen sacrificers are absolutely necessary. But what if one of them should leave or die before the completion of the ceremony? In such a case he *must* be replaced by a substitute, or the whole thing becomes null and void. This, however, cannot be done when there is only one sacrificer engaged in a sacrifice. The nyāya is the subject of Jaimini 6. 3. 22. In sūtras 23 to 26 it is laid down that the substitute does not reap the benefit of the sacrifice,—but that it goes to the man whose place he has taken. It is very clear, from the above, that the mention of the सत्रन्याय on page 430, line 5 of *Vedāntakalpataru*, is wrong, and that the reference is really to the रात्रिसत्रन्याय which see above.

संदिग्धस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णयः ॥

The meaning of an ambiguous expression is to be determined from the context. In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 3. 14 there is a discussion as to the meaning of the 'small ether' of Chhāndogya Upaniṣad 8. 1. 1, and Ānandagiri makes the following comment on the closing part of it:—"समुच्चयेति । संदिग्धस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णय इति न्यायादादौ तस्मिन्यदन्तरिति तच्छब्दोऽनन्तरमप्याकाशमभिलंघ्य हृत्पुण्डरीकं परामृशति तत्र यदन्तराकाशं तदन्वेष्टव्यं विजिज्ञासितव्यं चेत्युपसंहरति." The nyāya is quoted again in his ṭikā on 3. 3. 52. It is taken from Jaimini's sūtra 1. 4. 29, "संदिग्धेषु वाक्यशेषात्," which is quoted and applied by the author of the *S'āstradīpikā*, in his

discussion, under 1. 3. 8, of such words as यव, वराह, पीलु and others, to which the Āryas attach one meaning and the Mlecchas another. We find it, too, in Kumārila's lengthy exposition of the same portion, in the words:—"संदिग्धेषु च सर्वेषु वाक्यशेषेण निर्णयम्" (page 148); and again under 3. 4. 36 (page 1003):—"संदिग्धं वाक्यशेषेण निर्णयमत्रधारितम् । विध्युद्देशेन निर्णीते किं तु शेषः करिष्यति." See also *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 34 (page 641).

समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः ॥

For this paribhāṣā, see under गर्गशतदण्डनन्याय.

संभवत्येकवाक्यत्वे वाक्यभेदश्च नेष्यते ॥

When a sentence can suitably be regarded as one, it is not right to divide it. This oft-quoted line of Kumārila's was directed against an older writer, named Bhavadāsa (so Pārthasārathi tells us), who proposed to divide Jaimini's sūtra 1. 1. 4 into two parts. The line is found in *S'lokavārtika*, page 135. It is quoted in *Bhāmatī* 1. 1. 28 (page 159), 1. 3. 13 (page 206), 1. 4. 3 (page 286), 1. 4. 16 (page 308), 3. 3. 57 (page 668), and 3. 4. 20 (page 678). In Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 2. 15, we read—"वक्तृभेदेऽप्येकवाक्यता साकांक्षत्वात्पूर्वोत्तरवाक्ययोरेकार्थत्वं वाक्यैक्यसंभवे तद्भेदस्यायोगादित्यर्थः," and, in the latter part of the bhāṣya on 1. 4. 3, S'ankara himself has a good deal to say on एकवाक्यता. Then Ānandagiri quotes the nyāya in his comment on 2. 3. 2 and 3. 3. 14. "A *vākyabheda*—split of the sentence–takes place according to the Mīmāṃsā when one and the same sentence contains two new statements which are different." (Dr. Thibaut's Translation of Sankara's bhāṣya, vol. i. page 177 note). See, too, Prof. Cowell's long note on page 68 of his Translation of S'āṇḍilya sūtras.

सम्भवे व्यभिचारे च स्याद्विशेषणमर्थवत् ॥

A qualifying word is of use when it is appropriate [that is, when it suits the विशेष्य], *and when* [without it] *a wrong meaning would be conveyed.*

The nyāya is quoted as above in the commentary on *Sankṣepas'ārīraka* i. 347 (The Paṇḍit, vol. v. page 676), and on page 401 of *Vidyāsāgarī* (a comment on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khādya*); whilst, on page 215 of the latter, it appears without स्यात्. There is another good example on p. 592.

I have traced it, however, as far back as Kumārila, but cannot say whether he was its author or not. In *Tantravārlika* 1. 3. 18 (=Jaimini 1. 3. 24.) there is a discussion (as a *pūrvapakṣa*) of the reasons assigned by Patanjali for the study of grammar. One of these is that, without a knowledge of grammar, the performance of the injunction "ब्राह्मणेन निष्कारणो धर्मः षडङ्गो वेदोऽध्येयः" would be impossible; on which the pūrvapakṣin says:—

"षडङ्गो वेद इत्युक्तं श्रुतिलिङ्गाद्यपेक्षया ।
तैः षड्भिः प्रविभक्तः सन्स हि कर्मविबोधनः ॥

ननु बाह्याङ्गानपेक्षत्वे वेदस्वरूपान्तर्गतश्रुत्याद्यपेक्षया विशेषणमनर्थकं प्रसज्यते । तथाहि ।

संभवव्यभिचाराभ्यां स्याद्विशेषणसंभवः ।
श्रुत्याद्यव्यभिचारात्तु तैरङ्गैः किं विशेष्यते" ॥

Dr. Gangānāth Jhā renders this (and the preceding clause) as follows :—

"We must explain the expression 'the Veda with its six subsidiary sciences' as referring to its constituent parts, in the following manner. The 'six subsidiaries' referred to must be taken to be the six means of interpretation—Direct Assertion &c.; as it is only when interpreted through these that the Veda becomes capable of rightly pointing out *Dharma*. An objec-

tion is here raised :—If the subsidiaries referred to be taken as those contained in the Veda itself (*i. e.* Direct Assertion, &c.), and not anything outside it (as grammar, Nirukta, &c.), then in that case the qualification *with the six subsidiaries* would be absolutely meaningless. Specially as we can have a qualification, only when such a one is possible, and when a qualification is actually needed for the purpose of setting aside certain incongruities (or contradictions); and as there is certainly no incongruity in the Veda with regard to Direct Assertion &c. what could be specified by a qualification of these subsidiaries ? [That is to say, Grammar not being invariably concomitant with the Veda, a qualification is needed in order to make it an object of study together with the Veda ; while Direct Assertion &c., are always contained in the Veda, and hence any qualification of these would be absolutely meaningless]." Page 281.

Another good example is furnished by Sures'vara in his vārtika on *Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya.* At the beginning of the second Brāhmaṇa of the sixth Chapter, referring to the prayer " अग्ने नय सुपथा राये &c.," at the end of the *seventh* chapter of the *āraṇyaka* (the *fifth* of the *Upaniṣad*), he says :—

"सप्तमावसितावुक्तं मार्गप्रार्थनमग्नितः ।
सुपथेति श्रुतं तत्र श्रुत्या मार्गविशेषणम् ॥ २ ॥
संभवे व्यभिचारे च विशेषणविशेष्ययोः
दृष्टं विशेषणं लोके यथेहापि तथेक्ष्यताम्" ॥ ३ ॥

Ānandagiri explains verse 3 as follows:—

"संभव इति । नीलमुत्पलमित्यत्र विशेषणविशेष्ययोः संभवे विशेषणं विना विशेष्यस्य व्यभिचारे प्रसक्ते नीलमिति विशेषणमर्थवद्दृष्टम् । तथा सुपथा नयेत्यत्रापि व्यभिचारसंभवे विशेषणमर्थवज्ज्ञेयमित्यर्थः" ॥ ३ ॥

The fourth verse of the vārtika still further elucidates it:—

"सुपथेति ततो युक्तं संभवे भूयसां पथाम् ।
विशेषणमतो वाच्याः पन्थानः कर्महेतवः" ॥ ४ ॥

सर्वं बलवतः पथ्यम् ॥

Everything is suitable [or proper] *for the strong.* "Might is right." In other words, a strong man may be lawless with impunity; or, to quote Prof. Gangānātha Jhā's explanation of it, "for a pious man all actions are equally lawful." This is quite in accord with the teaching of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* x. 33. 30, 31:—

"धर्मव्यतिक्रमो दृष्ट ईश्वराणां च साहसम् ।
तेजीयसां न दोषाय वह्नेः सर्वभुजो यथा ॥
नैतत्समाचरेज्जातु मनसापि ह्यनीश्वरः ।
विनश्यत्याचरन्मौढ्याद्यथारुद्रोऽब्धिजं विषम्" ॥

Kumārila quotes the nyāya (in *Tantravārtika*, page 134, line 14) in the course of a long explanation of the evil doings attributed to certain holy personages; but, in order to discourage persons of less piety from imitating them, adds:—"मन्दतपसां गजैरिव महावटकाष्ठादिभक्षणमात्मविनाशायैव स्यात्."

In the opening part of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, Vācaspati Mis'ra reproduces Kumārila's warning in the following words:—"तपःप्रभाव एव हि तादृशस्तेषां यत एवंविधाः पाप्मानो विलीयन्त इति । न चास्मदादीनां मन्दतपसामयं प्रसंगः । न हि गजानामुदर्य्यं तेजो वटकाष्ठमशितं पचतीत्यस्मदादीनामप्युदर्य्येण तेजसा तथा भवितव्यम्."

सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययमेकं कर्म ॥

All the different schools of a Veda acknowledge one and the same sacrificial action. The followers of the Mīmāmsā evidently regard this as an important point, for Jaimini devotes 25 sūtras, *viz.* 2. 4. 8-32, to the discussion of it. Kunte's remarks on the bearings of the question, in his *Ṣaḍdars'anacintanikā*, are worthy of perusal. The nyāya is frequently quoted in the philosophical works. Instances of it will be found in *Tantra-*

vārtika, page 84, line 7; in *Pancapādikāvivaraṇa*, page 167, line 3 from bottom; in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 256, line 16; in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 169, line 17; and in *Srībhāṣya* 3. 3. 53. Raghunāthavarman makes use of the nyāya but does not include it in his numbered list.

साकमेधीयन्यायः ॥

The law *relating to the Sākamedha offerings.* This is the topic of Jaimini 5. 1. 19-22. The group of offerings called *Sākam-edhāḥ* form the third of the three seasonal, or four-monthly (cāturmāsya), sacrifices which are performed at the *parvans* (or commencement of the spring, rainy, and autumn seasons), and which, in this case, last for two days; three of the group (consisting of seven) being offered on the first day, and the remainder on the second day. An objector urges that two days are required for each of the group, but this is set aside, and the ruling is as above. For a full description of these four-monthly sacrifices, see Dr. Eggeling's translation of the *S'ata-patha-Brāhmaṇa*, vol. i. pages 383 and 408.

साक्षः पुरुषः परेण चेन्नीयते नूनमक्षिभ्यां न पश्यति ॥

If a man with eyes is led by somebody else, it is clear that he does not see with his eyes! This is found in S'abara on Jaimini 1. 2. 31 and is used by an objector to illustrate his argument that it is not necessary to understand the meaning of Vedic sentences employed in sacrificial rites, since the way in which they are to be used is clearly laid down in works prepared for the purpose. The illustration is quoted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 286, line 12.

सामान्यविधिरस्पष्टः ॥

An injunction in general terms is indefinite. It appears as a nyāya in the second part of the *Laukikanyāyaratnākara* (I. O. MS, page 319 *a*), where Raghunāth applies it thus:— "लोके कंचिद्देशं जिगमिषुं प्रति तत्रत्यानि वस्तून्यानेयानीति सामान्यतो विधायेदमानेयमिदमानेयमिति स्पष्टीक्रियते." It is doubtless derived from the following verse in *Tantravārtika* 3. 4. 47 (page 1020):—

"सामान्यविधिरस्पष्टः संह्रियेत विशेषतः ।
स्पष्टस्य तु विधेर्नान्यैरुपसंहारसंभवः" ॥

The verse is cited in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala* (page 253), where the second line reads "स्पष्टस्य तु विधेर्नैवमुपसंहार इष्यते," and the first line is quoted by the author of the *Nyāyasudhā* in his comment on *Tantravārtika* 1. 2. 42 which defines the term परिसंख्या ('limitation,' or 'exclusive specification,' as Dr. Thibaut and M. M. Kunte respectively render it).

The lack of definiteness in general statements is alluded to by S'abara, also, on Jaimini 10. 8. 16, where he says "न हि सामान्यवाची शब्दो विशेषानभिवदति," but Kumārila points out (on page 1027) that the विशेष requires the सामान्य. He says:—"न तु निःसामान्यः कश्चिद्विशेष उपपद्यते । ततश्च वृक्षमानयेत्युक्ते शिंशपामित्यविरोधात्पश्चादुच्यमानं न विरुध्यते."

सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशो बलीयान् ॥

That [injunction] *which leaves no room* [for others] *is stronger than one which does.* For example, an injunction directing animal sacrifice ["अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत"] and which leaves no room for option, overpowers the more general one forbidding the taking of life ["न हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानि"]. In this way one Smṛiti may prevail over another. The nyāya is found in Raghunātha's list, and is applied by him as follows:—

"न चानुभवेन श्रुतेर्बाधः शक्यः श्रुतेर्निरवकाशत्वात् । निरवकाशस्य च सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशो बलीयानिति न्यायाद्बाधकत्वोपपत्तेः"॥ A reference to *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 1 will fully explain the two terms of this expression. In his comment on it Ānandagiri quotes the nyāya twice, and again under 2. 1. 4, 6, and 13. In immediate connection with the first of the five, Ānandagiri quotes also the nyāya "सापेक्षनिरपेक्षयोर्निरपेक्षस्य बलवत्त्वम्," and the two occur together in the following verses of Yāmunācārya's *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, page 63:—"सापेक्षनिरपेक्षत्वे न हि बाधस्य कारणम् । शुक्तौ रजतबोधस्य निरपेक्षस्य बाधकम् ॥ नेदं रजतविज्ञानं तत्सापेक्षमपीष्यते । सेयं ज्वालेति संवित्तेस्तैलवर्तिविनाशजा ॥ अनुमा बाधिका दृष्टा सापेक्षाप्यक्षजन्मनः । अतो निरवकाशेन सावकाशं निषिध्यते"॥ See also Citsukha Muni on *Nyāyamakaranda*, pages 7 and 148; and "सापेक्षमसमर्थं भवति" in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 1. 69 (vārt. 6) and *Syādvādamanjarī*, page 19.

सिंहस्यैकपदं यथा ॥

Like a lion's first step. This obscure nyāya occurs in Merutunga's work, page 278:—"विचार्याविचार्य वा कृतप्रयाणोऽयं महानरेन्द्रश्चालितः । सिंहस्यैकपदं यथेति न्यायाच्चलित एव राजते." Mr. Tawney renders it thus (on page 174):—"Whether with due consideration or not, this great king has been set in motion, and has started on his expedition; on the principle of the lion's first step, he cuts a good figure on the march." Does the illustration mean that a lion in motion presents a finer appearance than one at rest?

सिकताकूपवत् ॥

The simile of *a well* [dug] *in sandy soil* [the sides of which are incessantly falling in]. Used of an argument that will not hold water. It is found in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 32:—"किं बहुना सर्वप्रकारेण यथा यथायं वैनाशिकसमय उपपत्तिमत्त्वाय परीक्ष्यते तथा तथा सिकताकूपवद्विदीर्यत एव । न कांचिदत्रोपपत्तिं पश्यामः" ॥

सिकतातैलन्यायः ॥

The figure of *oil from sand.* A non-entity like a hare's horn. The following is from Bhartṛihari's *Nītis'ataka* (verse 5):—

"लभेत सिकतासु तैलमपि यत्नतः पीडयन्
पिबेच्च मृगतृष्णिकासु सलिलं पिपासार्दितः ।
कदाचिदपि पर्यटञ्छशविषाणमासादये-
न्न तु प्रतिनिविष्टमूर्खजनचित्तमाराधयेत्" ॥

In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 16, we read:—"यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्तते न तत्तत उत्पद्यते यथा सिकताभ्यस्तैलम्." Compare with this, *Yogavāsiṣṭha* 2. 5. 23, "न यत्नेनापि महता प्राप्यते रत्नमश्मतः", where तैलमश्मतः is given as a variant. American rock-oil was not known in those days! There are two good examples of this illustration in *Nyāyamanjarī*. On page 493, line 1:—तैलार्थी हि तिलसर्षपानुपादत्ते न सिकताः । असत्त्वे च तैलस्य को विशेषः सर्षपाणां सिकताभ्यः" ॥ On page 494:—"तैलार्थी सिकताः कश्चिदाददानो न दृश्यते। अदृष्ट्वा चाद्य नान्योऽपि तदर्थी तासु धावति."

Compare also *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* viii. 152:—

"व्याहार्षीन्मुनिरप्येवं प्रसीद मृगलोचने ।
अस्मासु भवति द्रव्यं किं तैलं वालुकास्विव" ॥

सूक्तवाकन्यायः ॥

The law as to *the Sūktavāka* [or song of praise]. This is the topic of Jaimini 3. 2. 15-18, and immediately follows the *Prastara-praharaṇanyāya* with which it is closely connected. Both form a part of the New and Full Moon sacrifices in connection with which there is the direction "सूक्तवाकेन प्रस्तरं प्रहरति." The question then arises as to whether the whole of the mantras which comprise the Sūktavāka are to be repeated on each of the two occasions, or only a part. S'abara's argument is thus paraphrased by Kunte:—"Though the Veda mentions positively

that certain mantras are to be used in certain sacrifices, yet they are not to be so used blindly. The mantra which serves some purpose of a sacrifice is to be used. Though the Veda prescribes the use of the whole mantra, yet it is not to be obstinately maintained that the whole is to be recited. A whole mantra like the Sūktavāka, or a part only, is to be recited according as it is necessary. This is to be ascertained by the sacrificer himself. Hence it cannot be said that the whole Sūktavāka is to be recited on the occasion either of the new or of the full moon day." Again :—"That portion of the Sūktavāka which is recited at the new or full moon sacrifice is the whole of it in reference to the sacrifice itself; because the Veda never prescribes a certain text as constituting the Sūktavāka, and because the Veda simply states that the Sūktavāka, is to be recited... The Sūktavāka is not one text only, but is composed of different texts. The principal god connected with a sacrifice is mentioned in the middle of the Sūktavāka, while something connected with the sacrifice to be performed is described at its beginning and end......All that is sought is the accomplishment of the new or full moon sacrifice. Hence there is no necessity for discussing whether the whole Sūktavāka or a portion of it is to be recited; because whatever mantras are sufficient to accomplish a sacrifice constitute the whole Sūktavāka so far as the sacrifice is concerned."

सूत्रबद्धशकुनिन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a bird tied by a cord*. It is found in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* 6. 8. 2, namely :—"स यथा शकुनिः सूत्रेण प्रबद्धो दिशं दिशं पतित्वान्यत्रायतनमलब्ध्वा बन्धनमेवोपश्रयत एवमेव खलु सोम्य तन्मनो दिशं दिशं पतित्वान्यत्रायतनमलब्ध्वा प्राणमेवोपश्रयते प्राणबन्धनं हि सोम्य मन इति."

Vidyāraṇya versified the above in his *Anubhūtiprakās'a* (iii. 81) and *Pancadas'ī.* (xi. 47) respectively as follows:—

"शकुनिः सूत्रबद्धो यः स गच्छन्विविधा दिशः ।
अलब्ध्वाधारमाकाशे बन्धनस्थानमाव्रजेत्" ॥

"शकुनिः सूत्रबद्धः सन्दिक्षु व्यापृत्य विश्रमम् ।
अलब्ध्वा बन्धनस्थानं हस्तस्तम्भाद्युपाश्रयेत्" ॥

I have omitted, in each case, a second verse relating to the *dārṣṭāntika.*

सूत्रशाटिकान्यायः ॥

The simile of *the thread* [about to be woven into a] *garment* [and already regarded as a garment]. Raghunātha explains it thus:—"यत्र तु भाविसंज्ञया निर्देशो यथा नारुद्रो वसेत्काश्या-
मित्यत्र तत्र सूत्रशाटिकान्यायावतारः । सूत्रस्य शाटिकां वापयतीत्यत्र यथा
सूत्रावस्थायां भाविन्या शाटिकेतिसंज्ञया निर्देशस्तथा दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपीति बोध्यम्."

It is no doubt derived from the following passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 3. 12 (vārtika 2):—"आत्मनेपदेषु चापि नेतरेतराश्रयं
भवति । कथम् । भाविनी संज्ञा विज्ञास्यते सूत्रशाटकवत् । तद्यथा । कश्चित्कं-
चित्तन्तुवायमाह अस्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वयेति । स पश्यति यदि शाटको न वात-
व्योऽथ वातव्यो न शाटकः शाटको वातव्यश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । भाविनी खल्व-
स्य संज्ञाभिप्रेता स मन्ये वातव्यो यस्मिन्नुते शाटक इत्येतद्भवतीति." This is repeated in 2. 1. 51 (vārtika 4). Kumārila employs the illustration in *Tantravārtika* 3. 7. 33 (page 1145):—"यथैवास्य
सूत्रस्य शाटकं वयेत्युक्ते वानेन शाटकः क्रियत इति हि भाविसंज्ञाविज्ञानादवि-
रोधो विज्ञायते तथैवात्र प्रत्येतव्यम्."

Light is thrown upon this by the following extract from Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyāya*, ii. 127. The sūtra so numbered is "सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्य &c." "Though its meaning be not so and so, it is figuratively so employed in the case of a Brāhman, a scaffold, a mat......in consideration of association,

place, design......'Though it be not so and so,' *i. e.*, though such be not the direct meaning of the word, it is figuratively employed; for example, the word 'staff' &c., is employed for a Brāhman &c., because of association......In like manner...... from the 'design' (*tādarthya*), 'He makes a mat' (kaṭa) implies his aiming after a mat; for the mat, inasmuch as it is a thing non-existent [*until* made] can have [at the time when one is spoken of as making it] no maker."

Again, under sūtra 4. 1. 50 [बुद्धिसिद्धं तु तदसत्], the author of the vṛitti says (as interpretted by Dr. Ballantyne):—"The weaver sets himself to work, having considered, that, 'In these threads [*i. e.*, constituted by these threads] there *will be* a web,' but not with the understanding that 'there *is* a web'; for, if *that* were the case, then, the product being supposed extant, there would be no setting one's self to work, because desire [precluded by possession] would be absent." See also a passage in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, page 254, beginning at line 14; and *Sānkhyatattvakaumudī* on karikā 9, pages 52, 53.

सोपानत्के पादे द्वितीयामुपानहमशक्यत्वान्नोपादत्ते ॥

A man does not [attempt to] *put a second shoe on a foot already shod, for it would be an impossibility.* This is found in the bhāṣya on Jaimini 1. 2. 33, where the *pūrvapakshin* objects to certain Vedic texts as unnecessarily setting forth things already known.

स्थावरजङ्गमविषन्यायः ॥

The simile of *vegetable* [or mineral] *poison and animal poison* [जङ्गमविष]. An illustration of one thing being counteracted by another. In his smaller work Raghunāthavarman places this amongst the purely grammatical nyāyas, immediately after the

पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वन्याय, and describes it as follows:—"स्थावरजङ्गम-विषन्यायश्चेह बोध्यः । रजतादिज्ञानतद्बाधज्ञानयोः सर्पवत्सनाभादिरूपजङ्गम-स्थावरविषयोश्चोत्तरेण पूर्वबाधः प्रसिद्धो यथा तथा प्रकृतेऽपि" ॥ In the larger work, it stands amongst miscellaneous nyāyas near the end of the *uttarabhāga*, and is numbered 242. I extract from it the following:—"स्थावरेण वत्सनाभादिविषेण जङ्गमस्य सर्पविषादेर्बाधो जङ्गमेन च स्थावरस्येति प्रसिद्धम् । सामान्येन परस्परबाध्यबाधकभावविवक्षायां सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायविषयेऽस्य प्रवृत्तिः । पूर्वं निवर्त्यान्यस्य स्वयमेव निवृत्तौ विवक्षितायां दग्धेन्धनवह्निन्यायविषयेऽस्यावतरणम् । परेण पूर्वबाधमात्रविवक्षायां पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वन्यायस्येति बोध्यम् । अपच्छेदन्यायस्त्वस्पष्टमुदाहरणमुभयत्रा-नियतपूर्वापरीभावेनानियतबाध्यबाधकभावात्" ॥

An example of animal poison proving an antidote to the other kind is found in *Ādiparva*, chap. cxxviii (Calc.). The wicked Duryodhana mixed some *kālakūṭaka* in Bhima's food and, when he had eaten it and become unconscious, threw him into the water. The story then continues thus:—"स निःसंज्ञो जलस्यान्तमथ वै पाण्डवोऽविशत् । आक्रामन्नागभवने तदा नागकुमारकान् ॥ ततः समेत्य बहुभिस्तदा नागैर्महाविषैः । अदश्यत भृशं भीमो महादंष्ट्रैर्विषोल्बणैः ॥ ततोऽस्य दश्यमानस्य तद्विषं कालकूटकम् । हतं सर्पविषेणैव स्थावरं जङ्गमेन तु"॥ Compare the विषनाशकविषन्याय in *Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tattvamuktākalāpa* ii. 53.

स्वाङ्गुलिज्वालया परं दिधक्षुः स परं दहेद्वा न वा स्वाङ्गुलिदाहमनुभवति ॥

A man who tries to burn his enemy by setting fire to his own fingers, may or may not burn the enemy but certainly burns his own fingers! It occurs in *Nyāyavārtika* 2. 1. 12 in reference to a person who denies the validity of Proof. Sūtras 8 and 12, as translated by Dr. Ballantyne, are as follows:—"[Perhaps some one will say] the nature of a Proof

does not belong to sense &c., for it cannot be so at any of the three times [into which Time is divided]." "[If there be no such thing as Proof] because [forsooth] nothing can be such at any of the three times, then the objection itself cannot be established." On this the author of the vārtika says:—"यत्खलु त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न साधकं तदसाधनमिति ब्रुवता प्रतिषेधस्यासाधकत्वं स्ववाचैवाभ्युपगतं भवति । यथा कश्चित्स्वाङ्गुलिज्वालया परं दिधक्षुः स च परं दहेद्वा न वा स्वाङ्गुलिदाहमनुभवति."

स्वेदजनिमित्तेन शाटकत्यागन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *throwing away a garment because of a louse in it!* It occurs in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā* (page 160 line 10):—"यतोऽहमनन्तापत्यापि दुर्जनचक्षुर्दोषभयादविवेकादिभिर्मत्रिभिर्वन्ध्येति प्रख्यापिता लोके ममैवापत्यान्यन्यजनापत्यतया गीयन्ते । सोऽयं स्वेदजनिमित्तेन शाटकत्यागन्यायः" ॥ Compare Raghunātha's यूकाभिया कन्थात्यागन्यायः ॥

हिरण्यनिधिदृष्टान्तः ॥

The illustration afforded by *buried treasure* [over which men may walk again and again, unconscious of its existence]. It is found in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* 8. 3. 2 as follows:— "यथापि हिरण्यनिधिं निहितमक्षेत्रज्ञा उपर्युपरि सञ्चरन्तो न विन्देयुरेवमेवेमाः सर्वाः प्रजा अहरहर्गच्छत्य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्त्यनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः" ॥

Sures'varācārya makes use of it in *Sambandhavārtika*, verses 294 and 295:—

"कुतस्तज्ज्ञानमिति चेत्तद्धि बन्धपरिक्षयात् ।
असावपि च भूतो वा भावी वा वर्ततेऽथवा ॥
अधीतवेदवेदार्थोऽप्यत एव न मुच्यते ।
हिरण्यनिधिदृष्टान्तादिदमेव च दर्शितम्" ॥

The translator of the vārtika, Mr. S. Venkaṭaramaṇa Aiyar, gives "the illustration of the golden mine," as the rendering of the nyāya in verse 295; and adds in a footnote, "people, other than professional detectives of mines, will not discover a rich mine of gold hidden deep beneath the surface of the earth"; but I think that my rendering is more in accord with S'ankarācārya's interpretation of it in the Vedic passage. He says :—

"हिरण्यनिधिं हिरण्यमेव पुनर्ग्रहणाय निधातृभिर्निधीयत इति निधिस्तं हिरण्यनिधिं निहितं भूमेरधस्तान्निक्षिप्तम्" ॥

There is no thought here of a *mine,* but of treasure buried in the ground with a view to its being taken up again on a future occasion.

The two verses from the *Vārtika* reappear as *Pancadas'ī* ix. 39, 40, preceded by the following:—

"पुनःपुनर्विचारेऽपि त्रिविधप्रतिबन्धतः।
न वेत्ति तत्त्वमित्येतद्वार्तिके सम्यगीरितम्" ॥

ALPHABETICAL LIST

OF

NYĀYAS EXPLAINED IN PARTS I, II & III.

The Nyāyas being arranged in alphabetical order
in each handful, it is not necessary
to quote the pages.

LIST OF NYĀYAS.

- **सूक्तिकुसुमाञ्जलिः** । (Flowers of Dictums) डॉ॰ हरिकृष्ण शास्त्री दातार कृत हिन्दी-आंग्लानुवाद सहित ।
- **सूक्तिमुक्तावली** । पं॰ माधवशास्त्री दातार । हिन्दी टीकाकार— श्रीहरिकृणशास्त्री दातार
- **सूक्तिमञ्जरी** । हिन्दी टीका सहित । आचार्य बलदेव उपाध्याय
- **सुभाषितरत्नभाण्डागारम्** । (सुभाषित ग्रन्थों से संग्रहीत) । श्रीनारायणराम आचार्य
- **शार्ङ्गधरपद्धतिः** । (सुभाषितसंग्रह) । श्रीशार्ङधरविद्वत्संकलित । डॉ. पीटर पीटर्सन
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